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Evaluations of John Howard Yoder’s legacy have proliferated since his death in 
1997. Although there is much disagreement, a broad consensus is forming that his 
theology was, on the one hand, focused on the social and political meaning of the 
New Testament accounts of Jesus Christ and, on the other hand, sociologically 
reductive, hermeneutically tendentious, and ecclesiologically ambiguous. This thesis 
proposes a revision of Yoder’s theology that maintains its broadly sociological 
emphasis but corrects for its apparent problems. In specific, adjustments are made to 
his social theory to open it to spiritual reality, to hone its analytical approach, and to 
clarify its political import. To do so his preferred framework for social criticism, the 
theology of the principalities and powers, is examined in the context of his wider 
work and its critics, and then synthesized with concepts from Pierre Bourdieu’s 
influential reflexive sociology.  
Yoder maintains that the powers, understood as social structures, are part of God’s 
good creation, fallen, and now being redeemed through their subjection to the risen 
Lord Christ. Bourdieu’s fundamental sociological concepts--habitus, capital, and 
field--enable an interpretation of the powers as dynamically constituted by their 
relations to the triune God and to personal dispositions. His treatment of social 
reproduction and freedom furthermore facilitate a construal of choice as a divinely 
gifted, sociologically mediated freedom for obedience to God. The sinful restriction 
of this freedom is read in light of Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence, which 
recognizes the ambiguity of violence without thereby identifying any form of killing 
as nonviolent. Violence and other phenomena can be investigated by a reflexive, 
dialogical, and empirically rigorous comparison with the life of Christ. The church’s 
spiritual participation in the redemption of the violent powers is conceptualized in 
Bourdieusian terms as a critical legitimation of other political and cultural fields 
made possible through autonomy from those fields. Christian social distinctiveness 
moreover has universal meaning because it is oriented towards the worship of God 
and so radically welcoming of others; and this sociological universality is distinctive 
because it is the result of a particular history of social struggles with and for God. 
These revisions to Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers produce a 
sociological theology that is material and spiritual, critical and dialogical, 
and particular and universal. By incorporating these revisions, Yoder’s work can 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Glen Stassen tells a story about the time he approached John Howard Yoder after a 
session at the Society of Christian Ethics. Noting that many of the papers bore the 
mark of his friend’s thought, Stassen said, “Your influence is really spreading.” 
Yoder’s simple response: “Not mine. Jesus’.”1 
Whatever one thinks about the accuracy, not to mention the humility, of this 
response, there is little doubt that Yoder’s Jesus-centered writings have gained a wide 
readership. Since 1999, four monographs, four special journal issues, and six 
collections of essays have focused on his life and thought,2 and there is a steady 
market for new collections of his journal articles and unpublished writings.3 Needless 
to say, the proliferation of commentary about Yoder has not led to a unified 
assessment of his legacy, and many dispute the identification of his influence with 
Jesus’. The present thesis is an attempt to grapple with Yoder’s critics in order to 
decide how to move forward with a revised “Yoderian” theology. How that revision 
is accomplished is described in the remainder of this introduction, which is divided 
into three parts: (1) an overview of the current state of Yoder scholarship and this 
thesis’ place within it; (2) an argument that Yoder’s theology can profitably read as a 
“sociological theology” that exhibits reductive tendencies, but which can be revised 
to be non-reductive; and (3) an outline and justification of the proposed method of 
                                                 
1 This story is told in Peter Steinfels, “John H. Yoder, Theologian at Notre Dame, is Dead at 70,” The 
New York Times (January 7, 1998). The phrasing used above differs slightly from the published 
account, as I am following an amended version Stassen distributed to a seminar at Fuller Seminary in 
the fall of 2005. 
2 Bergen and Siegrist, eds., Powers and Practices; Carter, Politics of the Cross; Dula and Huebner, 
New Yoder; Hauerwas et al., eds., Wisdom of the Cross; Nation, John Howard Yoder; Nugent, ed., 
Radical Ecumenicity; Ollenberger and Koontz, eds., Mind Patient and Untamed; Sider, To See History 
Doxologically; Somer, ed., La sagesse de la croix; Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus. Additionally, see 
Bourne, Seek the Peace of the City; Doerksen, Beyond Suspicion; Park, Missional Ecclesiologies in 
Creative Tension; Shaffer, Moral Memoranda from John Howard Yoder. The journal issues are Epp, 
ed., “John Howard Yoder,” special issue, Conrad Grebel Review; Holland, ed., “The Jewish-Christian 
Schism Revisited and Re-Imagined: Reflections on the Work of John Howard Yoder,” special issue, 
CrossCurrents; Roth, ed., special issue, Mennonite Quarterly Review; Snyder, ed., “John Howard 
Yoder as Historian,” special issue, Conrad Grebel Review. 
3 In addition to ARS, JCSR, NV, THW, and WL, see Yoder’s essays in Martens and Howell, eds., John 
Howard Yoder; Vogt, ed., Roots of Concern; Vogt, ed., Concern for Education; Nugent, ed., Radical 
Ecumenicity. New editions of CA, DPR, KB (with previously unpublished essays), OR, and Preface 
have been released, and PWK gathers his published writings on epistemology and method. See also 
Yoder’s online archive of unpublished writings, UNDA. 
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revision, which involves putting Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers 
into conversation with the reflexive sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. 
 
1. The Many Yoders and Yoder’s Many Readers 
John Howard Yoder (1927-1997) was an American Mennonite theologian whose 
work centered on the church’s mandate to imitate the nonviolent politics of Jesus. 
Though most of his life was spent in America, he began his career in Europe while 
enrolled as a doctoral student at the University of Basel in the 1950s.4 Drawn to 
questions about the relation of church and state, he organized discussions between 
the Historic Peace Churches and the established European churches for the World 
Council of Churches.5 Many of his early publications emerged from these 
ecumenical discussions.6 He was simultaneously involved in a publishing venture, 
the Concern journal, with a few other young American Mennonites who were also 
based in Europe. Yoder’s ecumenical papers and his essays in Concern were focused 
on the correlation between the life of Jesus and the life of the church. They were, in 
other words, exercises in Christian ethics. For his doctoral dissertation, however, he 
chose a historical topic: the dialogues between the early Swiss Anabaptists and the 
Reformers.7 This choice was necessitated by the resistance Yoder encountered among 
the European professoriate to work in Anabaptist theology.8 Researching as a 
historian, he surmised, would allow him to investigate his theological preoccupations 
without causing controversy.  
By the late 1960s, Yoder had published his dissertation (and some of its 
findings in historical journals), essays in Concern, much of his ecumenical material, 
and a translation of Hendrik Berkhof’s Christ and the Powers. The main critical 
response, in print at least, was directed towards his dissertation.9 Historians accused 
Yoder of distorting the evidence to serve a romanticized vision of Anabaptist origins. 
Some of these historians were from rival Reformation or secular historiographical 
                                                 
4 Nation, John Howard Yoder, 16-21; Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 70-100. 
5 Ibid. and Durnbaugh, “John Howard Yoder’s Role in ‘The Lordship of Christ over Church and State’ 
Conferences.” 
6 Yoder, CWS; DPR; Karl Barth; “Reinhold Niebuhr.” 
7 Yoder, ARS.  
8 Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 140-141. 
9 Criticisms of Yoder’s historiography, as well as of his general hermeneutic, are detailed in chapters 
three and four below. 
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traditions, but some were other Anabaptists concerned that Yoder’s reconstruction 
unfairly limited the heterogeneity of their common beginnings. This fear that his 
theological preferences served as ideological blinders to historical reality would 
follow Yoder throughout his career and, indeed, beyond the grave. Although Yoder’s 
historiography has many defenders, and many of his central findings remain 
plausible, there are serious questions about his methodological approach to scripture 
and church history. 
Yoder did not engage in original historical research again after completing his 
dissertation, and his attention turned fully to theological ethics. His reputation, too, 
was made as an ethicist with the publication of The Politics of Jesus in 1972.10 That 
book presented a powerful reading of the New Testament as a summons to the 
church to Jesus’ radical nonviolent politics. The Politics of Jesus was, and is, widely 
read.11 Along with other of Yoder’s writings, it helped galvanize an emergent 
“evangelical left” that combined a focus on scripture and the church with social 
justice activism.12 Furthermore, it propelled Yoder to the forefront of Anabaptist 
theology for the remainder of his career.13 Given the predominance, at the time, of 
the Niebuhr brothers in American theological ethics, many readers regarded Yoder’s 
pacifistic ecclesiology as an invitation to sectarian withdrawal from political 
activity.14 If Christians cannot participate in state violence, the critics argued, they 
must abdicate any claim to political influence. Yoder and his growing number of 
advocates insisted that the Niebuhrians illegitimately restricted the definition of 
politics so that a community dedicated to following Jesus could only be considered 
                                                 
10 Such is the judgment of, for instance, Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making, 463. 
11 See Nation, John Howard Yoder, xvi; Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 23. 
12 Yoder’s impact was felt especially by the Sojourners community and the Mennonite Central 
Committee’s Washington Office. Cf. Cartwright, “Radical Catholicity,” 44 and Graber Miller, Wise as 
Serpents, 175. On the term “evangelical left,” see Hunter, To Change the World, 136-138. Hunter sees 
Yoder as a “neo-Anabaptist” separatist (165), underplaying his ties to Jim Wallis and the other 
evangelical left figures he discusses (150). 
13 Gordon Kaufmann is the other 20th-century Mennonite theologian with a broad ecumenical 
audience. But “Kaufman does not identify his basic standpoint as Anabaptist” and “challenges all 
attempts to theologize within any past perspective” (Finger, Contemporary Anabaptist Theology, 73). 
For comparison of Yoder and Kaufman, see Friesen, Artists, Citizens, Philosophers, 65-69, and 
Stoltzfus, “Nonviolent Jesus,” 38-41. 
14 Criticisms of Yoder’s sectarianism are discussed in chapters five and six below. In Social Ethics in 
the Making, Dorrien presents Reinhold Niebuhr as the major figure in American Christian ethics. 
Although he acknowledges that Niebuhr’s influenced had waned by the 1960s, he views the 
liberationist ethics that soon became dominant as proper extensions of Niebuhrian realism (271, 447). 
On H. Richard Niebuhr’s legacy, see Werpehowski, American Protestant Ethics.  
   4 
sectarian and apolitical. By contrast, the New Testament portrays Jesus as a political 
martyr and the church as an alternative political community based on his politics. To 
a certain extent, Yoder won the day. His friend and disciple Stanley Hauerwas, the 
Methodist theologian, put his rhetorical and philosophical gifts behind Yoder’s 
project and made it, arguably, one of the leading options in theological ethics.15 
Nevertheless, the chorus of voices clamoring for a more robust and engaged political 
vision has not quieted. There are many, even among Yoder’s own followers, who 
believe that he unnecessarily limited the scope of Christian political participation and 
underplayed the significance of the common ethical resources shared by church and 
world.  
The editors of a recent collection of essays entitled The New Yoder begin their 
history of Yoder’s reception at this point. “Old Yoder” scholarship, they contend, was 
concerned with defending or impugning his pacifism and alleged sectarianism.16 In 
the intellectual environment in which Yoder’s work was first encountered, 
particularity and difference were frowned upon. After the postmodern revolution, 
however, those vices became virtues.17 Important philosophers from various quarters 
have begun to sound much more like Yoder in their appreciation of historicity, their 
suspicion of liberal orthodoxy, and their prioritization of dialogue. Now the emphasis 
shifts from defending Yoder to using him to explore perennial philosophical issues 
alongside likeminded postmodern travelers. The editors of The New Yoder 
acknowledge Stanley Hauerwas’s influence here, as well as that of Radical 
Orthodoxy, a postmodern theological movement initiated by a trio of British 
Anglicans.18 Hauerwas and Radical Orthodoxy, they claim, introduced many Yoder 
scholars to congenial postmodern voices of both post-analytic and Continental 
persuasion.  
What they do not say, but could, is that Hauerwas and Radical Orthodoxy 
have also contributed to a theological climate in which traditional metaphysical 
                                                 
15 See, for instance, the evaluations of Hauerwas’s influence in Dorrien, Social Ethics in the Making, 
474-488, and Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 140. 
16 Dula and Huebner, “Introduction,” ix-xii. They characterize old Yoder scholarship as existing before 
1990 and, excepting Hauerwas and James McClendon, mainly being the work of Mennonites. Their 
primary example is A. James Reimer. This designation of pre-1990 Yoder scholarship as a Mennonite 
affair is surprising, given the work of Richard J. Mouw, J. Philip Wogaman and many others. All of 
these figures appear throughout this thesis.  
17 Ibid., xiv.  
18 Ibid., xviii. 
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issues, especially those concerned with the sacraments, are prominent again.19 
Anabaptist theologians have contributed, too, as they have sought to recover their 
spiritual traditions and emphasize their continuities with creedal orthodoxy.20 Though 
differing in important ways, these sacramentally minded theologians draw from 
patristic and medieval sources in a manner that would have made Yoder 
uncomfortable, to put it mildly.21 Whereas Augustine and Aquinas are often their 
leading lights, Yoder saw those classic theologians as dangerous and unhelpful.22 
Whereas the sacramental thinkers regard Christendom, at least to some degree, as a 
salutary development, Yoder saw it as the greatest blow to the church’s integrity.23 
Whereas they celebrate the interconnections between the spiritual and political 
dimensions of ecclesial practice, Yoder worried that discussion of the former 
distracted from commitment to the latter.24 In each case, the postmodern return to the 
pre-modern Catholic and early Anabaptist heritages has led to suspicions about 
Yoder’s typical metaphysical reticence. 
In The Politics of Jesus, Yoder positioned himself as offering a corrective to 
metaphysical christologies that bracketed out political questions.25 He did not, there 
or elsewhere, elaborate a trinitarian metaphysics or a doctrine of two natures, 
considering these topics at best to be doctrinal “fences” that kept the church’s focus 
                                                 
19 See, e.g., Hauerwas, Grain of the Universe; Hauerwas and Wells, Christian Ethics; Milbank, 
Pickstock, and Ward, “Suspending the Material: The Turn of Radical Orthodoxy,” in Radical 
Orthodoxy, eds. Milbank, Pickstock, and Ward, 1-20, and Milbank and Ward, “Radical Orthodoxy Ten 
Years On,” 151-169. 
20 E.g., Dintaman, “Spiritual Poverty,” and Reimer, Mennonites and Classical Theology. 
21 On Yoder and Hauerwas see, e.g., Doerksen, “Share the House”; Hovey, “Public Ethics”; G. 
Schlabach, “Continuity and Sacrament.” On Yoder and Radical Orthodoxy see C. Huebner, 
Precarious Peace, 39-48, and H. Huebner, “Participation, Peace, and Forgiveness.” 
22 E.g., Brubacher Kaethler, “Practice of Reading the Other,” 48-51 (on Yoder and Aquinas); 
Hauerwas, Grain of the Universe, 23-37; Hauerwas, State of the University, 136-146; Leithart, 
Defending Constantine, 284-287 (on Yoder and Augustine); Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 
382-442; Milbank and Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas; Smith, Radical Orthodoxy, 116-122; Ward, Cities 
of God, 227-237. 
23 See chapter three below for Yoder’s reading of Christendom. There are various perspectives within 
Radical Orthodoxy, recent Anabaptist theology, and Hauerwas’s work on Christendom. For more 
positive evaluations, see Hauerwas, Good Company, 19-32; Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 
410-413; Reimer, “Positive Theology” in Ollenburger and Koontz, eds., Mind Patient and Untamed, 
245-273. 
24 E.g., Hauerwas, Grain of the Universe, 205-241; Kroeker, “Yoder’s Voluntariety,” 56-58; Milbank, 
Being Reconciled, 162-186. See Yoder’s consistently historicist, non-metaphysical treatment of 
doctrine in Preface, 58, 276, 306-307, 318, 371, 393. He identifies historicism as the biblical, 
“Hebraic” outlook. 
25 Yoder, PJ, 11. 
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on imitating Jesus.26 There are some indications that he simply assumed creedal 
orthodoxy as normative, and some indications that he thought it was dispensable—
Yoder has defenders and detractors on both sides of the argument.27 For his 
detractors, whether he assumed orthodoxy or not is beside the point. The problem, 
they charge, is rather that a silence about orthodox metaphysics combined with a 
historicist’s zeal for demonstrating the political and ethical meanings of doctrine 
leads to a body of work that is easily assimilable to secular thought. Without some 
intelligible framework for speaking of the divinity of Christ, Jesus appears as just 
another political hero or wise moral teacher. On this reading, the only way Yoder’s 
influence is equivalent to Jesus’ is if Jesus is the great man of nineteenth-century 
liberal Protestant biography.28  
The editors of The New Yoder, therefore, may be correct that a new era of 
postmodern, philosophically oriented Yoder scholarship has emerged. But their 
sanguine outlook is questionable, as the orientation they celebrate has raised 
additional doubts about the validity of Yoder’s legacy: the new Yoder possibly spells 
the death of Yoder. Furthermore, there is more continuity between old and new 
Yoders than the editors let on, as familiar criticisms of his method and politics are 
now heard from “postmodern” readers as well.29 A more accurate depiction of the 
state of Yoder scholarship would describe the many Yoders that now exist thanks to 
Yoder’s expanding circle of readers.  
David C. Cramer takes this taxonomic route in his review essay on The New 
Yoder and two other recent collections of essays on Yoder, Powers and Practices: 
Engaging the Work of John Howard Yoder and Radical Ecumenicity: Pursuing Unity 
and Continuity after John Howard Yoder.30 Noting that “a recurring theme in these 
collections is the question of how to inherit or appropriate Yoder’s legacy,” he 
identifies sixteen “distinct, though sometimes overlapping, ways of inheriting Yoder” 
                                                 
26 Yoder, Preface, 204, 223. 
27 These debates arise throughout the thesis, but especially in chapters one and two. 
28 See esp. Martens, “Universal History,” 131-146, where Yoder is compared to Rauschenbusch. 
29 See the essays by Boyarin and Coles in Dula and Huebner, eds., New Yoder, and Sider, History and 
Holiness, 81-117. Dula and Huebner are careful to stipulate that “old” and “new” are “broad, 
occasionally clumsy, generalizations” (x) and acknowledge that “old” readings persist. They do not 
seem to recognize that many of the “new” essays in their collection are concerned with “old” 
questions, even if these are raised by non-Mennonites and non-Niebuhrians. See esp. discussion in 
chapter five below. 
30 Cramer, “Inheriting Yoder.” See also Carter, “Liberal Reading of Yoder” and J. D. Weaver, “Yoder 
Legacy” for less systematic attempts at defining trends in Yoder reception. 
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discussed in the essays.31 In addition to the “old” and “new” readings of Yoder, he 
lists the following interpretive possibilities: Yoder as a theological revisionist; an 
Augustinian; a postmodern theologian; a “radical democrat”; a purveyor of secular 
Christianity; a Hauerwasian postliberal; an apocalyptic Barthian; an ecumenist; a 
theological liberal; an evangelical; an advocate of international peacekeeping efforts; 
an anarchist opponent of international peacekeeping efforts; a sociological 
reductionist; and an “expansionist” whose sociological emphasis was meant to 
enlarge, not reject, “personalistic, pietistic and sacramentalistic accounts of the 
faith.”32 To this catalogue one might append the older readings discussed above, 
namely, Yoder as a reliable guide to or distorter of scripture and history, and Yoder as 
political activist or sectarian.  
Cramer recognizes that some of these readings are compatible and some are 
in conflict. The conflicting readings demand attention to the question of what it 
means to inherit Yoder faithfully, and the three books under review offer different 
strategies of faithful inheritance.33 The New Yoder, according to Cramer, inherits 
Yoder by putting his work into dialogue with other thinkers. Its editors acknowledge 
the dialogical emphasis of their approach, claiming that this emphasis brings a range 
of new issues to Yoder scholarship.34 The downside of their approach, as they also 
acknowledge, is that “the new Yoder” mostly ignores scripture and Anabaptist history 
in favor of philosophy: “not only is the new Yoder much more philosophical than 
Yoder himself was, it is more philosophical than he ever would have wanted to be.”35 
Cramer, moreover, suggests that this philosophical focus has the tendency to make 
Yoder’s work seem overly theoretical and removed from the concrete ecclesial 
concerns that were his own focus.36  
On the other hand, Powers and Practices and Radical Ecumenicity mostly 
retain Yoder’s idiom and interests. Powers and Practices is largely taken up with 
attempts to resolve criticisms of Yoder’s theology through clarification of his 
writings. Cramer finds this strategy helpful, but is wary of attempts to systematize 
                                                 
31 Cramer, “Inheriting Yoder,” 133-134. 
32 Ibid., 134-136. 
33 Ibid., 137-141. 
34 Dula and Huebner, “Introduction,” xvi.  
35 Ibid., xix. 
36 Cramer, “Inheriting Yoder,” 138. 
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Yoder’s thought.37 Yoder wrote voluminously and for specific contexts; apparent 
contradictions within his oeuvre should be explored patiently in light of the purpose 
of a given composition. The authors writing in Radical Ecumenicity instead use 
Yoder’s thought to explore various dimensions of the Stone-Campbell tradition and 
its relation to the wider body of Christ. Cramer suggests that this approach of putting 
Yoder’s work into conversation with specific ecclesial traditions is probably the most 
amenable to Yoder’s own conception of theology.38 Nevertheless, he argues that the 
approach of each of the three collections is necessary to inherit Yoder faithfully. 
Although Cramer does not specify the reasoning behind this conclusion, it can be 
extrapolated from his later definition of faithful inheritance as tending to both the 
content and the dialogical, unsystematic style of Yoder’s writings.39 This definition is 
drawn from Yoder’s understanding of tradition as a process of “looping back” to 
resources from the past in order to cope with issues in the present.40 It is therefore 
appropriate, and faithful, for scholars of Yoder’s thought to take it into new territory, 
to explore its internal intricacies, and to extend its ecumenical logic.  
Cramer’s assessment represents the most thorough review of recent 
scholarship on John Howard Yoder, and is preferable to alternatives that simplify and 
dichotomize the various viewpoints without thorough examination.41 The present 
thesis is an exercise in faithful inheritance that combines each of the three 
approaches named by Cramer. Like the new Yoder, Yoder is put into dialogue with an 
“outsider,” Pierre Bourdieu. But unlike the new Yoder, this dialogue does not replace 
a focus on scripture and Anabaptist history. Yoder’s interpretation of the Pauline 
language of principalities and powers is in view throughout the thesis. The historical 
writings are of special interest in chapters three and four, which cover 
methodological issues, and in chapter five, which introduces Yoder’s politics. 
Moreover, it is arguable that, as a sociologist, Bourdieu is not quite the outsider that a 
more philosophical dialogue partner would be. He trained in philosophy, and deals 
with many philosophical topics, but his sociology was constructed largely as a 




40 Yoder, PK, 69. 
41 Cf. Cramer’s analysis of Carter’s essay, “Liberal Reading,” on liberal versus evangelical reception 
strategies (“Inheriting Yoder,” 144-146). 
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repudiation of philosophical abstraction.42 His unremitting focus on the practical and 
concrete, his insistence that even the most “pure” theory has (often insidious) 
political consequences, and his resistance to common sense dualisms in many ways 
parallel Yoder’s own commitments.  
Moreover, Cramer’s insinuation that Yoder was only interested in ecumenical 
dialogue is manifestly untrue. Even if he did prioritize ecumenical dialogue, he was 
engaged in and endorsed dialogue with non-Christian others. Yoder repeatedly 
referred to social scientific literature to buttress his claims about the political 
viability of nonviolent action and minority community structures.43 He was also 
conversant with the social scientific study of punishment, and made tentative 
remarks about a nonviolent theology of punishment based on his reading of 
Durkheim, Girard and others.44 Besides, in an essay on interfaith dialogue he 
maintained that there was no real distinction to be made between religious and 
secular “believing communities.”45 Christians, he argued, should be prepared to 
dialogue with other believers whether their master is Buddha or Marx. Yoder himself 
was engaged in a lengthy dialogue with the Jewish neo-Kantian philosopher Steven 
Schwarzschild.46 As a sociologist, Bourdieu is perhaps a more fitting dialogue 
partner than the philosophers treated in The New Yoder; but, in principle, there is no 
reason to limit the range of potential partners. 
This thesis also shares the approaches of Powers and Practices and Radical 
Ecumenicity. As in the former collection, there are extended close readings of 
Yoder’s texts in each chapter below. Contradictions are explored and obscurities 
identified, but there is no attempt to offer a grand Yoderian theological system. 
Although the thesis is organized according to the typical creation-fall-redemption 
pattern, no effort is made to offer a comprehensive Yoderian account of each of the 
loci. Chapter topics were, rather, chosen by grouping various criticisms of Yoder and 
organizing them within the framework of his theology of the principalities and 
powers. At times Yoder’s writings are synthesized to avoid redundancy, but more 
                                                 
42 See chapter four below. 
43 Yoder’s interactions with the social sciences are detailed in chapters three and four below. 
44 Yoder, You Have It Coming: Good Punishment: The Legitimate Social Function of Punitive 
Behavior, in UNDA. 
45 Yoder, RP, 253. 
46 Yoder’s reflections on Judaism, and comments on Schwarzschild, are contained in his JCSR. 
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often they are discussed chronologically and contextualized. Yoder’s primary 
context, as explored in Radical Ecumenicity, was ecumenical dialogue. This thesis 
constantly refers to Yoder’s ecumenical context, both when discussing his own 
writings and those of his critics. Ecumenicity and dialogue are, furthermore, major 
themes of the thesis.  
In conclusion, this thesis is an attempt to inherit Yoder faithfully without 
ignoring the serious issues raised by his critics past and present. It acknowledges the 
methodological, political, and metaphysical problems in his work, and its response at 
once “loops back” to Yoder’s work and seeks new dialogue partners. It dialogues 
with the work of a secular, arguably “postmodern” sociologist,47 yet it does not leave 
behind the ecumenical setting that was dear to Yoder. It does not assume that there is 
or should be only one Yoder, and it does not pretend to offer the last word on his life 
and work. 
 
2. “Sociological Theology,” Its Virtues and Vices, and a Possible Solution 
Even if Yoder’s work cannot be systematized, its different aspects can be emphasized 
as organizing motifs.48 For example, Mark Thiessen Nation’s introductory book on 
Yoder is organized around the motif of ecumenism.49 Chapters explore Yoder’s 
Mennonite heritage, “evangelical witness,” and “Catholic convictions.” Craig Carter 
focuses on Yoder’s connections to systematic theology, and so his overview includes 
chapters on Christology, eschatology, and ecclesiology.50 Chris K. Huebner, on the 
other hand, highlights Yoder’s unsystematic, ad hoc theological method, and his 
writings typically utilize Yoder’s thought to undermine the “theoretical closure” of 
rival theologies.51 Such motifs are, of course, the basis for the many readings of 
Yoder identified by Cramer. As he suggests, the relation between them is complex 
and there are varying degrees of overlap and tension among them. A given motif may 
be judged by its faithfulness to the content and method of Yoder’s work, but in 
principle there is no reason why there cannot be multiple faithful motifs. Because 
                                                 
47 Cf. Lash, “Modernization and Postmodernization.” 
48 This section foreshadows the discussion of concept construction in chapter four. 
49 Nation, John Howard Yoder. 
50 Carter, Politics of the Cross. 
51 See Huebner, Precarious Peace, where he brings Yoder into conversation with Mennonite theology, 
Radical Orthodoxy, narrative theology, Karl Barth, globalization theory, and others. 
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Yoder’s oeuvre is rich and varied, and because his method is resistant to calcification, 
the flourishing of organizing motifs may be seen as part of the process of faithful 
inheritance.  
On this view, a motif is a practical tool honed to deploy Yoder’s thought for 
some purpose or another. A motif may eventually be deemed unfit for purpose, or the 
purpose for which it is honed judged as unworthy. Yet the development of a new 
motif should not in and of itself be dismissed as a hostile claim to a fixed Yoderian 
“essence” that defeats all other motifs. A new motif may rather be developed in order 
to face a new context or to engage a new dialogue partner. In that case, new 
organizing motifs may be welcomed as potentially faithful co-inheritors of Yoder’s 
legacy. Tension between the various motifs can be acknowledged and explored, and 
any overlap accepted and welcomed. 
The present thesis is organized around the motif of Yoder’s “sociological 
theology.” At its most basic, this motif suggests that Yoder’s work offers theological 
insight into the logic of social being. His writings employ convictions about God to 
illuminate ideal and actual patterns of social organization. The justification for this 
motif is mostly contained in the chapters that follow this introduction. In other 
words, the description of Yoder’s work as a sociological theology becomes plausible 
when his work is displayed as such in the body of the thesis. The viability of the 
motif emerges from its use as a heuristic tool in the process of research, and cannot 
be proven before the fact. 
It is, nonetheless, possible to say a few preliminary words about some of the 
advantages of construing Yoder’s theology in terms of a sociological theology—
though it must be kept in mind that these “advantages” do not, prima facie, entail the 
rejection of all other motifs. One strong reason for using the motif of sociological 
theology is that it distances his work somewhat from motifs that portray Yoder as a 
philosophical theologian. As argued above, there is no clear principle in Yoder’s 
theology that demands separation from philosophy. Yet even the editors of The New 
Yoder admit that highly philosophical treatments tend to displace Yoder’s more 
concrete interests and context. As Cramer puts it, if the authors contained in that 
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volume “err on any side, it is on the side of theory—albeit praxis oriented, anti-
theory theorizing.”52  
By contrast, the sociological tradition, at least as it is represented by Pierre 
Bourdieu, views theoretical construction and empirical inquiry as interdependent.53 A 
sociological theology, then, would not err either on the side of theory or on the side 
of a supposedly theory-free practice. It would marry its propositions about the 
character of God to scrupulous attention to the history of God’s interactions with 
human society. Further proclamations about social order, whether in the church or at 
large, would not shy from consideration of specific cases. There are numerous 
examples of such a sociological theology in Yoder’s body of work, from his 
dissertation on Anabaptist history, to his review of New Testament scholarship in The 
Politics of Jesus, to his study of the social impact of liturgical practice in Body 
Politics. At its best, Yoder’s theology is deeply sociological. 
Another reason for using the motif of sociological theology, however, is that 
Yoder’s theology is also deeply sociological at its most troubled. As noted above, a 
significant current area of concern regards his reduction of metaphysics to issues of 
social process. This point has been pressed to its furthest extent by Paul Martens in 
essays on Yoder’s view of the sacraments and his conception of history. Martens 
contends that Yoder’s interest in demonstrating the communal, political nature of 
Christianity to both Christians and non-Christians led him, at least in the 1990s, to 
speak only of what could be verified empirically. For Yoder, on Martens’s view, 
what is important about Jesus is that he, like the prophet Jeremiah and Gandhi, 
realized that suffering minority communities change history. What is important about 
the church is that it is a history changing community. At this point, Yoder seems to 
exchange theological for sociological claims. No insight into Jesus’ status as the 
second person of the Trinity is necessary to understand his work, nor is any sense of 
the mystery of sacramental participation in the risen Christ important for describing 
the church’s character. All that is needed is an empirical understanding of social and 
political processes. All that is needed is sociology, not theology. These arguments 
                                                 
52 Cramer, “Inheriting Yoder,” 138. 
53 See chapter four below on Bourdieu’s method. 
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raise the possibility that Yoder “is merely presenting a form of Christianity that is but 
a stepping stone to assimilation into secularism.”54  
Although Martens’s arguments might suggest that the second term in 
“sociological theology” should be left out, Yoder did clearly write in a theological 
idiom, even in the 1990s. Thomas N. Finger has also written an article critical of 
Yoder’s reduction of theology to social ethics, but he admits that the 
pneumatological aspects of Yoder’s late work Body Politics (from 1992) cannot be 
ignored.55 It is perhaps better to say, therefore, that Yoder’s sociological theology at 
times emphasized the sociological in a way that obscured its relation to the 
theological. Whatever he intended, he occasionally makes it too easy to read God out 
of society. Yoder’s is a sociological theology, for better or worse. 
If a motif is a tool honed for a specific purpose, what purpose does the 
sociological theology motif serve? The primary aim of this thesis is to determine how 
Yoder’s theology might be revised in light of allegations that it does not further the 
legacy of Jesus, in other words, that it is not fully Christian. In the previous section, 
Yoder’s reception history was traced to highlight three major areas of criticism, each 
of which may be articulated in terms of a reduction: (1) the methodological reduction 
of the complexity of church (and other) history; (2) the moral reduction of 
theologically legitimate socio-political activity; and (3) the sociological reduction of 
the metaphysical and ontological dimensions of Christian faith. The basic proposal of 
the thesis is that the motif of sociological theology allows for Yoder’s assumptions 
about the nature and function of social reality—his “social theory”—to come to the 
surface. Once surfaced, these social theoretical assumptions can be revised in such a 
way that his theology ceases either to flirt with or to fall into any of the three named 
reductions. 
This proposal does not assume that Yoder’s theological and social theoretical 
assumptions are neatly separable. One of Yoder’s central insights, arguably, is that 
theological conviction entails a certain vision of social reality.56 Yet it seems that 
aspects of Yoder’s vision of society limited or distorted his theological convictions. 
                                                 
54 Martens, “Problematic Development,” 73. See also his “Universal History.” 
55 Finger, “Theology to Ethics,” 333. 
56 See chapter four below on Yoder’s view of sociology: he rejected any “closed” vision of society that 
automatically ruled out servanthood as politically effective. 
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Namely, his attempt to proclaim the gospel in sociological terms appears to have 
obscured, at times, his theological commitments to methodological patience, faithful 
politics, and spiritual participation in Christ. A revised Yoderian sociological 
theology will be willing to revisit each of these commitments and propose an 
improved, non-reductive social theory. 
 
3. Outline of the Thesis   
In order to surface Yoder’s social theory, the focus of the thesis is on his theology of 
the principalities and powers. As detailed in chapter five below, Yoder argued 
repeatedly that the Pauline language of principalities and powers was “roughly 
analogous” to contemporary social scientific terminology.57 Drawing principally on 
Hendrik Berkhof’s small book, Christ and the Powers, he portrayed the powers as 
created social structures that fell into sin but are now subject to the redeeming 
lordship of the risen Christ. 
This conception of social structures as created, fallen, and being redeemed, he 
insists, facilitates a theologically subtle and sociologically realistic mode of moral 
discernment. Christ is at the center of the theology of the principalities and powers, 
as firstborn of creation, suffering servant, and risen lord. It is through Christ that 
anything is known of the “original” shape of the powers, and therefore it is through 
Christ that a clear understanding is gained of their distorted, fallen shape and of their 
future state of redemption. By attending closely to Christ’s own interactions with the 
powers, Christians have a clue as to how they might participate in their ongoing 
redemption. They will not condemn the powers, which are part of God’s good 
creation, but they will also refuse to identify any fallen power with God’s coming 
reign. They will, rather, carefully review the shape of a given power at a given place 
and time as they encounter it in the process of imitating the politics of Jesus. 
The theology of the principalities and powers is, of course, not the only theme 
Yoder treated that is laden with social theory. Christian witness to the state, war and 
peace, the politics of Jesus, body politics, sacrament as social process, the exilic 
vocation of the church, Jewish-Christian relations, community hermeneutics—all are 
exemplary of his approach to sociological theology. But these and other themes can 
                                                 
57 Yoder, “Natural Law,” 22. 
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easily be seen, and many of them have been seen, as falling prey to the temptation of 
sociological reduction. Yoder’s treatment of the powers has not escaped such 
criticism, as Marva Dawn suggests that it reduces the complex biblical portrait of 
social and spiritual structures.58 Nevertheless, in his theology of the principalities and 
powers, Yoder commits himself to robust doctrines of creation, providence, the fall, 
and the church’s spiritual participation in the risen Christ’s eschatological rule. In no 
other theme does his commitment to these doctrines—none of which is easily 
reducible to sociology—emerge as clearly as it does here. 
Hence, the decision to focus on Yoder’s theology of the principalities and 
powers brings his social theoretical assumptions to the fore at the point where he is 
least reductive. For not only does his understanding of the powers include “high” 
metaphysical commitments, but it also calls for empirical rigor in moral discernment 
and a broad, cosmic framework for approaching Christian politics. This presentation 
of the strongest version of Yoder’s sociological theology is not meant to shield him 
from criticism, but rather to provide the most adequate basis for revision once 
criticisms are considered. Revisions to the social theory contained in his theology of 
the principalities and powers will be more minimal and, thereby, closer in spirit to 
Yoder’s own work, than if the revision process focused on a more reductive theme. 
A final reason for focusing on his theology of the principalities and powers is 
that it has not been reviewed systematically in his own terms.59 It is often grouped 
with Berkhof’s Christ and the Powers and similar treatments by Karl Barth, Jacques 
Ellul, and Walter Wink, and is rarely considered to have an integrity of its own in the 
context of Yoder’s wider oeuvre. This state of affairs is, perhaps, exacerbated by his 
self-portrayal as one who merely presented the scholarly consensus summarized by 
Berkhof. Although it is true that Yoder did not do original exegesis on the relevant 
Pauline passages, it is also true that, once placed within Christian Witness to the 
State, The Politics of Jesus and other works, Berkhof’s synthesis became Yoder’s 
                                                 
58 See chapter one below. 
59 That said, Scott Prather is currently writing a PhD thesis at the University of Aberdeen entitled 
Powers and the Power of Mammon, which draws from Yoder and Barth’s theologies of the powers. 
Other significant treatments of Yoder on the powers include Bourne, Seek the Peace, 210-212; Carter, 
Politics of the Cross, 146-147; Dawn, Ellul, 59-61; Doerksen, Beyond Suspicion, 99-108; Harink, 
Paul among the Postliberals, 114-125; Murphy and Ellis, Moral Nature, 179-180; Parler, “Politics of 
Creation,” 69-72; Stassen, “New Vision,” 211-222; Toole, Godot in Sarajevo, 218-225. Cf. Kerr, 
Christ, History, and Apocalyptic. See chapter one for an overview of scholarship on the principalities 
and powers. 
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own. A subsidiary purpose of this thesis, therefore, is to articulate a distinctly 
Yoderian theology of the principalities and powers. This purpose is attained by 
explicating his writings on the principalities and powers as fully as possible, paying 
attention to their contextual origins and connections to other of his writings. 
  There are five primary texts on the powers in Yoder’s body of work. His first 
book, The Christian Witness to the State, published in 1963, opens with a discussion 
of Christ’s lordship over the powers as the foundation of the church’s witness.60 Nine 
years later, the chapter “Christ and Power” in The Politics of Jesus summarizes 
Berkhof’s argument to demonstrate that Paul and his followers considered Jesus’ 
relevance in terms of social structure and power.61 The principalities and powers 
featured again in two lecture series from the early 1980s. In the third of his Stone 
Lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary in 1980, he would turn to the powers to 
indicate that flexible Christian moral discernment can be centered on Jesus rather 
than the “orders of creation.”62 The eighth of his recently published Warsaw 
Lectures, from 1983, portrays the powers as part of an early Christian cosmology 
supportive of nonviolent convictions.63 Finally, he was asked to revise his 
unpublished critique of H. Richard Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture for the 1996 
collection Authentic Transformation.64 Yoder, who had recently supervised Marva 
Dawn’s doctoral dissertation on Ellul’s treatment of the powers,65 proposes the 
theology of the principalities and powers as an alternative framework for cultural 
criticism. 
  The exposition of these texts occurs over the course of the entire thesis, 
which is organized according to the basic creation-fall-redemption framework Yoder 
inherited from Berkhof. For each part of the framework, two chapters address 
different aspects of Yoder’s sociological theology and its criticisms. The first two 
chapters examine the spiritual, personal, and triune context of created life, and the 
meaning of human freedom in a structured social world. The second two chapters 
look at violence and theological method after the fall. The third pair is concerned 
                                                 
60 Yoder, CWS, 8-11. 
61 Yoder, PJ, 134-158. 
62 Yoder, “Servant.” 
63 Yoder, Nonviolence, 97-106. 
64 Yoder, “HRN.” 
65 Dawn, Ellul. 
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with the redemption of the powers. Church, Spirit, and the relationship between the 
particular and the universal are the major themes there. 
  Each chapter itself is made up of three sections. The first section presents 
material from Yoder’s theology of the powers, and then relates it to his broader 
oeuvre and relevant criticisms. This presentation always includes a consideration of 
the pertinent passages from scripture and Berkhof’s Christ and the Powers that frame 
Yoder’s discussion. The intent here is to introduce Yoder, not offer original exegesis. 
Historical-critical insights into scripture are occasionally useful for this purpose, but 
they are not a focus. Yoder’s theology is reviewed through close readings of the 
powers texts and then of writings from elsewhere in his corpus germane to the topic. 
The powers texts are most often treated chronologically and, when space allows, so 
are the other writings. This approach is helpful for showing how Yoder’s thought 
developed, which is a major point of contention in current scholarship. It is also a 
reminder that Yoder’s theology was itself an evolving social practice connected to 
other events in his life.  
The presence of criticisms does not, of course, entail the presence of 
problems in Yoder’s work. The validity of each criticism is judged in light of the 
prior presentation of Yoder’s work and of secondary discussion. But even when a 
particular criticism appears weak and insubstantial, it often points to a place where 
Yoder’s thought can be revised for greater clarity. The sheer persistence of some of 
the more obvious misreadings would seem to call for such revision. After identifying 
valid criticisms of the area of Yoder’s sociological theology under review, each 
chapter moves to a revisionary proposal. The proposals are revisionary in the sense 
that they are intended as improvements to Yoder’s writings. Yoder is neither 
abandoned, nor is he venerated as infallible. Although it is hoped that these proposals 
will be judged as “Yoderian,” as efforts in faithful inheritance, consideration of 
criticisms leads to the conclusion that his heritage should not simply be preserved in 
its original state. Furthermore, Yoder’s insistence on the need for continual radical 
reformation suggests that he did not accept his own word as the last word. An 
embrace of the semper reformanda creed entails turning one’s critical sights on 
Yoder himself. 
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Each of the proposed revisions aims to correct for the unsalutary reductions 
present in Yoder’s sociological theology. The primary instrument of revision in this 
thesis is the reflexive sociology of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu (1930-2002) is perhaps 
the leading French sociologist after Durkheim and one of France’s great public 
intellectuals.66 Although there have been waves of resistance to Bourdieu in France 
and elsewhere, his influence continues to grow around the world.67 Theologians 
increasingly appreciate the sophistication of his studies of power and culture, in 
which exhaustive empirical research is seamlessly interwoven with systematic 
theoretical reflection.68 Moreover, he is often praised, though sometimes vilified, as a 
rare example of a popular intellectual who is as known for his scientific output as he 
is for his political activity.69 This combination of theoretical insight, empirical 
grounding, and political engagement recommends his sociology as a useful resource 
for approaching the revisionary task. 
The respect and popularity currently enjoyed by Bourdieu are, perhaps, 
sufficient reasons for drawing him in as a conversation partner—though, given 
Yoder’s disregard for popularity, they are also possible reasons for avoiding him. Yet 
there is, at times, a deep resonance between the two thinkers: both refused to separate 
theoretical construction from empirical research; both wrote largely for practical, 
rather than theoretical, purposes; both were engaged in attempts to change the 
communities that were the subject of their work; both embrace historicity and 
particularity against what Bourdieu calls a “false universalism”; and both were 
allergic to common sense dualisms that ruled out their preferred form of politics as 
impossible. Stronger evidence for the fruitfulness of bringing them together, 
however, is found in the ways Bourdieu’s highly sophisticated writings on social 
structure and power can be used to prod Yoder’s sociological theology in a non-
reductive direction. Each of the chapters below provides an overview of some of 
Bourdieu’s major concepts, selected for their relevance to the topic at hand. 
                                                 
66 See, e.g., Kauppi, French Intellectual Nobility; Kauppi, “Sociologist as Moraliste.” 
67 Dubois, Durand, and Winkin, eds., Réception internationale. 
68 Pilario, Rough Grounds of Praxis; Smith, “Redeeming Critique”; Tanner, Theories of Culture; Ward, 
Cultural Transformation; Ward, “Postmodernism and Postmodernity.” See also Flanagan, “Sociology 
into Theology.” 
69 See chapter five below on Bourdieu’s politics. 
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Although criticisms of those concepts are referenced throughout the thesis, they are 
rarely the focus—the purpose, after all, is to revise Yoder, not Bourdieu. 
The deployment of a secular sociologist to revise a (possibly secularizing) 
theologian might seem like a strange, if not impotent, solution. There is no attempt 
here to hide from the full secular strangeness of Bourdieu’s work, but there is also no 
explicit attempt to criticize or correct this strangeness. The Bourdieusian revisions of 
Yoder’s sociological theology already gesture towards a possible theological 
transfiguration of reflexive sociology, but a full transfiguration awaits further 
explication. Moreover, the idea that secular thought is only useful for theology 
insofar as its secularism is overcome ignores how dialogue is most often mutually 
transformative. As David Fergusson puts it with reference to Alvin Plantinga’s 
apologetic requirement that secular “defeaters” of religion must themselves be 
defeated, 
the language of “defeating the defeaters” suggests that somehow faith, if successful 
in this engagement, will be unaltered by this intellectual encounter. This seems 
highly unlikely. Debates with the natural sciences, historical criticism, and other 
faith traditions will for much of the time result in a restatement, revision, and 
adjustment of earlier theological positions. In this respect, theology is never 
immobile. There is no single confessional position that is immune to change. 70  
 
Heeding Fergusson’s point is especially important in the present context, as Yoder’s 
understanding of dialogue is resistant to the kind of theological closure implied by 
the need to first defeat one’s opponents before anything can be learned from them.  
The presentation of Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology, therefore, is mindful of his 
secularism, as well as its other potential problems, but does not regard them as 
absolute barriers to constructive appropriation. Throughout the thesis Bourdieu’s 
concepts are called upon to revise Yoder’s social theoretical assumptions in order 
that they might become non-reductive in terms of method, morals, and metaphysics. 
In brief, once Bourdieu’s understanding of society as a set of objective 
relations is incorporated into Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers, 
society can be regarded as fundamentally related to God, its creator and sustainer. 
This move opens trinitarian pathways that are followed throughout the thesis to move 
beyond Yoder’s sociological reductionism. Relational sociology also demands a non-
reductive methodology, for claims about any one sociological phenomenon must take 
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into account its full set of relations to other phenomena. The relational approach 
requires a more intimate dialectic between theoretical construction and empirical 
research than Yoder’s sometimes ideologically charged methods allow for. Finally, 
Bourdieu’s political concepts give sociological clarity and weight to Yoder’s ethics, 
and strengthen his argument that the nonviolent politics of Jesus are a fully 
responsible, universal, and Christian form of life. 
Agreeing with critics that Yoder’s legacy is not always identical to Jesus’ 
presumes some understanding of Jesus’ legacy that is not derived exclusively from 
Yoder’s writings. For the most part, this thesis takes Yoder’s work as a reliable guide 
to Jesus and the Christian faith, and the revisions draw as much on that work as 
possible. As already indicated, the theology of the principalities and powers works 
well as a focus here precisely because it motions beyond the methodological, moral, 
and sociological reductions that plague other of Yoder’s themes, even if it does not 
completely overcome them. At times, however, it is necessary to revise Yoder by 
correcting his theology, not simply by revising the latent social theoretical 
assumptions in his work. The social theoretical revisions may clear the way for 
theological revisions that are more clearly Yoderian than alternatives, but they 
cannot supply the improved theology. In cases where strictly theological questions 
are at issue, the bias in this thesis is always to side with the great achievements of the 
Nicene and Chalcedonian creeds: God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit, and Jesus is 
fully God and fully human. Although, as mentioned above, there is much debate over 
whether or not Yoder sided with the creeds, it is questionable if his christocentric 
sociological theology makes any sense without them. Why base a community on the 
politics of Jesus unless he uniquely discloses the politics of God? This question is 
raised both by Yoder’s critics who charge him with abandoning the creeds, and by 
his defenders who argue (or assume) that he remained creedal. Without a more 
robust affirmation of the creeds, Yoder would seem to be in danger of reducing 
theological convictions to existential symbols or regulative principles.  
In his critique of postliberal regulative accounts of doctrine, John Milbank 
suggests that exclusively focusing on Christian narratives and practices is like 
describing a drama without reference to its historical or mythical setting.71 Just as the 
                                                 
71 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 385. Milbank is criticizing Lindbeck, Nature of Doctrine, 
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drama only makes sense in light of some description of its setting, Christian practice 
only makes sense in light of an account of the transcendent reality that always 
exceeds it. Rational debate about the transcendent—Is God triune, or does God only 
appear that way? Is Jesus God and human, or just one or the other?—cannot be 
extracted from the “grammar” of the Christian faith. That admission need not lead in 
a speculative direction or to the search for rational “foundations” external to the 
faith. From a theological perspective, human knowledge of God emerges from the 
history of God’s self-revelation in creation.72 Even “natural” knowledge of God, as 
Paul suggests to the Athenians, is only possible because God created, sustains, and is 
active in the world (Acts 17:22-31). The process of constructing metaphysical 
propositions in order to make the faith intelligible, therefore, is a process of faith 
itself. In other words, adequate statements about God are a possible product of 
participation in the history of God’s self-revelation. Cosmology and the Christian life 
cannot be separated.73  
The perspective taken in this thesis is that the creedal affirmations of the 
Trinity and the divinity of Christ are faithful developments within Jesus’ legacy by 
communities that participated in the history of God’s self-revelation. Where Yoder 
does not clearly affirm them, his work is revised to do so. Although some readers 
might regard this move as a work of heretical inheritance of Yoder’s legacy, not to 
mention Jesus’, it can be pointed out that there is a considerable textual basis within 
Yoder’s writings for doing so, and, besides, there is no way to satisfy every reader. 
Nevertheless, it is hoped that the creedal revisions of Yoder’s legacy contained 
herein gain wide assent among his readers, precisely because they are intended as 
constructive revisions to his sociological theology. Yoder’s reluctance to elaborate 
creedal metaphysics stems from his fear that such elaboration distracts from concrete 
obedience. The doctrines of the Trinity and the divinity of Christ have indeed been 
subject to much speculation, but they are developed below through continual 
                                                                                                                                          
which attempts to move liberalism beyond “experiential expressive” accounts of doctrine to a 
regulative view. See also Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 113-130, for constructive criticism 
of Lindbeck’s treatment of conservative propositionalism.  
72 This perspective is developed in chapter one below as an explication of Yoder’s own views, 
especially as presented in his Preface. 
73 For sustained philosophical arguments that theological knowledge is rooted in the life of believing 
communities, see Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein; Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity; and 
Westphal, Overcoming Onto-Theology. 
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attention to the social practices of Jesus and the church. The principalities and 
powers exist in relation to God, and so the social and the spiritual cannot be neatly 
separated. The practical is spiritual, and vice versa. Once all the relations that 
constitute the principalities and powers are admitted, then Yoder’s sociological 
theology can be revised to avoid methodological, moral, and metaphysical 
reductions, even as it maintains his characteristic focus on imitating the politics of 
Jesus. Such a revision, it is hoped, will contribute not only to the spread of Yoder’s 
influence, but of Jesus’, too.
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1. REVISING YODER’S THEOLOGY OF CREATION 
 
One of the persistent criticisms of John Howard Yoder is the insufficiency of his 
doctrine of creation. Both friends and foes of his Anabaptist approach worry that he 
places so much emphasis on the redemptive and eschatological work of Jesus in 
overcoming the fall that he denies the present goodness of creation. As Yoder himself 
put it in an early discussion of the powers, after the fall “we have no access to the 
good creation of God.”1 Others indicate that his exclusive interest in the socio-
political dimensions of Jesus’ ministry blinds him to personal and spiritual aspects of 
created humanity. Many blame Yoder’s cursory trinitarianism here: a greater 
appreciation of the work of the Father and Spirit would complete his doctrine of 
creation. Behind all these factors, critics point to a sociological reductionism that 
places little value on discussing individuals, metaphysics, or ontological matters.   
 Yoder, it is true, does not exult the enduring wonders of the “orders of 
creation” in the manner of a Lutheran or Reformed theologian;2 nor does he engage 
in mystical speculation on the union of the believer with the triune divinity, as might 
someone from the Anglo-Catholic or Eastern Orthodox tradition. Yet he does 
promote the theology of the principalities and powers as offering a more adequate 
understanding of the creational status of social structures than the leading 
alternatives, and he does attempt to support that theology by stressing the continuities 
among the members of the Trinity. The crux of Yoder’s argument is that the refusal to 
separate creation from fall and redemption, the Father from the Son and Spirit, 
enables a far more nuanced view of the present social order than that afforded by a 
blithe optimism about creation’s lasting goodness. By articulating “a doctrine of 
                                                 
1 Yoder, PJ, 141. 
2 Yoder, as seen below, uses “orders of creation” as a cipher for Protestant natural theologies. The term 
is usually traced to the 19th-century Lutheran theologian Adolph von Harless, who developed Luther’s 
reflections on the first article of the Apostles’ Creed (in the Large and Small Catechisms) to speak of 
the specific, concrete contexts in which God places us and calls us to obedience. Some Lutheran and 
Reformed theologians, and—in the 20th century—their Barthian opponents, interpreted Harless as 
providing a conservative justification for any given social order. See Schroeder, “Orders of Creation,” 
5-10, for history and analysis of the concept. Schroeder points out that Harless’s term was “Creator’s 
order” (Schopferordnung), not “orders of creation” (Schopfungsordnung), placing the emphasis on the 
reality of election and judgment in each present moment. Far from immutable structures, the 
Schopferordnung are the dynamic existential conditions of human life with God: historicity, gendered 
embodiment, sociality, and so forth. Far from conservative, the concept includes divine judgment as a 
fundamental condition of human being: each human is called to obedience in his or her own location. 
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creation that (like creation itself) coheres with and in Christ,”3 Yoder places the life 
and teachings of Jesus Christ as the standard by which Christians judge that which in 
contemporary society is truly rooted in creation. It is not so much, he clarifies, that 
we have no access to the good creation of God, but that what access we have is 
through Jesus,4 and so through the Father whom he reveals and the Spirit whom he 
sends. 
 Whether or not Yoder’s theology of the powers produces the superior social 
critique he thinks it does, this fact alone is unlikely to convince those who want, for 
theological as well as missiological reasons, clarification of how the social 
dimensions of his account relate to personal spirituality and classic Christian 
metaphysical claims. The purpose of the present chapter is to formulate a revision of 
his doctrine of creation that maintains his christocentric ethical emphasis, but is more 
obviously trinitarian and inclusive of spirituality. Specifically, it will revise his 
assumption that sociological and historicist discourse must be isolated from spiritual 
and metaphysical claims. Unlike most other aspects of his theology of the 
principalities and powers, Yoder treats the doctrine of creation very little elsewhere. 
Instead of looking at other writings, therefore, the first section of the chapter 
examines his work on the created powers, its primary influences and theological 
context, and its critics. In the second section, Pierre Bourdieu’s primary sociological 
concepts—habitus, field, and capital—are introduced as part of his relational 
philosophy. These concepts are then used to revise Yoder’s theology of the powers as 
created, and implications are drawn for a Yoderian theology of persons, spirituality, 
and the Trinity. The result is a definition of the “powers” that is clear about their 
metaphysical status as creatures and their implication in human dispositional 
structures, yet is nonetheless fully sociological.    
 
1.1 Yoder’s Theology of Creation 
In extolling the virtues of the Son of God, in whom Christians “have redemption, the 
forgiveness of sins” (1:14), the author of Colossians makes a dramatic statement 
about Christ’s role in creation: 
                                                 
3 Parler, “Politics of Creation,” 76. Cf. Col. 1:15-17. 
4 Cf. Yoder, “Servant,” 163. 
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He is the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all 
things in heaven and on earth were created, things visible and invisible, whether 
thrones or dominions or rulers or powers—all things have been created through him 
and for him. He himself is before all things, and in him all things hold together. 
(1:15-17)5 
 
The same Christ who redeems and guides the church (1:18) is involved in the 
creation and sustenance of “all things” (ta panta). Among these things are thrones 
(thronoi), dominions (kuriottes), rulers (archai), and powers (exousiai), each of 
which Yoder regards as representing the constitutive structures of human existence.6 
These structures cannot be understood apart from their status as created, and hence 
they cannot be understood apart from Jesus Christ.  
 
1.1.1 “We Cannot Live without Them” 
In Christ and the Powers, Hendrik Berkhof had written of the powers as those 
“forces which hold together the world and the life of men and preserve them from 
chaos.”7 They are “the framework of creation, the canvas which invisibly supports 
the tableau of the life of men and society,” the basic “structures of earthly existence” 
(23). “Creation has a visible foreground, which is bound together with and dependent 
on an invisible background. This latter comprises the powers” (28). As the author of 
Colossians puts it, in Christ “all things hold together [synestken]” (Col. 1:17). The 
powers thereby “serve as the invisible weight-bearing substratum of the world, as the 
underpinnings of creation” (C&P 28-29). In other words, physical and social 
structures are the divinely intended tools by which Christ sustains creation—they are 
instruments of providence. As such, they may not be considered as fundamentally 
evil:  
They are the linkage between God’s love and visible human experience. They are to 
hold life together, preserving it within God’s love, serving as aids to bind men fast in 
His fellowship; intermediaries, not as barriers but as bonds between God and man. 
As aids and signposts toward the service of God, they form the framework within 
which such service must needs be carried out. (29) 
 
                                                 
5 Cf. Jn 1:1-3; 1 Cor. 8:6; Heb. 1:2f. On the authorship of Colossians and other “disputed” letters, this 
thesis follows Yoder’s lead: “It is not crucial for present purposes whether the same person who wrote 
to the Romans also wrote to the Ephesians and the Colossians” (PJ, 138n3). Unless otherwise noted, 
all scripture cited in this thesis is from the New Revised Standard Version. 
6 Yoder, PJ, 140-141, following Berkhof, C&P, 27-29. All transliterations follow SBL guidelines. 
7 Berkhof, C&P, 22. Future references to this work in this paragraph are in the text.  
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However Christians might view the present fallen powers, they are not to forget that 
the powers are created, and “therefore the believer’s combat is never to strive against 
the Orders, but rather to battle for them, and against their corruption” (29). An 
interpretation of the powers as fallen and redeemable thus depends crucially on 
convictions as to their status as created. 
 John Howard Yoder does not reference the doctrine of creation in his earliest 
appropriations of Berkhof’s theology of the principalities and powers. In “The 
Anabaptist Dissent,” he distinguishes between the subjection of the powers and of 
the church to Christ.8 Christian Witness to the State contains a strong statement about 
the powers as God’s instruments in “the order of providence,’ where Christ reigns 
over man’s disobedience.”9 This statement, however, is not explicitly related to his 
later rejection of general revelation as providing norms for social structures.10 The 
chapter on “Christ and Power” in The Politics of Jesus, however, has a brief section 
entitled “The Origin of the Powers in the Creative Purpose of God.” Reading 
Colossians 1:15-17 in similar terms to Berkhof, Yoder insists that, in spite of the New 
Testament’s emphasis on the fallenness of the powers,  
It is important…to begin with the reminder that they were part of the good creation 
of God. Society and history, even nature, would be impossible without regularity, 
system, and order—and God has provided for this need. The universe is not 
sustained arbitrarily, immediately, and erratically by an unbroken succession of new 
divine interventions. It was made in an ordered form and “it was good.” The creative 
power worked in a mediated form, by means of the Powers that regularized all 
visible reality.11 
 
Summarizing the point later, he writes that “there could not be society or history, 
there could not be humanity without the existence above us of religious, intellectual, 
moral, and social structures. We cannot live without them.”12 This created 
indispensability of the powers to humanity is what, for Yoder as for Berkhof, makes 
them objects of redemption even after their fall.13 As will be discussed in more detail 
                                                 
8 Yoder, “Anabaptist Dissent,” in Roots of Concern, ed. Vogt, 36. 
9 Yoder, CWS, 12. Yoder writes “order” as such to emphasize that the powers’ limited providential role 
is in mind in Romans 13, where taxis (“order”) is at the root of several of the words Paul uses, e.g., 
“Let every soul be subordinate to the ordained authorities” (Rom. 13:1a, Yoder’s translation).  
10 Yoder, CWS, 33-35, cf. 60-65. 
11 Yoder, PJ, 141. 
12 Ibid., 143. 
13 Ibid., PJ, 143, 144. 
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below, this theology of the created powers became Yoder’s alternative to 
“mainstream” attempts to derive a creational social ethic apart from Christ.14  
 Yoder extends beyond Berkhof’s theology of the powers in his mild 
theoretical preoccupation with the nature of power and structures. Whereas Berkhof 
does not offer general meanings for those terms at all, in The Politics of Jesus Yoder 
gives common sense definitions of “power” as pointing “in all its modulations to 
some kind of capacity to make things happen” and of “structure” as “the patterns or 
regularities that transcend or precede or condition the individual phenomena we can 
immediately perceive.”15 The latter definition becomes the basis for a holistic or 
nonreductive social ontology, as “structures are not and never have been a mere sum 
total of the individuals composing them. The whole is more than the sum of its 
parts.”16 These transcendent wholes are what Yoder understands the powers to be. He 
defines the powers in similar structural terms in “Early Christian Cosmology and 
Nonviolence,” even after admitting that Paul is not interested in speculation on “what 
kinds of entities he is talking about.”17 Yoder is, however, more careful here to clarify 
that the powers “cannot be identified with social structures but are most adequately 
understood as a larger reality, of which visible…structures are the manifestation.”18 
Although he does not specify what the “larger reality” is, he does go on to distinguish 
the powers from personal morality and purpose.  
 For Yoder, both power and structure are modified by Jesus Christ. Jesus’ 
deployment of nonviolent service is definitive of the “capacity to make things 
happen” and his creation of a community of nonviolent service is normative for all 
“patterns or regularities,” at least as these involve human social interaction.19 
Although Jesus enters history well into the development of civilization, as the 
firstborn of creation his life is the primary source of knowledge about creation. 
According to Yoder, Jesus and the church disclose the original created powers, and 
are not merely redemptive rejoinders to the fallen powers. In God’s providence, we 
                                                 
14 Ibid., PJ, 134-136, 144, 153-155; “Servant,” 162-166; “HRN,” 68-71.  
15 Yoder, PJ, 138. 
16 Yoder, PJ, 143; “Servant,” 162. Elsewhere Yoder employs the term “culture” to describe them 
(“Servant,” 157, “HRN,” 69-71, 85). 
17 Yoder, Nonviolence, 100-101.  
18 Ibid., 102. 
19 Yoder, CWS, 9-10; PJ, 144-149; “Servant,” 155-160, 164; “HRN,” 71, 73-76. For an argument that 
Yoder’s kenotic Christology illuminates physical cosmology, see Murphy and Ellis, Moral Nature, 
202-220. 
   28 
humans do not live with what we cannot live without: structures that provide relative 
unity and a relatively orderly deployment of power. In Christ, we see an exhibition of 
the creational goodness of structured existence. 
   
1.1.2 Theology of the Powers in Ecumenical Context 
Yoder disclaims any originality in his theology of the powers, preferring instead to 
speak of “the Berkhof synthesis” that he represents.20 But Yoder did more than 
simply repeat Berkhof, and theology of the powers takes a distinctive shape in the 
context of his own ecumenical theology and practice. This shape can be discerned 
first by tracing the polemical agenda of Yoder’s theology, and then by describing 
how Yoder drew upon diverse ecumenical resources to construct a theology of the 
powers that would contribute to his polemic.  
 The Politics of Jesus results from a commission by a Mennonite think tank 
for “a ‘peace witness’ that Mennonites could recognize as their own, yet which 
would be aimed at non-Mennonite readers.”21 Its argument was meant to counter the 
assumption of many Christians that Jesus has little to do with practical social 
ethics.22 That assumption, for Yoder, reflects a “theology of the natural” in which 
“the nature of things is held to be adequately perceived in their bare givenness; the 
right is that which respects or tends toward the realization of the essentially given.”23 
What “is”—whether that is understood to be creation, the dictates of the state, or the 
“situation”—is viewed as an unproblematic source for ethical norms. Jesus has 
nothing to add. Against the theology of the natural, Yoder develops a political 
reading of Jesus from the Gospel of Luke, and he goes on to demonstrate its 
continuity with the trajectory of Old Testament political thought, and with the rest of 
the New Testament. The chapter on “Christ and Power” is part of his effort to 
demonstrate the consonance between the politics of Jesus and the politics of Paul.  
 “Christ and Power” opens with Yoder’s taking aim at personalistic theologies, 
especially Lutheran, pietist, and existentialist theologies, which occlude New 
Testament teachings on social power.24 The “‘pietistic’ misunderstanding,” in which 
                                                 
20 Yoder, “Servant,” 161-161; also PJ, 136; “HRN,” 280n96, 282n114. 
21 Yoder, “The Politics of Jesus Revisited,” in UNDA. See Nation, John Howard Yoder, 110-112. 
22 Yoder, PJ, 1-20. 
23 Ibid., 8. 
24 Ibid., 134-136. 
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the path to social transformation runs only through redeemed individuals, comes in 
for specific criticism later.25 Although not explicitly tied to the theology of the 
principalities and powers he develops earlier in the book, near the end of Christian 
Witness to the State, Yoder offers an assessment of the politics of pietism as 
sporadically creative but typically conformist.26 Although ecumenical theologians 
like to impugn pietism as the one clearly indefensible Christian social strategy, Yoder 
sees ecumenists as adopting a pietist position: the state rather than the church is 
treated as the paradigmatic political community, responsible individuals are seen as 
the bearers of the Christian social message, and majority opinion (or “natural law”) 
provides ethical standards rather than Christ. In “Christ and Power,” Yoder names 
ecumenical theologian Roger Mehl as an exemplar of this approach.27 In light of 
Yoder’s theology of the created powers, the error here is ignorance of the powers’ 
creational status: human individuals cannot be isolated from the social structures that 
give shape to their lives.  
  Elsewhere in “Christ and Power,” theologies of the “orders of creation” are 
attacked for insufficiently balancing providence with fallenness, omitting religion 
and ideology from their purview, and negating Jesus as normative ethical source.28 
Although they go beyond pietism to promote a political theology for “responsible” 
Christian citizenship, their criteria for responsibility are not materially related to 
Christ. Yoder mentions Lutheran and neo-Calvinist theologies as typical here, but 
singles out H. Richard Niebuhr as a leading contemporary representative of the 
theology of the orders.29 According to Yoder, Niebuhr’s fault is to make each person 
of the Trinity a separate moral source. Niebuhr had argued that Christianity is a loose 
association of unitarianisms of the Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Churches tend to 
derive their theology either from creation, a (mystical or ethical) “Jesus cult,” or a 
mystical spiritualism.30 Each has validity, and a “synthesized formula in which all the 
partial insights and convictions are combined” is therefore necessary for Christian 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 153-155. 
26 Yoder, CWS, 84-88.  
27 Yoder, PJ, 135n1. Mehl searched for a Christian ethic that accepts Jesus’ irrelevance. See his 
“Christian Social Ethics,” 44. 
28 Yoder, PJ, 144.  
29 Ibid., 144n7. Yoder focuses on Niebuhr’s essay “Doctrine of the Trinity,” but see also Niebuhr, 
Christ and Culture, 81-82, 114, and 131. 
30 Niebuhr, “Doctrine of the Trinity,” 372-378. 
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unity.31 Yoder’s most expansive critique of Niebuhr’s trinitarian theology appears in 
the essay “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned.”32 There Yoder denies that Niebuhr’s 
argument has any basis in the Bible or in subsequent orthodox theological 
development.33 In fact, given Niebuhr’s stated orthodox intentions, it is likely that his 
modalism is but a screen, “a slogan, symbolizing in a superficial way [his] urbane, 
pluralistic concern for a balance between Christ and other moral authorities.”34 Yoder 
opts for what he regards as a more biblical Christology by proclaiming that Christ is 
the “agent of creation” and “Lord of history.”35 The theology of the powers is then 
offered as an alternative Christian social vision in which neither creation nor the 
work of the Spirit is taken to provide independent moral norms.  
 In his Stone Lectures at Princeton Theological Seminary, many of Yoder’s 
concerns about Niebuhr are directed towards Reformed theologies of the orders of 
creation.36 Yoder does not name specific Reformed theologians in his third lecture, 
when he discusses the powers, but it is possible that he had his debating partner 
Richard Mouw in mind there.37 Mouw advances a neo-Calvinist creational theology, 
in which the functioning of creational “spheres,” such as family and the state, is read 
as a sign of God’s provision of common grace.38 Excellence within the spheres, as 
that quality is defined by norms internal to each sovereign sphere, testifies to this 
grace.39 Mouw had proposed a neo-Calvinist theology of the powers against Yoder in 
his early book Politics and the Biblical Drama,40 and they subsequently published 
                                                 
31 Ibid., 383.  
32 Yoder, “HRN,” 61-65. 
33 Ibid., 61-62. 
34 Ibid., 63. 
35 Ibid., 62. 
36 Yoder draws the parallel between his critique of Niebuhr and of Reformed theology in “Servant,” 
159. 
37 Cf. PJ, 144n7, where Yoder names Herman Dooyeweerd, the Reformed theologian and philosopher, 
and his concept of “sphere sovereignty.” Both Dooyeweerd and Abraham Kuyper, the originator of the 
concept, influenced Mouw. See Dooyeweerd, New Critique, 1:101-106, 3:170, 221-222, 629-630; 
Kuyper, Calvinism, 78-109; Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty.” 
38 Mouw, He Shines, 31-51; Mouw, Biblical Drama, 34-35; Mouw, Kings Come Marching.  
39 Mouw, He Shines, 36: “I think God takes delight in Benjamin Franklin’s wit and in Tiger Wood’s 
putts and in some well-crafted narrative paragraphs in a Salman Rushdie novel, even if these 
accomplishments are in fact achieved by non-Christian people….I think God enjoys these things for 
their own sakes.” Cf. Kuyper, “Sphere Sovereignty,” 476-477, where he praises Spinoza who “grasped 
the sovereignty of learning in its own sphere” and refused to compromise his intellectual conclusions, 
although those conclusions were false. 
40 Mouw, Biblical Drama, 85-116.  
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essays together on the Reformed-Anabaptist dialogue.41 Branson Parler suggests that 
Yoder’s Anabaptist doctrine of creation, as intimated by his theology of the powers, 
is complementary to neo-Calvinism, insofar as “both [traditions] are joined by their 
continued mutual concern to live out the Lordship of Christ in everyday life.”42 
Yoder and Mouw indeed agree that they are engaged in an “intra-family” dispute.43 
Nevertheless, insofar as Mouw and other Reformed theologians emphasize the 
autonomy of a creational from a redemptive ethic, Yoder stands in opposition to 
them.  
 Perhaps the weightiest evidence for Yoder’s Anabaptist side of the dispute is 
that his theology of the powers is largely based on the work of Reformed 
theologians.44 In addition to Berkhof, other Reformed sources include Oscar 
Cullmann and Willem Visser ‘t Hooft. Cullmann, one of Yoder’s teachers at Basel,45 
regarded the powers as angels or spirits that act “behind” social structures and 
leaders to direct the course of world events.46 These created “angel-powers” are 
“grounded in Christ from the very beginning.”47 Visser ‘t Hooft’s account of the 
powers is largely Cullmannian, but he suggests that the impetus for the theology of 
the powers was born out of Karl Barth’s attempt to find an alternative to the 
traditional “orders” theology during World War II.48 Yoder does not name Barth as an 
influence at this point, but Barth is perhaps the most prominent Reformed proponent 
of theology of the powers—and also happened to teach Yoder at Basel.49 Barth 
makes little of the creational status of the powers, though he stresses that they are 
created (human) potentials gone astray.50 Barth, of course, famously refuses to 
                                                 
41 Yoder, “Reformed versus Anabaptist Social Strategies”; Mouw, “Reformed Assist”; Mouw and 
Yoder, “Anabaptist-Reformed Dialogue.”  
42 Parler, “Politics of Creation,” 77.  
43 Mouw and Yoder, “Anabaptist-Reformed Dialogue,” 135. 
44 Yoder, “Servant,” 161. 
45 See Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 114-130. 
46 Cullmann, Christ and Time, 190-196. Cf. Schleir, Principalities and Powers, 11-39, an early source 
for Cullmann, Berkhof and others. (Schleir was a Roman Catholic convert from Lutheranism.)  
47 Cullmann, “The Kingship of Christ and the Church in the New Testament,” in Early Church, 130. 
Cullmann is explicating Colossians 1:16. 
48 Visser ‘t Hooft, Kingship of Christ, 28-43. Barth himself was building on work by various New 
Testament interpreters. See, e.g., the references in Barth, Church and State, 23-36. 
49 See Carter, Politcs of the Cross, 61-90, and Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 104-114. 
50 Barth, Church and State, 30, and Barth, Christian Life, 214-215. Barth is explicit in the former, 
which was published after Yoder studied with him, that the powers are “human potentials,” though he 
had earlier referred to them as “angelic powers” (Church and State, 10-11). See also Barth, Against 
the Stream, 15-50. On changes in Barth’s theology of the powers—he initially rejected Berkhof’s 
   32 
separate creation from the revelation of Christ. Yoder’s theology of the powers has its 
own contours, but he agrees with his teachers that the powers originate in creation 
and that creation originates in Christ.51  
 Yoder’s contribution to ecumenical theology was not as an academic 
spectator, but rather as a lifelong advocate of peace church perspectives in the World 
Council of Churches and other forums.52 Christian Witness to the State began as a 
paper for a WCC-sponsored meeting of European peace churches with the 
established Protestant churches.53 The Politics of Jesus was written as a rejoinder to 
mainstream ethicists who marginalize Christ, and “Christ and Power” constructively 
appropriates arguments from ecumenical pioneer J. H. Oldham.54 Yoder’s Stone 
Lectures were delivered at a Presbyterian seminary, and “Early Christian Cosmology 
and Nonviolence” was written for the (Protestant) Polish Ecumenical Council as its 
members struggled to assess a nascent nonviolent movement led by Catholics and 
secular persons.55 “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned” was written to counter the 
pervasive influence of Christ and Culture throughout American Christianity, and 
published within an ecumenical assessment of Niebuhr’s theology.56 The theology of 
the principalities and powers therefore appears in these works, not merely as an 
interesting social theory, but also as a key device of Yoder’s ecumenical persuasion. 
By aligning himself with an emerging Reformed theology of creation, Yoder sought 
to gain a hearing in enemy territory for his christocentric, Anabaptist ethics. Yoder’s 
promulgation of the theology of the principalities and powers, in other words, is a 
                                                                                                                                          
interpretation as “mythologizing”—see Berkhof, C&P, 9.  
51 Yoder, PJ, 157, 159, names the French Reformed theologian Jacques Ellul as modeling social 
criticism rooted in theology of the powers. Ellul, however, only offers a positive doctrine of the 
created powers in his early work Theological Foundation of Law, 76-79. Cf. Fasching, The Thought of 
Jacques Ellul, 118. Yoder is more closely aligned with Barth, Cullmann, and Berkhof in underscoring 
the created goodness of the powers. Along with Berkhof, Yoder considers the British 
Congregationalist scholar G. B. Caird to have set forth theology of the powers most “systematically 
and concisely” (PJ, 136). See his Principalities and Powers, esp. 25, 46, 78, on creation.  
52 See Nation’s overview in John Howard Yoder. 
53 Yoder, CWS, 4; Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 26-27, 55, 114-116. The conference, held in 1955, 
was titled “The Lordship of Christ over Church and State” and consisted of responses to two papers 
by Oscar Cullmann, “The Kingship of Christ and the Church in the New Testament” and “The State in 
the New Testament.” These essays are in Cullmann, The Early Church, 101-137, and The State in the 
New Testament. 
54 Yoder, PJ, 4-13, 151-152. 
55 Martens, Porter, and Werntz, “Introduction,”in Yoder, Nonviolence, 1-3.  
56 Yoder, “HRN,” 31, which is published alongside articles by Glen Stassen (a Baptist) and Diane 
Yeager (a Lutheran). 
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consequence of his conviction that the powers are redeemable in Christ, through 
whom they are created.57  
 
1.1.3 The Created Identity of the Powers 
John Howard Yoder understands the created principalities and powers to be those 
powerful structures that make human life possible. In contrast to other traditional 
theological options, Yoder stresses that these structures are socio-political in nature 
and that their creational identity is best seen in the life of Jesus. Put in these terms, 
Yoder’s interpretation is unlikely to encounter much dissent from others working on 
the Pauline language of the powers. Nevertheless, how he articulates—or in this case, 
fails to articulate—the created relationship between social structures and spiritual 
entities has caused some consternation.58 Yoder disputes any historical evangelical 
consensus that would secure the identification of the powers with spirits.59 He 
counters the alleged consensus with an emerging agreement among biblical scholars 
that Paul at least had social structures, such as the state “authorities” (exousiais) in 
Romans 13:1, in mind—whatever else might also be meant by “powers” and related 
words. By focusing on only the agreed upon sociological dimensions of the powers, 
Yoder puts forth a metaphysically minimalist sociological theology.   
 Marva Dawn has outlined five typical hermeneutical strategies used by 
interpreters of the powers passages; an overview of these strategies helps locate 
Yoder’s interpretation. The first strategy is represented by Rudolf Bultmann and 
Ernst Käsemann, who argue for a thorough demythologization and abandonment of 
New Testament powers language.60 Berkhof and Barth go in the opposite direction, 
and Dawn names this second strategy “the Bible as demythologizer of the powers.” 
Biblical imagery is far more realistic than the modern denuded perspective, and it 
sees to the core of our political illusions. The third strategy includes Yoder, 
                                                 
57 The present tense here reflects what Parler, “Politics of Creation,” 71, rightly notes is Yoder’s 
theology of ongoing creation in which “Christ both restores and perfects creation.” 
58 Yoder, PJ, 160n28, on personal correspondence with John Stott. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Dawn, Ellul, 69. Dawn is critical of this strategy for failing to offer clear standards for determining 
which modern language or theoretical framework is adequate for translating the old myth. Amos 
Wilder and G. H. C. MacGregor’s demythologization projects illustrate the problem: both affirm 
demythologization, but Wilder believes something about the New Testament view is real and worth 
holding onto, and MacGregor rejects Bultmannian existentialism. See Wilder, Otherworldiness, and 
MacGregor, “Principalities and Powers.”  
   34 
Cullmann, Visser ‘t Hooft and others.61 It treats the Pauline language as analogous to 
modern realities, and these realities are named in functional social terms. Yoder’s 
discussion of the powers as social structures is typical of this strategy.62  
 A more traditional evangelical view is taken up by John Stott and Robert 
Webber, who both hold a “theory of direct application.”63 Proponents of this fourth 
hermeneutical strategy argue that the New Testament authors believed personal and 
intelligent spiritual beings were real, and so Christians today ought to believe 
likewise. Yoder debated Stott on this point, insisting that the application of the terms 
“personal,” “intelligent,” and “real” to the first century is anachronistic.64 According 
to Yoder, Stott reads the New Testament through “a worldview which persists 
uncritically in our popular culture, so that [he] can assume a greater univocality in 
the evangelical tradition than any scholar has in fact spelled out.” Dawn presents 
Webber as a more nuanced representative of this type; he holds that the New 
Testament authors had in mind both personal spiritual beings and the social and 
cultural institutions under their sway. Dawn endorses this view as maintaining the 
complete, if ambiguous biblical picture.65 She later contends that Jacques Ellul 
moved from a view close to Webber’s to the functionalist analogies of Yoder, 
Stringfellow, and the others.66 
 The fifth and final strategy belongs to Walter Wink and his followers. Wink, 
an American biblical scholar and activist, became convinced in the 1960s that Paul’s 
language was important for “comprehending institutional evil.”67 Developing this 
conviction led to a trilogy on the powers, a work on the powers in Gnosticism, a 
popularization of the trilogy, and two books that apply his analysis to contemporary 
socio-political events.68 In those works, Wink develops a distinctive interpretation of 
                                                 
61 Dawn, Ellul, 71-75, also includes Markus Barth, Gordon Rupp, William Stringfellow and others in 
this category.  
62 Yoder, PJ, 142f. James McClendon and Nancey Murphy’s treatments of the powers are also written 
in this analogical mode. See McClendon, Ethics, 162-176; Murphy, “Social Science, Ethics, and the 
Powers” and “Traditions, Practices, and the Powers,” in Transforming the Powers, eds. Gingerich and 
Grimsrud, 29-38, 84-95.   
63 Dawn, Ellul, 76f. See Stott, Ephesians, 267-275, and Webber, Church in the World, 24-45, 286-290. 
64 Yoder, PJ, 160n28.  
65 Dawn, Ellul, 77-78. 
66 Ibid., 84-165. Dawn points to Ellul’s late Subversion of Christianity, 174ff, as the turning point, 
comparing it to his Apocalypse where he repeatedly affirms the existence of independent powers 
which influence human affairs. 
67 Wink, Naming the Powers, xi. 
68 The “Powers Trilogy” consists of Wink, Naming the Powers, Unmasking the Powers, and Engaging 
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the powers as at once the “outer,” visible dimension of social institutions and their 
“inner,” invisible spiritual dimension. Wink’s strategy, based as it is on a dense 
amalgam of Jungian psychology, process theology, modern physics, and biblical 
criticism, is often difficult to follow and perhaps finally incoherent.69 But it is 
currently a leading strategy, recently earning distinction as the only theology of the 
principalities and powers to be feted with a collection of critical essays.70  
 In summary, Dawn portrays Yoder as pursuing an analogical, functional 
strategy that rejects demythologization and refrains from speculating on the spiritual 
dimensions highlighted by the other strategies. For Yoder, the powers may be created 
with an invisible spiritual dimension, but how to speak of it is far from evident—
better, then, to focus on how “this set of passages from the Pauline corpus 
demonstrates an astoundingly sweeping and coherent ‘translation’ of the political 
meaning of Jesus into the worldview of the audience of Paul’s missionary witness.”71 
The concern to discern a precise metaphysics of the powers actually moves modern 
interpreters further from the texts, texts that are largely interested in the socio-
political meaning of Jesus’ ministry.72 This minimalist sociological interpretation 
allows Yoder to avoid contentious debates about spirituality, but opens him to 
charges of reductionism and ignoring what Dawn identifies as the appropriate 
biblical ambiguity about the powers.  
 
1.1.4 Criticisms 
The possibility that Yoder’s tactical silence on the spiritual nature of the powers 
conceals a reduction is linked to questions about the coherence of his doctrine of 
God. In terms of the present subject, the issue concerns both the identity of creational 
structures and the identity of their creator. Mennonite theologian A. James Reimer 
addresses this problem with his suggestion that Yoder’s strictly political view 
“devalues the existentialist-sacramental power [for individuals] of Jesus’ message.”73 
                                                                                                                                          
the Powers. These were followed by Cracking the Gnostic Code, Violence and Nonviolence in South 
Africa, When the Powers Fall, The Powers That Be and other works. 
69 See Murphy, “Social Science, Ethics, and the Powers,” in Transforming the Powers, eds. Gingerich 
and Grimsrud, 33. 
70 Gingerich and Grimsrud, eds., Transforming the Powers. 
71 Yoder, PJ, 160. 
72 For similar methodological moves, see Yoder, PK, 46-62 and WL, 165-180.  
73 Reimer, Mennonites and Classical Theology, 293.  
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For Reimer, the human’s status qua individual before God is irreducible. But Yoder’s 
“sharply-focused ethical glasses” occlude “the mystical, spiritual, and sacramental,” 
as well as the metaphysical and ontological aspects of the doctrine of God that are 
the necessary underpinning of Christian ethics.74 Thomas Finger supports Reimer’s 
interpretation through a close reading of several of Yoder’s important works. Finger 
concludes that “the great majority of [Yoder’s] affirmations [about Christ and the 
church] provide no intrinsic reason to refer to anything beyond” ethics or other 
disciplines concerned with “exclusively” human realities.75  
 The most stringent criticism of Yoder along these lines has been worked out 
by Paul Martens in a series of three essays. In the first of these Martens cursorily 
mentions Yoder as an exemplar of “the spiritual poverty” of contemporary Anabaptist 
thought, and urges Mennonites to go beyond ethical christocentrism to recover a 
vigorous biblical and Anabaptist pneumatology.76 The second and third essays review 
the development of Yoder’s work on the sacraments and on the Hebrew prophet 
Jeremiah respectively.77 Martens sees Yoder’s thought undergoing three stages of 
growth. In the first, early stage, Yoder makes clear assertions about the uniqueness of 
Christ and the church, and his arguments ultimately depend on traditional Christian 
metaphysical affirmations. During the 1980s, however, Yoder begins to shift his 
emphasis from God to human activity: there is a blurring of lines between 
measurable ecclesial practices and God’s eschatological and sacramental action. But 
it is in the texts written in the final years of his life that, according to Martens, 
“Yoder tirelessly reduces” the life of the church to social processes that, far from 
being unique, are fully visible to and imitable by the rest of the world.78 The 
sacraments are indistinguishable from secular social practices, and there is no 
difference between the politics of Jesus, Jeremiah, and others who accept “not being 
in charge.”79  
                                                 
74 Ibid., 12. 
75 Finger, “Theology to Ethics?,” 332. 
76 Martens, “Discipleship,” 33-34. He references Dintaman, “Spiritual Poverty,” whose argument is 
that Mennonite theologians writing after Bender’s Anabaptist Vision tend to focus on ethics rather than 
the spiritual aspects of sin and redemption. Dintaman does not mention Yoder in his essay, and later 
defends him as offering an implicit robust theology (“Socio-Ecclesial Brushpile,” 33-49). 
77 Martens, “Problematic Development,” 65-77, and “Universal History,” 131-146. 
78 Martens, “Problematic Development,” 70. 
79 Ibid., 70, 74-75, and “Universal History,” 140. 
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 The allegations of Reimer, Finger, and Martens further indicate that Yoder’s 
theology of the created powers omits important personal and spiritual aspects of the 
structures of human life. They also raise the possibility that this omission is related to 
a weak or nonexistent commitment to historic Christian convictions about God, 
Christ, and the Spirit. As Nigel Goring Wright argues, Yoder lacks the metaphysical 
or ontological resources to develop an adequate trinitarian theology in which God the 
Father and creator is seen as complementing the redeeming work of Jesus and the 
Holy Spirit. Yoder holds to a “unitarianism of the Son” that eviscerates his theology 
of creation.80 Problems with Yoder’s trinitarianism may then explain criticisms by 
theologians such as Mouw and Gerald Schlabach that Yoder underplays the 
continuing goodness of the created powers, and so undercuts transformational 
politics, for example, by advocating limited Christian participation in government.81 
At issue is whether or not Yoder offers cogent replies to the questions of who created 
the powers and what they were created to be, given that these replies affect his 
construal of the fall and redemption of the powers. Can satisfactory answers be found 
in Yoder’s minimalistic, sociological theology, or ought Christians look elsewhere?  
 Yoder apparently found these sorts of questions abstract and distracting, but 
more recent theologians have found them vital for political discipleship. John 
Milbank has identified a difference between social theories rooted in a vision of 
“ontological violence” versus those based on a Christian vision of “ontological 
peace.”82 Both visions are derived from a narrative of origins that, by necessity, 
includes some idea of the who and the how of human origins. As David Burrell 
summarizes, “everything turns on the account we give of ‘in the beginning.’”83 The 
Christian account of creation does not portray original human being as meaningless 
or mired in strife, but as the gift of a loving God. Christian politics are, therefore, the 
pursuit of genuine social harmony, not merely an ever-allusive attempt to manage 
                                                 
80 Wright, Disavowing Constantine, 163-164. Wright contrasts Yoder’s negative view of the powers 
with Moltmann’s theology of hope. Carter, Politics of the Cross, 146, also finds the language of the 
powers to be unduly negative. 
81 Mouw, Biblical Drama, 105; Schlabach, “Christian Witness,” 234-235, 243n59. See also chapter 
five below. Charles Mathewes, “Culture,” 62, proposes against Yoder and others a “Patriological 
theology of culture”: “If God the Father is the Creator and Sustainer of the universe, we might insist 
that theological discourse—discourse about God—is the most profoundly cultural discourse one can 
find.” 
82 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 278-326, 429-440. 
83 Burrell, “Introduction,” 329. 
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struggle. Yoder’s theology of the created powers ostensibly supplies such a Christian 
vision of ontological peace based on a narrative of a nonviolent God who wills social 
structuring as essential to good human life.84 Yet if Yoder hesitates to endorse the 
basic convictions about God and creation that make the narrative intelligible, then the 
nature of his contribution is more difficult to discern. Paul Martens’s suggestion that 
Yoder may assimilate Christianity to a secular ethos indicates that he may rather 
embrace, wittingly or not, ontological violence and its attendant politics.85  
 This suggestion is strengthened by recent worries about Yoder’s partial 
endorsement of the Israelite holy war tradition. Yoder regards the biblical holy war 
passages as demonstrating Israel’s reliance on God in battle rather than on than their 
own military strength.86 The relativization of military preparedness is said to 
prefigure Jewish and Christian pacifism. But if the hallmark of Jesus’ revelatory 
politics is nonviolence, then a tension exists between Jesus and the fighting God of 
Israel. “Yoder has left us with the biblical and theological problem of a warrior 
God—of a moral Son and, if measured by the same criteria, an immoral Father.”87 If 
the Father is violent, then it is difficult to see how his creation is fundamentally, 
“ontologically” peaceable. Clarification is required around Yoder’s theology of the 
Trinity and its relation to his theology of creation. 
 There are a number of possible internal defenses of Yoder’s understanding of 
God and creation. Glen Stassen uncovers hints in Yoder’s late writings that “the 
experiential dimension and spiritual commitment crucial for peace church traditions 
cannot be reduced to ethical argument.”88 Craig Carter and Stephen Dintaman 
highlight the “orthodox” assumptions that would seem to undergird Yoder’s entire 
project—but even they admit that more constructive doctrinal work is necessary.89 
One could also point to recent writings on Yoder’s work on the powers that puts it 
into an apocalyptic context that always includes politics.90 Likewise, biblical 
                                                 
84 Cf. chapter three below. 
85 It would be ironic if Yoder embraced a kind of secular pacifism, given his criticism of Niebuhr for 
doing just that (“Reinhold Niebuhr,” 101-117). 
86 Yoder, PJ, 76-88. 
87 Gingerich, “Yoder’s God,” 418. See also Stoltzfus, “Nonviolent Jesus.” Here the irony would be if 
Yoder were to be guilty of the critique he leveled at H. Richard Niebuhr’s doctrine of the Trinity.  
88 Stassen, “Introduction,” in Yoder, WL, 15.  
89 Carter, Politics of the Cross, 236-237; Dintaman, “Socio-Ecclesial Brushpile,” 45, 48.  
90 Bourne, Seek the Peace, 210-216; Kerr, Christ, History, and Apocalyptic, 137-139. 
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scholarship tends to affirm the validity of a political interpretation of the powers.91 
Even if Yoder only gets part of the picture, perhaps his work can be developed 
fruitfully with a recognition of its limitations and need for supplementation. But 
hints, assumptions, and restricted claims do not get to the heart of the criticisms of 
Yoder’s project. Those criticisms suggest that his sociologically reductive theology 
of the created powers neglects personal spirituality and makes his account of the 
Trinity incoherent—problems that have rather negative implications for the 
theological and political recommendations based on them. A revision of Yoder’s 
theology of creation will need to attend to the larger spiritual reality in which the 
powers exist. Such a non-reductive sociological theology will acknowledge that 
social structures only exist in relation to God and persons.  
 
1.2 Bourdieu on Society  
During his more than forty years of sociological and anthropological research, Pierre 
Bourdieu formulated and refined a handful of concepts for practical analysis of the 
social world. Under the influence of the philosopher of symbolic forms Ernst 
Cassirer, psychologist and field theorist Kurt Lewin, and others, Bourdieu sought to 
move sociological science beyond an understanding of society as a grouping of 
substances, of objects with intrinsic identities outside of social relations—”the real is 
relational.”92 On this model, agents and institutions, as well as society itself, are 
viewed as relatively dense ensembles or nodes of relations to other ensembles or 
nodes. Relations are never static or neutral, but always more or less intensely 
“charged,” pushing or pulling towards some node or another. Lines of relation are 
lines of force, shaping groups of ensembles dynamically. Hence, Bourdieu’s 
approach to sociological description consists in identifying and exploring the 
objective relations determinative of a given agent or institution. As Lahouari Addi 
                                                 
91 See Harink’s evaluation in Paul among the Postliberals, 146-149. For a more critical perspective, 
see Forbes, “Demythologizing Apocalyptic?” and “Pauline Demonology and/or Cosmology?” 
Although Forbes contests the apocalyptic and “demythologizing” interpretations that follow after 
Berkhof, he argues that Paul saw a continuity between physical (e.g., political) and spiritual realities.  
92 Bourdieu, IRS, 96-98; PR, vii. In addition to Cassirer and Lewin, Bourdieu names Georges 
Dumézil, Norbert Elias, Claude Lévi-Strauss, Edward Sapir, and the Russian Formalists (such as 
Roman Jakobsen) as precedents. Bourdieu’s book IRS was co-authored with Loïc Wacquant. Aside 
from an introductory essay, which will be referenced under Wacquant’s name, the rest of the book 
consists of two interviews with Bourdieu. When the reference is to Bourdieu’s responses in those 
interviews, it simply reads Bourdieu, IRS. 
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writes, Bourdieu works against substantialism and “privilégie plutôt l’approche 
structurale et relationnelle, car, pour lui, la société est un flux et non un organe.”93 He 
accordingly creates “concepts qui expriment un mouvement et des relations et non 
une substance ou un système extérieur à l’individu.”94 Three concepts are at the basis 
of this relational sociology: habitus, capital, and field.  
 
1.2.1 Habitus 
Relegated to Algeria in 1955 as a disobedient soldier, Bourdieu slowly left behind 
academic philosophy, including his incomplete doctoral thesis on “The Temporal 
Structures of the Affective Life.”95 Upon his exit from the military, in 1958, he 
learned ethnographic and sociological techniques in order to represent the struggles 
of Algerian peasants to a French public ignorant of the consequences of war and 
colonialism. The rigors of empirical research satisfied his scientific epistemology 
and, before long, his ethnographic work provided material for reflection on his 
earlier philosophical preoccupation with the social experience of agents.96 Whereas 
Bourdieu’s early studies betray the strong influence of the structuralist emphasis on 
the determination of social practice by external structures,97 his later reflections 
demanded attention to agents. At the time, however, philosophical respect for the 
agent was typically expressed as existentialist exultation of the self-determining 
individual.98 Habitus is the concept Bourdieu formulated to transcend or dissolve the 
antinomy between deterministic structuralism and ahistorical subjectivism.99  
                                                 
93 Addi, Bourdieu, 25-26: Bourdieu “privileges rather the structural and relational approach, because, 
for him, society is a flux and not an organ.” See also Schinkel, “Sociological Discourses of the 
Relational”; Vandenberghe, “‘The Real is Relational.’” 
94 Ibid.: He creates “concepts that express movement and relations, not substance or a system exterior 
to the individual.” 
95 Bourdieu, CD, 16; SSA, 38-44. 
96 Bourdieu’s doctoral investigations formed the basis of OTP (SSA, 33). See the many works on 
Algeria listed in the bibliography below.  
97 Marlène Benquet, “Détermination,” in Abécédaire, ed. Cazier, 42-43. Bourdieu attended the 
structuralist anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss’s research seminars in the early 1960s (Robbins, 
Bourdieu and Culture, 22). Bourdieu writes on structuralism in OTP, 1-71; LP, 30-41; CD, 19-28. On 
this period of French intellectual activity, see Bourdieu, CD, 13-38; HA; SSA, 4-43; and Kauppi, 
French Intellectual Nobility. 
98 Bourdieu opposes as ahistorical all subjectivisms and intellectualisms, including existentialism, 
phenomenology, ethnomethodology, rational action theory, and (Christian) humanism and personalism 
(OTP, 72-95; LP, 42-51; CD, 22; CS, 251). Cf. Throop and Murphy, “Bourdieu and Phenomenology.” 
99 Bourdieu often notes his debt to Ludwig Wittgenstein’s efforts in “dissolving” debates between 
objectivists and subjectivists, especially his understanding of rule following. See Bourdieu OTP, 29; 
CD, 19; LP, 18, 25, 39; PM, 1, 31. Cf. e.g., Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §82, 197-202. 
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 Bourdieu claims, perhaps immodestly,100 to work within an ancient 
philosophical tradition in which “habitus” has been used in various ways to denote 
the historical, embodied nature of human dispositions.101 More immediately, 
Bourdieu first employed the term in discussions of art historian Erwin Panofsky’s 
Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism.102 Panofsky wrote to demonstrate that high 
scholasticism’s “monopoly on education” endowed cultured persons with shared 
“mental habits” unconsciously formative of the modus operandi of artistic 
production.103 Using “habitus” as an a propos translation of “mental habits,” 
Bourdieu elaborated his understanding of historically endowed habits dynamically 
generative of innovative cultural practices of production. The concept would soon 
appear in his writings on education and religion as the primary means through which 
societies reproduce their norms and structures.104 Inculcation of a habitus, of 
determinate and durable ways of seeing and acting in the world that are effective 
even in unforeseen circumstances, is the central task of families, schools, and cultural 
institutions.105 
 In the 1970s Bourdieu returned to his earlier ethnological research in order to 
conceive a general theory of practice as non-intentional strategy. Outline of a Theory 
of Practice and The Logic of Practice represent major leaps from Panofsky’s “mental 
habits” insofar as habitus now includes “bodily hexis,” dispositions that are written 
                                                                                                                                          
For critical accounts of Bourdieu’s relationship to Wittgenstein, see Schatzki, “Practice and Actions,” 
and Stirk, “Wittgenstein and Social Practices.” 
100 Sterne, “Bourdieu, Technique and Technology,” 377. Sterne sees Norbert Elias and Marcel Mauss 
as the relevant antecedents of Bourdieu’s “habitus.”  
101 Bourdieu, CD, 20, 22-23, calls habitus a “vieux concept artistotélicien-thomiste” either used by or 
similar to other concepts in Hegel (Habitualität, Sittlichkeit), Heidegger, Husserl, Merleau-Ponty, 
Weber, Durkheim, Mauss (hexis), and others to reintroduce dispositions and embodied practices into 
philosophy and sociology (cf. Bourdieu, IRS, 121). Bourdieu, OTP, 214n1, defines “disposition” as 
“the result of an organizing action, with a meaning close to that of words such as structure; it also 
designates a way of being, a habitual state (especially of the body) and, in particular, a predisposition, 
tendency, propensity, or, inclination.” 
102 Panofsky, Gothic Architecture and Scholasticism. Bourdieu, “Creative Project and Intellectual 
Field,” 118-119, and “Postface” to Architecture gothique et pensée scholastique by Panofsky. 
103 Panofsky, Gothic Architecture, 22, 27-28. Bourdieu later contrasts his focus on modus operandi 
with structuralist emphasis on the opus operatum (OTP, 18, 36, 72, 90, 111; “Sur le pouvoir 
symbolique,” 407; Distinction, 172-173; LP, 12; RA, 340).  
104 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 31, 40, 43, 46-48, 179, 205; Bourdieu, “Legitimation and 
Structured Interest,” in Max Weber, eds. Lash and Whimster, 126, 131.  
105 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 43. As such “habitus” can be seen as the inheritor to Émile 
Durkheim’s attempt to sociologize the a priori categories of Kantian epistemology through an 
exposition of religious “collective representations” functional for social stability. Durkheim, 
Elementary Forms, 8-18. Cf. Champagne and Christin, Bourdieu, 89. 
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into the shape, movement, and use of the body, for instance, by the differential use of 
the family household space by the mother and father.106 Bourdieu notes a connection 
between “traditional”107 peasant habitus and that which is designated in modern 
societies as “personal style.”108 Through surveys assessed in Distinction, he proposes 
judgments of cultural “taste” as highly significant categories in the stakes of French 
cultural reproduction.109 Preferences in music, theatre, newspapers, fashion, and 
other areas are both indicative and constitutive of social class. Habitus is both a 
“structured structure” of embodied dispositions, and a “structuring structure” of new 
practices and modes of cultural production110—though for the most part “new” does 
not entail the interruption of social reproduction. In social theory, habitus thus 
replaces the determining rules of structuralism, as well as the conscious calculations 
of subjectivists. The ends of practice are given by the objective possibilities of a 
given social situation, and are only available to agents insofar as they possess the 
perceptual schema, the habitus, to see and use them.111 Because the logic of practice 
is inscribed into bodies and brains through education, its exercise requires no “logic” 
in the academic sense but rather a “feel for the game.”112 As Bourdieu would put it in 
a late work, the human body is a “memory pad” that both registers the effects of 
history, and strategically deploys them to make new history.113 The experience of 





                                                 
106 On bodily hexis, see OTP, 88-95; Distinction, 173-174; LP, 66-79; MD, 64. On the household, see 
OTP, 90, 93; LP, 271-283. Mauss, Merleau-Ponty, and Goffman are influential in his discussion of 
bodily hexis (OTP, 94-95; CD, 20, 23; IRS, 121). On Bourdieu’s departure from Panofsky’s 
intellectualism, see Bourdieu, CD, 23, and Hanks, “Practices of Language,” 70-72.  
107 Martín-Criado, Les deux Algéries, 91-95, rejects Bourdieu’s description of post-colonial Kabylia as 
traditional. This debate would not seem to affect Bourdieu’s account of the collision between 
relatively undifferentiated societies and complex capitalist societies.  
108 Bourdieu, OTP, 85; LP, 60. The connection Bourdieu makes here undermines, at least somewhat, 
the complaint that he used Algeria as a pre-modern foil for modern French society. See, e.g,. Engler, 
“Modern Times”; Martín-Criado, Les deux Algéries, 110-111. See further discussion in Reed-Danahay, 
Locating Bourdieu, 84, 90. 
109 Bourdieu, Distinction, 6, 11, 18, 56, et passim.  
110 Bourdieu, OTP, 72; Distinction, 170; LP, 53. 
111 Bourdieu, OTP, 96-158; “Avenir de classe”; LP, 80-97.  
112 On the “feel for the game,” see Bourdieu, LP, 66-67, 81, 104; PR, 23. 
113 Bourdieu, PM, 141. 
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1.2.2 Capital  
As in a Darwinian account of biological evolution, in which certain evolved physical 
traits result in a species advantage in a given context, for Bourdieu each habitus or, 
more accurately, each group of similar habitus has features that are more or less 
valuable in a given setting.114 In particular, it is vital that agents recognize what is 
and is not valuable for their material and social well-being—and such perceptual 
ability depends on habitus. Bourdieu’s theory of capital is far more expansive than 
the Marxist focus on material property.115 It is, indeed, less a “theory of capital” than 
an attempt to enumerate all that has value for humans. “Capital,” for Bourdieu, 
includes aspects of the agent herself and her relations, as well as material holdings. 
Whatever else it may be, capital is always symbolic, its value always derived from 
perceptions that differentiate the world into hierarchies of worth.116  
 Bourdieu’s influential early work on the French education system, Les 
Héritiers, with Jean-Claude Passeron, portrays a series of correlations existent 
between the “cultural heritage” of university students, their socio-economic 
background, and their chances of academic success. The authors repudiate any 
reduction of success to social origin, instead positing a complex relationship between 
class, setting, and practice.117 But “cultural heritage,” as a stable deposit of 
dispositions towards specific cultural products and practices, is soon replaced in 
Bourdieu’s work by capital as value arising situationally from a set of relations.118 
Already in Reproduction, what counts as “cultural capital” emerges in the process of 
school selection.119 In Outline of a Theory of Practice, Bourdieu writes on the 
“matrimonial game” as involving both “symbolic” and material capital, as well as the 
                                                 
114 On Bourdieu’s Darwinian sociology, see Bennett, “Historical Universal.” Cf. Bourdieu and 
Passeron, Reproduction, 32, on the analogy between cultural and genetic capital.  
115 On Bourdieu’s relation to Marx and Marxism, see Bourdieu, PM, 9; IRS, 126, 250; Champagne and 
Christin, Bourdieu, 89-95, 117; Grenfell, Education and Training, 184-187; Heinich, Pourquoi 
Bourdieu, 102-105; Robbins, Bourdieu and Culture, 44-49, 61, 123-124. 
116 Bourdieu, PR, 47. This is a late definition of symbolic capital, and earlier Bourdieu often 
contrasted symbolic with economic capital (e.g., OTP, 178). As detailed in chapter four below, 
Bourdieu used functional, “open concepts” that he constantly refined through research (Bourdieu, IRS, 
95-96). See Anheir, Gerhards, and Romo, “Forms of Capital,” 862n2, for a critique of Bourdieu’s 
ambiguous use of “capital.”  
117 Bourdieu and Passeron, Les Héritiers, 61. 
118 Champagne and Christin, Bourdieu, 109. See also Bourdieu, LP, 41, on capital and his other 
concepts as relations rather than “entelechies.”  
119 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 87. 
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“capital of alliances.”120 As in a card game, success is always a combination of the 
hand dealt and the strategic skill of the player vis-à-vis the other hands and players. 
The value of skill, hand, and relation to the other players only arises insofar as the 
game is underway. Bourdieu also emphasizes the relative interconvertability of 
different kinds of capital, as when strategic skill compensates for a poor hand, e.g., in 
a bluff.121  
 Bourdieu’s understanding of capital receives further refinement in Distinction 
and other works written around the same time. Capital is now defined explicitly as a 
“social relation” or “energy” that functions within the setting of its production.122 It is 
at once power itself, and the means of gaining greater power.123 The formation of 
habitus within “social spaces”124 structured by differential capital distribution tends 
to lead to perceptions of those structures as “natural.”125 Agents’ particular 
dispositions toward their social spaces are, however, inextricable from their own 
locations, from the opportunities afforded them by their dynamic capital holdings.126 
In “Forms of Capital,” Bourdieu delineates possible holdings as economic,127 social 
(relationships),128 and cultural capital. Cultural capital is found in an embodied state, 
as habitus; in an objectified state, as a culturally valuable accumulation of objects, 
e.g., a “tasteful” private literary archive, rather than one assembled by those with 
economic but no cultural means; and in an institutionalized state, as formal cultural 
                                                 
120 Bourdieu, OTP, 58, 70. 
121 Bourdieu, OTP, 178-179, 193; Distinction, 310; LP, 121-134; “Forms of Capital,” 252-254.  
122 Bourdieu, Distinction, 113; LP, 122. 
123 Bourdieu, Distinction, 315-316, cf. 228; Bourdieu and Saint-Martin, “La Sainte Famille,” 28-29.  
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Social Capital, 17, 55). 
128 “Social capital” is a term used by a variety of academics from various theoretical perspectives. On 
Bourdieu and Robert Putnam, see Swartz, “Pierre Bourdieu and North American Political Sociology,” 
89. For a critique of the concept as used by Bourdieu, Gary Becker, and John Coleman, see Fine, 
Social Capital. Bourdieu criticizes Becker’s “human capital” in “Avenir de classe,” 36. 
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recognition such as an academic degree or an award for artistic achievement.129 Each 
of these forms of capital represents a relative potential for different forms of social 




Throughout the preceding discussion of habitus and capital has been constant 
reference to the importance of historical and social context in understanding the 
dispositions, practices, and values of agents. Bourdieu specifies this context with the 
concept “field,” dynamic networks of determinate, objective relationships. His first 
significant treatment of the concept was in 1966, with “Champ intellectuel et projet 
créateur.”130 There Bourdieu reviews the development of “the creative project” in 
western art and literature as occurring within a nexus of relations between producers, 
distributors, and audiences. The concern is to refute reductions of cultural production 
to either economics or aesthetics. As he would put it later, fields of cultural 
production mediate between individual producers and the economic sphere by 
providing internal, semi-autonomous production standards.131 A field emerges as 
those standards are constructed and enabled progressively to regulate production, 
product distribution, and product reception. Increasing allegiance to a set of field 
standards results in the legitimation of the field, a situation that agents in the field 
will typically seek to prolong through reproductive institutions (schools). 
Concomitant with the elaboration of the field, there is a gradual creation of 
individuals who are disposed to participate within it—the birth of a field births 
habitus. 
 Derek Robbins notes that, as Bourdieu distanced himself from structuralism 
in the late 1960s, his interest in fields turned to their practical construction.132 In 
Reproduction and “Legitimation and Structured Interests in Weber’s Sociology of 
Religion,” Bourdieu begins to unfold an account of fields as existing through a 
                                                 
129 Bourdieu, “Forms of Capital,” 241-249. 
130 As Addi, Bourdieu¸ 26, and Engler, “Modern Times,” 455, point out, Bourdieu constructed the 
concept “field” only after returning to complex modern French society from Algeria.  
131 Bourdieu, Les usages sociaux de la science, 14. 
132 Robbins, Bourdieu and Culture, 37-38. 
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practical logic of competing interests.133 Legitimation of an area of interest is 
equivalent to power for the interest holders,134 who establish their interests as an 
orthodoxy.135 But as allegiance to a single interest is never uniform, heterodoxies 
arise, and so a field is both a power structure and a struggle to transform it. Bourdieu 
soon begins to refer to belief in the prevailing orthodoxies as a “doxa.”136 He also 
specifies “illusio” as the investment in the “game” of a field, an investment shared 
even by those who seek to break the doxa (“heresiarchs”).137  
 Implicit in Bourdieu’s understanding of fields is an appropriation of the 
classic sociological depiction of societal development from a simple unity to modern 
differentiation.138 From Outline of a Theory of Practice onward, Bourdieu employs 
the terminology of temporal differentiation to represent both the complexification of 
structures and interests.139 Capital is introduced into field theory, and a key difference 
between traditional and modern societies is said to be the relative unity and ease of 
conversion of the forms of capital in the former.140 In Distinction, Bourdieu reworks 
“social class” as three dimensional groupings of certain volumes and types of capital 
as these are flexibly held by groups and individuals over time.141 At this point, a field 
is defined as a dynamic class hierarchy specific to a given form of capital. Agents are 
thus involved in the construction and attempted legitimation of capital, and the force 
of other forms of capital is more or less blunted, or “refracted,” insofar as a complex, 
autonomous field is built up around it.142 In highly complex societies, a “field of 
power” exists in which large-scale holders of particularly valuable capital vie for the 
ascendancy of their own type.143 Fields as “microcosms” of the social “macrocosm” 
                                                 
133 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 18-19, 203-204; Bourdieu, “Structured Interests,”121-122, 
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134 Bourdieu, “Structured Interests,” 127. 
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136 Bourdieu, OTP, 165-166, 168; LP, 36, 68; IRS, 98-100; PR, 66-67. For Bourdieu, doxa is closely 
associated with “common sense.” See Holton, “Common Sense.” 
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140 Bourdieu, “Forms of Capital,” 243, 246. 
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143 Bourdieu, Distinction, 315-316; IRS, 76n16; PR, 16, 30-34, 41-42. 
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are the results of agents’ efforts to distinguish themselves and gain power.144 As with 
habitus and capital, these areas of social possibility are ineluctably tied to economics, 
but they are not reducible to economics. They are driven by personal interests, yet 
they shape interests through the collective weight of the embodied and 
institutionalized historical structures that constitute them.  
 
1.3 Revising Yoder’s Theology of Creation 
Bourdieu’s concepts of habitus, capital, and field provide a richer interpretation of 
power and structure than Yoder’s common sense definitions.145 Beyond Yoder’s 
definition of power as “some kind of capacity to make things happen,” Bourdieu 
points to how capacities arise as determinate relational nodes or, more precisely, as 
accumulations of various dispositions and goods recognized by participants in a field 
as valuable (capital). The conviction that power is created by God thus involves, in 
this construal, an anthropological claim about the centrality of practical value 
judgments to created human being and, further, that such judgments always exist as 
structured by particular historical and social contexts. Power is a function of 
structure, but it is also constitutive and generative of structure: power is always an 
interested act, a practice of capital maintenance or investment, in and for a given 
structural configuration. Yoder’s definition of structure as “the patterns or regularities 
that transcend or precede or condition the individual phenomena we can immediately 
perceive”146 is therefore not wrong but incomplete. It underestimates how patterns 
and regularities are products of a dialectical encounter between agents and structures 
or, in Bourdieu’s terminology, between capital-endowed habitus and fields (structures 
of capital). Structures both transcend individual practices, and are contained within 
them. Interest is a personal and systemic phenomenon and, on Bourdieu’s account, 
must be viewed in action to be comprehended. The powers exist as habitus, capital, 
and field, independent but interpenetrating realities lived as relatively durable 
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ensembles of structured practices (institutions and agents). “We cannot live without 
them” indeed, for we are them.  
 The Bourdieusian reading of the powers may give conceptual depth and 
clarity to Yoder’s understanding of what it means that human existence is innately 
socially structured. The issue for many of Yoder’s critics, however, is how to deal 
with the omission of personal and spiritual dimensions of reality from his 
sociological theology of creation—how can Bourdieu help here? 
 
Recovering the Personal 
It should be apparent, first of all, that Bourdieu gives considerable attention to 
personal practice and affect. Bourdieu’s dispositional sociology147 privileges the 
examination of agents insofar as their modus operandi reveals the conditions of their 
practice more accurately than a decontextualized analysis of their products (their 
opus operatum). This move towards agents is not a veiled repristination of 
structuralism, but an insistence that society, as a human phenomenon, is only 
understood with reference to emotional, intellectual, and bodily ways of being. Each 
of these overlapping ways of being is irreducibly personal and irreducibly social: the 
personal is social, and the social is personal.148 Theological interpretation of the 
powers ought to include the personal, not as an alternative to the social, but because 
society is lived and experienced personally. “The powers are created” is as much a 
statement about social structures as it is about the structured nature of personal 
existence. Because the theology of the principalities and powers concerns the powers 
as a whole, its area of inquiry includes persons and structures as interlocking 
realities.  
 Critics who wish Yoderian theology to consider an asocial soul or “subject” 
will undoubtedly be disappointed by this solution, but to do so would be to abandon 
Yoder’s sociological theology altogether.149 From a sociological perspective, Yoder 
may be faulted for choosing the structuralist or objectivist extreme in his rejection of 
pietistic subjectivism. Although, as previously noted, Yoder’s definition of structure 
                                                 
147 For this phrase see Bourdieu, PR, vii.  
148 Cf. Bourdieu, IRS, 202-215. 
149 See Neufeld, “Realism,” 44-57, for a criticism of Yoder’s “objectivism,” and Kroeker, “Yoder’s 
Voluntariety,” 56, for an argument that Yoder needs to embrace a Platonic-Augustinian conception of 
God’s invisible rule over the soul. These criticisms are considered in chapter two below. 
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in the Politics of Jesus is non-technical, and most of his other examples are 
unexceptionable, he does write of “the way words function following unwritten laws 
located somewhere in the common mental process of the race.”150 This line, perhaps, 
is only accidentally reminiscent of structuralist linguistics, but the resemblance 
strengthens the point made by critics, such as Reimer or Finger, who see no room for 
the personal in Yoder’s theology. On the other hand, in the context of a critique of 
“the pacifism of redemptive personalism,” Yoder reviews the practical and 
philosophical inadequacies of personalism and states, “nevertheless, there is no 
alternative to personalism. What cannot be done by persons will not be done. 
Overarching structures and institutions may amplify or dampen, twist or straighten 
what people do, but still people will do it.”151 Yoder may not have capitalized greatly 
on this insight in his own work, but it could be taken as the cornerstone of a Yoderian 
sociological theology integrative of personal and social analysis.  
 
Recovering the Spiritual 
On one level, this Bourdieusian restoration of the personal to the powers is already 
indicative of how spirituality, too, might be secured as a legitimate social query. As a 
dimension of both personal and collective being, spirituality is simply another of the 
dispositions upon which a theologian attentive to the powers might focus.152 The 
powers are spiritual inasmuch as their identity is inextricable from practices and 
structures experienced as “spiritual,” whatever that may mean in a given time and 
place. To fail to discuss the spirituality of the powers is to ignore an important aspect 
of their objective being.  
 Such a minimalistic definition may recover spirituality in some sense, but it is 
unlikely to satisfy many of Yoder’s critics. Critics of his theology of the powers, such 
as Dawn or Stott, seek ontological affirmation of an objective spiritual being 
(personal or otherwise) behind, accompanying, or in lieu of those social structures 
Yoder names as powers. Critics of his broader work wish, at the very least, for 
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attention to spirituality as an integral component of created humanity’s relation to the 
triune God. For Finger, there is also a missional dimension here, since “interest in 
transcendent reality is strong today, and [the] inability to speak of it will often hinder 
mission.”153 The challenge is to meet these criticisms without surrendering to 
individualism or asocial metaphysical speculation. Ostensibly, Bourdieusian 
sociology can add little to ontological claims about invisible spiritual realities. Yet it 
is possible to deploy Bourdieu’s relationalism within Yoder’s theological framework 
in order to account for the God-relatedness of social practice, and for the trinitarian 
shape of that relationship. 
Christians have long drawn upon relational terminology to account for God’s 
identity and interactions with humans. Jesus, after all, speaks throughout the Gospels 
of his intimacy with his Father154 and prays “as you, Father, are in me and I am in 
you, may they [those who will believe in Jesus] also be in us.”155 Paul frequently 
meditates on the work of the Spirit of Christ156 or, especially, the Spirit of God157 to 
incorporate believers into God in Christ. Early Christian theologians drew 
extensively upon biblical relational language in formulating the doctrine of the 
Trinity and in writing about Christian spirituality.158 In more recent years, 
theologians have integrated various philosophical and scientific accounts of relations 
into their doctrines of God and creation.159  
Yoder himself gestures to such a move in Preface to Theology, where he 
writes that “to be in Christ is to have one’s identity derived from a relation to 
Christ.”160 He goes on to write of faith as “commitment to the faith-union of 
obedience made available to us through the perfect and triumphant obedience of 
Christ.”161 Salvation is participation in and solidarity with Christ through obedient 
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154 E.g., Matt. 11:27; John 13-17.  
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faith.162 He extends these reflections near the end of The Politics of Jesus. The 
biblical apocalyptic vision of the universe is of a system in which “God acts and we 
act, with our respective actions relating to another. The spiritual and providential 
laws which we expect to see at work in this system are as solid for the believer as are 
the laws of dialectical materialism for the Marxist.”163 Although there are shades of 
determinism in this statement, it at least envisions society as intrinsically related to 
God.164  
 For Yoder, social structure is integral to the way God creates and sustains 
humanity, and its paradigmatic form has been revealed in history by Jesus. Adopting 
Bourdieu’s sociological concepts, created society can be construed as a highly 
differentiable, dynamic relational structure. From a theological perspective, created 
society therefore exists as an ensemble of objective relations that are simultaneously 
the various interactions between agents and institutions that characterize it, and 
interactions with God who creates and sustains it. The ground of social being is thus 
inherently spiritual in the sense that it subsists in God, who is spirit (Jn 4:24) and in 
whom “we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).165 Every human person 
and every institution is spiritual for none has reality outside of the constitutive 
relation to spirit: God is part of the relational structure of society, even as God 
transcends it.166 Social practice is unintelligible without including its relatedness to 
God who, on Yoder’s account, provides humanity with an awareness of its purpose 
through interaction with Israel, Jesus, and the church.167  
 Although this discussion of “spiritual relations” may sound speculative and 
detached from historical reality, it is rooted in the material objectivity of creation qua 
creation.168 Furthermore, the biblical witness to a God who is active among human 
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social practices, though not reducible to them, lends theological credence to the 
claim that God is a structuring force within and upon society. Examples of this divine 
social structuring include the covenant with Abraham, the Law of Moses, the 
teachings and practices of Jesus, the scriptures, and the ministry of the church. Each 
of these examples is a specific structured product of the relation between God and 
human beings—structures that are at once spiritual and material. The spiritual nature 
of society as a whole may be seen in the relative lack of chaos that affects social 
practice, in the continued ordering of life that makes it possible.169 A spirituality 
rooted in the relation of society to God thus remains part of a sociological theology, 
and is not a speculative departure.  
 Such a spirituality also has the feature of considering persons as relationally 
structured, making a purely individual spirituality impossible. Relationships, in 
Bourdieu’s view, consist of capital-laden social practices. The spirituality of agents 
and institutions may be discerned as a degree of intensification or diminishment of 
the basic divine-human relation established in creation. In other words, the extent to 
which the social practices of agents and institutions deny or embrace relationship 
with God determines their spiritual quality.170 Traditional language of “spiritual 
practice” may, on this model, be taken to refer to habitual intensifications of a person 
or group’s relation to God, evinced by a correspondence to the social patterns 
revealed through the aforementioned spiritual structures (e.g., Israel, Jesus). 
Maintaining Yoder’s emphasis, the standard spiritual structure by which all practices 
are judged is Jesus Christ. Correspondence to the social activity of Jesus Christ 
determines whether or not something is a spiritual practice in the special, intense 
sense. Although they are always personal, such practices are in no way individual, if 
by that is meant some form of relation to God that escapes society. Prayer, worship, 




                                                                                                                                          
reductive physicalist construal of spirituality as practical participation in the reign of God (Bodies and 
Souls, 30-36). 
169 Cf. Pannenberg, Anthropology, 409, on cultural order as an experience of the kingdom of God.  
170 Cf. Shults, Doctrine of God, 65, on “intensification” of life in the Spirit. 
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Recovering the Trinity 
The facts of Christ’s earthly obedience, i.e., his own practical relation to God, allow 
for the construction of a trinitarian theology “from below.”171 Drawing on the 
account of spiritual practices above, it is possible to see Jesus’ life as a single 
spiritual practice, a continuously intense practical relationship to God. Further 
reflection on Jesus’ spiritual practice by his Jewish and later Gentile followers, in 
light of the history of God’s interactions with humanity, especially with Israel, 
suggested that the particular intensity of that practice pointed to a relationship of 
significant identity between God and Jesus.172 This identity is seen especially in 
Jesus’ fulfillment of a singular Jewish habitus. Embodying the structured dispositions 
of a first-century Galilean Jewish male, his structuring social practice corresponds 
with maximum intensity to the God of Israel’s structuring practices and with the 
products of those practices: the one who fulfills the law is the one in whom all things 
hold together.173 Similar reflection on the church’s practical experience with the Holy 
Spirit indicates that it, too, enjoys an identity with God and Jesus, the three forming 
an integral and distinct divine relational node.174 The Trinity is defined then from an 
anthropological perspective by the manner in which the practical interactions with 
human society by the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are unified in their intense 
correspondence to each other. Insofar as Christians trust that God’s activity with 
humanity is not deceptive, that it is revelatory in some way of God’s identity, it is 
possible to say on the basis of the unity of these practical interactions that God is 
triune.175 Triune unity on this model is not undifferentiated. Christian reflection has 
typically regarded the quality of humanity’s interactions with Father, Son, and Holy 
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Spirit as suggestive of three distinct divine “persons” or centers of interaction—the 
proposal here is not modalist.  
 This understanding of the Trinity, rooted in the human experience of God’s 
action as witnessed to by Israel and the church, maintains Yoder’s sociological 
orientation yet unambiguously affirms the tri-unity of God. Important aspects of 
God’s being may be hidden from humans, but the history of revelation points to a 
triune divinity. Yoder is right: “the doctrine of the Trinity is a test of whether your 
commitments to Jesus and God are biblical enough that you have the problem that 
the doctrine of the Trinity solves.”176 Practical commitment to Jesus and God, to 
Jesus as God, gives rise to trinitarian language.  
 The major problem identified by critics of Yoder’s minimalist trinitarianism is 
that it underspecifies the unity of the work of the Father and the Son, resulting in an 
assimilation of creation to redemption, and a disjuncture between violent providence 
and nonviolent atonement. It might be objected that the relational trinitarianism 
outlined above exacerbates the problem, as Bourdieu’s understanding of relations is 
conflictual: relations exist as objective interactions between competing forces. But 
for Bourdieu “competition” is a relative term, and he insists that he does not posit a 
Hobbesean war of each against all as the basis of social reality.177 Social 
differentiation is indeed only possible within fields that, by definition, are more or 
less coherent and unified. It would be possible then to speak from a human 
perspective of the Trinity as a field of three forces that are distinguished from each 
other by the particular relational mode taken by each toward creation.178 To draw 
from traditional terminology, the Father’s primary mode of relating is as creator and 
sustainer, the Son’s as redeemer and lord, and the Spirit’s as advocate and guide.179 
These relations are not antagonistic, as if one member were vying for supremacy 
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(PR, 27). See Fowler, “Autonomy, Reciprocity, and Science,” 106, contra Addi, Bourdieu, 198.  
178 Cf. Pannenberg’s conception of the Spirit as a field of force that pervades creation and “releases 
event after event into finite existence” (Systematic Theology, 44-52). 
179 One could argue on Thomistic grounds that these descriptions “from below” are consistent with the 
“internal” or “essential” identities of the persons of the Trinity, insofar as the persons “are constituted 
in the actions of being mutually related” (Kerr, After Aquinas, 199). Given the reliability of revelation, 
it would be strange if there were not at least some continuity between descriptions of each person of 
the Trinity’s relation to creation (as these descriptions are developed from practical interaction with 
God) and adequate descriptions of the relations between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
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over the others, but complementary in their distinctiveness.180 Traditional theological 
language of the mutual indwelling of each member in the other (perichoresis) is 
suggested by what, above, has been described as the intense correspondence of each 
of these modes of practical relating with the other.181 Biblical language that speaks of 
the Father’s role in redemption, or Jesus and the Spirit’s place in creation, is not 
confused, but rather is a coherent expression of the unified trinitarian force toward 
creation.182 
 These considerations strengthen Yoder’s contention that there is an essential 
unity between the social practices of Jesus and creational structures, that Jesus 
reveals “the grain of the universe.”183 Against H. Richard Niebuhr and Nigel Goring 
Wright, it is possible to speak christologically of God without thereby falling into a 
monotheism of the Son. Christians, indeed, must attend to and celebrate God’s action 
in creation, providence, redemption, and mystical union with the believer, but not in 
such a way that any of these actions is viewed as conflicting with the others. 
Moreover, a minimalistic, sociologically oriented trinitarianism can be articulated 
without denigrating creation. The created powers may not be autonomous sources of 
moral authority apart from the instruction of Christ, but they do have integrity as 
ongoing agents of providence.  
 What, then, to make of Yoder’s acceptance of Old Testament imagery of God 
as divine warrior? It seems that Gingerich and Stoltzfus are correct that a critical 
hermeneutic influenced by a constructive doctrine of God is necessary if Yoder’s 
theology is to be coherent. The outlines of such a doctrine of God should be evident 
from the foregoing discussion of creation and Trinity. This doctrine might be 
elaborated by a trinitarian interpretation of Yoder’s metaphor of God as a “librarian” 
who, at this point in history, simply puts the errant books (powers) in order rather 
than forcibly correct or destroy them.184 Instead of suggesting complicity with the 
powers’ violence, this imagery could suggest a providential practice of nonviolent 
                                                 
180 Thomas, Summa Theologica Ia28, Article 3: “So as in God there is a real relation, there must also 
be a real opposition. The very nature of relative opposition includes distinction. Hence, there must be 
real distinction in God, not, indeed according to that which is absolute—namely, essence, wherein 
there is supreme unity and simplicity—but according to that which is relative.” 
181 Stramara, “Trinitarian Perichoresis.”  
182 Cf. Lewin, “Field Theory,” 39-40, on “goal” as “a force field where all forces point toward the 
same region.”  
183 Yoder, “Armaments and Eschatology,” 58; PJ, 246. 
184 Yoder, PJ, 201-202. 
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patience that is complimented by God’s more “activist” activity in resisting violence 
through the work of Jesus and the Holy Spirit.185 To extend Yoder’s metaphor, God 
runs a library whose books have been effaced such that a reader is more likely to 
become ignorant than wise from reading them; reading is liable to incite further 
textual effacement, as well as a disordering of the library. But God continually 
reorganizes the library to optimize the possibility of enriching reading, and God’s 
Son has in fact demonstrated how to read for true knowledge. God’s Spirit leads 
readers to the right reading revealed by Jesus, who is found to be the subject of the 
books. Jesus’ forbearance—he neither effaces nor disorders, but rather enables 
understanding—is echoed by the forbearance of the providing God and the 
empowering Spirit.186  
 The doctrine of the Trinity developed here emphasizes that triune unity is 
visible in the unity of the structuring practices of each divine person within human 
society. The single purpose of the trinitarian force in human society is to (re)produce 
the social structures seen in Jesus, which are in continuity with those from creation 
and with those that the Spirit labors to bring about in the church. Spiritual practices 
are activities that align with or participate in the spiritual structures, especially the 
structured dispositions and practices of Jesus Christ. In other words, to be spiritual is 
to identify, in the specific ways highlighted by the New Testament authors, with 
Christ’s bodily hexis, to be his body by imitating his cruciform practices. God’s 
providential use of the powers and invitation to a different set of power structures can 
therefore not be reduced to an intellectual or individual metaphor, but are fully social 
phenomena. Because providence is a trinitarian activity, the specters of intra-divine 
antagonism and ontological violence dissipate. Insofar as the created powers 
continue after the fall to provide a relative ordering enabling the possibility of human 
social life, they continue to witness to God, albeit for the most part in an extremely 
limited manner. The structures seen in and produced by Christ are no less “created 
powers” for being structures of redemption; they emerge from the long labor of 
                                                 
185 Patience has become a significant theme in scholarship on Yoder. See chapter four below. 
186 It is outside the scope of this thesis to evaluate whether or not this doctrine of God can make sense 
of the Old Testament holy war narratives. One possible reading of them, however, is that they exhibit 
God’s patience both with Israel’s (limited) war-making and with their construction of a bellicose 
image of God. Jesus’ nonviolence then repudiates both war-making and the bellicose divine image. 
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God’s interaction with humanity through creation and Israel. There is no substantial 
rift between creational and redemptive structures: Christ is the firstborn of creation.  
 
Conclusion 
Bourdieu’s relational concepts allow for the following revisions to Yoder’s theology 
of creation: First, the concepts depict personal existence as socially structured, 
thereby dissolving the antinomy between social and personal theology created by 
Yoder’s emphasis on the former. The theology of the principalities and powers 
necessarily includes personal dispositions and practices, for structures are personally 
mediated, and habitus are socially structured. This recovery of the personal already 
allows for a recovery of the spiritual, though only in the sociological sense that 
theologians must examine those dispositions, practices, and structures regarded as 
spiritual by agents. Second, a more metaphysical recovery of the spiritual is enabled 
by extending Bourdieu’s relationalism analogically to God’s creative and 
providential activity. If society only exists in relation to God, who is spirit, then spirit 
is constitutive of society itself. This spiritual constitution is displayed both in the 
general cohesion of society and in the specific structures resulting from God’s 
interactions with Abraham, Israel, Jesus and the church. Spirituality is thus 
metaphysical, rooted in the spiritual being of God, yet at once fully practical, a 
matter of structuring social practices in accord with the revealed will of God. Third, 
Bourdieu’s practical relationalism can be opened toward a trinitarian theology robust 
enough to escape the charge of ontological violence, but sociological enough to 
maintain focus on the social practices or politics of Jesus. God’s trinitarian identity is 
revealed in the high degree of consistency or correspondence between the activities 
of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit as witnessed to by Israel and the church. These 
three revisions result in a sociological theology of creation as personal and social, 
spiritual and material, and as a work of the triune God.  
 This construal of creation brings up a further question about the status of 
human beings: are humans free in any sense if their lives are structurally constituted 
by relations to God and the powers? Yoder would seem to err on the side of 
determinism, yet he upholds a traditional Anabaptist “free church” ecclesiology. For 
all the worry that he favors the social to the exclusion of the personal, there is a 
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strong case that his ecclesiology rests on a (secular) view of persons as autonomous 
wills. In the following chapter, the revisions made to his theology of creation are 
extended to his anthropology in order to articulate a conception of personhood as 
freedom for relationship with God. 
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2. REVISING YODER’S THEOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY 
 
John Howard Yoder frequently described his basic outlook as that of a “free church” 
theologian.1 Anabaptist convictions about the meaning of Christian discipleship led 
to the rejection of infant baptism, the separation of church and state, and the 
elevation of a scripture-centered community ethic above doctrine as a principle of 
unity.2 In each case, the impetus to free the church from identification with the civil 
community was derived from a command of Christ as recorded in the New 
Testament: baptize believers (Matt. 18; Mk. 16); do not take up the sword or 
otherwise resist evil (Matt. 5:39); order your community through disciplinary 
discernment (Matt. 18).3 Freedom from civil control meant freedom for obedience to 
Christ’s commands. Ecclesial membership was no longer a cultural given, but a 
radical commitment to discipleship. Stated in this form, Yoder’s free church theology 
is just that: theological. A christological premise about the authority of the risen lord 
Christ leads to a clear ecclesiological conclusion. This ecclesiological conclusion 
furthermore yields an anthropological conclusion, namely that persons who 
encounter the disciplined, Christ-centered church possess the freedom to respond to 
it positively or negatively. Stated evangelically, persons have a choice whether or not 
to repent and believe the gospel. The governing logic of this anthropology is 
theological, as Jesus’ nonviolence reveals the God-given freedom for belief that 
constitutes human being as such.  
 Recent writings on the role of voluntarism in the rise of secular modernity 
have, however, brought Yoder’s valuation of voluntary membership into critical 
perspective. According to Oliver O’Donovan, voluntarism involves the prioritization 
of the will in descriptions of human action, and has restrictive implications for divine 
grace and for the institutional mediation of personhood.4 Voluntarism assigns 
                                                 
1 At various points Yoder employs other descriptions of his perspective as belonging to a “believers’ 
church,” “peace chuch,” “radical reformation,” or “baptist” vision. In RP, 279 he states his preference 
for “free church.” See also Yoder, PK, 26, 105; RP, 221-241, 262-288, 338-341; JCSR, 105-119. 
2 Yoder, RP, 279.  
3 See Yoder, ed. and trans., Schleitheim Confession. The author (probably Michael Sattler) also points 
to Jesus’ example, e.g., in refusing to stone the adulteress (Jn 8:11) or to settle an inheritance dispute 
(Lk 12:13), and to early church teaching, e.g., to the association of baptism with belief (Acts 2, 18, 16, 
19), or the exemplarity of Christ’s suffering (Rom. 8:29; 1 Pt. 2:21). See also Yoder’s discussion of the 
Christocentrism of early Anabaptist ethics in ARS, 285-299. 
4 O’Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 274. 
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ultimate authority in decision-making to the individual will, thereby reducing the 
influence of the church to that of the many optional social clubs littering the late 
modern landscape. “Join if you feel like it” becomes the heart of the gospel 
proclamation. Although Yoder’s ostensibly theological account of the free church 
would seem to escape such criticisms, O’Donovan rather sees it as a conformist 
expression of this secular anthropological “heresy.” The desire to avoid implicating 
the church in coercion may be laudable, but not when it comes at the expense of the 
church’s authoritative witness to and mediation of the power of grace. Given the 
portrait of Yoder’s free church theology sketched above, it is unsurprising that its 
defenders draw attention to its theological context. Yet almost all of them confess 
that it is unnuanced and susceptible to O’Donovan’s critique to some degree. At the 
same time, neither its defenders nor its critics offer an anthropology that does justice 
to the meaningfulness of non-coerced church membership. The requirement that faith 
be free is repeatedly affirmed, but the accent then shifts to divine and human 
influence in eliciting faith—as if to specify the conditions for human choice is 
already to be guilty of voluntarism.  
The present chapter risks a revision of Yoder’s theological anthropology that 
holds together both his emphases on voluntariety and structure. In the first section, 
his free church theology and its critics are examined in the context of his writings on 
the powers. Although his overall perspective goes a long way to answering the 
critics, it is finally difficult to see how it can be reconciled with some of his more 
troubling affirmations about the freedom of the will. The suspicion that Yoder’s 
anthropology requires clarification is thus confirmed, and to that end the next section 
introduces Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological attempt to dissolve the philosophical 
dualism between freedom and determinism. Although Bourdieu argues for a strong 
theory of social reproduction, he maintains that freedom is a possible product of 
social activity. On Bourdieu’s anthropology, genuine choice never escapes social 
structuring but rather can be its result. These moves lead to a revision of Yoder’s 
theological anthropology in the final section that draws from the previous chapter’s 
conclusions. Because human being only exists in relation to social structures and to 
God, choice as a social product can be conceived of as a divine gift that is received 
through human labor for freedom. Freedom, moreover, is not merely the ability to 
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choose anything, but a freedom for intense relationship with God and others—it is a 
freedom for obedience to God. The possibility of free choice is socially and 
spiritually mediated. From the perspective of this revised theological anthropology, 
church membership can be viewed as a voluntary response to the extension of God’s 
grace through the witness of the church in the world. 
 
2.1 Yoder’s Theological Anthropology 
Issues of human freedom and its limitations run throughout the central biblical texts 
on the powers. In Romans, Paul rhapsodizes about the vastness and finality of 
Christian freedom:  
For I am convinced that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor rulers [archai], nor 
things present, nor things to come, nor powers [dynameis], nor height nor depth, nor 
anything else in all creation, will be able to separate us from the love of God in 
Christ Jesus our Lord. (Rom. 8:38-39; cf. 1 Cor 15:24-28)  
 
Yet a little later he recommends subjection to “governing authorities” (exousiais 
hyperechousais) as a necessary form of subjection to God (Rom. 13:1-3). In other 
passages, a state of enslavement or death is contrasted with the enlivening freedom 
of being God’s children in Christ (Gal. 4:1-11; Eph. 2:1-10; Col. 2:8-23). Although 
freedom is achieved through Christ’s ongoing defeat of the powers, Christians are 
called to join the battle by resisting the coercive powers with God’s strength and 
armor (Eph. 6:10-18). 
 Within the biblical portrait, there are tensions between a general 
determination by the enslaving powers and Christian freedom from the powers; 
between Christian freedom and the duties of Christian commitment; and between the 
gift of freedom and the labor of its reception. These tensions are mediated in Yoder’s 
theology by the concept of voluntariety: escape from determination occurs with the 
choice to follow Jesus and join the church, and that choice commits one to an 
ecclesial mode of life patterned after Jesus. This construal of choice, with its 
voluntaristic anthropological implications, raises problems for Yoder’s theology. As a 
first step towards revising his theological anthropology, summaries are offered here 
of Yoder’s views of structure and freedom in the powers and of the free church. The 
section concludes with an analysis of the criticisms of Yoder’s account. 
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2.1.1 The Powers: Structure and Freedom 
Yoder’s theology of the created powers suggests that he does not perceive the 
structured nature of human existence as an impediment to the exercise of human 
capabilities. If “society and history…would be impossible without regularity, system, 
[and] order,”5 then freedom and choice are structured phenomena. This freedom is 
restricted, though not completely eliminated, once disobedience is chosen. After the 
fall, the powers continue to provide an essential order. As Paul preached to the 
Gentiles, the general structures of the world still offer a glimpse of God.6 Yet they 
also “have enslaved humanity and our history” and become “our masters and our 
guardians.”7 The powers “exercise dominion over men and women”8 and are 
“invisibly determining human events.”9 By contrast, the “genuinely free and human 
existence” of Jesus Christ breaks with this determinism: “Here we have for the first 
time to do with someone who is not the slave of any power, of any law or custom, 
community or institution, value or theory.”10 As a human being, Jesus’ freedom is not 
of course from the powers as such, but from collaboration with their rebellious “self-
glorification.” Freedom and structure are not basically opposed, but rather 
determinism is defined by the inhabitation of structures denigrative of divine-human 
and interhuman relations. Humans are created for freedom, for an ordered mode of 
being with God and others. It is this freedom that the church witnesses to when it 
proclaims Christ’s redemption of the powers.11 
 At various points in his writings on the powers and elsewhere, Yoder deepens 
his description of freedom as a created and intrinsic aspect of human being. In 
Preface to Theology he argues that because “God is agape and agape respects the 
freedom of the beloved,” the choice between obedience and disobedience has existed 
                                                 
5 Yoder, PJ, 141. 
6 Ibid., 141-142 and BP, 39 on Acts 14:15-17 and 17:22-31. The latter verses are especially interesting 
as Paul includes the “times” and “boundaries” of the nations in the order of providence. In BP, Yoder 
stresses that “it was by naming the risen Jesus that Paul ended his description of the providential 
plurality of peoples.” The universality of revelation through the providentially-maintained fallen 
powers is consonant with the particular lordship of Jesus. Cf. FTN, 63, where he explains this 
“providential plurality” as the gracious intent of the scattering at Babel (Genesis 11). These themes are 
treated in detail in chapter six below.  
7 Yoder, PJ, 141-142. 
8 Yoder, “HRN,” 68. 
9 Yoder, CWS, 8. Cf. Berkhof, C&P, 30-33. 
10 Yoder, PJ, 145. Cf. Berkhof, C&P, 36-39. 
11 Yoder, PJ, 147-153; CWS, 16-22. Cf. Berkhof, C&P, 44-52. 
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from the beginning.12 Freedom is therefore “the context of choice before God, which 
is our condition” as humans. It is built, as it were, into the powers, part of the 
structural make-up of the cosmos. Humanity is thus fundamentally free from divine 
coercion, but always free to choose obedience—and both of these freedoms are 
rooted in God’s love. This situation does not change after the fall. The providential 
ordering of the powers, and the existence of Israel and the church continue to hold 
open the possibility of obedience. The Jewish and Christian communities proclaim 
God’s love in word and deed and, in fact, are constituted in response to it. As Yoder 
puts it, “the gospel is not a mere message; it is a continuum of loving relationship 
extending in a chain—imperfect, to be sure, but historically real—from Christ to 
those who today become recipients and givers of love. The church is not an end in 
itself; it exists for the sake of the world.”13 Evangelism cannot be separated from 
social witness, because repentance occurs as a response to the church’s witness to 
love.14 The proclamation of the gospel, moreover, is not ahistorical or otherworldly, 
but always “translated” into terms understandable by its hearers.15 Yoder regards his 
sociological theology of the principalities and powers as just such a translation.16 
This translated proclamation invites persons not only to a new communal structure, 
but also to enjoy a transformation of their dispositions or “heart” by entering “a 
whole new world.”17 The reality of gospel proclamation, of baptism as the transition 
into the new community of love, and of the community itself means that change is a 
real possibility within history.18 Change is possible, but not required. Its possibility 






                                                 
12 Yoder, Preface, 309. 
13 Yoder, “Review: The Context of Decision,” 135. 
14 Yoder, CWS, 22-25; OR, 76; RP, 90-91.  
15 Yoder, “Natural Law,” 21-22; CWS, 25; PK, 46-62; HCPP, 69-88.  
16 Yoder, PJ, 136, 138. 
17 This is Yoder’s interpretation of 2 Corinthians 5:17 and the “new creation.” See PJ, 218-223; THW, 
13-24. Cf. Yoder’s discussion of “cosmological conversion” in WL, 56; Nonviolence, 23. 
18 See Yoder, BP, 41-42, on baptism as the possibility for change (and so for nonviolent 
reconciliation). 
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2.1.2 Free Church and Free Choice 
Yoder considers voluntary membership to be a basic trait of the “free church” 
tradition to which he belongs as a Mennonite. In the Schleitheim Brotherly Union, 
arguably the founding document of Swiss Anabaptism, the first article, after all, 
reserves baptism for those who “wish to be with Him [Jesus Christ] in death, so that 
they may be resurrected with Him and to all those who with this significance request 
it (baptism) of us and demand it for themselves.”19 This “requested” baptism then 
becomes the principle on which the other articles are based, in particular church 
discipline and the Lord’s Supper.20 Harold S. Bender, the Mennonite historian who 
was Yoder’s early mentor, saw voluntary membership as one of three “essential” 
features of the “Anabaptist Vision.”21 For Bender, the choice of discipleship entailed 
separation from the world, readiness for persecution, and commitment to a 
community of goods. Yoder inherits this emphasis, and from early on highlights the 
role of voluntary membership as the basis for Christian moral discipline and 
distinction from the world.22 It would soon become a central concept in his 
ecumenical and interreligious efforts.23 
 In order to synthesize Yoder’s writings on voluntary membership, it is 
possible to divide his concerns into groups of negative and positive freedoms.24 The 
practice of choosing to join the church, according to Yoder, involves freedom from 
“the givenness of the social order”25 and from the tyranny of human sovereignty. The 
latter of these negative freedoms founds the separation of church and state, which 
Yoder interprets as the sovereign’s admission of finitude in matters divine.26 Yoder 
links freedom from “inherited faith” with the “genuineness of choice” implicit in 
Jesus’ admonition to count the costs of discipleship in Luke 14:25-33.27 Discipleship 
                                                 
19 Yoder, ed. and trans., Schleitheim Confession, 10. On the debatable influence of the Brotherly 
Union, see Snyder, “Influence of the Schleitheim Articles.” 
20 Yoder, ed. and trans., Schleitheim Confession, 10-13. Cf. Yoder, JCSR, 124-129. 
21 Bender, Anabaptist Vision, 26-31. On the legacy of Bender’s Anabaptist Vision, see Biesecker-Mast, 
“Anabaptism as a Vision”; Hauerwas, Good Company, 65-78; Hershberger, ed., Anabaptist Vision; 
Nolt, “Anabaptist Visions.” 
22 Yoder, “Anabaptist Dissent,” in Roots of Concern, ed. Vogt, 31; ARS, 273-277. 
23 Yoder, PK, 105-122; RP, 221-320; JCSR, 103-143.  
24 Cf. Yoder, JCSR, 136. 
25 Ibid., 136, cf. 126; PK, 25; RP, 254-257. 
26 Yoder, “Amateur Historian,” and “Religious Liberty and the Prior Loyalty of the People of God,” in 
UNDA. Cf. PK, 172-195; RP, 265-266, 273; JCSR, 136. 
27 Yoder, JCSR, 255.  
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is difficult. Those who enter it without consideration of the hardships they will 
undergo do so unadvisedly.  
 This point elucidates the primary positive freedom involved in voluntary 
church membership, namely, the freedom to obey the commands of God as these are 
revealed in the biblical testimonies. Yoder tellingly titles a section of his theological 
study of Swiss Anabaptism “Commandment as Freedom”28—to choose the church is 
to choose the way of Jesus. “‘Freedom’ in this sense is not only a descriptive trait but 
also a theological value. Behind those formal ways in which it has been tested or 
stated in the past lie deeper concerns regarding the faithfulness of the individual and 
the Body, their mission and their renewal.”29 As such, freedom for obedience 
provides the soil in which the other positive freedoms are rooted. Because the 
voluntary church is founded on personal choice, it is more likely to maintain a 
distinctive identity and is thus more capable of fulfilling its missional mandate.30 
Choice grounds practices of accountability, making ethical performance and 
awareness of defectibility more likely.31 This awareness provides the humility 
necessary for missionary work.32 The constitution of the church through baptismal 
mission gives it the knowledge that differences can be resolved through dialogue, 
thereby reinforcing its commitment to nonviolence.33 Further, focusing Christian 
identity on ecclesial obedience has the potential to move ecumenical discussions onto 
the (ostensibly) common ground of the life of Jesus as portrayed in scripture.34 From 
freedom for obedience therefore spring freedoms for peaceful mission and growth, 
communal cohesion and Christian unity. Those freedoms are unthinkable, according 
to Yoder, without the corresponding negative freedoms. But the negative freedoms 
are intelligible only in light of the material commitments they enable. Repentance is 
only the “shadow side of the new beginning, its face is reconciliation.”35  
 
 
                                                 
28 Yoder, ARS, 295-299. 
29 Yoder, RP, 264. 
30 Ibid., 270-272; FTN, 153-155; JCSR, 136. 
31 Yoder, “Review: The Context of Decision,” 135; PK, 25; RP, 265; JCSR, 126, 140-141. 
32 Yoder, RP, 254-257; FTN, 157. 
33 Yoder, PK, 110-111. Cf. BP, 28-46, on baptism as the creation of a new community out of 
previously opposed groups. 
34 Yoder, PK, 119-120; RP, 225-230, 238, 274-276.  
35 Yoder, HCPP, 138. 
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2.1.3 Criticisms 
This review of Yoder’s writings on the structured nature of human being and on the 
free church indicate that he has a rich account of choice as a response to God’s love 
mediated through social structures. To put it in a Heideggarian register, human being 
is “being-with-God.” Because we are with God, always faced by God, the option of 
loving obedience is always present—but never forced. Far from being reducible to 
autonomous wills, humans are rather constituted by their concrete relation to God 
and to those structures that make God’s love visible in the world. Moreover, God 
does not simply appeal to the will, but invites the whole person into deeper 
relationship. What, then, are Oliver O’Donovan and other critics concerned about?  
For his part, O’Donovan points to Yoder’s essay “Radical Reformation 
Ethics,” where Yoder distinguishes between free church and established Protestant 
views on baptism, the relation between church and state, compulsory church 
membership, and violence.36 O’Donovan finds it “disconcerting that such a 
heterogeneous collection of issues should be so drained of theological distinctiveness 
as to serve the general cause of voluntariety.” It becomes unclear, moreover, what 
“this all-important act of will” has to do with the broader faith, especially with 
convictions about the prevenience of grace and “the testimony of community faith in 
awakening individual faith.” Although O’Donovan admits that “a church defined by 
the faith it confesses will be free, for ‘coerced faith’ is a contradiction in terms,” he 
worries that emphasizing voluntariety is a capitulation to the modern scenario in 
which various non-essential “voluntary societies” constitute the civic marketplace. 
Yoder’s free church fits a little too easily alongside political parties and social clubs. 
In the end he appears to be “championing a great conformism.”37 
 The problem for O’Donovan clearly lies with Yoder’s anthropology, which he 
regards as reducing persons to individual decision-makers devoid of grace and 
unable to trust others. It is easy to reply to O’Donovan by pointing to the writings 
reviewed above, or even just to the wider context of the quote he lifts out of “Radical 
Reformation Ethics.” That essay was delivered at a symposium on “Christian Ethics 
in Ecumenical Perspective.”38 Given the setting, Yoder explicitly limits his 
                                                 
36 O’Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 223, on Yoder, PK, 106-107. 
37 O’Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 224. 
38 Yoder, PK, 202n1. 
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discussion to ethics as the obvious original point of disagreement between the 
established and radical Protestant churches.39 This is not to say that related 
theological and metaphysical issues are unimportant, but that the rupture was over 
issues such as violence and the organization of the church. His focus is therefore on 
the ethics of a missionary, scripture-centered community that subordinates itself to 
the lordship of Christ.40 Once again, free membership is a response to God’s love 
encountered through the church’s mission. The human will is not isolated, but 
confronted with concrete grace.41  
 Similar arguments can be raised against other criticisms of Yoder’s 
anthropology. Stanley Hauerwas, usually among Yoder’s most stalwart defenders, 
confesses that Yoder’s voluntarism “can too easily, particularly in modernity, 
underwrite rationalistic accounts of the faith.”42 It further “puts too much stress on 
process separate from the material convictions [Yoder] wants the process to serve.”43 
In other essays on Anabaptism and Protestantism, Hauerwas spells out his fear that 
such voluntarism leaves the church without resources for a thick identity after 
Christendom, which at least maintained that social norms were above the will of its 
citizens. The accent on voluntary commitment “cannot help but appear as a 
legitimation of the secular commitment to autonomy,”44 one that “nicely underwrites 
patterns of domination characteristic of capitalist social orders with much less basis 
for critique than was provided by the Catholic church.”45 Hauerwas instead 
articulates a “non-voluntary” ecclesiology in which, with special reference to 
conversion and baptism, “Christians discover that what they thought they had done 
voluntarily has in fact been done to them.”46  
                                                 
39 Ibid., 108. 
40 Ibid., 116-118. 
41 A similar reading of Yoder’s essay “Hermeneutics of Peoplehood” is possible (PK, 15-45). The 
essay contains his strongest language of negative freedom (25), but only in light of the church’s 
“missionary ethic of incarnation” (44-45). 
42 Hauerwas and James Fodor, “Remaining in Babylon: Oliver O’Donovan’s Defense of 
Christendom,” in Hauerwas, Wilderness Wanderings, 224n15. 
43 Hauerwas in Milbank and Hauerwas, “Christian Peace,” 215. 
44 Hauerwas, Good Company, 73. See also his “Confessions.” 
45 Hauerwas, Sanctify Them, 166. It is perhaps ironic that he does not capitalize “church” in this 
sentence. See also Hauerwas, Good Company, 19-31, esp. 228n2, for his attempt to find, beyond 
Yoder, “traditioned practices or disciplines where imposed will and total freedom are not assumed to 
be the only alternatives.” 
46 Hauerwas, Sanctify Them, 166; cf. 93.  
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Not only is it difficult to see how this non-voluntary ecclesiology respects 
human freedom,47 but it also fails to see the context of Yoder’s writings on the free 
church. Indeed, if rationalism is the fear, then Hauerwas might have looked at 
Yoder’s prioritization of community life—which has both intellectual and affective 
dimensions—over individualistic “intellectualism.”48 If formalism is the problem, 
then he might have attended to Yoder’s comments on the positive freedoms, and 
especially to his identification of nonviolence as the “substance” of Christian ethics 
made possible by the “form” of voluntary membership.49 Similarly, those theologians 
who worry about Yoder’s “almost Pelagian denial of the prevenience of grace” 
overlook his account of grace as mediated through the powers, Israel, and the 
church.50 
 Although these criticisms can be refuted through careful readings of Yoder’s 
oeuvre, it is notable that they occur at all—especially among readers as sympathetic 
as Hauerwas. Internal defense is legitimate and important but, in this case, it does not 
fully explain why Yoder is subject to distorted interpretations. The reading of Yoder’s 
theological anthropology given above is textually plausible, but it must be admitted 
that he often left the connections between the negative and positive freedoms vague 
and implicit. He may see theology and metaphysics as intrinsically related to ethics, 
but it is the ethics that always gets his attention.51 The new community may be 
                                                 
47 Hauerwas claims to dissolve the freedom-determinism dualism with the recognition that our 
decisions are only made intelligible in retrospect (Sanctify Them, 93). For example, it is impossible for 
a couple to “know” in advance precisely what the commitment entailed by their marriage vows means 
(102). That may be true, but it does not negate the importance of relatively informed decision-making. 
48 Yoder, PK, 38-40. 
49 Ibid., 110. 
50 Bourne, Seek the Peace, 257. Cf. Bourne, “Governmentality, Witness, and the State,” 110-111; 
Doerksen, Beyond Suspicion, 183-185; Doerksen, “Share the House,” MPU, 194; Kroeker, “Messianic 
Political Ethic,” 156; Kroeker, “War of the Lamb,” 82-83; Kroeker, “Yoder’s Voluntariety,” 55-58, 
63n63; Harink, Paul among the Postliberals, 283-284. Each of these critics seeks to repudiate 
O’Donovan’s reading of Yoder as caricatured, but each wants a stronger, more consistent and explicit 
account of grace and election. Carter, Politics of the Cross, 187-188, 199, also repudiates O’Donovan 
but still wants a better description of the experience of the believer in baptism. 
51 Cf. Yoder, PK, 101, where he says that “the imperatives of dialogue with majority mentalities have 
skewed description toward the problematics of weakness and effectiveness. An authentic portrayal of 
‘the peace church vision’ from the inside would have spoken more of worship and servanthood, 
reconciliation and creativity, Gelassenheit and the Power of the Light, ‘heart-felt religion’ and 
transforming hope, and the person of Jesus Christ.” It may be, as Gerald Schlabach maintains, that 
these lines speak for Yoder’s entire career and show that he “would have come across as more 
orthodox and pious” if he were not constantly fighting majority views (“Christian Witness,” 241n41). 
But it is striking that Yoder never does consider many of these “pious” themes, even when speaking in 
peace church settings.  
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graced and affective, but his focus is on the socio-logical rationale for joining. 
Nonviolence may be the substance of his ethics, but he mainly treats it as a dialogical 
procedure.52 If this is the case, then how should Yoder’s project be revised? 
Hauerwas’s non-voluntary ecclesiology dispenses altogether with the emphasis on 
choice, as God does something to us we only thought we were doing ourselves.53 
O’Donovan offers a quite remarkable account of freedom that is in many respects 
similar to Yoder’s;54 yet this freedom is articulated within the horizon set by 
Christendom political theologies.55 Another proposal is from P. Travis Kroeker, who 
suggests that Yoder incorporate a Platonic and Augustinian conception of the inner 
soul ruled invisibly by God.56 This spiritual invisibility supposedly allows for an 
accounting of the movement of grace in spite of an imperfect church. But Yoder’s 
church is merely real, not sinless—and its reality, like the reality of the fallen powers 
and Israel, is what mediates grace in the world. Taking these criticisms and their 
shortcomings into consideration, the question then becomes how to revise Yoder’s 
theological anthropology in such a way that better integrates his emphasis on 
voluntariety with his attention to the spiritual and social context of freedom. That 
remains the task of this chapter. 
 
                                                 
52 Chapters five and six below are especially concerned with an attempt to articulate a dialogicism that 
overcomes substance-form dualism. 
53 Hauerwas, Sanctify Them, 102: “At most, ‘agency’ names the skills correlative of a truthful 
narrative that enables us to make what happens to us our own, which includes ‘decisions’ we made 
when we thought we knew what we were doing but in retrospect seem more like something that 
happened to us.”  
54 See also O’Donovan’s pneumatological account of freedom in Resurrection and Moral Order, 106-
109.  
55 O’Donovan, Desire of the Nations, 252-256. As will be seen in chapter five below, Yoder worries 
that Christendom betrays the politics of Jesus and proper Christian mission when it uses state power to 
promote the faith. It should be noted that, unlike many Christendom apologists, O’Donovan advocates 
a theology of international law rather than of empire (267-268). Either way, he wants a legal 
framework conducive to Christian political judgment. The fate of religious freedom under a Christian 
legal framework is unclear, and its omission from O’Donovan’s theological “redemption” of liberal 
freedom is troubling. In his book Defending Constantine, Peter J. Leithart contrasts Constantine’s 
religious toleration with Yoder’s claim that “Constantinianism” is corrosive of religious freedom 
(112). But he then goes on to demonstrate approvingly how Constantine’s policies encouraged and 
enforced Christian beliefs and practices, since a religiously neutral public space is impossible (112-
146). With reference to O’Donovan, it is difficult to see how any theology of religious freedom he 
could offer would be different from Leithart’s Constantianian theology of enforced religious 
“concord.” It then becomes unclear how faith is free in any sense. See O’Donovan’s “Response to 
Skillen” for a defense of his Christendom theology in light of concerns about religious “pluralism.” 
For a Yoderian critique of O’Donovan’s non-christological ontology, see Neufeld, “Just War Theory.” 
56 See note 50 above. 
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2.2 Bourdieu on Freedom and Structure 
Pierre Bourdieu sought to overcome classical debates about freedom and 
determination by demonstrating how freedom, as a concept and state of being, is 
socially produced. “Freedom” does not describe normal social functioning, but may 
be created through strenuous intellectual and practical labor. Bourdieu developed two 
analytical concepts relevant to this conception of freedom, “reproduction,” and 
“margins of freedom.” 
 
2.2.1 Reproduction 
In the 1960s and early 1970s Bourdieu collaborated with Jean-Claude Passeron to 
produce two seminal works of disenchantment, Les Héritiers and Reproduction.57 
Against a prevalent communist “Jacobin” ideology that cast the French education 
system as a perfect meritocracy,58 Bourdieu and Passeron set out to demonstrate that, 
“l’égalité formelle des chances étant réalisé, l’École pourrait mettre toutes les 
apparences de la légitimité au service de la légitimation des privilèges.”59 French law 
guarantees equal access to the education system, making that system appear to be 
neutral. But a student’s chances of success are inextricably linked to the confluence 
of their class of origin, social status, and academic practices.60 Legal neutrality thus 
masks the subservience of the system to elites. 
 Pedagogical practice, according to Bourdieu and Passeron, generally depends 
on the education system’s legitimacy being as broadly unquestioned as one’s native 
language.61 In this context the system is free to inculcate whatever “cultural 
arbitrary” it is entrusted with.62 Teachers are granted pedagogical authority by the 
system to shape student habitus, and their authority is validated by the “truth” or 
correspondence of their decrees to the system.63 The authors support these claims 
with evidence from their research into the function of cultural capital, especially 
                                                 
57 See Kauppi, French Intellectual Nobility, 50, on their impact. 
58 Law, “Unredeemed Marxism,” 679; Wacquant in Bourdieu and Wacquant, IRS, 80n24. 
59 Bourdieu and Passeron, Les Héritiers, 44: “the formal equality of chances being realized, the school 
can place all the appearances of legitimacy at the service of the legitimation of privileges.” 
60 Ibid., 61. 
61 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 13-14. 
62 Ibid., 31-54. 
63 Ibid., 67, 186-206. The authors name this process “dependence through independence.” See chapter 
five below on the “circuits of legitimation.” 
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linguistic capital, in the French school system.64 Students whose family life prepares 
them to speak more or less like their professors almost always exceed their peers 
from different backgrounds—and these successful students are almost always from 
relatively privileged families. 
 The role of the habitus in reproducing social order receives even more 
treatment in Outline of a Theory of Practice and subsequent works. Whereas the 
Bourdieu of Reproduction is still indebted to structuralism65—which views practices 
as mere epiphenomena of social structures—Outline presents what has come to be 
known as a “constructive”66 or “genetic structuralism.”67 On this view, “structural 
distinctions are the construction of social agents who are struggling to reconcile their 
indigenous cultures (their habitus) with those objectified cultures which carry value 
and power.”68 Social reproduction is thus not a matter of static systems implanting 
ideology into passive agents, but a product of ongoing contest between agents for 
power. Marriage is for Bourdieu a typical example of “the system of reproduction 
practices,” as it tends to preserve capital holdings through a matrix of uncoordinated 
strategies.69 The reproductive outcome of these strategies requires no explicit 
planning, because the principles of and for reproduction are already embedded in the 
habitus of participating agents:  
The habitus, the durably installed generative principle of regulated improvisations, 
produces practices which tend to reproduce the regularities immanent in the 
objective conditions of the production of their generative principle, while adjusting 
to the demands inscribed as objective potentialities in the situation, as defined by the 
cognitive and motivating structures making up the habitus.70  
 
Reproduction occurs across changes in “objective potentialities” because agents have 
learned, consciously or not, to recognize and respond to these changes in ways that 
                                                 
64 Ibid., 72-161. 
65 Robbins, Bourdieu and Culture, 37l, and “‘Cultural Capital,’” 25-26. In Le bal des célibataires, 12, 
Bourdieu names his essay “Le stratégies matrimoniales dans le système des stratégies de 
reproduction,” (from 1972) as signaling a clear break from structuralism. Some are unconvinced that 
the break was complete: Dillon, “Pierre Bourdieu,” 426; Heinich, Pourquoi Bourdieu, 142; Martín-
Criado, Les deux Algéries, 119-121; Schinkel, “Bourdieu’s Political Turn?,” 83. 
66 Bourdieu, CD, 147; Accardo, Lire Bourdieu, 259. 
67 Accardo, Lire Bourdieu, 259; Addi, Bourdieu, 141; Fowler, Bourdieu and Cultural Theory, 35, 85-
89. Cf. Grenfell and James, eds., Bourdieu and Education, 155-156, on Bourdieu’s 
“phenomenological structuralism.” Fowler, Bourdieu and Cultural Theory, 85-89, and Robbins, 
Bourdieu and Culture, 44-47, relate Bourdieu’s understanding of reproduction to Marx and Marxism. 
68 Robbins, “‘Cultural Capital,’” 25. 
69 Bourdieu, OTP, 59; cf. LP, 160-161. 
70 Bourdieu, OTP, 78. 
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perpetuate their class position. As habitus is formed in conditions laden with specific 
expectations of success and failure, it is difficult for agents to conceive of strategies 
that would truly disrupt the social order. Reproduction is thus a generative product of 
agents throughout society whose often agonistic practices maintain field structures 
over time.  
 During the 1970s and 80s, Bourdieu expanded his generative structuralism 
through a number of essays on education,71 culture,72 and religion.73 Intellectual 
interests, cultural “tastes,” and religious convictions are all ways agents distinguish 
themselves from one another and, in doing so, help reproduce the order of society. A 
particular interest, taste, or conviction may gain or lose value over time, but the 
capital “rich” and “poor,” dominant and dominated, tend to stay the same due to 
habitus-shaped acquisition strategies. The State Nobility, originally published in 
1989, is perhaps Bourdieu’s most elaborate attempt to show how reproduction 
strategies adapt to constantly changing structures.74 Among other topics, the book 
examines a shift in France from the family to the school as the basis of social 
reproduction. Although this shift could have occasioned a transfer of power from 
family dynasties to intellectuals, in fact school-based reproduction became a strategy 
employed selectively by dominant families.75 Reproduction in this case occurred as a 
battle within the field of power, as “a struggle to dictate the dominant principle of 
domination.”76 As a result of this struggle, academic credentials replaced family titles 
as the most valuable form of symbolic capital, but continuities of habitus across the 
field prohibited this from drastically affecting French class structures.77 Dominant 
habitus is simply better equipped than dominated habitus to take advantage of and 
gain from social transformation—most change is therefore reproductive.  
 Bourdieu returns to these themes in his exploration of the most enduring of 
social structures, gender. In Masculine Domination he writes of gender as an 
                                                 
71 E.g., Bourdieu and Boltanski, “Demand for Education”; Bourdieu, HA, esp. 84-89, 176, 183, 217. 
72 Esp. Bourdieu, Distinction, 164-165, 193, 414, 480; “Forms of Capital,” 241-242, 246, 249, 253-
254. 
73 Bourdieu and Saint Martin, “La Sainte Famille,” 30, 44. 
74 Bourdieu, IRS, 140, names SN as his best response to the question of social change. See IRS, 80-81, 
131-140, on habitus and change.  
75 Bourdieu, SN, 278-299. 
76 Ibid., 265. 
77 As explored in chapter five below, Bourdieu believes this development had positive political effects 
that may still be utilized.  
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“eternalized arbitrary,”78 a product of “the history of the continuous (re)creation of 
the objective and subjective structures of masculine domination, which has gone on 
permanently so long as there have been men and women, and through which the 
masculine order has been continuously reproduced from age to age.”79 Family, 
church, and state have all played important roles in perpetuating gender structures 
over eras of considerable social upheaval, and today the neoliberal economic order 
serves the same function.80 The association of women with “symbolic goods” (art, 
fashion, etc.), for example, may provide women with “professional emancipation,” 
but only by consigning them to the bottom rung of cultural production.81 
Reproduction strategies can thus be so successful as to appear to transcend the flow 
of time, even if they only occur through continual labor on fields, capital, and 
habitus. 
 
2.2.2 Margins of Freedom 
Bourdieu’s emphasis on reproduction has led many commentators to accuse him of 
deterministically underplaying the possibility of change.82 If perceptions of social 
possibility are rooted in the habitus, and the habitus is formed by the possibilities 
available during agents’ primary formation, then structural transformation seems 
unlikely, if not impossible: agents will only see the limited possibilities of their field 
positions. Bourdieu, however, saw his conception as transcending a binary construal 
of freedom and determinism. With Luc Boltanski he called for an end to the 
“academic polarity between stability and change” in favor of the recognition that 
reproduction “can be realised in and through the translation of the structure whenever 
the members of the dominated classes enter separately, through statistical actions and 
reactions, in the free play of competition, i.e. in that form of class struggle which is 
imposed on them by the dominant class.”83 Far from being antithetical to change, 
stability on this model is achieved through constant change—even through 
                                                 
78 Bourdieu, MD, vii-ix.  
79 Ibid., 82-83. 
80 Ibid., 85-87, 92-95; cf. PR, 19, 66-71, 108, on the family.  See Mitrovic, “Neoliberal Philosophy.” 
81 Bourdieu, MD, 102. 
82 E.g., Bennett, “Habitus Clivé,” 221-225; Certeau, Everyday Life, 53-60; Crossley, Social Body, 115-
118; Fowler, Bourdieu and Cultural Theory, 4-5, 66; Heinich, Pourqoui Bourdieu, 145-151; 
Marginson, “Global Field,” 308-313; Skeggs, “Bourdieu and the ‘Self,’” 87-90. Cf. Hobsbawm, 
“Sociologie critique,” 286-289. 
83 Bourdieu and Boltanski, “Changes in Social Structures,” 221. Cf. Bourdieu, OTP, 95.  
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competitive struggles waged by the dominated, given that the dominant dictate the 
terms of the struggle.   
 But this alleged resolution of the stability-change antinomy seems actually to 
add weight to the criticisms; for the overcoming of the antinomy accepts micro-
change only as a mechanism of macro-stability.84 Nevertheless, Bourdieu elaborates 
a concept of “margins of freedom” in and from which to challenge unfettered 
reproduction. This concept is treated in detail in Bourdieu’s late work, Pascalian 
Meditations, but its lineaments may be perceived throughout his oeuvre. These 
lineaments may be described in terms of the freedoms of knowledge, practice, and 
symbols.  
 For all its interest in revealing the closed circle of educational success, Les 
Héritiers concludes with an appeal for a democratizing “rational pedagogy.”85 
Rational pedagogy consists of constant assessment of pedagogical forms in light of 
the differential social backgrounds of the students in question. Rather than 
demonstrating their high cultural capital, teachers should make their material as 
comprehensible as possible to all members of a class. This pedagogy would have the 
effect of leveling academic opportunities, especially if practiced on the youngest 
schoolchildren. It is not clear if Bourdieu continued throughout his career to believe 
that rational pedagogy was possible or desirable,86 but he remained convinced of the 
emancipatory potential of knowledge. No positive proposal ends Reproduction, yet 
Bourdieu and Passeron do position themselves as exposing the “illusion of freedom 
and universality” that makes agents “prisoners of their limitations.”87 Presumably 
their sociological disenchantment of French educational ideology would break the 
illusion and allow for some freedom of action. This conception of sociology and 
intellectual production as liberating becomes a major theme of Bourdieu’s work in 
the 1980s and 90s. During these years, which unsurprisingly coincide with his own 
increased political activity, he argued for a “corporatism of the universal” which 
would use the tools of scientific reflexivity to defend the autonomy of cultural fields. 
                                                 
84 But see Addi, Sociologie, 32; Grenfell and James, “Theory, Practice and Pedagogic Research,” in 
Bourdieu and Education, eds. Grenfell and James, 25; Passeron, “Le sociologue en politique,” 99-100. 
85 Bourdieu and Passeron, Les Héritiers, 111-115. 
86 Grenfell, Education and Training, 77, 93, 109-110, 115-116; Zanten, “Education Policy Analyst,” 
671-686. 
87 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 40.  
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This “Realpolitik of reason” will be discussed in detail in chapter five below, but here 
it is important to note it as a contribution to his understanding of human freedom. 
Knowledge, especially of one’s illusions and limitations, births at least the possibility 
of freedom.88 
 Knowledge, nevertheless, cannot fully capture the logic of reproduction or, 
for that matter of any practice. Practice obeys what Bourdieu calls “polythetic” logic; 
put more colloquially, the logic of practice is “fuzzy.”89 Scientists too easily accept 
“the synoptic illusion” which imposes the rigor of academic logic onto human 
practices.90 But the interpretive schemes of the habitus are “practical operators.” 
Academicism misses “the unceasing dynamism of units which are constantly 
forming and reforming” and the “fuzziness” that allows non-academic “native 
notions” to work.91 This fuzziness results from the extreme efficiency by which a 
multitude of practical relations are formed by analogy with a small set of 
oppositions.92  
 The “poverty” of practical logic is expressed, for instance, in bodily motion. 
The body does not rely on geometrical calculations to navigate space, but on a small 
set of dualisms: up/down, forward/back, left/right, east/west, and so on.93 Such 
“practical geometry” can be observed in ritual, where spatial inversions provide 
symbolic order: the eucharistic host is raised, then brought down to the lips of the 
faithful; bread is broken, while water and wine are mixed; the cross is processed into 
and then out of the sanctuary; and so on.94 These oppositions provide a wealth of 
combinations of bodily movements that may be imitated and innovated upon in ritual 
practice. Similarly, distinctions of “taste” take a few adjective pairs and categorize 
                                                 
88 Touraine, “Le sociologue du people,” 111, sees Bourdieu as a successor to Norbert Elias on this 
point. On knowledge and freedom in Bourdieu’s thought, see Marlène Benquet, “Determination” in 
Abécédaire, ed. Cazier, 43-44; Castel, “Entre la contrainte sociale et le volontarisme politique,” 303-
31; Fowler, “Autonomy, Reciprocity and Science,” 113-114; Reed-Danahay, Locating Bourdieu, 153; 
Francisco Vázquez García, Pierre Bourdieu, 219-220; Wacquant, IRS, 49-52.  
89 Bourdieu, OTP, 106-107, 109, 110, 112, 123, 221n25; cf. parallels in LP, 80-97. Bourdieu cites 
Husserl on “polythesis” and George Lakoff on “fuzziness.” See Pilario, Rough Grounds of Praxis, 
205-208, for summary.  
90 Bourdieu, OTP, 98-109. 
91 Ibid., 109. Bourdieu regards Edmund Leech as sensitive to the gap between academic and practical 
classification, whereas Durkheim and many others confound the two. Chapter four below returns to 
the issue of scientific knowledge and practice.  
92 Ibid., 109-113. 
93 Ibid., 117-119. 
94 Ibid., 120; LP, 92. The liturgical example is supplied by the present author.  
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the entire social world: heavy/light, hot/cold, dull/brilliant, etc.95 Agents do not apply 
these adjectives in the logical or systematic sense demanded by academics, but in an 
open manner whose coherence is that of lived experience. A “heavy” conversation 
can be clunky or intimate, while a “light” one may be fun or frivolous. Meaning is 
not supplied by semantic rigor, but by fluid, often contradictory usage pertaining to 
specific contexts.  
 Because the habitus is, therefore, an “open system of dispositions,”96 the 
fuzzy practical logic it embraces does not necessarily lead to the reproduction of 
field structure. Freedom is latent within practice.97 Habitus may be extremely 
durable, but even the most “eternal” dispositions are susceptible to transformation.98 
As dispositions are formed in specific contexts, habitus is only “activated” by similar 
contexts, and significant contextual change may result in unexpected practical 
outcomes.99 In normal circumstances, habitus is characterized by “conatus,” a desire 
for reproduction.100 But the disjunction of field and habitus can give rise to 
“hysteresis,” a disorientation full of both opportunity and peril.101  
 Bourdieu explores the possibilities of hysteresis in the context of crises such 
as the May 1968 student demonstrations in France.102 Changes in the French 
economy during preceding decades resulted in the disappointment of a generation of 
students’ career expectations. This “break in the chain of anticipated identifications” 
produces “agents who, excluded from the race for future prospects which until then 
had been programmed into their position, are now led to call into question the race 
itself.”103 When this questioning leads enough of the less-dominated agents, e.g., 
teachers, to disrupt the race, a “critical situation” occurs. This critical situation 
                                                 
95 Bourdieu, OTP, 120-123; cf. Distinction.  
96 Bourdieu, IRS, 133. The openness of the habitus counters the critique of Bennett, “Habitus Clivé,” 
201-228, that Bourdieu overemphasized the unity of the habitus until late in his career.  
97 Passeron, “Le sociologue en politique,” 99-100, describes freedom in Bourdieu’s sociology in terms 
of Democritus’s clinamen: a “flick of obliqueness” that ripples through “the river of necessity.”  
98 See Bourdieu, MD, 102. 
99 Bourdieu, Distinction, 99-168; IRS, 135.  
100 Bourdieu, HA, 176; WW, 508; PR, 19. See Fuller, “Conatus,” 171-181. Bourdieu names Spinoza as 
the antecedent here, and Fuller traces the term back to John Philoponus in the sixth century. 
Bourdieu’s book Weight of the World has several co-authors but, since every reference to the work in 
this thesis is to Bourdieu’s own contribution, it will simply be referenced as Bourdieu, WW. 
101 Bourdieu, OTP, 83; LP, 62; PM, 162. In PM Bourdieu calls this “the Don Quixote effect.” See 
Hardy, “Hysteresis.” 
102 Bourdieu, HA, 160-186. 
103 Ibid., 172. 
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involves “the intrusion of the possibility of novelty, in short, [an] open time where all 
futures appear possible, and are indeed so to a certain extent, for that very reason.”104 
If the crisis is trans-sectoral—as in May 1968, when it included both workers and 
students—agents inhabiting homologous positions in different fields may find that 
their disruptive interests and practices overlap.105 In this moment of solidarity the 
typical flow of time as reproduction is halted, and new modes of production may be 
imagined.106 Belief in such alternative futures may inspire alternative practices and 
structures, the institutionalization of revolution.107 The crisis may therefore draw out 
the liberating potential of practice, enabling the creation of free structures.  
 In Pascalian Meditations Bourdieu draws together the rational and practical 
dimensions of freedom under the concept of “margins of freedom.”108 The 
generalization of crisis under neoliberalism paradoxically results in the omnipresence 
of the conditions for revolution. In this context the “relative autonomy of the 
symbolic order” may become the source of those alternative imaginations that 
facilitate social change: 
Symbolic power, which can manipulate hopes and expectations, especially through a 
more or less inspired and uplifting performative evocation of the future—prophesy, 
forecast or prediction—can introduce a degree of play into the correspondence 
between expectations and chances and open up a space of freedom through the more 
or less voluntarist positing of more or less improbable possibles—utopia, project, 
programme or plan—which the pure logic of probabilities would lead one to regard 
as practically excluded.109  
 
To be successful, these symbolic actions would need to account for the dispositions 
of targeted agents, and for the limitations of those dispositions.110 Freedom is thus 
produced through realistic assessment of possibilities for creating a space within the 
habitus, which separates unconscious expectations from the “explicit aspirations” 
elicited by visions of alternate futures.111 This margin of freedom is “a site of twofold 
                                                 
104 Ibid., 162. 
105 Cf. Ross, May ‘68, 11: “The principle idea of May was the union of intellectual contestation with 
workers’ struggle.” 
106 Bourdieu, HA, 182-183. 
107 Bourdieu regards this situation as “a general model of the revolutionary process” (ibid., 172).  
Bourdieu’s understanding of revolution is generally indebted to Weber’s sociology of religion. See 
esp. Bourdieu, “Structured Interests.” 
108 Bourdieu, PM, 234-236.  
109 Ibid., 234 
110 Ibid., 234-235. 
111 Ibid., 235. 
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uncertainty” encompassing an openness in the symbolic and material structure of 
fields and of agents. Their existence, whether possible or real, belies the “fatalism” of 
all orthodoxies, including that of “a sociologism which constitutes sociological laws 
as quasi-iron laws or an essentialist pessimism based on belief in an immutable 
human nature.”112 Reproductive transformations may be the norm, but within the 
margins of freedom, new beliefs and practices may be produced that take society in a 
new, freer direction.  
 
2.3 Revising Yoder’s Theological Anthropology 
Bourdieu interprets reproduction and freedom in light of his basic anthropological 
concept habitus. Human being as habitus is structured by fields oriented towards 
certain forms of capital. Personal dispositions, including dispositions to choose, are 
therefore formed publicly. “Choice” is always a selection among given options and 
never the creation ex nihilo of an autonomous subject. Humans most often choose to 
accept their social order, since that is what they were formed to do. But freedom to 
break from the social order is also a possibility; albeit one that is realized only by 
taking advantage of specific challenges that arise in the reproductive cycle. This kind 
of freedom is produced by an imaginative act of collective will, yet neither the 
imagination nor the will are drawn from nowhere. Voluntariety is essential, but can 
only be understood in its social context. 
At one level, Bourdieu’s anthropological insights mirror Stanley Hauerwas’s 
“non-voluntary” construal of human agency. Bourdieu’s sociological reading of May 
1968 would seem to confirm Hauerwas’s contention that decisions can later be 
narrated as having happened to the decider. The 1968 protests only happened because 
contradictions in the mode of reproduction caused a trans-sectoral crisis. Dominated 
members of various fields were given the opportunity to work together for a new 
order. But Bourdieu’s anthropology cannot be called non-voluntary; the will cannot 
be subtracted from his account: The labor of freedom is rational, for people need to 
know that alternatives are available. The labor of freedom is emotional, for people 
need to value the goals set forth by any freedom program if they are going to work 
for them. But the labor of freedom is inevitably voluntary too, for people need to 
                                                 
112 Ibid., 235. 
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choose the available opportunity. Indeed, Bourdieu’s anthropology complicates the 
division of persons into reason, emotions, and will or, for that matter, into any other 
collection of discrete “organs” that could be exulted with an “-ism” or rejected with a 
“non-.”113 Bourdieu’s willing agent is an intellectual and affective agent; and in every 
respect this agent is socially structured.  
Incorporating Bourdieu’s integrated sociological anthropology into Yoder’s 
revised theology of creation enables a further step to be made: willing, intellectual, 
and affective agents are also spiritual. As Yoder at his best maintains, human being is 
being-with-God. Although this point was made in a general way in the previous 
chapter, it can now be given greater specificity. The spiritual constitution of humans 
is such that reason, affect, and will only exist in relation to God. No idea or feeling or 
choice ever occurs outside of structures created and sustained by God, namely, the 
human body and other powers.114 If human bodies are part of the powers, then bodies 
themselves are providential instruments holding open the possibility of freedom for 
obedience. On this account, there is no reason to downplay voluntariety, but rather to 
portray embodied volitional structures as a gift from God, as part of the gift of 
human being. Choice is a product of grace; choice is mediated and, after the fall, 
deformed by social structures.  
In light of these comments, it is clear that the voluntary church cannot be 
defined by a series of acontextual choices made by autonomous individuals. There 
are no acontextual choices, and “individuals” are constituted by social relations. 
Yoder’s occasional language of escape from the social order to join the church is 
sociologically implausible. Nevertheless, the concept of a voluntary church remains 
theologically defensible. Hauerwas makes an important theological point that God is 
the primary agent in conversion and baptism.115 Yet unless this conviction is to 
                                                 
113 As quoted above, Bourdieu does identify his politics as “more or less voluntarist” (PM, 234). See 
also Kauppi, “Sociologist as Moraliste,” 17. But given Bourdieu’s commitment to collective 
intellectual political intervention (see chapter five below), he could hardly be accused of reductive 
“voluntarism.”  
114 Cf. Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, 417-421, on Augustine’s treatment of the soul, in which 
reason, passions, and will overlap as embodied “movements of desire” towards some goal or another 
in a spiritual context (421). Milbank summarizes the anthropology and its implications for ethics: “It 
is the whole desiring person who sins or does right, and the measure of right desire is not the rule of 
reason over the body, but the external relation of person to person in the community of peace, under 
God” (421). See also Smith, Desiring the Kingdom. 
115 Flinn, “Conversion,” 52, notes that Paul uses the language of “call,” not conversion, to describe 
what happened on the road to Damascus (see Rom. 1:1; 1 Cor. 1:1). Flinn suggests that Paul patterned 
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devolve into an ahistorical spiritualism, an account must be given of the social 
context of conversion.116 Yoder is right to insist on voluntary membership as a mark 
of the church, not because, as O’Donovan fears he believes, voluntarism is an 
adequate anthropology, but because God calls humans to discipleship within their 
varied social realms.117 “Voluntary” membership here should be understood as a 
social, rather than an “inner” psychic achievement.  
 Conversion involves, for example, a person whose initial habitus is formed 
within a context that is not well oriented to the activity of God; his dispositions and 
practices are not in continuity with those structures that result from intense 
interactions between humans and God. In Christian Witness to the State, Yoder 
argues that the primary difference between those belonging to the “present aeon” and 
those belonging to the “coming aeon” is “a matter of direction” towards or away 
from concrete obedience to the will of God.118 This difference is not temporal, for the 
Holy Spirit is present in the church “as a foretaste of the eventual consummation of 
God’s kingdom.”119 Transfer from one age to another thus involves a sociological 
shift from mild to intense interaction with God, namely through participation in the 
Holy Spirit through the church.120  
 From a Bourdieusian perspective, this shift is only precipitated by a gradual 
or sudden change of the person’s interest such that they now ascribe value to 
Christian identity. Presumably there could be any number of reasons for this change 
of interest: Christian identity guarantees citizenship or survival, as it did for some 
Jews in the middle ages; it is the identity of the rich and powerful, as it was in 
Protestant America; one’s primary social group or family adopts it, as in missionary 
settings; it offers intellectual or emotional resources that are distinct from those 
offered by other available identities, as it may in today’s increasingly post-secular 
society. Whatever the reason, Christian identity only appears as valuable capital to 
                                                                                                                                          
his account after the Old Testament prophets (Isaiah 49:1; Jer. 1:5). 
116 Recent studies of conversion insist that it is a contextually locatable social process. See, e.g., Flinn, 
“Conversion,” 52-61, and Rambo, Religious Conversion. 
117 See, e.g., Peace, Conversion in the New Testament. 
118 Yoder, CWS, 9. See chapter five below.  
119 Yoder, CWS, 9. 
120 Cf. Rambo, Religious Conversion, 66-141, on the potential progression from initial encounter with 
a religious “advocate” to initial participation to commitment. 
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anyone for reasons related to their habitus, to the structure of his or her interests.121 
The adoption of Christian identity may be judged as superficial, i.e., it does not 
accompany participation in dispositional or institutional structures that are intensely 
related to God. But it may rather involve such participation and be deemed an 
“authentic” conversion.122 Authentic conversion may come about because of the 
proximity between one’s original habitus and the new Christian habitus, or because a 
margin of freedom is found within the dispositional structure such that the church 
appears to offer a desirable and interesting alternative future. Regardless, God has 
interacted with the person through the visibility of ecclesial structures to shift that 
person’s interested practice in such a way that he is now in solidarity with the church, 
that is, he belongs to the body of Christ. The only adequate human way to describe 
his response to God is as a voluntary conversion enabled not by an autonomous will, 
but by a divine appeal to his context-formed interests via the church. Inasmuch as it 
is constituted by such conversions, the church is rightly called voluntary.     
 There are, of course, many persons whose initial habitus are formed within a 
context that is well oriented to the activity of God; discipleship provides the only 
way of being they know.123 Yoder’s arguments are not denigrative of such “cradle 
Christianity.” But his connection of voluntary membership to church discipline 
suggests that, if accountability is a constitutive practice of ecclesial being, then 
reliable readiness to give and receive correction is a condition of full membership, 
i.e., of baptism.124 The voluntary membership of a Christian reared in the church is at 
once a recognition by the church of her reliable readiness to give and receive 
correction, and a personal affirmation of this reliable readiness. The disposition to 
                                                 
121 Cf. Rambo, Religious Conversion, 56-65, on the various personal motivations and “availabilities” 
(structural, emotional, intellectual, religious) that encourage conversion.  
122 Cf. Rambo and Farhadian, “Converting,” 32: “For converting to be authentic (as judged by 
particular religious traditions), converts must change aspects of their life according to the prescriptions 
and proscriptions of specific religious communities. These dimensions include affective, intellectual, 
ethical, religious, and social/political domains.” 
123 Anabaptists have typically included their children in the church, assuming that children’s salvation 
is assured until they begin to choose sin—which they inevitably will, thus leading to the necessity of 
conversion even within the church. See Finger, Anabaptist Theology, 168-169. 
124 Cf. Finger, Anabaptist Theology, 179: “Believers’ baptism also portrays membership not only as 
submission to or reception into an institution—but also, since it involves, inward, conscious choice, as 
taking an active role. Infant baptism can hardly express that interplay between individual freedom and 
corporate identity central to ecclesial existence. Neither does it symbolize that interaction of divine 
grace and human response woven through all Christian life.” Finger correctly notes (180) that Yoder 
(BP, 28-35) rejects a view of baptism as the result of “inward believing.” 
   82 
affirm, to choose, ecclesial belonging is inculcated by the church itself. Choosing the 
church from within the church gives assent to the church-shaped habitus. This assent 
is necessary from a theological perspective as it signals the maturation of a habitus 
that is able to give and receive correction. The decision to assent to church 
membership is an invitation to receive correction and an announcement of one’s 
intention and (ecclesially recognized) ability to give it. Insofar as the church is 
constituted by persons who are reared within it, it is still rightly called voluntary. 
 This account of the voluntary church responds to O’Donovan, Hauerwas, and 
the others’ worries about Yoder’s rationalism and lack of attention to the prevenience 
of grace in decision. The latter point can be stated more strongly. If the practices of 
created society are intrinsically related to the activity of the triune God, then 
practices of freedom are produced with God. Freedom is at once a divine gift and 
divine-human co-production. There can be no separation of the work of freedom 
from the gift of freedom—Christians engage in the labor of receiving freedom.125 
Because this labor responds to God, it is necessarily involved in those structured 
structures that in different ways result from God’s intense structuring activity. The 
production of Christian freedom is thus centered on the practices of Israel, Jesus, and 
the church, especially as these are given normative shape in scripture. One of these 
practices is the inclusion through baptism of outsiders who respond to God’s call 
through the church by committing themselves to discipleship. Another practice is the 
baptism of children who assent to the church’s recognition of their capacity to 
participate in accountability practices. These practices contribute to the labor of 
receiving the gift of freedom for discipleship. As they are central to the being of the 
church, the church is rightly called voluntary.  
The Bourdieusian revision of Yoder’s theological anthropology further allows 
for a cogent response to Kroeker’s call for a return to Augustinian inwardness and 
invisibility. Because decisions and choices are products of interested practices, the 
“inner” and “outer” dimensions of Christian commitment cannot be separated.126 
Decisions and choices are powerful practices, and God relates to them creatively by 
                                                 
125 This language is indebted to Walzer’s discussion of the Jews’ free self-bondage to divine law as 
achievement of God’s promise (Exodus and Revolution, 52-53, 77-97, 108). 
126 Cf. Murphy, Bodies and Souls, and Kerr, Theology after Wittgenstein, for theological critiques of 
anthropologies that separate an “inner” and “outer” person. 
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drawing them towards those structures resulting from intense divine-human 
interaction. God therefore relates to personal decisions and choices, not by bypassing 
their visible social context, but through the practical presence of the body of Christ. 
God’s personal relating to personal interests is intertwined with the church’s labor of 
receiving the gift of freedom. Richard Bourne is thus correct to suggest election as 
the theological locus for a revision of Yoder’s understanding of the voluntary church: 
God has chosen a people on earth through their voluntary identification with Jesus 
Christ. The body of Christ is formed over time by a series of decisions that are the 
gifts and products of socially structured personal interests interacting with God 
through Christ.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter began with an examination of John Howard Yoder’s theological 
anthropology as seen in his writings on the powers and the free church. Those 
writings yield an anthropology centered on the constitutive encounter between 
humans and God. Because human being is being-with-God, the freedom for 
obedience is always and everywhere available to some degree. The powers provide 
the basic order that makes freedom possible, and Israel and the church make it a 
reality through their response to and proclamation of divine love. Although this 
anthropology would seem to strike a fine balance between the priority of grace and 
the importance of choice, several critics indicate that Yoder’s emphasis lands 
squarely on choice. He thereby comes dangerously close to modern voluntarism, and 
thus to downgrading the church to the status of other optional societies. 
 The remainder of the chapter pursued a revision of Yoder’s theological 
anthropology that drew from Bourdieu’s sociological anthropology. Bourdieu’s 
concepts of reproduction and margins of freedom place choice fully within a 
sociological context. Choice is a product of social forces, but cannot be reduced to 
social forces—any account of action has to include the process through which agents 
come to accept a decision as their own. The irreducibility of choice is perhaps best 
seen in crisis situations, where agents may be swayed in multiple directions. Appeals 
to their embodied wills (and intellects and emotions) must attend to their formation, 
but the habitus can become more flexible when fields collapse into each other.  
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A theological interpretation of these sociological concepts led to a discussion 
of conversion and baptism as part of the labor of receiving freedom as a gift from 
God. This language returns to Yoder’s most coherent depictions of voluntariety, but 
more clearly shows how choice can be emphasized without undermining the priority 
of grace and its social mediation. Conversion is a labor, both of the church that 
extends grace abroad and of the new believer who affirms and participates in that 
grace. But the laborious reception of grace is irreducibly a responsive labor. Grace is 
structurally part of creation, but it does not have to be chosen. It is often not 
chosen—sin and violence are the result.  
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3. REVISING YODER’S THEOLOGY OF VIOLENCE 
 
The social and spiritual context of human being suggests that the refusal of grace, as 
much as its acceptance, is not just an inner or individual phenomenon. Yoder’s 
sociological theology unsurprisingly casts sin in broad structural and cosmic terms. 
The powers are fallen, meaning the created social structures are now badly 
malformed. God’s intended peaceful order has been disrupted and violence is the 
norm. As a Christian pacifist, Yoder was concerned to expose how violence is 
implicated in the everyday language and practices of Christians. Some critics argue 
that he was so focused on violence that he lost sight of the goodness that is still 
present in the world—goodness that is so precious that at times it requires protection 
by violent means. These critics insist that the possibility of protecting the good with 
violence casts doubt over unilateral assessments of violence as an evil. It even raises 
questions about the nature of violence itself, especially if mind-body and spirit-
matter dualisms are destabilized. The barrier between violent and supposedly 
nonviolent modes of persuasion weakens. From here one can moot the possibility 
that violence is inescapable and simply part of being. The best humanity can do is to 
play off lesser versus greater forms of violence.  
 This chapter responds to similar criticisms of Yoder’s pacifism by revising his 
theological conception of violence. There are strong resources within Yoder’s work 
for countering such criticisms, and none stronger than his theology of the fallen 
principalities and powers. After investigating the latter, it is possible to see violence 
as part of a wider reorientation of the powers away from their created role in binding 
humans to God. Prideful rebellion is now built into our social structures, as their own 
autonomy as state, family, or market is now valued higher than their service to 
human flourishing. When humans give primary allegiance to these structures instead 
of to God, it then becomes possible to violate, or do violence to, the freedom of 
others in the names of those structures. Nowhere is this violation more obvious than 
in the decision to take another’s life. For Yoder, as suggested by the previous chapter, 
the freedom that is violated is the freedom to obey God. Taking life is the ultimate 
refusal of the other’s freedom for obedience. Yoder thus focuses his polemical 
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energies against physical violence, especially war, but his vision is by no means 
limited to the physical, and he discusses a wide range of “violences.”  
 Although these moves go a long way to answering Yoder’s critics, they are 
not sufficient in the end. More analytical clarity is desirable around the term 
“violence” such that it includes the panorama of “violences” while still validating a 
special moral imperative against killing. Pierre Bourdieu is helpful at this point, for 
he articulates the relationship between physical, symbolic and other forms of 
violence in such a way that clear moral distinctions can be made between them, at 
least at the extremes. These distinctions enable revisions to Yoder’s theology of 
violence useful for a robust Christian pacifism.  
 
3.1 Yoder’s Theology of Violence 
The focus of this section is Yoder’s “epidemiology” of violence: what does he 
consider as the primary features of violence, what distinctions does he make between 
types of violence, and how does violence relate to other fallen realities? 
Methodological questions as to how Yoder diagnoses violence are addressed in the 
following chapter, and his redemptive remedy is discussed in chapters five and six. 
This presentation of Yoder’s epidemiology of violence begins by outlining his 
theology of the fallen powers, in the context of the Pauline texts and Berkhof’s 
influential interpretation. A definition of violence emerges as a symptom of the 
rebellion of the powers against their divine ordering in creation. This definition is 
confirmed and significantly deepened through a study of Yoder’s writings on 
violence. An analysis of criticisms of Yoder’s understanding of violence follows, 
with suggestions as to necessary revisions. 
 
3.1.1 “We Cannot Live with Them” 
Yoder’s understanding of the fallen powers is drawn from Berkhof and his own 
exegesis of a variety of Pauline texts that link the powers with oppression, violence, 
and death. In Romans 12-13, Paul urges Christians not to avenge themselves, but to 
allow God to maintain order through the sword of the “governing authorities” 
(exousiais hyperechousais).1 Yoder understands the reference to exousiais here to 
                                                 
1 Yoder, CWS, 74-83, and PJ, 193-211. The exegetes cited by Yoder devoted much time to these 
   87 
indicate, not simply government, but tyranny.2 The tyrannical dimension of the 
powers is also visible in Ephesians, where the author writes of the death “through 
trespasses and sins” experienced by those who followed “the ruler of the power of 
the air [ton archonta ts exousias tou aeros], the spirit that is now at work among 
those who are disobedient” (2:1-2).3 At the end of the letter, the author warns of 
ongoing struggle “not against enemies of blood and flesh, but against the rulers 
[archas], against the authorities [exousiais], against the cosmic powers 
[kosmokratoras] of this present darkness, against the spiritual forces [pneumatika] of 
evil in the heavenly places” (6:12). Christians are to take up “the whole armor of 
God” (6:13) to withstand the onslaught of the powers.4 In language that is less 
overtly violent, Paul also writes to the Galatians about their erstwhile enslavement 
“to the elemental spirits [stoicheia] of the world” (4:3).5 The author of Colossians 
similarly admonishes his readers to beware of captivity to the deceitful stoicheia 
(2:8, 20).6 
Berkhof notes that, if the powers were created for human flourishing, then 
their fall represents a “demonic reversal” of their intended purpose.7 It is not just 
human individuals who are fallen, but “the invisible side of the cosmos functions in 
diametric opposition to its divinely fixed purpose.”8 This situation means that human 
relations with each other, the rest of creation, and God are now deeply disordered. 
Thus when Paul relays his conviction that the powers cannot separate us from Christ 
(Rom. 8:38-39), “he presupposes that the nature of the Powers is to do just that, to 
separate us from love.”9 God’s providential oversight means the powers are not 
wholly given over to chaos, but now the order they provide separates us from rather 
                                                                                                                                          
verses. See Berkhof, C&P, 66; Caird, Principalities and Powers, 22-30; Cullman, State in the New 
Testament, 50-70; MacGregor, “Principalities and Powers,” 24-25; Morrison, Powers That Be; Visser 
‘t Hooft, Kingship of Christ, 94-95; Wink, Naming the Powers, 47-50. Hays, Moral Vision, 247-248, 
supports Yoder’s reading. 
2 Yoder, PJ, 141. 
3 Ibid. This living death is later characterized as the hopelessness and desolation of Gentiles excluded 
from God’s covenant with Israel, practically experienced as “hostility” and a “dividing wall” between 
Jews and Gentiles (2:11-14). On this passage, see Yoder, HCPP, 108-115. 
4 Yoder, PJ, 149, on Berkhof, C&P, 51-52. 
5 Yoder, PJ, 141, and Berkhof, C&P, 21-24, 33. 
6 Yoder, PJ, 141. 
7 Berkhof, C&P, 30. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. Cf. Yoder, PJ, 141. 
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than unites us to God.10 Citing Galatians 4:8, Berkhof suggests that the problem is 
our enslavement to “beings that by nature are not gods.”11 It is their pretension to 
divinity that makes the powers’ reign tyrannical.  
 Berkhof then gives extended attention to the imagery of the powers as 
existing in the “air” (cf. Eph. 2:2; 6:12).12 For first-century Christians, “air” united 
the earth to the heavens, but the central point in the powers passages—according to 
Berkhof—is that something or someone more powerful than humans directs 
terrestrial affairs. Berkhof observes that we still use this language when we say a 
mood or idea is “in the air.” He draws from recent experience to speak of the 
“Powers of Volk, race, and state” that seemingly dominated German life “from 
above” during Nazi rule: “these powers intruded as a barrier between God’s Word 
and men. They acted as if they were ultimate values, calling for loyalty as if they 
were the gods of the cosmos.”13 But it is not just obvious tyrannies that are at fault. 
All the various powers—state, opinion, morality, etc.—that dominate everyday 
human life unite by separating us from God.  
 In Christian Witness to the State, Yoder considers the state’s “universal 
temptation” to abuse its divine mandate to provide basic social order by instead using 
violence to bring about a supposed “ideal world.”14 Yoder goes beyond Berkhof to 
suggest that the problem is deeper than the state’s self-deification; that deeper 
problem is “pride, the one sin that most surely leads to a fall, even already within 
history.”15 Pride, according to Yoder, is behind every use of violence, and “the sword 
is itself…part of the Fall”—it would not be legitimated if somehow the state were 
more humble.16 This analysis corresponds to his portrait of the powers earlier in the 
book. As seen in previous chapters, Yoder introduces his discussion of the state with 
a review of New Testament language of the powers. He then relates this language to 
his teacher Oscar Cullmann’s eschatology, in which Christ inaugurates an “aeon” 
                                                 
10 Cf. Yoder, HCPP, 30-36, 108-115. 
11 Berkhof, C&P, 30. 
12 Ibid., 31-33.  
13 Ibid., C&P, 32. See also Rupp, Principalities and Powers, 15. 
14 Yoder, CWS, 37.  
15 Ibid. Cf. HCPP, 89-95. 
16 Yoder, CWS, 38. Yoder is distinguishing his approach from Cullmann, State in the New Testament, 
78, and Barth, Church and State, 24-30. They suggest that a humble, non-idolatrous state could wield 
the sword without sin. 
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different from the present one.17 Yoder summarizes: “The present aeon is 
characterized by sin and centered on man….The present age, by rejecting obedience, 
has rejected the only possible ground for man’s own well-being.”18 Disobedience and 
self-centeredness are definitive of the fallen powers. Like Berkhof, Yoder does not 
identify the fall with absolute evil. Rather, Christ “channels” violence through a 
“vengeance-upon-vengeance mechanism” that discourages violence through the 
selective and restrained use of violence, thereby maintaining the minimal order 
necessary for human life.19 The state, at least “in its judicial and police functions,” is 
therefore throughout fallen history “the major incarnation of this channeled evil.”20 It 
is also a major force behind the exclusion of widows, orphans, strangers, and 
enemies.21 Pride turns humans against each other and God; this pride is at the heart 
of our most basic social institutions.  
 Throughout Christian Witness to the State, Yoder criticizes theological modes 
of approaching the moral status of the state that use standards not rooted in 
revelation. He counters, for example, ethics rooted in natural law or in readings of 
Romans 13 that assign moral autonomy to the state.22 Autonomy from Christ, as will 
soon be evident, is Yoder’s primary way of describing the fallenness of the powers. 
The pride that wields violence and oppresses the poor is a conviction that one 
possesses standards for living that derive elsewhere than God’s revelation in Jesus 
Christ. This pride is the major target of Yoder’s The Politics of Jesus. As discussed in 
chapter one above, that book argues against “mainstream” Christian ethics that Jesus 
is politically normative.23 Some say Jesus’ ethics were meant only for an 
eschatological interim, or for a powerless sect; others that his message was purely 
spiritual, or that his purpose purely one of metaphysical atonement. Whatever the 
reason, what mainstream ethics have in common is their ethical methodology: they 
                                                 
17 Cf. Cullmann, Early Church, 109-120. 
18 Yoder, CWS, 9.  
19 Ibid., 11. 
20 Ibid., 12-13. 
21 Ibid., 41-42. 
22 Ibid., 33-35, 74-83. 
23 Yoder, PJ, 4-8, 15-20, 99-109. Yoder further updates his account of mainstream ethics in 
“Confessing Jesus in Mission,” in UNDA, 1996. Cf. his DPR, 38-43; FTN, 99; THW, 61. 
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hold that it is “by studying the realities around us, not by hearing a proclamation 
from God, that we discern the right.”24  
 The chapter on “Jesus and Power” in The Politics of Jesus has the particular 
role of showing that Paul thought about the reign of Christ in terms related to social 
structure and power.25 The theology of the powers is then offered as an alternative 
both to personalism, which denies Christian social teaching as such,26 and to “orders 
of creation” theologies that hold that fundamental social institutions have “an 
autonomous value unrelated to redemption and church, by virtue of their being the 
product of a divine act of creation.”27 Yoder, intentionally or not, is giving examples 
of fallen powers here, as evident from his characterization of the fallen powers as 
abandoning their created purpose to enslave and dominate humanity:28  
These [created] powers have rebelled and are fallen. They did not accept the 
modesty that would have permitted them to remain conformed to the creative 
purpose, but rather they claimed for themselves an absolute value. They thereby 
enslaved humanity and our history. We are bound to them; “slavery” is in fact one of 
the fundamental terms used in the New Testament to describe the lost condition of 
men and women outside of Christ. To what are we subject? Precisely to those values 
and structures which are necessary to life and society, but which have claimed the 
status of idols and have succeeded in making us serve them as if they were of 
absolute value.29 
 
If the powers are constitutive of human being to the extent that “we cannot live 
without them,” the disastrous effect of their rebellion means “we cannot live 
with them.”30 There is now no obvious path to human freedom; all is 
circumscribed by the prideful powers. Therefore, those ethical systems that 
propose some set of standards independent of Christ are, following Yoder’s 
biblical interpretation, themselves fallen and idolatrous. “Creation” now cannot 
provide moral insight, for creation is fallen and in need of redemption. 
Remaining chapters in The Politics of Jesus discuss cultural and state power, 
warning, finally, against the temptation to “handle history.”31 The chapter on 
                                                 
24 Yoder, PJ, 9. 
25 Ibid., 134-136. 
26 Ibid., 153-155.  
27 Ibid., 144. 
28 Ibid., 141-144.  
29 Ibid., 142. 
30 Ibid., 143. 
31 Ibid., 162-192 (on culture), 193-211 (on the state), 228-247 (on “handling history”). 
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the state is concerned with physical violence, but the broader treatment 
underscores the prevalence of prideful autonomy throughout the social order.  
 These themes are expanded and given greater specificity in Yoder’s 
remaining discussions of the powers. In his third Stone Lecture, “Behold My Servant 
Shall Prosper,” he insists that the powers participate in the fall.32 Their fallenness is 
constitutive of the fall itself, and not merely a byproduct of human fallenness. He 
suggests that this formulation acknowledges the effects of sin in a way that trumps 
the Reformed doctrine of “total depravity”—for even the orders of creation offer 
only ambiguous moral testimony. Nevertheless, he is careful again to maintain that 
the fall does not totally negate the goodness of the powers. Fallenness means that 
power is never neutral, but it also means that it is not uniformly good or bad. 
“‘Undetermined’? ‘Malleable’?,” he asks, “Paul’s picture is more finely nuanced 
than any one word we can find.”33  
 In his lecture on “Early Christian Cosmology and Nonviolence” in Warsaw, 
he returns to the language of autonomy, now suggesting an intrinsic relation between 
autonomy and tyranny.34 In becoming separate from God, the powers also become 
separate from humans, allowing their existence over and against us. The fall, 
therefore, cannot be limited to strictly personal matters: “It is also that the structures 
which surround us have become instruments of our subjugation, not of our 
empowerment.” This structural reality is revealed clearly in the cross of Jesus Christ, 
which Yoder interprets as “the product of the consistent outworking of the nature of 
things in the fallen cosmos operating according to their own character.” Because the 
powers are their own ends,35 they must do violence to any challenger. The violence 
of the powers against Jesus unveils their true grain.36  
Yoder gives no examples of fallen powers in either his third Stone Lecture or 
his Warsaw lecture, but he does discuss “the fundamental wrongness of the vision of 
                                                 
32 Yoder, “Servant,” 163. 
33 Ibid., 164. 
34 Yoder, Nonviolence, 99. 
35 Cf. Yoder, OR, 149.  
36 Cf. Yoder, HCPP, 32, where he draws an analogy between the fallen powers, or “the world,” and 
the grain of a piece of wood. E.g., the arms race and nationalism expose the deep structures that run 
through the world. Yoder regards “the world” as the Johannine equivalent to the principalities and 
powers. See also his “Prophetic Dissent,” 101; ARS, 265; RP, 55-56; and “Review: The Context of 
Decision,” 136. 
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Christendom” in his first Stone Lecture, “Why Ecclesiology is Social Ethics.”37 What 
is wrong with Christendom is “its ascription of a Christian loyalty or duty to those 
who have made no confession,” thereby restricting the freedom of unbelief. This 
restriction rejects God’s nonviolent patience with non-Christians and, by implication, 
denies any possible process of legitimate Christian conversion. It is, once again, the 
prideful act of a power separated from God. At the same time, the Christendom 
arrangement encourages a number of institutional developments that reinforce its 
basic error: it searches for a generalized morality that gives special license to the 
ruler as the “privileged actor of history”;38 it supports a clericalism that assigns “a 
privileged handle on the social decision process” to the institutional church;39 and it 
allows quietist communities to flourish—which “are interested only in their own 
intensity and integrity”—thus refusing the missionary imperative.40 As a model fallen 
power, Christendom illustrates the breadth of Yoder’s vision of the fall. He returns to 
it throughout his writings, most famously in his frequent references to the 
“Constantinian” temptation to unite church and state that characterizes subsequent 
church history.41 
 Another example of a fallen power is in the essay on H. Richard Niebuhr. 
Yoder regards Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture as itself “deceptive” or “in the technical 
sense demonic, a structure that gets in the way of wholeness and understanding 
rather than serving those goals.42 At issue is the descriptive adequacy of Niebuhr’s 
five types of relating Christ to culture. Yoder claims that few readers find their 
tradition accurately represented by the types, and many find their forebears’ positions 
to be grossly distorted.43 The typology is thus “more convincing to the naïve than it 
is true when examined,” casting serious doubts on its pedagogical or normative 
helpfulness. Furthermore, Yoder accuses Niebuhr of using the objectivity of the 
                                                 
37 Yoder, RP, 109. 
38 Yoder, RP, 117. 
39 Ibid., 118. 
40 Ibid., 119. 
41 Yoder saw the “Constantinian” (Christendom) temptation as present in all ages of church history 
(OR, 149-155; PK, 135-141; RP, 57-60; CA, 42-73). The same logic he uses to discuss 
Constantinianism is evident in his criticisms of violent movements within ancient Judaism (OR, 13-
33; JCSR, 72-75, 107-108, 152, 187-188). 
42 Yoder, “HRN,” 47. For a recent defense of Christ and Culture in light of Yoder’s criticisms, see 
Stackhouse, Making the Best of It, 31-41. 
43 Ibid., 45, 51. 
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typology to cloak an argument for his own preferred “transformationalist” option.44 
This option, as Yoder tendentiously summarizes it, states that “Jesus would have us 
turn away from all culture, but we prefer not to do this because of our more balanced 
vision of the values of nature and history. Yet in our affirmative attitude to ‘culture’ 
we do want to continue to show some respect for the criticism (or the 
‘transformation’) which flows from Christ’s critical attitude toward it.”45 Christ and 
Culture is thus also “demonic,” a fallen power that unifies readers around an option 
that leads them away from Jesus. This judgment is especially clear in light of Yoder’s 
exegesis of Niebuhr’s use of the term “culture.”46 According to Yoder, Niebuhr 
portrays culture as a monolithic unity that is autonomous from Christ. The question 
for Niebuhr is how Christians are to relate to this autonomous monolith. Unity that 
autonomously forms a people apart from Christ, however, is what the New Testament 
calls a fallen power.47 Yet the New Testament does not portray the powers as 
monolithically evil, but as at once created and fallen. Discernment of evil is, 
therefore, a “dialectical challenge” requiring careful real-time judgments, not a 
timeless typology.48 Christ and Culture, consequently, ill-prepares its readers for the 
real task they face. The book, like other fallen powers, undermines genuine freedom. 
  
3.1.2 Violence 
Between 1969 and 1996, Yoder explored the meaning of violence in a variety of 
contexts. In “Conflict from the Perspective of Anabaptist History and Theology,” 
Yoder investigates the nuances of the term “nonviolence.”49 This term is inadequate, 
he alleges, as a way of defining what Christians are against, for “there is real 
difficulty in defining how far the word violence goes.” In itself, “violence” offers no 
clarity in distinguishing between physical and other injustices—and Christians are 
concerned with the breadth of injustices. Jesus, for example, suggests that hatred of 
another is to an important degree morally equivalent to murder (Mt. 5:21-22). But it 
is also right to insist that “the act of intent of taking life…is qualitatively one serious 
                                                 
44 Ibid., 42. 
45 Ibid., 42-43. 
46 Ibid., 54-55. 
47 Ibid., 68-69.  
48 Ibid., 85.  
49 Yoder, WL, 145. On Mennonite debates about the proper description of their stance against violence, 
see Yoder, CA, 297, 305-306, 356-357, and Nevertheless, 107-114. 
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step worse than physical force that shocks, insults, or wounds, but does not kill.”50 
There is thus a basis for discrimination between, on the one hand, the violence of 
murder and other types of physical force and between, on the other hand, physical 
violence and other injustices. 
 The essay “Jesus and Power,” an evaluation of a 1972 World Council of 
Churches consultation on violence, sees Yoder return to the question of the meaning 
of violence.51 He notes that the consultation documents vary between definitions of 
violence as something “discrete, identifiable, avoidable” and as something built into 
the fabric of human being, i.e., “interference with the fulfillment of human 
potential.”52 To some extent this ambiguity is unavoidable, as violence is not “a 
univocal, unidimensional something varying only in terms of more or less; each 
varies in quality, in depth, in direction, in wholeness.”53 Refinement of the definition 
is desirable, but it should not distract from Jesus’ love of enemies and rejection of 
domination. For the Christian, these imperatives cannot be slighted by analytical 
sophistication. 
 Over a decade later, Yoder makes a first attempt at refining his definition of 
violence in a brief but important comment in his ecumenical essay, “A ‘Peace’ 
Church Perspective on Covenanting.”54 There he insists that the identifications of 
“social authority” or effectiveness with violence are “denials of the gospel.”55 There 
must be, in other words, a peace that is beyond or deeper than violence. Whatever 
violence is, it is not fundamental to reality.56 
This view of the limited ontological status of violence receives further 
specification in Yoder’s “A Theological Critique of Violence.” Yoder begins by 
rejecting the “dominant view” that violence must be defined before it can be assessed 
morally.57 He therefore turns to the Cain and Able story (Gen. 4:1-16), observing that 
the first biblical reference to people outside of Adam and Eve’s family occurs just 
                                                 
50 Yoder, WL, 146.  
51 Yoder, “Jesus and Power,” 453-454.  
52 Ibid., 453n15.  
53 Ibid., 454. Cf. Hauerwas, Performing the Faith, 169-175, where he argues that Yoder is not actually 
a pacifist, if by that is meant someone who always knows in advance what violence is. 
54 Yoder, “Covenanting,” 318-321. 
55 Ibid., 320.  
56 But see Blum, “Ontology of Violence,” for a challenging argument that “the deconstructionist 
insistence on the ubiquity of violence might actually imply that nonviolence is made possible by its 
very impossibility” (26).  
57 Yoder, WL, 27.  
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after Able’s murder.58 When God tells Cain he is condemned to be “a fugitive and 
wanderer on the earth,” Cain protests that “anyone who meets me may kill me” 
(4:12, 14). According to Yoder, “this is the primeval definition of violence for our 
present purposes: that there are people out there whose response to Cain’s deed is 
mimetic. They will quasi-automatically, as by reflex, want to do to him what he had 
done to Abel. It will not occur to them not to do so. It will seem self-evident to them 
that that is what he has asked for by what he did.”59 God swears an oath of 
“sevenfold vengeance” upon anyone who would harm Cain (4:15), an oath so 
powerful as to deter would-be assailants. But as the subsequent story of Lamech 
demonstrates—Lamech brags of wreaking “seventy-sevenfold” vengeance on anyone 
who challenges his murders (4:23-24)—”the retaliatory reflex, by its very nature, 
runs amok.”60  
 French anthropologist René Girard has argued that civic control is introduced 
as a means of placing a limit on mimetic vengeance.61 Although Yoder identifies a 
number of problems with Girard’s theory, he agrees that it describes the objectivity 
of ancient violence—its basis in the fallen order of things—better than 
rationalizations that view violence as restorative of social or cosmic order.62 The 
problem with rationalizations is that violence is not ultimately rational. In short, 
“there is a destructive reflex at work, which will not go away and whereby violence 
propagates itself.”63 Yoder next reviews several leading ways of defining violence, 
concluding that there is no obvious way to judge between them.64 He therefore turns 
to “ordinary language” analysis of the term, beginning with the observation that 
“violence” is a verbal noun from the transitive verb “to violate.”65 Hence violence is 
always directed towards an object. “To evaluate violence, morally, then, is to 
evaluate the worth of the value violated.” Violence appears to be unavoidable, and 
                                                 
58 On Cain, see also Yoder, HCPP, 57-68. 
59 Yoder, WL, 28.  
60 Yoder, WL, 29.  
61 Cf. Girard, Violence and the Sacred. 
62 Yoder, WL, 29-31. See also Yoder, You Have It Coming: Good Punishment. The Legitimate Social 
Function of Punitive Behavior, in UNDA, where Yoder explores how punishment and coercion are “in 
the order of things” and therefore must be dealt with and not simply opposed. He looks at mothering 
as a necessary agonistic discipline, governmental justice as constitutive of public order, and the 
victim’s need for vindication.   
63 Yoder, WL, 30.  
64 Ibid., 33-35.  
65 Ibid., 36.  
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this raises the possibility of weighing greater and lesser evils. But Yoder warns that 
this mode of moral analysis assumes we have high level of accuracy about the facts 
of the case, that we can easily judge who has the legitimacy to wield violence, and 
that we can quantify the various values weighed against each other.  
 Yoder does not develop these arguments, but the implication is that, while 
violence may be unavoidable in many circumstances, not everything humans do is 
violent. There may be a moral scale of “violences,” but unless some violations can be 
judged as more or less nonviolent, and others as so violent as to be off limits, then 
evaluation lacks hard criteria. For Yoder, theological commitments provide the 
evaluative criteria for the critique of violence. Turning to the ancient creeds, he 
suggests that the affirmation of God as creator provides a clear standard: “What is 
wrong with violence is that what is violated is a creature of the sovereign God.”66 
Humans, in particular, are bearers of God’s image, meaning that violence against 
humans is an attack on “the majesty of the creator God.”67 Yoder notes that in the 
Bible the only sin linked to the image of God is the shedding of human blood (Gen. 
9:6). Although some kinds of “violation” may be unavoidable after the fall, killing 
another human cannot be one of them. Killing is the grossest violence against God 
and fellow humans.68 
 The fall of the powers is their prideful rebellion against the God-human 
relationship. As an assault on the image of God in humanity, killing, more than any 
other offense, attempts to negate that relationship. It represents an absolute threat 
against human freedom. Elsewhere on the spectrum there is room to weigh violences; 
and on the far end from killing lies the possibility of nonviolence. 
 
3.1.3 Criticisms 
Yoder’s theology of Christian pacifism has been criticized from a number of angles. 
These can be grouped into four areas: Yoder insufficiently recognizes that violence 
requires discernment; Yoder’s focus on violence misses out on the broader meaning 
                                                 
66 Ibid., 38. 
67 Ibid. 
68 See also Yoder, Preface, 311. Cf. his Capital Punishment, 4-6, on the absolute prohibition against 
killing. Yoder never discusses the various ambiguities that exist for human life in the womb or at old 
age. Although it is possible to question the language of “killing” at these stages, Yoder’s distinction 
would seem to apply at all other times. Arner, Consistently Pro-Life, contends that Yoderian pacifism 
should extend to opposition to elective abortions.  
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of the fall; Yoder fails to relate his critique of violence to the judgment of God; and 
Yoder is ambiguous as to the legitimacy of state violence in the order of providence. 
 
Violence and Discernment 
In an essay “Violence: Double Passivity,” Anglican theologian John Milbank claims 
that “violence is never simply evident, because we have to judge whether a 
substantive good has been impaired.”69 A “phenomenological pacifism” that simply 
condemns all “apparent” violence skips over the necessary discernment process. 
Moreover, although the ultimate good is invulnerable to violence, our fragile 
approximations do require appropriate defensive measures.70 The status of an action 
as violent or not, then, is judged in light of both the goods it threatens and the goods 
it protects.71 
 Milbank directs his general critique of pacifism toward Yoder in a recent 
essay, “Power is Necessary for Peace: In Defence of Constantine.”72 After portraying 
the church as a “realm of non-violence which proclaims the power of weakness,” 
Milbank restates his claim that such a realm needs defense from communities that 
refuse weakness. He praises Mennonites who, refusing apolitical and compromised 
stances, posit the church as the true polity that lives “beyond the law.” But the 
Mennonite solution, especially in the “avowed anti-Constantinianism” of Yoder and 
Hauerwas, is “politically disingenuous and theologically dangerous” in its refusal to 
admit minimal coercion.  
                                                 
69 Milbank, Being Reconciled, 28. His argument, which rests on an interpretation of evil and violence 
as convertible “anti-transcendentals,” is not entirely clear. Presumably he means to say that violence is 
evil when it impairs a substantive good, and not evil when it does not.  
70 Ibid., 39-40.  
71 Milbank also argues that the passive gaze upon violence is actually more violent than “defensive 
counter-violence,” because surviving victims can only interpret such non-interventionist voyeurism as 
a further act of violence (Being Reconciled, 29). Mennonite theologians object to this binary division 
between passive pacifism and active defensive violence, e.g., Blum, “Ontology of Violence” and 
Derksen, “Milbank and Violence.” Nevertheless, in a conversation with Stanley Hauerwas about 
“Violence,” Milbank states that his target was not the “christological pacifism” that Hauerwas 
represents (“Christian Peace,” 209). His critique of passive, non-christological pacifism thus will not 
be pursued here. 
72 Milbank, “Defence of Constantine.” A modified version of this essay is the foreword to Gift of 
Difference, xi-xviii. Milbank had earlier interacted with several theologians who used Yoder’s work to 
dispute his portrayal of pacifism. In addition to the conversation with Hauerwas in “Christian Peace,” 
see Snyder, ed. “Radical Orthodoxy and Radical Reformation,” special issue, Conrad Grebel Review. 
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 Yoder’s “absolute purity,”73 according to Milbank, fails in two respects.74 
First, it does not see how a close church-state relation can benefit both parties: the 
church can and sometimes has redeemed the state, and the state can and sometimes 
has protected the church from extinction.75 Second, it does not appreciate the 
fragility of churches and (Christian) bodies as physical realities requiring defense if 
“the offer of the sacred” is to be made at all. Yoder may protest that “coercive 
resistance to evil does more damage than original evil itself,” but surely there are 
enough examples to the contrary to suggest that defensive violence can be salutary.76 
Violence, as Milbank suggested in his earlier essay, must be weighed in perspective 
of the goods it sacrifices and the goods it protects. It is possible to distinguish 
between “a Christian acceptance of legitimate uses of force” and “its brutal, 
altogether idolatrous manifestations.”77 Just wars are possible, and Christians can 
endorse killing. 
 Milbank’s concerns are echoed by a number of Yoder’s critics, and are 
valuable precisely because they put the question so clearly: is Yoder’s pacifist ethic 
fully Christian, or does it overlook a properly Christian outlook on the ambiguity of 
violence? Peter Ochs raises a similar question from a Jewish perspective, asking if 
Yoder’s “pure pacifism” owes more to the absolutizing logic of “the colonialist 
philosophies of western civilization” than to his ancient sources.78 These issues, of 
course, have long been raised by Christian defenders of just war theory against 
                                                 
73 Cf. Milbank, “Forum with John Milbank,” 48. on “pure pacifism” as falling prey to “Kantian 
formalism.” See also Donahue, “Review of The Politics of Jesus,” 180: Yoder is in danger of 
“proclaiming a formal ethic of suffering, where pacifistic suffering is self-justifying.” 
74 Milbank also suggests that Yoder denies the Old Testament political pattern as normative, and so 
risks Marcionism. This charge, made also by Leithart and others, is treated in the following chapter on 
methodology.  
75 Here Milbank names the positive effects on the state of the Justinian code, and the dependence of 
the church for survival on medieval kings. One does not have to refute the former claim to be 
confused by the latter. It is not clear when the church’s existence per se has ever been threatened, 
especially in the Christendom era.  
76 It is uncertain why Milbank attributes this view to Yoder. Yoder’s argument is rather that 
nonviolence runs “with the grain of the cosmos” as revealed by Jesus, and so it is unsurprising when it 
works—this argument depends on no claims about the success of violent methods in resolving specific 
conflicts. See, e.g., Yoder, PJ, 228-247.  
77 Milbank adds this as a “footnote” to his article in a comment made on November 1, 2010. As an 
example, he imagines a British foreign policy aligned with France, Russia, and Commonwealth 
nations instead of, primarily, America. Milbank believes “that the UK can start to take an imaginative 
lead in pursuit of an international order based on more balanced alliances and compatible with 
genuine Christian principles.”  
78 Ochs in Yoder, JCSR, 4. Ochs remark about Yoder’s potential “colonialism” relates to the concern 
that Yoder distorts rabbinic Judaism to fit his pacifist theological agenda.  
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Yoder. Richard J. Mouw, for example, insists that a valid moral distinction exists 
between coercive activities that emerge from a desire to coerce and those that emerge 
as unintended effects of just actions.79 To refuse to make this distinction is to refuse 
“significant political activity.”  
 Other critics defend just war as an appropriate response to the Christian call 
to “neighbor love,”80 “justice,”81 the “common obligation to just institutions,”82 and 
to engage “the dilemma of civilization.”83 In each case, the rationale offered for war 
is rooted in a Christian ethic that the critic regards as ruling out an absolute 
prohibition of lethal violence. In an interesting twist, there is now a group of Yoder-
influenced “pacifists” who support armed international peacekeeping efforts under 
the rubric of “just policing.”84 Like the just warriors, advocates of just policing insist 
that minimal violence in defense of the innocent is justified on Christian grounds. 
The critics agree: the morality of violence must be discerned, and Yoder’s absolute 
pacifism evades this task. 
 
Violence and the Fall 
Earl Zimmerman and P. Travis Kroeker both lament Yoder’s almost exclusive focus 
on war. For Zimmerman, Christians ought to confront “other equally pressing social 
and economic problems.”85 War exists in a web of issues, and cannot be adequately 
addressed without attending to them all. Kroeker concurs, adding personal moral and 
psychic matters to the list.86 By neglecting these, Yoder “has lost sight of certain 
aspects of moral discernment that would allow for a better account of idolatrous 
‘Roman’ (or Constantinian) politics and how such temptations might be agonistically 
engaged also in the Church and the academy.” Although Cynthia Hess is more 
generous to Yoder’s approach, she too seeks to supplement his work on external 
                                                 
79 Mouw, Politics and the Biblical Drama, 110.  
80 Lutz, “Foreword to the First Edition,” in Yoder, WWIU, xix.  
81 Wright, Disavowing Constantine, 91-92.  
82 Beckley, “Rawls’s Idea of Justice as Fairness—Part I,” 219. 
83 Wogaman, Christian Method of Moral Judgment, 192. See also Wogaman, Christian Perspectives 
on Politics, 46, and Christian Moral Judgment, 111-115.  
84 Reimer, Christians and War, 167-170; Schlabach, ed., Just Policing. Reimer and Schlabach note 
that Yoder raised the question of Christian participation in policing (in CWS, 56-57), and then argue 
that international crises call for a non-militaristic police force that retains lethal force as an option. See 
A. Alexis-Baker, “Unbinding Yoder from Just Policing,” for a response.  
85 Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 122. 
86 Kroeker, “War of the Lamb,” 82-83.  
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physical violence with a look at “violence that has injured persons from the outside 
and then moved into their bodies, minds, and souls (internal violence).”87 If all the 
powers are implicated in the fall, then Yoder’s concentration on physical violence 
misses the wider reality of which it is just a part.  
 
A Violent God?  
As discussed in chapter one above, several critics doubt if Yoder’s commitment to 
nonviolence can be reconciled with the traditional conception of God as a holy 
warrior. In the present context, these same criticisms raise the possibility that Yoder’s 
interpretation of violence as a mode of autonomization from God cannot be 




A similar question can be raised as to the role of violence in providence. Even if state 
violence is simply permitted, and not condoned, by God as a means of maintaining 
relative order, it seems that Christians are required to validate the legitimacy of state 
violence. What is the shape of this legitimation? Does it include political 
endorsement of certain wars? Chaplaincy? Qualified military service? Craig A. 
Carter suggests that this issue demands far more clarification than Yoder gave it.89  
 
The third and fourth criticisms can be dealt with using material from previous 
chapters of this thesis. As for divine violence, chapter one discussed God’s 
permissive providence as a practice of nonviolent patience. This practice is 
complementary rather than antithetical to Jesus’ nonviolence. Whatever the shape of 
God’s judgment, it need not include violence. A similar argument can be advanced in 
relation to the fourth criticism, about Christian legitimation of state violence that God 
permits. If Christians are meant to participate concretely in the structures that result 
from intensive interactions with the triune God, then there is no reason Christians 
                                                 
87 Hess, “Traumatic,” 202.  
88 See, e.g, Boersma, Violence, Hospitality, and the Cross, for an argument that God’s redemptive 
hospitality includes the use of violence. 
89 Carter, “Liberal Reading of Yoder,” 99.  
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should do more than imitate God’s permissiveness in this area. Christians accept that 
states will use violence to bring about order, but refuse to endorse violence as such. 
Christian nonviolence models an alternative politics that, through dialogical witness, 
calls the state to chasten its violence.90 Neither of these criticisms fundamentally 
challenges Yoder’s conception of violence.  
  A response to the first and second criticisms, however, is more difficult. To a 
significant degree, concerns about a limited definition of violence and a too narrow 
focus on violence were addressed by the presentation of Yoder’s theology of 
violence. Yoder does recognize a wide spectrum of violences, even if he draws an 
absolute line between killing and the rest.91 He likewise places violence within a 
much broader interpretation of the fall of the powers as prideful autonomization from 
created structures.92 It should also be mentioned that none of the advocates of just 
war or policing engage Yoder’s theological arguments as to why human life is a good 
that cannot be taken in exchange for other goods.93 Yoder’s writings on punishment 
suggest that he does not refuse the need for justice as a correction or deterrent for 
injustice. As later chapters will explore, neither does he pose responsible political 
engagement and nonviolent practice as alternatives. To Milbank’s statement that “we 
have to judge whether a substantive good has been impaired,” Yoder would reply that 
any time a human life has been taken is an impairment of a substantive good. None 
of the other legitimately Christian goods can be played off against the value of 
human life.  
 Nevertheless, Yoder offers few analytical clues about how violent and 
nonviolent coercion can be parsed, or about how to assess the moral status of modes 
of coercion that do not seek, but still risk, lethal violence. It can be asked, moreover, 
how (or if) Yoder’s view allows for the separation of violence from other forms of 
prideful rebellion, such as that lodged within human dispositional structures. Yoder’s 
Christian pacifism, therefore, needs a definition of violence that is at once more 
                                                 
90 The Christian response to violence is treated extensively in chapters five and six, below.  
91 Cf. Bourne, Seek the Peace, 203-206, who argues that, although Yoder’s terms could have been 
clearer, his support for nonviolent protest indicates a willingness to identify forms of coercion that 
stop short of violence.  
92 Cf. Kerr, Christ, History and Apocalyptic, 138, for an excellent formulation of how the political 
dominion of the powers is predicated upon an “immanently determined nexus of causality” that closes 
history’s divine horizons. State violence and the autonomy of the powers cannot be separated.  
93 Presumably Yoder would say that human life can only be given freely in suffering service. 
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capacious and more precise: one that distinguishes, on the one hand, between 
physical and other forms of violence and, on the other hand, between violent and 
nonviolent coercion. Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological concept of “symbolic violence” 
offers just such an understanding of violence.  
 
3.2 Bourdieu on Violence and Domination 
Loïc Wacquant suggests that “the whole of Bourdieu’s work may be interpreted as a 
materialist anthropology of the specific contribution that various forms of symbolic 
violence make to the reproduction and transformation of structures of domination.”94 
It is therefore unsurprising to find that the principles of Bourdieu’s interpretations of 
violence and domination are embedded in his general theories of practice and social 
reproduction. Those theories were honed on research into the disintegration of rural 
traditions in Algeria and France, and the erosion of French democracy by dominant 
political, intellectual, and economic forces. Like Yoder, Bourdieu does not offer a 
“prelapsarian” social theory that then can be contrasted with developments in this 
postlapsarian world. Rather, he begins his social criticism in the midst of efforts to 
expose and overcome injustice in the present.95  
 Bourdieu conceptualized domination as a particular kind of relation made 
possible by inequalities in capital holdings. As the following review demonstrates, 
the sorts of relational practices that warrant the label “domination” involve the use of 
superior, in quantity and/or type, capital holdings to bring about the acceptance of 
inequality by those with inferior capital holdings. He does not decry inequality as 
such, but the symbolic, structural, and physical forces used to maintain it. His special 
emphasis is on “symbolic violence,” a concept he uses to describe the complicity of 
the dominated in their domination. In the following, this concept is described 
alongside his account of the transition from traditional to modern modes of 
domination. It is then fleshed out in greater detail through an engagement of Willem 
                                                 
94 Wacquant, “Social Praxeology,” 14-15. See also Wacquant “‘State Nobility,’” 134: Bourdieu’s 
“sociology of ‘culture’” is “a political economy of symbolic violence, of the imposition and 
inculcation of instruments of knowledge and construction of reality that are socially biased but unseen 
as such.” Cf. Heinich, Pourquoi Bourdieu, 87. There is considerably less secondary literature on 
symbolic violence than on Bourdieu’s other concepts. For summaries, see Addi, Sociologie et 
anthropologie, chapter seven; Champagne and Christin, Pierre Bourdieu, 135-137; Fernández, “La 
noción de violencia simbólica”; Lakomski, “Symbolic Violence”; Rey, Bourdieu and Religion, 52, 
156; Schubert, “Suffering”; Webb, Shirato, and Danaher, Understanding Bourdieu, 24-26, 117-119. 
95 See chapter five below on Bourdieu’s political activity. 
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Schinkel’s recent criticisms of Bourdieu, criticisms that are taken here as elucidating 
rather than weakening Bourdieu’s treatment of violence. 
 
3.2.1 Symbolic Violence and the Modes of Domination   
Bourdieu first systematically outlines his theory of symbolic violence in 
Reproduction, with Jean-Claude Passeron, but its features may be discerned in his 
earlier work as well. After a brief overview of the theory as presented in 
Reproduction, the rest of Bourdieu’s work on domination comes into view. 
 Book One of Reproduction is titled “Foundations of a Theory of Symbolic 
Violence,” and its central concept is defined at the start: “Every power to exert 
symbolic violence, i.e. every power which manages to impose meanings and to 
impose them as legitimate by concealing the power relations which are the basis of 
its force, adds its own specifically symbolic force to those power relations.”96 The 
imposition of meaning may therefore be violent, in the first place, when its 
legitimacy is obtained by hiding the power imbalance that makes the imposition 
possible. But concealment is not the only problem. It is also that concealment obtains 
legitimacy. The dominated’s recognition of the imposition as legitimate can only be 
described as illegitimate, as coerced. Further, because the content of the imposition is 
“meanings,” and not primarily a physical or structural restraint, the particular 
character of such violence is symbolic. Symbolic violence is a deceitful, coercive use 
of symbolic power.  
 In Reproduction, these themes are shaped around an account of pedagogical 
activities and institutions as means of imposing culture. The symbolic violence of 
pedagogical activity as a whole is revealed, according to Bourdieu and Passeron, in 
its “arbitrary” nature. Neither the power structure that sees one group instructing 
another, nor the meanings that have been selected by the instructing group can be 
“deduced from any universal principle, whether physical, biological or spiritual, not 
being linked by any sort of internal relation to ‘the nature of things’ or any ‘human 
nature.’”97  
                                                 
96 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 4. The authors portray themselves at this point as having 
resolved tensions between Marx, Weber, and Durkheim on the social theory of domination (4-5). See 
Addi, Sociologie et anthropologie, 16; Fernández, “La noción de violencia simbólica,” 8; Hobsbawm, 
“Sociologie critique,” 290; Poupeau, “Reasons for Domination,” 70-71.  
97 Bourdieu and Passeron, Reproduction, 8.  
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 Neither the pedagogical structure nor its cultural meanings, however, are 
open for dispute. Indeed, the central task of “pedagogical work” is the formation of a 
habitus that accepts the legitimacy of the pedagogical imposition or, more broadly, of 
the culture which that particular form of pedagogy maintains.98 Bourdieu and 
Passeron describe the resulting habitus as suffering “genesis amnesia,” a forgetting of 
the origins of culture and of cultural learning.99 For example, academic success is 
often attributed to “innate gifts,” but strong correlations can be found between 
success and the cultural habits and social class of the pupil’s family of origin.100 The 
supposed objectivity of the education system, guaranteed by initial conditions of 
equal access, enables the source of differences in intellectual capacity to be cloaked 
under the rhetoric of natural ability. Agents who go through the system are educated 
to recognize its objectivity, but this recognition is in fact a misrecognition 
(méconnaissance) of the objective power relations that facilitate the cultural 
reproduction of symbolic violence.101  
 The concealment of imposition, therefore, is buried deep within the embodied 
dispositions and perceptions of agents. When students explain their failure as a 
simple lack of talent, neglecting to consider the socio-cultural bases of academic 
success, they legitimate the system’s symbolic schema for rationalizing reproduction. 
Agents’ own practices contribute to the reproduction of their power holdings, of their 
status as more or less dominant. The ultimate, most pernicious effect of symbolic 
violence is this ability to co-opt the dominated into supporting their own 
domination.102 
 Bourdieu does not employ the vocabulary of symbolic violence in his earliest 
ethnographic writings. Its nascent logic is nonetheless evident in his concern over 
how, for example, aging peasant men explain their perpetual bachelorhood in terms 
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of financial prudence or lack of romantic interest—even when their systematic 
exclusion from marriage (and so from biological reproduction) can be traced to the 
shift in cultural power from rural to urban ways of life.103 Bourdieu’s later reflections 
on his ethnographic work, Outline of a Theory of Practice and The Logic of Practice, 
do classify such explanations as effects of symbolic violence and its misrecognition 
of the objective reality of social inequalities.104 Beyond that, however, they propose 
two distinct “modes of domination” that correspond to relative uses of symbolic 
violence in traditional, undifferentiated societies and in modern, differentiated 
societies.105  
 The lack of social differentiation in “pre-capitalist” societies such as Kabylia 
or the Béarn means the mediation of power relations is primarily personal.106 The 
“archaic economy” functions not through abstract money, financial instruments, or 
banking institutions, but through informal exchanges of goods and services, often 
under the guise of a gift. In traditional societies, Bourdieu observes, gifts are given 
and received as gratuitous, disinterested capital distributions.107 But, on an objective 
level, a gift always calls forth a counter-gift. The relative amounts of capital 
exchanged and the timing of the counter-gift establish and maintain material and 
symbolic hierarchies. A livestock- and honor-poor family risks much of its holdings 
when it offers a gift that is too large or too small, too late or too fast, to a richer 
family.  
 Yet Bourdieu emphasizes that this work of euphemizing the maintenance of 
capital inequalities, of domination, as gift exchange is costly for the dominant as 
well. A gift has to be received as a gift. Given the personal interdependence of the 
dominant and dominated, a gift cannot appear as overt exploitation and must contain 
                                                 
103 Bourdieu, Bachelors’ Ball. Addi, Sociologie et anthropologie, chap. 7, argues that Bourdieu 
developed the concept of “symbolic violence” while studying traditional societies, and that it does not 
function well when applied to modern societies. But Fernández, “La noción de violencia simbólica,” 
uses close exegetical readings of texts from the early anthropological works to Masculine Domination 
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104 Bourdieu, OTP, 183-197; LP, 112-134. 
105 See also Bourdieu, “Les modes de domination” and “Stratégies de reproduction et modes de 
domination.” 
106 Bourdieu, OTP, 183-184, 189, 190-197; LP, 122-131. 
107 Bourdieu, OTP, 171-198; LP, 98-111. 
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a significant downward distribution of capital. This redistribution is what qualifies a 
gift as a gift, what calls forth its recognition from the receiver as gratuitous. But the 
gift’s subjective, symbolic reality does not negate the objective reality of the 
exchange cycle, which is reproductive. Because it hides the power relation to 
legitimate its imposition of meaning, Bourdieu views this first, traditional mode of 
domination as reliant on symbolic violence.  
 The second mode of domination he describes is characteristic of the modern 
period. Gradual accumulation of capital allows for its objectification as institutions 
and their mechanisms. Relations between dominant and dominated are mediated by 
institutions, reducing the need for euphemism and symbolic violence. A capitalist 
needs no other reason to justify the exploitation of workers than the systemic 
requirements of the pursuit of profit. A teacher needs no other reason for failing 
students than the systemic requirements of the pursuit of a degree. The legitimacy of 
domination is thereby shifted from the interpersonal to the objective institution. A 
more “naked” and brutal form of structural violence arises. Inequalities are kept 
stable through coercion, and coercion is now visible in the structure of the 
institutions. But brutality has its own price: resistance. As the dominated become 
aware of and react to their domination, the dominant have to construct new forms of 
symbolic violence. Gifts return as donations to foundations, charities, hospitals, and 
academic and cultural institutions.108 The consumption of luxury goods is 
euphemized as a product of “taste,” not self-interested accumulation. Although the 
structural framework of domination is still present, its legitimacy has to be won again 
at some mild but impressive expense to the dominant.  
 Aside from his ethnographic writings, the bulk of Bourdieu’s oeuvre is 
concerned with exposing the symbolic violence at work in modern capitalist cultures. 
Studies of the education system, such as Reproduction, Homo Academicus, and The 
State Nobility, show how the French Republican ethos of equal access to education 
masks vast inequalities of educational opportunity. Distinction extends earlier 
comments into a lengthy account of how all classes accept the symbolism of cultural 
taste. When the dominated insist on the superiority of spartan aesthetics or common 
cultural sensibilities, they make a “virtue out of necessity” and inadvertently 
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legitimate the material conditions that restrict their cultivation.109 The pursuit of 
cultural distinction is a universal strategy within modernity that, for the most part, 
only affirms the material composition of society. Similar conclusions are drawn from 
various works on photography, museums, and literature.  
 In Masculine Domination, Bourdieu identifies the symbolic violence at work 
in upholding the most basic and stable of inequalities, that which exists on the basis 
of gender. This book advances the quite controversial arguments that (1) expanded 
opportunities for women in the workplace continue to confine women to subordinate 
aesthetic and symbolic realms; and (2) that most iterations of feminism fail to break 
with a masculinist vision of the world and so contribute to the reproduction of gender 
inequality.110 Following the general logic of symbolic violence, masculine 
domination is internalized in and as the female habitus and legitimated, however 
unwittingly, through female practice.   
 Other investigations of symbolic violence and domination include the 
function of “media intellectuals” in providing legitimation for neoliberal 
economics;111 of the appeal to the private home as a model of domesticity in 
justifying the end of welfare housing;112 of the rhetoric of formal universal suffrage 
in concealing links between education, class, and political participation;113 and of the 
many, many social scientific and philosophical methodologies that distract from the 
material bases of social practice.114 In each case, symbolic resources are deployed to 
activate the self-evidences built into the habitus: academics know what is best; 
having my own home is better than social housing; times may be bad, but at least this 
is a free country; and so on. By activating the self-evidences, what Bourdieu calls 
doxa or common sense,115 the dominant conceal the underlying unequal power 
relations and coerce consent to the reproduction of the dominant, dominating order.  
 Perhaps the most sinister implication of Bourdieu’s depiction of symbolic 
violence is that, for the most part, it is not exercised intentionally: symbolic violence 
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is not a conspiracy theory of domination. The dominant rarely need to scheme to 
guard their exalted positions or to maintain capital inequalities. Domination 
structures tend to reproduce themselves regardless of anyone’s intent. Symbolic 
violence is such an effective means of perpetuating domination because it is almost 
impossible to assign blame or to escape the cycle.  
 
3.2.2 Symbolic, Physical, and Other Violences  
Symbolic violence involves the formation of dominated habitus to misrecognize 
domination as the legitimate, “natural” social order. It coerces by shaping people 
who will not and, likely, cannot challenge capital inequalities. Bourdieu does not 
systematically investigate the links between symbolic and physical violence, 
portraying the latter as either a last resort when symbolic violence fails to elicit the 
desired legitimation, or as the more efficient path to domination when legitimation is 
not necessary.116 These two possibilities are inscribed in both modes of domination, 
explaining, on the one hand, the personal brutality of traditional societies and, on the 
other hand, the structural and state brutality of modern societies. On Bourdieu’s 
interpretation, physical violence is an exception to the symbolic violence that 
constitutes daily human interactions. If the rise of modernity coincided with an 
outbreak of brutality, then the return of symbolic violence signals a return to a more 
typical situation.  
 However, Bourdieu’s discussion of physical and symbolic violences is more 
complex than these statements let on. His comments assume a distinction between 
physical and symbolic violence based on the distinction between external force and 
internal force. Physical violence coerces agents from without, by dominating their 
bodies; symbolic violence coerces agents from within, by dominating their habitus. 
But of course the habitus is not merely an intellectual aspect of human being; it is 
embodied. Insofar as symbolic violence is formative of embodied habitus, it too is a 
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kind of violence against the body.117 The primary difference between physical and 
symbolic violence cannot be the object of violence. Nor can the spatial location 
(internal or external) of the force on the object be the main distinction, since there 
can be no clear demarcation here where the body is concerned—poison works 
internally; words may elicit tears. It is, then, the means of violence, its modus 
operandi, which allows for differentiation between physical and symbolic violence: 
whether violence includes the action of a physical instrument (a fist, a knife, a bullet) 
on a body, or only the action of symbols (words, images) on a body, symbols that 
specifically call forth a legitimation of the (physical or symbolic) violence.  
 These considerations allow for a response to Willem Schinkel, who argues 
that Bourdieu inadequately relates symbolic violence to other forms of violence and, 
more generally, fails to give a proper definition of violence at all.118 Evaluating these 
criticisms is helpful for expanding Bourdieu’s conception of violence to its furthest 
extent, so that it might better serve the revision of Yoder. Schinkel, in his book 
Aspects of Violence, worries that definitions of violence based exclusively on 
“personal” forms of violence (e.g., murder, rape, arson) are not capable of 
comprehending structural or state forms of violence. The problem is not just 
analytical, but political: narrow definitions of violence legitimate, and so potentially 
excuse and encourage, the violence they refuse to name as violence—and by the very 
act of not naming it violence.119 In the Bourdieusian terms Schinkel uses explicitly, 
narrow definitions of violence misrecognize much violence by calling it something 
else. Bourdieu is thus correct (and less violent) to develop symbolic violence as an 
“extended theory” of violence.  
 Yet Schinkel is not satisfied with Bourdieu’s lack of definitional work around 
the concept of “violence” itself. He goes on to develop his own definition, via an 
engagement of Heideggarian ontology, as “reduction of being.”120 Being as such is 
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pure potential, but actual being, ontic being, is always being with others; interactions 
with other humans restrict certain potentials and so reduce being.121 Violence is 
inscribed in and, as “an ontological condition of ontic being,” productive of (human) 
being—only fear of life (biaphobia) causes us to deny this.122 There is, of course, a 
difference between quotidian productive violence—a reduction that produces the 
possibility of life—and those cases typically called violence. The difference is one of 
degree, as some interactions are more reductive than others of another’s potential. 
Schinkel proposes a “sliding scale” of violence, with the reduction to matter—
killing—at the far extremity from productive violence.123  
 Although Schinkel presents his definition of violence as more basic than 
Bourdieu’s theory, it is possible to see it rather as a helpful extension thereof. 
Bourdieu is admittedly not explicit about his broad definition of violence, but the 
account given above indicates that he, too, regards the problem as a limitation of 
being, understood as power or capital. As has been pointed out, the issue for 
Bourdieu is not with capital inequalities as such, but with efforts to maintain or 
increase capital inequalities through concealment and coercion. Coercion does not 
necessarily entail symbolic legitimation through concealment of power relations, but 
the latter is usually present in traditional and modern societies, at least after the latter 
pass through the initial period of brutality enabled by institutional objectification.  
 It is confusing, therefore, when Schinkel attempts to fit Bourdieu’s theory of 
symbolic violence into his classification of ideal-typical forms of violence, 
specifically as a form of structural violence.124 Schinkel usefully distinguishes 
between three forms of violence: state, private, and structural. State violence is built 
into and exercised primarily by state institutions as a means of confirming the 
legitimacy of its use of violence.125 The legitimacy of state violence is derived from 
the state’s own definition of legitimate violence as a reaction to violent infractions of 
its juridical code, in other words, to illegitimate violence.126 “State violence is, in the 
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end, a reduction of [its] subjects to legitimate subjects,” subjects who legitimate state 
violence by refraining from illegitimate violence.127 Within a state, any violence 
exercised primarily by individuals or groups not legitimated by and as the state is 
considered illegitimate. Schinkel names such individual or group violence as private 
violence, which reduces being through non-state agency.128  
 In contrast to state and private forms of violence, structural violence, on 
Schinkel’s definition, is the reduction of being that occurs as society as a whole 
undergoes a process of differentiation.129 The agency of structural violence is neither 
the state nor a single individual or institution, but the variously fracturing and fusing 
relations between agents. Agents’ beings are reduced as they are increasingly 
confined to a social position (class). They are further reduced as differentiating social 
subsystems fracture subjects, and as “structural coupling” brings together subsystems 
that were formerly separate.130 It is only at this point that Schinkel identifies 
symbolic violence, “as a form of incorporated or embodied structural violence, in 
which subjects are violated but accept the legitimacy of the structure from which this 
violence emanates.”131  
 He then goes on to adapt Bourdieu’s conception of “the law of the 
conservation of violence” in which, e.g., structural violence leads to private 
violence.132 Bourdieu did not specify three ideal-typical forms of violence, so 
Schinkel sets forth clearly how the three forms may translate into one another. In 
doing so, he complains that Bourdieu’s account reduces private to structural violence, 
and ignores state violence completely.133 Although Schinkel has a point in reference 
to the specific passages in which Bourdieu proposes his “law,” his critique is less 
convincing when examined in light of his broader understanding of violence. The 
traditional violence of the first mode of domination is, by Schinkel’s definition, 
almost entirely “private,” since traditional society is mostly undifferentiated and does 
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128 Ibid., Violence, 175-176.  
129 Ibid., 185.  
130 Ibid. As an example Schinkel mentions the effects of economics and labor relations on gender 
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131 Ibid., 191.  
132 Ibid., 191, on Bourdieu, Acts of Reistance, 40; PM, 233.  
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not include the state. Schinkel also overlooks Bourdieu’s extensive discussion of the 
creation of the state as the simultaneous monopolization of physical and symbolic 
violence.134 But to accept Bourdieu’s analysis of private and state violence is to 
admit symbolic violence into those forms of violence. At this point, one might 
plausibly amend Bourdieu’s history of violence—which tells of symbolic violence’s 
retraction under modernity and subsequent (postmodern?) return—to argue that overt 
forms of violence are almost always accompanied by efforts to conceal the 
underlying power relation and coerce the (mis)recognition of violence as 
legitimate.135 Symbolic violence is present in interpersonal relationships and 
institutions, in ancient and modern societies. 
 In conclusion, Schinkel’s arguments against Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic 
violence appear more plausible as useful explications of the same. Schinkel’s 
definition of violence as reduction of being coheres with Bourdieu’s focus on the 
reproduction of capital inequalities. But Schinkel fruitfully proposes that this 
definition allows for a sliding scale of violence that measures the degree to which 
being is reduced. Bourdieu does not affirm that killing is the most extreme form of 
violence, but his logic leads to the same conclusion: killing eliminates personal 
capital by eliminating the person, and is an ultimate refusal of the possibility of an 
adjustment in levels of capital inequality. Moreover, Schinkel’s delineation of three 
convertible forms of violence is helpful for drawing out themes in Bourdieu’s theory 
that are mostly left unstated. In light of Schinkel’s elaboration of structural violence, 
which is characteristic of the second mode of domination, it is appropriate to add to 
the earlier discussion that objective conditions can be a means of violence as well as 
symbolic and physical means. Bourdieu’s theory and research suggest that structural 
and physical violence are most often accompanied by symbolic violence. One means 
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3.3 Revising Yoder’s Theology of Violence 
One of the criticisms of Yoder’s pacifism is that he does not attend suitably to the 
ambiguous nature of violence: it may be mostly reprehensible, but it is sometimes a 
morally justifiable way to attain or protect otherwise out of reach or threatened 
goods. Violence is justifiable when the good it seeks is theologically mandated, such 
as political responsibility or the preservation of the church. This criticism features a 
strong “realist” component that casts doubt on the sociological possibility of 
attaining those theologically mandated goods without the use of violence. Because 
nonviolence is unrealistic, it is unfaithful, and thus violence is theologically and 
sociologically legitimated. Given that this argument typically concerns just war (or 
policing), the violence so legitimated is killing. Theological and moral reasoning 
may treat violence as undesirable, but sociological considerations rehabilitate it as a 
tragic necessity for the sake of the broader Christian mission. The other major 
criticism of Yoder’s theology of violence and the fall concerned its breadth and 
depth. As a leading Christian pacifist, Yoder directed much of his theological energy 
to issues of war and peace. But economic oppression, racism, sexism, and 
psychological maladies are also effects of the fall. Yoder captures neither the 
sociological width, nor the psychological depth of violence and the fall.  
 Both criticisms suggest that Yoder requires a new sociology of violence, one 
that more clearly states why killing is the extreme form of violence he thinks it is, 
and how it relates to other violences. Bourdieu’s contribution to such a repair is 
readily apparent. Killing is the most extreme form of violence because it is a final 
negation of the person’s capital or power. Whereas other forms of violence devalue, 
distort, or deny the dynamism of a person’s capital, killing destroys what is arguably 
her most valuable capital, that which she embodies in and as habitus. Interpreted 
theologically, this destruction of capital is a refusal—for another or, in the case of 
suicide, for oneself—of the divine gift of freedom insofar as it takes away the basic 
sociological, not to mention biological, conditions for obedience.136 When Christian 
                                                 
136 See further Ellul, Violence, 130, on Christian freedom as freedom from the sinful cycle of violence. 
This point is a reminder that violence not only affects the victim, but the victim’s community, often 
leading to violent retaliation—that is, to further bondage to sin. Christian violence is therefore a 
failure of mission both to the victim and to the victim’s community. These reflections strengthen the 
theological case against Milbank’s justification of violence because of the (supposedly negative) 
effects of refusing violence. See also Yoder’s comments on disobedience, murder, and freedom in 
   114
defenders of just war and policing argue that the demands of discipleship in a fallen 
world require killing, they pit their own obedience against that of their enemies. They 
favor their own obedience to the extent that they are willing to employ a means 
(killing) they admit is, at best, tangentially related to obedience, in order to take away 
the enemies’ possibility for obedience. On this account, just war is a classic example 
of symbolic violence: a legitimation of violence through the concealment of the 
power relation, in this case a relation of differential powers for obedience. Put in 
Yoder’s theological terminology, the Christian justification of killing is paradigmatic 
of the church’s Constantinian compromise with the fallen powers. 
 Bourdieu’s theory of violence furthermore indicates how killing can be 
integrated at the far extreme of a theological scale or spectrum of violences. Each 
institutional or personal practice of symbolic, structural, and physical violence denies 
the possibility of obedience to some degree. Structural violence makes obedience 
difficult by restricting or denying access to the capital necessary for obedience. For 
instance, chapters five and six below discuss dialogue before scripture as a form of 
obedience. Structural differences in access to quality education, however, make 
meaningful dialogue difficult—though of course not impossible—for those with less 
access, given that education can enhance dialogical skills and textual interpretation. 
Similar conclusions can be drawn about the dialogical abilities of those whose 
emotional make-up has been denigrated by structural violence. At its extreme, of 
course, structural violence kills, whether through the violence that tends to 
accompany those whose access to capital has been systematically and severely 
restricted (e.g., gang warfare, suicide), or through “natural” deaths resulting from, for 
example, lack of access to medical care or money for winter heating. Practices of 
symbolic violence can likewise be guilty of killing, when it “mixes” with physical 
violence,137 and a range of “lesser violences,” such as those Bourdieu describes as at 
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work in pedagogy. And of course physical violence runs from killing to the betrayer’s 
kiss.138  
 In addition to its usefulness for conceiving of a spectrum of violences with 
killing at the far extreme, Bourdieu’s theory of violence also enables a look at 
“internal violence.”139 Violence is not simply embedded in social structures, nor is it 
exhausted by specific acts of physical violation. Although Bourdieu’s construal of the 
state as the monopolizer of physical and symbolic violence somewhat vindicates 
Yoder’s focus on war and peace,140 state, structural, and private violence are all 
inscribed in minds and bodies. Symbolic violence is an especially precise conceptual 
tool for describing how violence becomes part of persons’ basic dispositions and 
outlook. To accept a view of the world as legitimate, when the purveyors of that view 
hide the power that structures the pedagogical relation, is to have one’s existential 
being shaped by violence. Physical and structural means of violence also affect the 
habitus insofar as they restructure the specific capital available to it, whether that 
capital is a certain bodily unity—without scar or mutilation—or other material and 
symbolic goods. Because available capital forms personal and group expectations, all 
types of violence exact psychological and emotional tolls. Moreover, because the 
habitus suggests a basic unity, or at least a permeability, between a person’s body, 
intellect, and emotions, a violation of one is sure to have implications for the 
others—there is a kind of “subjective” law of conversion of violence. The powers are 
not just “out there.” They are “inside” us and are us, and the fall restructures every 
aspect of our humanity. Our autonomization from God is spiritual, intellectual, 
emotional and, in each case, social.  
 As a theologian of Christian pacifism, Yoder does not accept that humans 
merely are separated from God. Obedience is a possibility, and so nonviolence is a 
possibility. From this theological perspective, the spectrum of violences has to give 
way to a spectrum of nonviolences. But Bourdieu’s sociology would not seem to 
allow for the description of any action as nonviolent. Or would it? Bourdieu does 
                                                 
138 Judas’ kiss can be read as an interesting mix of symbolic and physical violences: physical, because 
it involves touch, and symbolic, because it draws on the legitimacy of familiarity to approach Jesus 
and signal his captors.   
139 As is evident, the use of the phrase “internal violence” here includes but extends beyond Hess’s 
concern for the psychological effects of physical violence.  
140 Nevertheless, as explored in the following chapter, Bourdieu’s attention to relations and symbols 
adds much to Yoder’s approach. 
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refer positively to nonviolence at various points,141 and his definition of symbolic 
violence seems to allow for reversal. One could seek legitimacy, ostensibly, without 
concealing the sources of his or her power. Power relations could be subject to open 
scrutiny, and those with more power could be genuinely receptive to those with 
less—a world without domination is possible. As a social practice, violence is never 
necessary and power can be deployed otherwise. The reversibility and non-necessity 
of violence gives a strong sociological warrant for accepting what Yoder proposes on 
christological grounds. For Yoder, the possibility of a world without domination 
derives from the reality of the human Jesus Christ.142 Christ embodies nonviolent 
servanthood, as foreshadowed by Israel and witnessed to haltingly by the church. 
Even if what constitutes nonviolent practice is not always obvious, its existence is 
not wishful thinking.  
 These reflections do not yet constitute an adequate response to Schinkel’s 
argument that violence, understood as reduction of being, is inherent in being itself. 
If human being is finite, then we have always and only ever been violated. If human 
practice fulfills some potential modes of being by denying others, then everything we 
do violates others, if not ourselves. This is the bleak and nihilistic vision that seems 
to be the only end of the sociological trail. Yoder denied this vision, even if he 
grappled with how destructive forces, such as aggression, are also productive 
forces.143 Moreover, whatever one makes of the coherency of non-Christian attempts 
to articulate a genuine peace, Bourdieu (and Schinkel) at least implicitly point to a 
mode of being beyond violence—their sociological critiques of violence make little 
sense otherwise.144 Schinkel drew a distinction between the minimal, quotidian 
violence that enables being and the violence that reduces and destroys it 
unnecessarily. Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence implies a distinction between 
violent and nonviolent modes of deploying power. The distinctions are far from clear 
cut: they can only be made on moral grounds. As Milbank had it, “violence” must be 
                                                 
141 These references are discussed in chapter six below. 
142 See Yoder, WL, 106, 121, on the basis of nonviolence in spirituality and faith. 
143 Yoder, Nonviolence, 69-72. See also his You Have It Coming: Good Punishment: The Legitimate 
Social Function of Punitive Behavior, in UNDA.  
144 See Sayer, “Disinterested Judgment,” 412-413, 415, for an argument that Bourdieu’s language of 
“domination” requires a moral framework. On the other hand, Hobsbawm, “Sociologie critique,” 290, 
suggests that Bourdieu’s use of the moral term “violence” interferes with his objective explanation of 
domination. 
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judged in light of the goods it impairs or preserves. That admission is, however, only 
the beginning of a process of moral discernment in which Christians look to the 
social practices of Jesus as definitive of nonviolent being and, by implication, its 
other.   
Bourdieu’s theory of violence and domination therefore facilitates a revision 
of Yoder’s theology of violence and the fall that responds to critics of its allegedly 
too strict proscription of killing, the lack of clarity around its positioning of killing 
vis-à-vis other violences, and its silence on those dimensions of the fall that affect 
human dispositions. Violence restricts the possibility of obedience; killing 
definitively eliminates it. Violence transcends any neat boundaries between internal 
and external personhood, realigning both social and dispositional structures. These 
deformed fallen structures indeed hold persons and society together. But in doing so, 
they hold persons and society away from God. Nevertheless, the violence of the 
fallen powers is not absolute. Social practices fall on a moral spectrum, with killing 
at one extreme and nonviolence at the other. The boundary between violence and 
nonviolence must always be discerned, but the boundary is real. And at the boundary 
we see Christ crucified, victim and nonviolent victor.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed John Howard Yoder’s theology of violence and the fall, 
with special attention to its basis in his theology of the principalities and powers. 
Yoder, following the New Testament and Berkhof, depicts the fall of the powers in 
terms of an autonomization of human social structures from God, and specifically 
from the process of development intended in their creation. This broad understanding 
of the fall is also visible in his analysis of violence. Yet critics of his thought are 
rightly concerned with the ambiguities in his presentation of violence, focused as it is 
on war and peace. Is violence simply killing, or does it, in every instance, need to be 
discerned anew? If killing is especially violent, how does it relate to other forms of 
violence, especially those experienced in thoughts, emotion, and spirituality? 
Bourdieu’s theories of violence and domination enable responses to these questions 
that are in continuity with Yoder’s project. As an especially definitive form of the 
reduction of capital—of the person him or herself—killing is indeed, in every 
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instance, the most extreme form of violence. But there exists a range of less extreme 
forms of violence, and these include state, structural, and private forms, all mediated 
through physical, symbolic, and structural means. In each case, the “inner” person is 
affected alongside the social structure. These revisions clarify Yoder’s Christian 
pacifism by specifying that which it censures, violence. This clarity is not gained at 
the expense of a complementary definition of nonviolence. Nevertheless, as a form 
of Christian theology and practice, the clarity of Yoder’s pacifism is ultimately 
provided by the light of Christ.  
 At this point, a question arises as to humans’ ability to perceive the light of 
Christ. The habitus shaped by violence is unlikely to recognize nonviolence. One 
might even regard the fall itself an ultimate “act” of symbolic violence, one that 
universally inculcates habitus to recognize the legitimacy of the fallen powers. Such 
a habitus is liable to reject Christ as a pretender and, of course, that is exactly what 
the Gospels depict as happening. The Christian tradition insists, nonetheless, and 
Yoder is no exception, that God reveals Godself authentically in the order of the 
powers, in the descendants of Abraham and their scriptures, and especially in Jesus 
Christ and his Spirit-empowered body and its scriptures. These modes of revelation 
have been described above as structures produced through intense spiritual 
relationship to God. As of yet, little has been said to indicate how humans can and do 
relate to God intensely. The following chapter begins that task by examining Yoder’s 
theological method, his proposal for how Christians discern between violence and 
nonviolence in light of Christ. This discernment is already political, already involved 
in God’s redemption of the powers, an argument that is spelled out in detail in the 
final two chapters. 
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4. REVISING YODER’S THEOLOGICAL METHOD 
 
The powers’ dynamic autonomization never escapes the grip of providence. The 
fallen powers are the created powers. As neither wholly good, nor wholly evil, the 
shape of the powers must be discerned. Yoder’s theological method privileges a form 
of discernment rooted in the practical encounter between specific Christian 
communities and specific powers. Discernment is ultimately a function of mission. 
Theologians’ contribution to this mission is limited, according to Yoder, yet 
indispensable for the discernment process. The theologian’s gifts of linguistic 
analysis and scriptural and historical memory are useful because they facilitate a 
comparison of the powers with the way of Jesus. For Yoder, critical discernment of 
the powers is a comparative task. 
 Yoder’s own work therefore concentrates on illuminating the way of Jesus as 
portrayed in scripture and comparing it to various points in Christian history. If the 
portrayal of the pacifist Jesus in The Politics of Jesus holds true, then a church that 
justifies war is obviously a fallen power. Christian discernment relies on accurate 
memories of Jesus, but it also relies on memories of how Christians in the past 
attempted to be faithful in their diverse settings. If the early church, St. Francis, the 
Anabaptists, and Martin Luther King, Jr., could find ways to imitate Jesus’ 
nonviolence in their times, then churches today can too. Linguistic analysis is helpful 
at this point to expose the faulty logic behind justifications of deviance from the way 
of Jesus.  
 This work of discerning history and language is always contestable, and 
many critics are dissatisfied with Yoder’s attempts. Several critics point to the 
insufficiency of his own theological language, given that he ignores both the need for 
metaphysical language to support the normativity of his ethics and the need for 
theological construction to specify his theological concepts. In other words, the 
metaphysical and constructive aspects of language cannot be overlooked in the 
discernment process. Other critics charge Yoder with a faulty memory: his 
interpretations of scripture and (church) history are tendentious, skewed to fit his 
theological agenda. Self-seeking and impatient, Yoder is an example of a fallen 
theological power, not a guide to discernment.  
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 The present chapter suggests that Yoder can be a guide for discernment if 
aspects of his method are revised by Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology. The 
chapter opens with an overview of Yoder’s theological method and its critics, with 
special emphasis on his understanding of how to discern the powers. Next, resources 
in Bourdieu’s sociology are examined, specifically his concepts of the 
epistemological break, relational object construction and confirmation, and 
reflexivity. The chapter concludes with a proposal for a Yoderian theology of the 
powers that is sociologically reflexive, perceptive of the symbolic, material, and 
spiritual dimensions of the powers, and inclusive of a rigorous empirical component. 
 
4.1 Yoder’s Theological Method 
 The first part of this section is a study of Yoder’s comments on discerning the 
powers. He envisages the theology of the principalities and powers as a subtle mode 
of social criticism useful for the church’s mission. Although he does not say how the 
powers are to be discerned, already in these writings it is clear that the basic 
methodology is comparative: contemporary powers, including the church, are judged 
by comparison to the way of Jesus as portrayed in scripture. This comparative 
method is elaborated in the second part of this section, through an overview of 
Yoder’s understanding of theology as service to the church. The final part of this 
section examines the many complaints about Yoder’s allegedly poor theological 
service. 
 
4.1.1 Discerning the Powers: A Comparative Theology  
Yoder regards the Pauline language of the principalities and powers as supplying the 
basic framework for Christian social discernment and critique. The Pauline authors 
continually correlate God’s redemption of the world through Christ with the exposure 
of the continuing rebellion of the powers. Christian social criticism is based on the 
lordship of Christ over the powers, since this lordship requires a qualification of 
every competing claim to ultimacy. The structure of Christian criticism is therefore 
comparative: immanent claims to ultimacy are compared with Christ’s ultimate 
status. For Yoder, “discerning the spirits” (1 Cor. 12:10) always involves close 
attention to who Jesus is. Although some Christians may be especially gifted 
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hermeneuticists, the entire witness of the gifted congregation is necessary for an 
accurate perception of Christ (1 Cor. 12, 14).1 Scripture, moreover, is the primary 
witness to the congregation of Jesus’ identity. Yoder often takes Philippians 2:1-11 as 
an adequate summary: Christ’s suffering humility results in his divine exaltation and 
reception of “the name that is above every name” (2:9).2 The church that sees the 
humble Jesus is equipped to see the prideful powers. It is the powers’ failure to 
conform to Christ that gives away their fallenness.  
 This comparative logic is also evident in Berkhof’s Christ and the Powers. Of 
particular interest here is Berkhof’s exegesis of Colossians 2:15. Through the cross 
and resurrection Christ “disarmed the rulers [archas] and authorities [exousias] and 
made a public example of them, triumphing over them in it.” According to Berkhof, 
“it is precisely in the crucifixion that the true nature of the Powers has come to 
light.”3 Before the advent of Christ, the powers “were accepted as the most basic and 
ultimate realities, as the gods of the world.” But after the powers turn against God-in-
Christ at the cross, there can be no illusions: “they are unmasked as false gods by 
their encounter with very God.” The shape of the fallen powers becomes clear in the 
light of Christ. Present discernment of the powers is then grounded in consideration 
of Christ’s life and work.4  
 Yoder makes the connection between Jesus and discernment explicit in The 
Christian Witness to the State. The “ground of Christian witness” and the “criteria for 
political judgment” have the same source. Christian witness has its purpose, form, 
and content in the lordship of the crucified and risen Christ.5 Moreover, “the 
Christian social critique finds its standards in the kingdom of God—for there are no 
other standards.”6 The state’s fallenness is apparent through the many ways in which 
it is not the kingdom, as seen especially in its use of violence to bring about order.7 
At the same time, “the judgments of Christians who are well informed will often 
differ little in substance from the intelligent judgment of other social critics.”8 Apart 
                                                 
1 See, e.g., Yoder, FC; BP, 47-70. 
2 E.g., Yoder, Preface, 80-88, 104; PJ, 121-122; PK, 52; HCPP, 83, 89-95. 
3 Berkhof, C&P, 38. The meaning of Christ’s “triumph” is the subject of chapters five and six below.  
4 Cf. Berkhof, C&P, 47-64, on the church and the powers.  
5 Yoder, CWS, 8-28, 35-44. 
6 Ibid., 39; see also his “Natural Law,” 22. 
7 Yoder, CWS, 36-38, 74-83. 
8 Ibid., 35. 
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from his typical censure of state violence, Yoder’s focus in this work is on the 
positive political alternatives Christians might offer as part of their witness.9 
 Subsequent writings on the powers indicate a shift in Yoder’s understanding 
of Christian social critique. From “Jesus and Power” in The Politics of Jesus 
onwards, he highlights not just positive Christian alternatives, but also the 
uniqueness of Christian moral judgment. The theology of the principalities and 
powers aids in discerning both what is wrong with society, and what Christians 
should do about it. Although the latter is the topic of the following chapter below, it 
is worth noting again that, for Yoder, Jesus Christ is the criterion of political critique 
and construction. In The Politics of Jesus, Yoder argues that a critically informed 
review of the canonical text of Luke’s gospel shows the distinctiveness of Jesus’ 
teachings on violence, economics, and power.10 If the gospels communicate the 
“substance” of Christ’s politics, the theology of the principalities and powers convey 
its “form” by directing readers to issues of power and structure “in the sense in which 
these terms are used by modern thinkers in the social and political sciences” (136). 
Yoder therefore begins his treatment of the powers with a common sense analysis of 
the different ways modern people use the terms power and structure, and then asks if 
Paul’s language is “translatable into the concepts of modern social science” (138). 
 To answer this question, Yoder turns to recent European historical-critical 
studies of the Pauline texts, observing that these arose from a need to understand the 
“power of evil” during Nazism and the Cold War (139). Yet what marks the recent 
criticism is not an eisegetical leap to see modern problems in ancient texts, but 
careful attention to the meaning of the texts in the authors’ own age. Modern evils are 
illuminated by ancient insights. After detailing Berkhof’s exegesis of the powers 
passages, Yoder concludes that, “far from being archaic or meaningless, the 
‘exousiology’ of the apostle, that is, his doctrine of the Powers, reveals itself to be a 
very refined analysis of the problems of society and history, far more refined than the 
other ways in which theologians have sought to describe the same realities in terms 
                                                 
9 These alternatives are discussed in the following chapter, below. 
10 Yoder, PJ, 11-13, defends his decision to attend mostly to the canonical shape of the New 
Testament, as his concern is precisely with the distance between the canon and current Christian 
ethics. He does not reject historical criticism, which he sees as providing confirmation for his 
arguments (e.g., 12n17, 41n35, 54-58, 72-75, 87-88, 139-149, 158-161). This overall approach is 
consistent with Yoder’s “biblical realism” (vii, x, 136), as explained below. Subsquent references to PJ 
in this and the following two paragraphs are in the text. 
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only of ‘creation’ or ‘personality’” (143-144). Yoder now sees the theology of the 
powers as offering insight into social problems, not just alternatives. It is, he 
believes, superior to other theological options for social interpretation that, like 
Reformed “orders of creation” theology, do not “combine with such clarity and 
precision the simultaneous recognition of humankind’s fallen condition and the 
simultaneous providential control.” Nor do these other options account for the 
pervasiveness of religion and ideology in perpetuating the fall. Nor, crucially, are 
they focused on Jesus Christ—and, as mentioned, Philippians 2 provides a clear 
contrast between the dominion-seeking powers and Christ’s voluntary subordination 
(145).  
 Because the Pauline language of the powers indicates an interpretation of all 
these elements (fall, providence, Christ) along social lines, Yoder sees it as affirming 
that “the New Testament provides [a] concept with which it would be possible to 
interpret the structures and the history of a secular society” (149-150). Secular 
criticism does not have the last word, as it does not account for the church as a 
community with special insight into social ills and their remedy.11 This insight is 
rooted in the biblical cosmology as “a more adequate intellectual framework of the 
task of social discernment.”12 A similar argument appears at the end of The Politics 
of Jesus, where Yoder argues that the apocalyptic depiction of the victory of the 
suffering lamb has implications for our understandings of causation, community, and 
conflict.13 The risen Christ sheds his light on all things. For those with eyes to see, 
evil is unveiled as is good.14  
 In the Stone Lecture “Behold My Servant Shall Prosper,” Yoder calls for 
discernment of the powers, since “some may be more fallen than others.”15 The 
church does not possess a priori knowledge of the shape of the powers; its 
engagement of each hangs on the outcome of a discernment process. “The 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 152-153. Yoder is criticizing World Council of Churches studies which leave social analysis to 
secular critics.  
12 Ibid., 156. Yoder mentions the extremely critical studies of French sociologist and theologian 
Jacques Ellul as exemplary modern appropriations of the powers language (157). He specifically 
names Ellul’s studies of “money, the law, violence, and technology.” By 1972 those studies would 
have included Ellul, Money and Power; Technological Society; Theological Foundation of Law; and 
Violence. 
13 Yoder, PJ, 245-146. 
14 Cf. Anderson, “Original Sin,” for a Barthian account of sin as only intelligible in light of 
redemption.  
15 Yoder, “Servant,” 165. 
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community,” therefore, “will not ask whether to enter or to escape the realm of 
power, but what kinds of power are in conformity with the victory of the lamb.”16 
Moral judgment of the powers involves a community focused on imitating Jesus. In 
Yoder’s first Stone Lecture he suggests that this focus—which he terms doxology—
automatically places “any claim to glory or authority made on behalf of alternative 
value definitions” under question.17 This doxological hermeneutic is expanded in the 
essays derived from Yoder’s second lecture as an “apocalyptic critique” or 
“apocalyptic consciousness.”18 Biblical apocalyptic literature has been subjected to a 
variety of fanciful interpretations, but Yoder is convinced that, if readers let the texts 
speak for themselves, they can “help us to see things ‘as they really are.’”19 Christ’s 
lordship means that no human ruler “is the primary agent of divine movement in 
history.”20 It means that the identification of moral righteousness with popularity or 
power is erroneous.21 It means that conceptions of society as a closed causal system 
that can be known (and manipulated) with certainty are fallacious.22 The fallenness 
of the powers is revealed in their resistance to the slain lamb who is risen as cosmic 
lord. 
 In this perspective, Yoder’s writings on the powers in his Warsaw Lectures 
and in “How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned” can be viewed as confrontations with 
competing modes of social criticism. The purpose of the lecture on “Early Christian 
Cosmology and Nonviolence” is to uncover “specific points at which we can see how 
[early Christian] thought was different from ours, and how this can help us to make 
sense of their witness and way in the world.”23 The Pauline powers passages and, 
more generally, New Testament apocalyptic affirm the socio-political nature of 
redemption and the lack of correlation between social control and moral progress.24 
                                                 
16 Ibid., 167. 
17 Yoder, RP, 123. He moves to critique the “realist” exchange of means for ends along these lines 
(124-125). 
18 Yoder, “Armaments and Eschatology,” 53-54. 
19 Ibid., 48, 52. 
20 Ibid., 53. 
21 Ibid., 54, 56, and “Ethics and Eschatology,” 123-124. 
22 Yoder, “Armaments,” 54-55; “Ethics,” 122-123, 125-126. Cf. his essay on the sacraments in RP, 
359-373, which is a significantly revised version of material from his fourth and fifth Stone Lectures. 
There Yoder depicts the sacramental community as internally and externally defined by dialogue—i.e., 
it does not accept a view of society as a closed causal system, but is constantly open to the future. This 
argument is a major theme of chapters five and six below. 
23 Yoder, Nonviolence, 97. 
24 Ibid., 102-103. 
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These insights help make sense of an earlier lecture, “The Science of Conflict,” in 
which Yoder critically engages social scientific accounts of human nature and social 
process.25 Accounts that deny the possibility of faithfulness to the way of Jesus, or 
the efficacy of that way, are cast in doubt. For example, when psychological findings 
on the detrimental effects of passivity are used to argue against pacifism, Yoder 
counters that there is no reason nonviolence should be passive.26 Studies of human 
aggression are sometimes read as justifications of the innateness of violence; but they 
can also be interpreted as highlighting the importance of direct conflict resolution in 
maintaining peaceable community.27 In sum, faith in the lordship of Christ over the 
powers requires suspicion towards and reformulation of social scientific frameworks 
that overlook the power of suffering service. 
 Yoder takes a similar approach towards H. Richard Niebuhr’s theological 
understanding of cultural transformation. Niebuhr dismisses interpretations of Jesus 
as the exemplary human or as cosmic lord as “radical.”28 His own Christology is 
moderated by a trinitarianism that views the Father and Holy Spirit as alternative 
moral sources.29 Although this move appears to be faithfully “theocentric,” Yoder 
views Niebuhr as surrendering Christian discernment to the ethical definitions of a 
given cultural mainstream.30 Whatever this mainstream says is wrong with culture is 
wrong, and whatever it says is right is right—Jesus has nothing to contribute. The 
Pauline theology of the principalities and powers, on the other hand, encourages 
communal discernment of the powers in light of scripture’s testimony to the work of 
Christ.31 
  
4.1.2 Community, Language, and Memory 
Yoder eschews methodological discussion that is not directly subordinate to the life 
of the church. In his essay “Walk and Word: The Alternatives to Methodologism,” he 
argues that “the life of the community is prior to all possible methodological 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 63-72. 
26 Ibid., 71-72. 
27 Ibid., 67-68, 71. 
28 Yoder, “HRN,” 58-61 (on Niebuhr, Christ and Culture, 45-82). 
29 Yoder, “HRN,” 61-65. 
30 Ibid., 66-67. Yoder later identifies theologies of cultural autonomy and relativism as similar moves 
that deny Christ as norm, and so disable discernment (77-82). 
31 Ibid., 68-69, 71-77, 82-89 (esp. 85).  
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distillations.”32 Ethical methods are pragmatic tools for moral discernment. There is 
no need for a unified methodology, but rather for “skills of mixing and matching 
[methods] according to the shape of a particular debate.”33 Some debates call for a 
focus on duties, some on consequences, and others on virtues—and some on all 
three. The “wholeness of community culture” as it encounters concrete situations has 
priority over “the appetite for intellectual thoroughness,” and this goes for ethics as 
well as other theological disciplines.34 
 Theologians are, consequentially, only relevant contributors to Christian 
mission insofar as they participate in the church’s encounter with the powers.35 They 
are a resource in the discernment process, not the primary executives of that 
process.36 In his essay “The Hermeneutics of Peoplehood: A Protestant Perspective,” 
Yoder writes of theologians (“scribes” and “teachers”) as being “agents” of the 
church’s practical reasoning. Among these he mentions “agents of direction” who 
prophetically “state and reinforce a vision of the place of the believing community in 
history, which vision locates moral reasoning.”37 There are also “agents of linguistic 
self-consciousness” who help the church untangle itself from linguistic thickets that 
impede practice.38 “Agents of memory” surface aspects of scripture and church 
history relevant to a problem at hand. Theologians thus have the linguistic tasks of 
cosmological construction and logical criticism, and the mnemonic tasks of recalling 
the church’s stories and scriptures. The following paragraphs outline Yoder’s own 
approach to each of these tasks. 
 
Language: Cosmology and Critique  
Little needs to be said here about Yoder’s prophetic cosmology given the focus of 
this thesis. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that he sees the purpose of cosmological 
constructions such as the theology of the principalities and powers as “locating” the 
                                                 
32 Yoder, PWK, 87. 
33 Ibid., 93. 
34 Ibid., 92. 
35 Although see Yoder, PK, 45, where he asks open-endedly about the prospects of an individual 
“internalizing” the discernment process in the absence of a functioning Christian community. 
36 Yoder, THW, 121: “The ethicist is a servant of the communal identity, not its founder or its ruler.” 
37 Yoder, PK, 29.  
38 Ibid., 30-33. In addition to these three roles, Yoder discusses “agents of order or due process” (33-
34). As Yoder describes this role in terms of an organizational facilitator, it will not be discussed here. 
Although there is no reason to think a theologian would be ineligible for such a role, it is not 
intrinsically linked to theological work, as the other agencies are to some degree.  
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church’s moral discernment.39 Yoder does not seek a systematic biblical 
“worldview,” but rather a general framework that can help churches understand their 
place in history as they go about interacting with various powers. Biblical cosmology 
is not speculative, but practical. Theologians imaginatively reconstruct contemporary 
language forms in order to convey the biblical cosmology, with full awareness of the 
theological risks involved.40 The risk enables cultural transformation.  
 Yoder observes that the New Testament authors repeatedly adopted 
cosmological categories from their surrounding cultures, but “seized the categories, 
hammered them into other shapes, and turned the cosmology on its head, with Jesus 
both at the bottom, crucified as a common criminal, and at the top, preexistent Son 
and creator, and the church his instrument in today’s battle.”41 The Pauline use of 
powers language is one example, along with the logos Christology of the Johannine 
Prologue (John 1:1-14); the angelology of the book of Hebrews (2:8-9); the 
apocalypticism of Revelation (4:1-5:4); and the kenotic Christology of Philippians 
2.42 Yoder writes of the process of cosmological adoption as a search for an 
“interworld transformational grammar” that faithfully translates the gospel into 
contemporary idioms.43 Church history can be read as a catalogue of more or less 
faithful attempts at imitating the biblical model of gospel translation.44 Even a non-
Christian like Gandhi can be viewed as rearticulating the gospel within a Hindu 
cosmology.45 The theology of the principalities and powers is, as seen above, an 
effort in translating the gospel into a secular social scientific cosmology. Such 
cosmological translation is central to the theologian’s linguistic task.  
 Yoder recognizes that technical aspects of theological practice require 
“professional” training and oversight.46 But for him theology is more than a 
profession, it is a way of serving the body of Christ—of which most members are not 
professional theologians. Technical theological vocabulary then has its place, but 
                                                 
39 Cf. Yoder’s comment that, biblically speaking, the audience of the prophet is the people of God, and 
not primarily the nations (CWS, 36).  
40 Yoder, PK ; THW, 109, 123. 
41 Yoder, PK, 54.  
42 Ibid., 50-52. See also his HCPP, 69-88 (on Jn 1) and 89-95 (on Phil. 2). 
43 Yoder, PK, 56; cf. 54-59; CWS, 25; PWK 110-112. 
44 E.g., the Anabaptists used Reformation-era biblicism, the Quakers used Enlightenment spirituality, 
and so on (Yoder, CA, 161-252).  
45 Yoder, Nonviolence, 22-26; WL, 56-57. See also his RP, 260. 
46 Yoder, THW, 125. 
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theologians “must make sense in ordinary language.” Translating the gospel into 
contemporary cosmologies is one way to make sense. Comprehensible prose and 
well-distributed publications is another.47 Nevertheless, Yoder envisions the 
theological encounter with ordinary language as critical and not merely affirmative. 
Hence one of the theological agencies described above is that of “linguistic self-
consciousness.” At the same time as theologians are to be sensitive to common 
language that communicates the gospel, they are to be alert for words and concepts 
that obscure it. As a theologian, Yoder is especially alert to “professional” theological 
language that enters the common parlance of the church with distorting effect—thus, 
his attack on Niebuhr’s Christ and Culture. 
 At the end of Christian Witness to the State, Yoder offers a formulation that 
could serve as the job description for an agent of linguistic self-consciousness: “It is 
normal for a newcomer to a debate which is already in process to accept the 
prevailing definitions of terms and choose one of the existing sides, whereas the 
wiser approach is to question the definitions.”48 Yoder refers there to a debate current 
among American Mennonites in the 1950s over the implications of Reinhold 
Niebuhr’s thought.49 Many Mennonites accepted Niebuhr’s designation of them as 
apolitical, arguing that the doctrine of nonresistance entails political and cultural 
“withdrawal.” Yoder’s response in Christian Witness to the State and elsewhere is to 
cast doubt on definitions of politics that exclude obedience to Christ as a possible 
political stance. Such definitional labor permeates his writings, for instance in 
treatments of “pacifism,”50 “imago dei,”51 “responsibility,”52 “Trinity,”53 
“evangelical,”54 “democracy,”55 and so on. Yoder is also suspicious of dualisms that 
preclude obedience as an option, such as “inner versus outer,”56 “grace versus 
works,”57 or “Reformed versus Anabaptist social strategies.”58 In each case the point 
                                                 
47 Yoder published numerous small church pamphlets, such as Capital Punishment, and spoke at 
church meetings around the world (see, e.g., the essays in OR and the “bible lectures” in HCPP).  
48 Yoder, CWS, 90. 
49 See Yoder, Nevertheless, 107-114. 
50 Yoder, Nevertheless. 
51 Yoder, WL, 165-180. 
52 E.g., Yoder, “Reinhold Niebuhr,” 112. 
53 Yoder, “HRN,” 61-65; Preface, 203-204, 297-298. 
54 Yoder, “Evangelical Dualism,” 450; PK, 54-55. 
55 Yoder, PK, 151-155. 
56 Yoder, “Evangelical Dualism,” 449-459. 
57 Yoder, PJ, 212-227; see 103-109 for a further list of unhelpful dualisms. 
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is to uncover how common word usage can deceive Christians into thinking that the 
way of Jesus is irrelevant or impossible.59 Both transformative cosmological 
construction and definitional critique are central to Yoder’s understanding of 
theological practice. 
 
Memory: Scripture and History 
In “Hermeneutics of Peoplehood,” Yoder observes that there is only one time a 
Gospel writer depicts Jesus using the term “scribe” non-pejoratively: “Every scribe 
who becomes a disciple of the kingdom of heaven is like a householder who brings 
out from his storeroom things both new and old” (Matt. 13:52).60 The faithful scribe 
therefore “does not speak on his own, but as the servant of a community and of the 
communal memory.” Moreover, the existence of a storehouse of memories indicates 
that the scribe’s job is to select a memory or set of memories appropriate to a given 
issue. The community’s memories are diverse, not univocal or interchangeable, and 
require regular review. “The scribe as practical moral reasoner does not judge or 
decide anything, but he (or she) remembers expertly, charismatically the store of 
memorable, identity-confirming acts of faithfulness praised and of failure 
repented.”61 Yoder is again concerned with practical mixing and matching, not with a 
systematic framework for discernment.  
 For the scribe of the kingdom, Yoder suggests, “scripture is the collective 
scribal memory, the store par excellence of treasures new and old.”62 In other 
writings, he designates his approach to recalling the treasures of scripture as “biblical 
realism.”63 This approach has its roots in a loose movement of biblical scholars from 
the 1950s and 1960s who pioneered a form of post-critical hermeneutics.64 Biblical 
                                                                                                                                          
58 Yoder, “Inadequate Typology.” 
59 Yoder’s reliance on lists for investigating the various ways words are used bears further 
examination. See Belknap, The List, 8-11, for a brief history of lists, and Eco, Infinity of Lists, for a 
partial list of lists. Eco’s ruminations on definition by a list of properties (versus definition by essence) 
are especially relevant to Yoder’s method (200-243).   
60 Yoder, PK, 30 (the translation is Yoder’s).  
61 Ibid. 
62 Ibid., 31. 
63 Yoder, PJ, viii, x; “The Politics of Jesus Revisited,” in UNDA; THW, 61, 100-101, 155-177, 178-
191. 
64 In his various references to the movement, Yoder names Markus Barth, John W. Bowman, John 
Bright, Oscar Cullmann, Edmund La B. Cherbonnier, Suzanne de Dietrich, Walter Eichrodt, Floyd 
Filson, Hendrik Kraemer, George Eldon Ladd, Paul Minear, Otto Piper, Gerhard von Rad, Adolf 
Schlatter, Claude Tresmontant, Hans-Reudi Weber, and G. Ernest Wright as the major figures. Yoder 
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realists utilize all the tools of historical criticism, but refuse the cynicism towards the 
texts with which those tools are often wielded.65 Yoder takes the title and content of 
Paul S. Minear’s book The Eyes of Faith: A Study in the Biblical Point of View as 
indicative of the main features of biblical realism.66 Biblical realists search for “the 
biblical point of view,” but without the assumption that a single timeless biblical 
theology or worldview exists. The unity of the biblical perspective is resistant to 
systematization, and to any other effort to domesticate it by shaping it to modern 
categories. Yoder reports that Minear imagined the biblical scholar as an archeologist 
opening a sarcophagus and finding a mummy, when suddenly the mummy reaches 
out and bends the tools of the archeologist.67 The goal of biblical realism is similarly 
to let the Bible shape exegesis, in order to find “the message of the Bible on its own 
terms.”68  
 The “realism” of this approach is therefore its methodological conviction that 
critical tools can uncover the real message of the Bible.69 Yoder accordingly accepts 
historical, literary, and sociological methods of biblical interpretation.70 These 
methods, of course, have their origins in Enlightenment skepticism about biblical 
authority. Yoder praises skepticism as a corollary of Radical Reformation biblicism, 
which denies the presupposition of an “identity between what [the Bible] says and 
what we believe.”71 Biblical realism nonetheless goes beyond Enlightenment 
objectivity with its realization that biblical authority is derivative of its ongoing 
function of constituting believing communities.72 Rather than drawing its authority 
from propositional infallibility or a pre- or proto-canonical history, the scriptural 
                                                                                                                                          
distinguishes it from the concurrent “biblical theology” movement (THW, 181-184). The 18th and 19th-
century German heilsgeschichtlich school, including the work of Johann Tobias Beck, Johann Georg 
Hamann, and Johann Christian Konrad van Hofmann, is an antecedent (159). More recent interpreters 
in the same spirit include Brevard Childs, Paul Ricoeur, and James Sanders (189).  
65 Yoder, THW, 158. 
66 Ibid., 160-167.  
67 Yoder, THW, 176. Minear does not use this image in Eyes of Faith, and Yoder does not report its 
source, but see Eyes of Faith, 3-5, on the impossibility of systematic objectivity in biblical studies, and 
206-214, on how the biblical authors remember history as events of encounter with God. 
68 This is the title of a lecture Yoder gave in 1964 to Mennonite students on biblical realism (THW, 
155-177).  
69 Ibid., 167. 
70 Ibid., 124, 147. In the 1980s and 90s Yoder critically embraced aspects of René Girard’s socio-
anthropological interpretations of scripture. See Yoder, “Review: The Scapegoat”; “Twenty Years 
Later” in UNDA; WL, 29-41, 176-178; You Have It Coming: Good Punishment. The Legitimate Social 
Function of Punitive Behavior, in UNDA. These studies are anticipated by HCPP, 58-65. 
71 Yoder, THW, 130. 
72 Ibid., 131, 153; see 94-119 on the canon.  
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canon is normative as a paradigmatic record of authentic norming efforts—a record 
that can “reach out” and judge contemporary efforts.73 True hermeneutical objectivity 
enables the objectivity of the Bible to stand over against Christians today. 
 Biblical realism is also “realistic” in its (biblical) focus on historical events.74 
Yoder, following Minear, argues that the biblical point of view begins with the 
practical activities of God in creation, and so is unconcerned with questions of 
philosophical (mono)theism. “The Bible is not interested in this kind of truth, but 
only in those things which truly were done in a particular time and place by a 
particular divine initiative.”75 The unity of the biblical point of view thus emerges 
from meditation on the disparate narratives, not from conceptual systematization.76 
Hence Yoder privileges an inductive hermeneutic that identifies structural 
homologies within the diverse biblical literature.77 Inductive inquiry is 
complemented by an interpretative bias towards a “straightforward” reading of the 
biblical texts.78 The events that matter are portrayed in the text as it stands, not in a 
history that allegedly exists prior to the texts.79 Again, this confidence in the text is 
not primarily from an a priori faith in biblical authority—though that faith may be 
present too—but from observation of the way scripture works in the church.80 The 
events recorded in scripture are the events that continue to form the church. Attention 
to these events takes priority for a hermeneutic sensitive to the real encounter 
between Bible and congregation.  
 The biblical realist scribe of the kingdom remembers God’s interactions with 
humanity as reported in the Bible, recalling them as appropriate for a given situation 
and in such a way that their normative force is not blunted by modern concerns. As 
                                                 
73 Yoder, THW, 107-108, follows through on the logical implications of this view, and argues that the 
canon can never be closed. He mentions the Didache as a text that might be included in the canon. 
That said, he does not view the canon as totally flexible and open-ended: the records of Jesus’ 
participation in the norming process, and of those of his closest followers, have priority. It is against 
those records that later norming processes are judged, and it is this paradigmatic nature of the canon 
that makes it a canon. 
74 Yoder, THW, 167. 
75 Ibid., 167. 
76 Ibid., 145. 
77 Ibid., 142-147. 
78 Ibid., 145-147, 178-191. 
79 Ibid., 145; see 155-157 for Yoder’s account of the failed search for the “Christ of history” behind 
the “Christ of faith” presented in the gospels.  
80 Ibid., 146-147. Yoder mentions Brevard Childs, George Lindbeck, and Alasdair MacIntyre as 
supporting a similar view on scriptural authority.  
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with the agent of linguistic self-consciousness, the purpose of this mnemonic task is 
largely critical. “The theologians’ task is more often to defend the text against a 
wrong claim to its authority than to affirm in some timeless and case-free way that it 
has authority.”81 All Christians have the ability to interpret scripture; the theologian’s 
special job is to make sure that in each instance scripture is allowed to speak for 
itself.  
 According to Yoder the church’s memories are of two kinds: “faithfulness 
praised and failure repented.”82 Within the Bible he discerns memories of both 
faithfulness and failure. These memories include the faithfulness of Abraham, the 
prophets, Jesus, and the apostles; and the failures of the Israelite monarchs, Ezra, and 
the opponents of Jesus and the prophets and apostles. This list suggests the 
inventiveness of Yoder’s own memory, as he goes against traditional readings to see 
a continuous lineage of failure that begins with the Israelites’ request for “a king to 
govern us, like other nations” (1 Samuel 8:5).83 Ezra did not restore the monarchy, 
but he adopted their logic of top-down, centralized administration backed by force, 
as did the powerful Jewish factions in Jesus’ day. Although antithetical to the way of 
Jesus, that logic grew within the church until it captured mainstream Christianity 
from Constantine until the present day.84 Here as elsewhere, it is the way of Jesus 
that matters—events, even biblical events, are remembered as faithful or failures 
insofar as they align with Jesus Christ.85 
 To recall these memories of post-apostolic “failure” suggests that the 
storehouse of the scribe of the kingdom is not limited to scripture, but includes the 
entirety of Jewish and Christian history. Yoder’s doctoral training was in Anabaptist 
church history and, although he quickly turned to theology and ethics, he remained 
active in historical scholarship through much of his life.86 His approach to history is 
                                                 
81 Yoder, THW, 84. 
82 Yoder, PK, 30. 
83 See Leithart, A Son to Me, for a “traditional,” typological reading of King David. 
84 See chapter three above on Yoder’s critique of Christendom. 
85 Yoder, PK, 37. Cf. Hays, Moral Vision, 248, on Yoder’s exemplary Christocentric hermeneutic. 
Yoder did not take the complement well (THW, 207-216).  
86 Yoder’s contributions to historical scholarship mostly cease after the late 1970s, and by 1989 he 
considered himself only an “amateur” historian (see his essay “Amateur Historian”). Although it is 
true that he did not embark on the kind of original historical research that characterized his 
dissertation, in 1989 he co-edited a collection of the writings of the 16th-century Anabaptist Balthasar 
Hubmaier (Pipkin and Yoder, eds. and trans., Balthasar Hubmaier). In the early 1990s he began to 
assemble a “History of Religiously Rooted Nonviolence” (in UNDA).  
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much the same as his approach to scripture, and he proposes a “doxological” 
historiography that “discern[s], down through the centuries, which historical 
developments can be welcomed as progress in light of the Rule of the Lamb and 
which as setbacks.”87 Doxological historiography is regulated by the prophetic-
apocalyptic cosmology of the lordship of Christ, and so interprets historical events, 
movements, and persons as more or less coherent with the way of Jesus. Elsewhere 
Yoder emphasizes that the critical perspective on history enabled by this cosmology 
is a particular gift of the Anabaptist and, more broadly, “restitutionist” or Free 
Church movements.88 These groups refuse to assume that the way things are is the 
way things are meant to be, and offer a variety of narratives of how the church 
deviated from authentic discipleship. The purpose of these narratives is not primarily 
to stoke academic interest, but to offer insight into the church’s present options for 
renewal. Free Church historiography is thus an exemplary mode of remembering for 
the sake of Christian mission. 
 Yoder’s own contributions to such a doxological, Free Church historiography 
are numerous. His doctoral dissertation examines the formation of the Swiss 
Brethren—one of the first Anabaptist groups—as a process of differentiation from 
Huldrych Zwingli after he deferred the pace and form of reformation to the town 
council of Basel.89 The existence of the Swiss Brethren indicates that the 
Reformation as a whole could have been otherwise. Yoder’s narrative of 
Constantinianism as a gradual compromise with imperial power similarly suggests 
that discipleship was not impossibile for third- and fourth-century Christians, but a 
lifestyle they willingly abandoned.90 He states the underlying historiographical 
principle explicitly in the title of an essay on the Jewish-Christian schism: “It Did 
Not Have to Be.”91 Historians should therefore become as familiar as possible with 
the options facing historical agents, as experienced by the agents themselves. 
                                                 
87 Yoder, RP, 132. See also his “Historiography as a Ministry to Renewal.” 
88 Yoder, PK, 123-134; JCSR, 133-142. 
89 Yoder, ARSS.  
90 Yoder, CA, 42-74. 
91 Yoder, JCSR, 43-44. Other examples of Yoder’s doxological historiography include his readings of 
Jeremiah, Jesus, the early church, the Quakers, Tolstoy, Martin Luther King, Jr., Gandhi, and the 
nonviolent people power movements of the 1980s. Each of these persons and movements affirm the 
possibility of discipleship and the contingency of disobedience. In the 1980s and 90s Yoder was 
especially interested in the sociologies of nonviolence and conflict resolution as contributions to this 
historiography. See BP, 8, 12; CA, 355-368; Nonviolence, 63-72; “The ‘Power’ of ‘Nonviolence’” in 
UNDA; and the writings on René Girard listed in note 69 above.  
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Without denying the objectivity of causation, understanding the first-person 
experience of history as an open future achieved by real decisions is indispensable. 
Because the Christian doctrine of sin implies the freedom of choice for or against 
obedience, history cannot be wholly determined. If not, then it always could be 
different. Yoder’s readings of history aim to demonstrate that discipleship is a latent 
possibility in every present—including our own. As a scribe of the kingdom, Yoder 
sought treasures new and old in the storehouse of scripture and church history. 
 
Cosmological construction, linguistic self-awareness, biblical realist scripture 
interpretation, and doxological historiography are tasks of the church’s process of 
moral discernment. Theology is a practical aid for the church as it responds to the 
good news of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. Because Christian 
mission is responsive across time and place, theology is an ad hoc affair. Theologians 
mix and match conceptual tools in order to supply the church with the right words 
and memories it needs to discern the path of discipleship in its diverse contexts. 
Often finding the right word or memory arises only after recognizing the wrong ones. 
Theology is an eminently critical practice, albeit one aimed at the positive goal of 
Christian faithfulness.  
 Yoder is under no illusion that theological insight and critique will be 
received by the church, much less by those outside the church. For the church, this is 
partially because theologians are not dominant and must yield to the other members 
of a congregation. Non-Christians are likewise discerning creatures whose decisions 
for or against Christ must be respected. In both cases Yoder counsels patience. 
However convinced a theologian, or any other Christian for that matter, may be of 
the rightness of his or her belief, the proper response to disagreement is never haste. 
In his essay “‘Patience’ as Method in Moral Reasoning: Is an Ethic of Discipleship 
‘Absolute’?,” Yoder outlines nineteen different forms patience might take.92 These 
include pedagogical patience with someone in a learning process; ecumenical and 
multicultural patience for persons formed differently than oneself; patience with 
one’s own epistemological finitude; the patience of apocalyptic hope; and the 
patience of an outvoted minority. Practicing these and other forms of patience does 
                                                 
92 Yoder, PWK, 114-119. 
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not necessitate moral compromise or a weakening of conviction, but rather involves 
“accepting willingly and not just grudgingly” the differences of our conversation 
partners from ourselves.93 Theologians guided by the conviction that Christ is lord of 
the cosmos can have the confidence to tarry with dissenting interlocutors within and 
without the ecclesial community. Theological patience enables and enlivens the 
discernment process. Patience is Yoder’s method in moral reasoning.  
 
4.1.3 Criticisms 
Nevertheless, Yoder reports that an early reader of his essay on patience saw it as a 
self-justificatory apologia, as a claim that his position is “right.”94 To this criticism 
Yoder objects, first of all, that the critic obviously thought she was “right” in her 
evaluation of his work. There is no escape from the making of moral and intellectual 
judgments. More than that, however, Yoder insists that “the authorial ‘I’ here speaks 
for the coherence of a mode of moral discourse, a position, not for a person. I as the 
person John Yoder am not generous, or consistent, or transparent, or adequate.”95 He 
accepts, in other words, his personal failings as a patient theological servant of 
ecclesial moral discernment. A host of critics concur and point to several cases in 
which Yoder’s language and memory evidence failure not faithfulness, haste not 
patience.  
 
Language: Reductive Cosmology, Hasty Words 
Other chapters of this thesis examine how Yoder’s metaphysical reticence reduces 
spiritual, personal, and theological dimensions of human being. Yoder’s reduction 
can be seen as at least in part a methodological error, and specifically as an overly 
restricted understanding of the linguistic aspects of theological labor. Although he 
develops a prophetic-apocalyptic cosmology centered on the principalities and 
powers, he does not investigate its metaphysical dimensions. No attempt is made at 
                                                 
93 Ibid., 117; cf. 125-130 for Yoder’s response to those who charge him of ethical “absolutism.” 
94 Ibid., 131. 
95 Ibid., 131-132. “‘Patience’ as Method in Moral Reasoning” was first printed in Hauweras et al., 
eds., WC, 24-42. An editorial note states that it was edited several times between 1982 and 1997 
(24n1). It is difficult to read the above cited personal confession without recalling Yoder’s own moral 
failings, and the public process of reconciliation he underwent in the 1990s. See Hauerwas, Hannah’s 
Child, 242-247, for the most complete published report of these events.  
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locating the powers within the activity of the triune God, and therefore the usefulness 
of this cosmology for “locating” ecclesial moral discernment is limited. Yoder 
connects cosmological vision to Christian worship, yet he leaves unaddressed “the 
task of investigating and clarifying the ontological grounds for the practice of 
doxology.”96 By failing to make his theological convictions clear, Yoder leaves the 
rationale behind his call to worship ambiguous. Cosmology and metaphysics are 
inseparable.  
 The effects of this cosmological problem are best seen in the confusion 
caused by Yoder’s use of the word “God.” When Yoder writes God, what or who 
does he mean? How precisely is this God related to Jesus Christ? Because he did not 
explore the assumptions behind some of his basic theological terms, he muddles the 
process of moral discernment—do we follow the nonviolent Jesus, or the warrior 
God? Philip E. Stoltzfus suggests that Yoder’s followers need to adopt a 
“theologically robust” form of conceptual construction to avoid internal 
contradictions that undermine faithful practice.97 In other words, those who join 
debates over Yoder’s cosmological pacifism must begin by questioning his 
definitions. They must begin by being more patient agents of linguistic self-
awareness. 
 
Memory: Slanted Scripture, Cynical Historiography 
The results of Yoder’s reduced cosmology and hasty words are on full display in his 
hermeneutical and historiographical practices. Ray Gingerich accuses Yoder of 
bringing an unexamined agenda to his interpretation of Old Testament holy war 
passages.98 The need for those passages to cohere with the gospels overrules any 
critical appreciation of the frailty of the authors of the Torah. In the end, Torah and 
incarnation are left as competing sources of moral truth.99 Gingerich sees Yoder’s 
biblical realism as at fault here, for it “did not allow sufficient freedom to view 
scripture more dialogically, as the product of a fallible and faltering people of God—
writings produced and preserved by communities in which power politics was at 
                                                 
96 Dintaman, “Socio-Ecclesial Brushpile,” 43. 
97 Stoltzfus, “Nonviolent Jesus,” 41. See also Gingerich, “Yoder’s God.” 
98 Gingerich, “Yoder’s God,” 427. 
99 Ibid., 429. 
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times more determinative than faithful prophecy and servanthood.”100 A constructive 
doctrine of God rooted in the nonviolence of Christ would allow for an alternative, 
critical reading of Israelite holy war. Other scholars raise similar concerns about 
Yoder’s hermeneutical method. Richard B. Hays regards Yoder’s reading of the New 
Testament Haustafeln passages in terms of “revolutionary subordination” as 
“apologetic wishful thinking.”101 According to Earl Zimmerman, Yoder displays “an 
inordinate confidence in his ability to read the Bible straight, without paying too 
much attention to historical and hermeneutical issues.102 Mark Thiessen Nation 
furthermore wishes for deeper engagement with biblical scholarship.103 It is notable 
that, aside from a few references in the second addition to The Politics of Jesus, 
Yoder’s interaction with contemporary biblical scholarship seems to have ceased in 
the 1960s. Perhaps Yoder considered his post-critical turn as an excuse to neglect 
rigorous hermeneutical and exegetical labor; but this is not the purpose of biblical 
realism as he presents it. Yet biblical realism or some other source seems to have 
encouraged him towards a less critical, even eisegetical interpretive practice.104 Such 
practice is neither biblically realistic, nor does it serve the church in truth. 
 Gingerich also worries that “Yoder seems to have had an innate urge to 
sacralize the Hebrew worldview.”105 For Gingerich, this urge is evident in his 
unwillingness to criticize Israelite holy wars. Gingerich does not consider that Yoder 
is consistently critical of Israelite kingship, as well as of Ezra’s post-exilic restoration 
of Temple authority. But he does point to a recurring theme in criticisms of Yoder’s 
position: a split between a positive “Hebrew” and a negative “Greek” worldview. A. 
James Reimer first raised this issue in his essay “The Nature and Possibility of 
Mennonite Theology.”106 Reimer contends that Yoder, especially in Preface to 
Theology, accepts an Enlightenment bifurcation between the ethically-focused 
Hebrews and the speculative Greeks. This interpretation actually reads modern 
                                                 
100 Ibid., 432. 
101 Hays, Moral Vision, 246. Cf. DeFerrari, “Review: The Politics of Jesus.” Like Gingerich, DeFerrari 
faults biblical realism here. 
102 Zimmerman, Politics of Jesus, 200. 
103 Nation, John Howard Yoder, 198-199. 
104 Gingerich, “Yoder’s God,” 431-432, further blames Yoder’s loyalty to the Mennonite church as 
causing him to skew scripture. For similar arguments, see Leithart, Defending Constantine, 317-319; 
Reimer, Mennonites and Classical Theology, 178. 
105 Gingerich, “Yoder’s God,” 432. 
106 Reimer, Mennonites and Classical Theology, 171-172. 
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historicism into the Hebraic—but in contrast to moderns, both the ancient Hebrews 
and Greeks believed in “an absolutely transcendent spiritual reality.”107 Yoder excises 
the spiritual from the Bible and so misses what Reimer later calls the “existential-
sacramental” aspects of Jesus’ message.108 Stanley Hauerwas and Alex Sider make a 
similar point in their editorial introduction to Yoder’s Preface to Theology, as does P. 
Travis Kroeker in a 2005 essay.109 Yoder’s avoidance of philosophical inquiry haunts 
him, as he uncritically embraces an outdated dualism that distorts his reading of 
scripture. 
 A related concern for Reimer is that Yoder seems to exclude in advance any 
reading of scripture that supports church institutions.110 Reimer as well as Peter J. 
Leithart insist that Jesus’ fulfillment of the Jewish law includes the civil law.111 These 
critics and many others draw special attention to Yoder’s interpretation of Jeremiah’s 
call for the exiled Jews in Babylon to “seek the peace of the city” (Jer. 29:7).112 In 
spite of the vision of return to the land that immediately follows (29:10),113 Yoder 
regards this call as definitively establishing landless diaspora as the normative 
political shape of Judaism and Christianity. John C. Nugent, who defends the general 
features of Yoder’s interpretation, still admits that it rests on a “needlessly pejorative 
reading of palestinocentric existence, the city of Jerusalem, and the return from 
exile.”114 As mentioned, Yoder dismisses Israelite kingship and Ezra’s restoration as 
distortions of the faithful politics of Abraham, the judges and prophets, and Jesus. 
Peter Ochs argues, however, that Yoder can only do so because he has generalized his 
reading of the gospels and is deaf to additional biblical themes. In doing so he draws 
                                                 
107 Ibid., 585n39. 
108 Reimer, Mennonites and Classical Theology, 293. See also Swartley, “Jesus and Jubilee,” 297, on 
Yoder’s reading of Jesus’ Jubilee proclamation in Luke 4. Swartley praises Yoder for recovering the 
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“Jews and non-Anabaptist Christians into a sphere of already completed interpretive 
conclusions.”115 As a scribe of the kingdom, Yoder’s cursory inspection of the 
storehouse leads him to pass over many of its treasures. This is not a mere 
“methodological” problem. Hermeneutical haste precludes dialogue and does 
violence to the interlocutor. 
 Yoder’s historiography has been subjected to a similar range of criticisms. 
Reimer warns his Mennonite readers against Yoder’s example of 
“selectively…read[ing] the Bible and history and undervalu[ing] the positive 
mandate for institutional life found in the biblical narrative as well as in our own 
Anabaptist-Mennonite heritage.”116 Critics have struggled with Yoder’s 
reconstruction of Anabaptist origins since the publication of his dissertation in the 
1960s. One influential response is from historian James M. Stayer. Although he 
acknowledges that Yoder’s “writings establish him as the most effective polemicist 
among contemporary Mennonite thinkers,” he fears that the equation of the pacifist 
Swiss Brethren with normative Anabaptism “imposes on the disparate Anabaptist 
sects a consistency and a system which do not correspond to sixteenth-century 
realities.”117 Stayer identifies diversity among early Anabaptists in regards to the use 
of violence and civic authority to bring about reform. Even some of the Swiss 
Brethren were initially open to a “top down” reform given their alliance with 
Zwingli, who always saw reform as a cooperative effort with the Basel town 
council.118 Pacifism only became a broad Anabaptist imperative when survival was at 
stake.119 Yoder and other proponents of “Evangelical Anabaptism” read their 
theological ideals into the past at the expense of historical truthfulness.  
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 For Yoder it is Stayer, rather, who fits the unsystematic “logic of events” into 
predetermined conceptual categories.120 Stayer can only see two possible political 
stances, apolitical separatism and realpolitik—and the early Anabaptists were either 
one or the other. This framework precludes him from considering the possibility that 
sixteenth-century Anabaptists were mostly unconcerned with systematic political 
ethics, and were instead involved in a dialogical negotiation of their convictions. The 
seeds of normative Anabaptism are present from the start. But Hans-Jürgen Goertz 
responds that Yoder “appears to have missed the main point”—Stayer’s categories 
are based on rigorous empirical research. It is Yoder’s “systematized theological 
history which tends to abstract historical reality.”121 Anabaptist theologians do better 
to reflect on the objective findings of historians than to produce their own 
tendentious interpretations. Later Mennonite historians like C. Arnold Snyder are less 
convinced that history and theology can be so divided,122 but still see Yoder as 
unduly twisting the former for the sake of the latter.123  
 Analogous criticisms have been raised about Yoder’s readings of the Jewish-
Christian schism,124 Constantine,125 the creeds,126 just war theory,127 and 
scholasticism.128 As Paul G. Doerksen argues, Yoder has a tendency towards 
“lumping” movements together that leads him to ignore historical subtleties for 
sweeping themes.129 Others observe that Yoder’s historiography favors dualistic, 
“essentialized” alternatives that do no justice to complex positions: positions Yoder 
likes are equated with his idealized Anabaptism, and those he dislikes with 
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purely synchronic historiography. 
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Constantinianism. For instance, Jewish theologians Daniel Boyarin and Peter Ochs 
receive no compliment from Yoder’s construal of a single normative line of 
pacifistic, diasporic Judaism stretching from Jeremiah through Jesus to Theodore 
Herzl. Yoder inadvertently adopts a form of supersessionism by eliminating those 
aspects of Judaism that do not conform to his understanding of Jesus and 
Anabaptism. Paul Martens worries that a similar logic is at work in Yoder’s writings 
on Hindu, Protestant, and Roman Catholic nonviolent movements.130  
 Yoder’s enemies fare no better. Peter J. Leithart has written an extensive 
defense of Constantine against Yoder, and his concerns resonate with the greater 
chorus of critics. On Leithart’s reading, Constantine is an exemplar of Yoder’s own 
theology of good governance.131 He ended Roman sacrificial practice; banned 
gladiatorial games; extended justice to the poor; increased religious tolerance; 
promoted Christian unity over his personal theological preferences; and (sometimes) 
subordinated imperial warmongering to ecclesial mission.132 Constantine was far 
from perfect, but he was a man like all of us slowly working out the implications of 
his salvation. Just before he died he laid aside the imperial purple, received baptism, 
and prepared to dedicate himself to the church.133 Yoder is oblivious to all of this. His 
Anabaptist “fall of the church” narrative ahistorically reaches back to the early 
church and disavows the possibility of faithful contextual development.134 He 
repudiates the primary historical source on Constantine, Eusebius of Caesarea, as 
captive to a “univocal” interpretation of history, but then sees that trait reproduced 
throughout the west up to Hegel—as if the reduction of fifteen hundred years of 
intellectual history to one word is not itself univocal.135 This homogenizing 
historiography is quintessentially “Constantinian,” as is Yoder’s apparent conviction 
that rulers indeed do direct history: if Christ and the church are at the center of 
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history, then why is Yoder so obsessed with Constantine?136 His historiography is 
controlled neither by a proper apocalyptic vision, nor by a corresponding patience. 
The faithfulness and effectiveness of his contributions to Christian moral 
discernment are questionable. 
 
Acknowledging criticism does not mean abandoning Yoder altogether, and his 
readings of Jesus, exile, church history, and Paul and the powers are still widely 
accepted as important, if incomplete, contributions.137 His legendary “patience,” 
moreover, has become the focus of a growing body of literature.138 Yet the criticisms 
cannot be ignored: Yoder’s linguistic omissions and faulty memory raise serious 
questions about his sociological theology. Several of Yoder’s critics maintain that 
Yoder’s theology continues to be a powerful tool for the church, but it needs to be 
made more consistent, if not subjected to constructive systematization.139 As seen 
above, even the friendliest of critics call for greater cosmological, linguistic, 
hermeneutical, and historiographical coherence. Nonetheless, both its proponents and 
its critics see the lack of a grand system as central to Yoder’s legacy. Writing against 
Nancey Murphy’s systematic account of Yoder’s pacifism, Chris K. Huebner argues 
that it “fails to appreciate that Yoder’s ad hoc, nonsystematic way of operating is 
crucial to the very substance of his pacifist theological position.”140 Murphy “cancels 
Yoder’s understanding of the priority of ecclesiology to epistemology by reasserting 
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the Enlightenment dogma of epistemological primacy.”141 Instead of systems, we 
should accept Yoder’s nonsystematic approach and read his oeuvre “as a series of 
thick descriptions of social practices…that collectively define a particular stance or 
way of life called church.”142 
 Whether or not Huebner is fair to Murphy’s effort,143 some methodological 
adjustment is called for if the distorting infelicities of Yoder’s approach are to be 
avoided. Put more bluntly, if Yoder’s work is to continue to serve the church in the 
way he envisioned, its defects will have to be resolved, and that resolution entails 
some form of intellectual coherence. Huebner rightly demands that extensions of 
Yoder’s thought take his (a)methodology seriously. For Yoder methodological mixing 
and matching is intrinsic to the vocation of the theologian, which is to privilege the 
demands of concrete moral situations faced by the church over intellectual systems. 
The issue is once again between adequate theological construction and faithful 
ethical service. The present chapter places Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology in 
the methodological mix. Bourdieu offers resources for a more coherent and nuanced 
theological methodology that is rigorously attentive to concrete ecclesial realities. 
 
4.2 Bourdieu’s Reflexive Sociology  
Like Yoder, Bourdieu is suspicious of methodological discussion and theoretical 
systemization that does not serve practical ends. “Those who push methodological 
concern to the point of obsession,” he suggests, “are like Freud’s patient who spent 
all his time cleaning his spectacles and never put them on.”144 Bourdieu’s early 
methodological treatise, written with Jean-Claude Chamboredon and Jean-Claude 
Passeron for classes in sociological epistemology in the mid-1960s, is accordingly 
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entitled Le métier du sociologue (translated as The Craft of Sociology).145 The words 
métier and craft are meant to evoke a set of creative habits oriented towards 
production—a research habitus rather than a theory of research.146 The sociological 
habitus Bourdieu and his co-authors propose requires, in short, a break from common 
sense language and concepts, systematic theoretical construction, and testing and 
revision of these constructions through empirical research. This “applied rationalism” 
is offered as an alternative to regnant positivist and theoreticist epistemologies and 
methodologies. The benefits of applied rationalism are identified for statistical and 
ethnographic methods, as well as for sociological science as a whole. 
 Excerpts from exemplary philosophical and sociological texts are included in 
The Craft of Sociology, but Bourdieu later came to regret not simply offering a 
number of “master works” in the style of a medieval craftsman.147 It was too easy for 
readers to treat the book as a new master theory instead of a prompt to masterful 
practice.148 Even so, Bourdieu consistently affirms the arguments of Craft,149 and it 
remains useful as a presentation of his methodology. The first part of this section 
accordingly summarizes Craft, taking note of later elaborations and modifications. 
Bourdieu does suggest that, were he to write the book again, he would place much 
greater emphasis on the closing comments on “the sociology of sociology.”150 As this 
sociological reflexivity became a major preoccupation of Bourdieu’s later years, the 
second part of this section treats it in detail.  
 
4.2.1 Applied Rationalism: The Epistemological Break 
In The Craft of Sociology, Bourdieu and his co-authors describe their epistemology 
as falling between the extremes of idealism and realism: it is an “applied 
rationalism.”151 This middle ground “alone can yield the full truth of scientific 
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practice by closely associating the ‘values of coherence’ and ‘fidelity to the real.’”152 
The values of coherence are associated with idealists. In the sociological tradition, 
idealism is associated with the great theoretical system builders such as Talcott 
Parsons and Robert K. Merton.153 For Bourdieu, their problem is precisely that they 
treat sociology as a tradition. They see their task as integrating past sociological 
theories into a whole, not performing detailed empirical studies that could give 
substance to their theories.154 On the other side are the positivist realists, like Paul 
Lazerfeld, who likewise treat sociological theory as a tradition, but one to be rejected 
as a whole in favor of quantitative analysis. Yet without some coherent theory to 
make sense of their data—not to mention their research practices—there is no way to 
verify their findings.155 As Bourdieu would put it later, “plagiarizing” Kant, “theory 
without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind.”156 
 Applied rationalism, by contrast, is a dialectical approach that includes both 
theory construction and its testing through empirical research. The purpose of both 
sides of the dialectic is to effect an “epistemological break” from everyday, common 
sense knowledge of the social world.157 Without the break, sociology simply affirms 
common sense—thereby putting its status as a social science in doubt. Scientific 
practice consists neither in the organization of theoretical speculations, nor in the 
compilation of random facts. For Bourdieu, tutored in the Bachelardian philosophy 
of science by Georges Canguilhem, the logic of science is a “logic of error.”158 
Scientific discovery occurs after the recognition that a phenomenon is not adequately 
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accounted for by received understandings. A new hypothesis is formulated to account 
for the phenomenon, and that hypothesis is tested experimentally. If that hypothesis 
is found to account better for the phenomenon, it replaces the old understanding—but 
only until errors are identified in it and another hypothesis constructed to replace it. 
There can therefore never be a single timeless scientific method.159 There can only be 
provisionally confirmed theories awaiting disconfirmation and supersession. 
Theories are heuristic tools that allow for a more or less adequate conception of the 
aspect of reality for which they were constructed. Theoretical construction, 
methodological review, and empirical research are not ends in themselves, but part of 
an epistemological break that aims to increase human knowledge of the real. Fidelity 
to the real is not realized without the values of coherence. 
 “The preconstructed is everywhere,” as Bourdieu would put it in a later 
writing.160 A Cartesian method of radically doubting common sense is necessary if 
sociology is to make the epistemological break consistently. In The Craft of 
Sociology and through his empirical studies, Bourdieu advocates for a unified social 
anthropology that would critically employ the best statistical and observational 
techniques to achieve the break and scientifically construct social facts.161 This 
language of social facts recalls Durkheim’s “first and most basic rule” of sociological 
method: “to consider social facts as things.”162 Considering social facts as things 
means considering them as independent of the individual human will; they in fact 
determine the will.163 To identify them, the sociologist must discard her 
preconceptions of the social and investigate isolated, rigorously defined groups of 
phenomena.164 Bourdieu and his co-authors interpret Durkheim as describing a 
scientifically productive way of seeing social phenomena and not as making an 
ontological statement.165 Just as Galileo’s view of physical entities as “a system of 
quantifiable relationships” birthed modern physics, and Saussure’s distinction 
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between langue and parole made the discipline of linguistics possible, so Durkheim’s 
turn to constructed social facts is the sociological revolution.  
  Seeing the social world as a collection of social facts is to begin to see it as a 
system of relations. In The Craft of Sociology, Bourdieu describes analogical 
reasoning as the “principle of construction of the relations between relations.”166 The 
manner in which related scientific disciplines, such as linguistics, anthropology or 
biology, depict the relations between the objects they study is a useful starting point 
for developing sociological hypotheses. Analogically constructed hypothetical 
systems of relations can be developed into generalized models, and each model acts 
as a “miniature theory” that can be tested scientifically (52-55). Empirical 
sociological research is then a form of experimentation, “a permanent reminder of 
the reality principle” (61). The attempt to confirm a theory with data reveals flaws in 
the theory, which then allows for theoretical revision. The method is deductive (54) 
or, in the terms of Anglo-American philosophers of science, hypothetico-
deductive.167 Theory is important because only a systematic, coherent body of 
concepts can be falsified by experimentation; and experimentation is important, 
because only it can falsify theory (63-64).  
 Bourdieu recognizes that the view of the social world as a set of objective 
relations is not agreeable to those who see society primarily as a set of individuals 
consciously choosing their actions de novo at each moment. The “principle of non-
consciousness” is indeed at the root of sociology, a methodological determinism that 
enables the construction of sociological objects (16). Because relations are 
fundamental, the sociologist must “reject all attempts to define the truth of a cultural 
phenomenon independently of the system of historical and social relations in which it 
is located” (19).  
 In order to construct the systems of relations, a number of research tools are 
helpful. Statistics, field observation, and questionnaires all contribute to the break 
from a common sense understanding of a phenomenon and its scientific 
reconstruction as a system of relations. But Bourdieu and his co-authors caution that 
each tool carries a theory about the nature of the social world and the way in which it 
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can be known. In other words, each tool is more or less successful in effecting the 
break. Random statistical sampling, for instance, treats the social world as a group of 
acontextual individuals.168 Bourdieu, who worked extensively with leading French 
mathematicians and statisticians in his research, prefers multivariate analysis, and 
especially multiple correspondence analysis, as it allows for the modeling of 
statistical relationships between all the relevant variables in complex social 
ecologies.169 Likewise, Bourdieu recommends conversational interviews based on 
extensive prior observation over the dominant practice of non-directive interviews.170 
The artificiality of non-directive interviews can only produce “artefacts,” showing 
only how interviewees respond to questions and questioners foreign to their social 
contexts. Encounters rooted in familiarity have a better chance of eliciting useful 
knowledge of interviewees’ practices. Questionnaires suffer from similar problems, 
and the implications of each question, and especially the taxonomy of questions, 
should be carefully controlled.  
 Although the tools just discussed are highly technical, Bourdieu locates their 
foundations in the logical and lexical critique of common language analysis.171 
Common sense understandings are expressed in words, and technical sociological 
tools are sophisticated means for exposing their assumptions and offering alternative 
constructions. Historical analysis of words and concepts likewise brings their 
theoretical resonances to the surface. Bourdieu did not emphasize historical tools in 
Craft, but they later became prominent in his research. “There is no more potent tool 
for rupture,” he would write in the 1990s, “than the reconstruction of genesis.”172 
Words have histories. Forgetting them is to treat them as expressions of an 
unquestionable grasp on the world. For Bourdieu, the discipline of philosophy is the 
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exemplar par excellence of the “forgetting or denial of history.”173 Sociologists are to 
break from philosophy with their radically doubting applied rationalism. 
 
4.2.2 Reflexivity: Radical Doubt Radicalized  
The Craft of Sociology concludes with a call for the “sociology of sociology”: the 
path to a reliably preconception-free sociology is only through the application of 
sociological tools to sociology itself.174 Over twenty years later, in Bourdieu’s other 
sustained methodological reflection, Invitation to Reflexive Sociology, he would 
identify reflexivity as the hallmark of his sociology: “I believe that if the sociology I 
propose differs in any significant way from the other sociologies of the past and of 
the present, it is above all in that it continually turns back onto itself the scientific 
weapons it produces.”175 Descartes’ radical doubt was insufficient, as it failed to 
question the social basis of the philosophical mode of thought.176 As Bourdieu put it 
in Pascalian Meditations, his final review of and break from philosophical categories 
for the social world, radical doubt must be radicalized.177  
 Even before The Craft of Sociology, Bourdieu had already begun to practice a 
kind of reflexivity. During his Algerian fieldwork he recognized that many of his 
basic intuitions about Kabyle culture had their origins in his rural upbringing in 
Béarn, in southwest France.178 He therefore began to carry out simultaneous research 
in Béarn in order to convert those intuitions into disciplined tools for research. The 
Logic of Practice, perhaps Bourdieu’s most advanced theoretical statement, reworks 
the conclusions of his Algerian studies, from Outline of a Theory of Practice, in view 
of his work in Béarn. It offers a reflexive theory of practice that accounts for its 
author’s predisposition to conceive of practice in certain ways rather than others.  
 After leaving Algeria in the early 1960s, Bourdieu’s reflexive discipline was 
turned to the education system that produced him. Les Héritiers, The State Nobility 
and his other educational studies all examine socio-economic and cultural forces 
behind academic success. The high point of this reflexivity came in Homo 
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Academicus, where he studied correlations between the social and cultural 
backgrounds of French professors and their political views on the May 1968 student 
rebellion.179 Although The Inheritors contributed to the student unrest, and he was in 
broad sympathy with Foucault and the other professors who supported the protests, 
Bourdieu himself did not man the barricades.180 As Derek Robbins points out, 
Bourdieu well inhabits the category of an “oblate,” defined in Homo Academicus as a 
career academic who, due to his low social origins, owes everything to the system.181 
He was only “able to resist conservatism as a result of his capacity to understand his 
situation,” i.e., through the reflexivity of works like Homo Academicus. Bourdieu 
states that the purpose of that book is “to trap Homo Academicus, supreme classifier 
among classifiers in the net of his own classifications.”182 In doing so, he of course 
traps himself, and so increases his awareness of and control over the academic 
common sense that shapes his research. 
 A few years before writing Homo Academicus, Bourdieu published a short 
essay entitled “Sur la objectivation participante.”183 There he expands upon the 
comments in The Craft of Sociology about a form of ethnographic research that 
would account for the social gap between observer and observed better than the 
supposed neutrality of participant observation. The success of the effort to objectify 
the observed, he argued, depended on a parallel objectivation of the point of view of 
the observer.184 Only participant objectivation can escape the false choice between 
the “mystified immersion” of participant observation and a mythic all-seeing 
objectivism. Although he does not use the phrase there, Bourdieu would return to 
participant objectivation as an interview methodology in The Weight of the World. In 
his closing essay on “Understanding,” he describes his research team’s construction 
of a method of “active and methodical listening” that evades symbolic violence as 
much as possible by employing interviewers who share a similar background to 
                                                 
179 Bourdieu, HA, xi, portrays the book as the culmination of a reflexive project that began with his 
Béarn studies. 
180 Schinkel, “Bourdieu’s Political Turn?,” 81; Swartz, “Critical Sociology,” 792. 
181 Robbins, “Epistemological ‘Break,’” 39, on Bourdieu, HA, 291. 
182 Bourdieu, HA, xi. 
183 Bourdieu, “Sur l’objectivation participante,” 67-69. See also his “Vive la crise!” 74; IRS, 260; 
“Participant Objectivation,” 281-294. 
184 Bourdieu, “Sur l’objectivation participante,” 67. 
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interviewees and who have studied that background thoroughly.185 A “double 
socioanalysis” is made possible, as the researcher is implicated in her interviewees’ 
responses.186 Although this method may seem highly subjective, distortions can be 
avoided so long as the sociologist is willing to practice the “permanent control of the 
point of view.”187 Reflexive knowledge of the self is a condition of adequate 
knowledge of the other. 
 Elsewhere, Bourdieu discusses the history of sociology as another necessary 
component of the sociology of sociology.188 Although he did not write an extensive 
history, at various points he addressed critically the origins of French sociology in 
philosophy and Christian humanism.189 As mentioned, Pascalian Meditations is an 
especially trenchant break from sociology’s philosophical past. 
Disciplinary history, participant objectivation, and study of one’s own familial 
and academic context, therefore, all serve as tools for sociological reflexivity. Each is 
a means for sociologists to break from the common sense that inhabits their research 
practices. Bourdieu’s identification of his sociology with this type of reflexivity, and 
his zealous advocacy for it, have struck some observers as beside the point. Reflexive 
review of one’s practices is a built-in feature of human consciousness, some argue, 
and does not require special sociological tools.190 Others maintain that Bourdieu is 
simply describing the basic research competence taught to every sociologist.191 
Whatever the case may be, Bourdieu nowhere reviews systematically alternative 
conceptions of reflexivity in order to distinguish his own.192 He is not altogether 
reflexive about his concept of reflexivity. Nevertheless, he is clear about the sources 
of his passion for reflexivity: the special vulnerability of the sociologist and the 
potential fruitfulness of rigorous scientific reflexivity. 
                                                 
185 Bourdieu, WW, 609-610. 
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In The Craft of Sociology, Bourdieu and his co-authors warn that “the 
sociologist…is vulnerable to the illusion of immediate self-evidence or the 
temptation to unconsciously universalize particular experience when he forgets that 
he is the cultivated subject of a particular culture and fails to subordinate his practice 
to a continuous questioning of this relationship.”193 In particular, sociologists often 
overlook how their “class ethos” shapes their understanding of social reality, and 
how academic fads direct their research interests.194 Because the object of sociology, 
society, is a constant subject of common debate, it is often very difficult for 
sociologists to separate themselves from spurious modes of social thought. But 
because sociology does, at times, carry scientific prestige, it becomes doubly difficult 
to escape common social sense when an audience demands “prophetic” vision about 
weighty topics such as “the future of civilization.”195 Sociologists must fortify 
themselves and refuse the social essences offered up by popular debates—even when 
these debates are supplied by past sociology. Concepts like “multiculturalism,” 
“race,” “globalization,”196 “pure art,”197 and even “reason”198 and “the state”199 must 
be subjected to socio-historical review.  
Bourdieu notes that sociologists who supply and/or rely on official state 
statistics are especially prone to accepting official categories without criticism: 
“thought on the state (pensée de l’État) is always liable to be a state thought (pensée 
d’État).”200 This problem can be seen for instance with legally accepted definitions 
of “the family.”201 Sociologists who do not at least question the identification of a 
family with heterosexual marriage, childbearing, and a shared domicile are blind to 
the various moral and practical issues raised by homosexuality, divorce, and 
cohabitation. Moreover, any sociological treatment of the state must be willing to 
                                                 
193 Bourdieu, Chamboredon, and Passeron, CS, 72. 
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ask, “what if the state was nothing but a word, upheld by collective belief? A word 
which contributes to making us believe in the existence and unity of this scattered 
and divided ensemble of organs of rule which cabinets, ministries, departments, 
administrative directions, bureaus of this and that are.”202 The reflexive sociologist 
gives up the certainties of the “illusory quest for an ontological foundation” and 
constructively explores the relational constitution of reality.203  
 Bourdieu promises great reward for those who endure on the path of 
reflexivity. Rather than being prey to the state and common sense, the reflexive 
sociologist has the opportunity to become “the subject of the problems she can pose 
about the social world”204 She can begin to think the social world for herself, instead 
of allowing the social world to think through her.205 Yet she cannot do it alone. “The 
gains from epistemological reflection cannot be really embodied in practice until the 
social conditions are established for epistemological control,” that is, for a fully 
reflexive scientific field.206 The sociology of sociology and of other disciplines 
enables a generalized conflict of the faculties to reign. Institutional inertia gives way 
and the scientific community moves “closer to the ideal city of scientists, in which, 
ideally, all the scientific communications required by science and the progress of 
science, and only those, would be able to take place.”207 Reflexivity does not offer an 
absolute, position-less view of the social world, but it can produce scientific 
knowledge.208 The freedom gained by reflexive sociologists to know themselves and 
know the world is a kind of “collective conversion.”209 The liberated scientific 
community can act as a model for and goad to a free and rational political 
community—and this political goal, ultimately, is the purpose of Bourdieu’s 
reflexive sociology.210 
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4.3 Revising Yoder’s Theological Method 
Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology is premised on the break from the common sense of 
and about the social world. Everyday practical reason is to be objectified and so 
purified by social science—especially when it is the scientist’s own practical 
reason.211 One possible summary of the problems with Yoder’s theological method is 
that he does not make the objectifying break. His language and memory are too 
indebted to Anabaptist common sense and he fails to question preconceived essences 
such as “Constantinianism,” “ethics,” “metaphysics,” and “the state.” Yet Yoder’s 
theology is explicitly a servant of ecclesial processes of practical moral reasoning. 
Does this focus not put him and Bourdieu at irreconcilable odds?  
 The previous section concluded with the observation that the purpose of 
Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology is political. Its goal is practical, but an improved 
practice stripped as far as possible of its tendencies to reproduce domination. 
Reflexive sociology aims to bring about a purified reason, but not a reason that 
escapes history and the realm of empirical practice: a pure practical reason. To the 
extent that Yoder’s doxological theology is oriented towards a more faithful 
discipleship, it too can be viewed as a kind of purifying practical reason. The 
theologian’s task within the church is not to leave it as it is, nor to affirm ecclesial 
common sense as always already adequate. As an agent of prophecy, linguistic self-
consciousness, and memory, the theologian breaks from preconstructed theological 
concepts and critically constructs new ones suitable for a situation. Some of Yoder’s 
corrective theological constructions are “the politics of Jesus,” “body politics,” and 
“the war of the lamb.” In each case, Yoder takes familiar ecclesial texts, language, 
history, and practices, and identifies new relations among them. These relations are 
not constructed haphazardly or without guiding hypotheses.  
Although Yoder labels his approach as inductive, his explanation of his 
research process is deductive, as theological patterns arise in response to specific 
questions brought to texts and other theological data. When discussing, for instance, 
his discovery of a pattern among New Testament authors’ translated contemporary 
cosmological concepts, he does not say that the pattern occurred to him as he was 
combing through the scriptures at random. Rather, the pattern “fell into place as I 
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was reading the New Testament with a view to standard questions about how a small 
faith community can claim that its message is pertinent to a wider world.”212 His 
interpretation of the Gospel of Luke in The Politics of Jesus, likewise, is not the 
result of a presuppositionless scouring of the text: “I propose to read the Gospel 
narrative with the constantly pressing question, ‘Is there here a social ethic?’ I shall, 
in other words, be testing a hypothesis that runs counter to the prevalent 
assumptions: the hypothesis that the ministry and the claims of Jesus are best 
understood as presenting to hearers and readers not the avoidance of political 
options, but one particular socio-political-ethical option.”213 This method is not 
inductive. Yoder breaks from theological common sense by testing alternative 
hypotheses against scripture. He is engaged in a deductive process of “theory” 
construction, whether he likes it or not.214  
Recognition of the deductive process at work in Yoder’s research practice 
opens avenues for dialogue with Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology. Yoder’s break from 
common ecclesial reasoning mostly occurs through common language analysis and 
broad alternative readings of ecclesial history. As Leithart and many others contend, 
Yoder’s historiography requires far more precision if it is to be convincing. 
Sometimes his dualistic logical analysis seems to get in the way of textured 
interpretations of events. At this point Bourdieu’s dense, focused sociological 
investigations of various phenomena are a helpful model. The careful social histories 
he produced at the end of his life are likewise exemplary. Adopting the relational 
thinking at the heart of these studies would, furthermore, encourage the kind of 
multivocal logic sought by Peter Ochs and those concerned with Yoder’s tendency to 
essentialize pluralistic movements as faithful or unfaithful to Jesus.   
 Relational thinking is, for Bourdieu, at once the principle of the break and of 
object construction. Yoder’s primary concepts are often under-constructed. When he 
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fails to break from Anabaptist common sense about Constantine, he fails to construct 
an historical object, “Constantinianism,” that could be useful for his theological 
purposes. To critique the powers is to construct the powers. But what would such 
construction look like in light of Yoder’s theology of the powers? The basic 
hypothesis of this theology is that the powers can be identified by contrast to the life 
of Jesus. This hypothesis postulates a relation between Jesus and the powers that is 
only made intelligible by postulating a further, unique relation between Jesus, God 
and God’s Spirit. If Jesus does not have a unique relation to God and the Spirit, then 
it makes little sense to make him the standard against which the powers are judged. 
The God-Jesus-Spirit relation then has critical priority over the Jesus-powers 
relation, and cannot be dismissed as mere metaphysical speculation. Some minimal 
construction of trinitarian relations is necessary to ground a critique of the powers.215 
The God-Jesus-Spirit relation is social, but also more than social. It may not be 
possible to say much about ontological relations “within” the Trinity, but some 
acknowledgment of those relations is required if language about the powers is going 
to be theologically adequate. From a theological view, a power is incompletely 
constructed if its constituting relation to the triune God is left out. Moreover, 
recognition of that constituting relation enables genuine criticism of the powers, 
since it raises Jesus above them. The fallen powers are visible in light of the God-
human Jesus Christ, not just the life of a first-century Jewish martyr. 
 Relational construction of the powers therefore must include all their 
dimensions: material, symbolic and spiritual. Yoder’s approach to cosmological 
construction might be labeled as “prophetic materialism.” He regards cosmology as 
fulfilling a prophetic function by offering a vision of a possible state of affairs that 
contrasts with a present state of affairs. In each case, the state of affairs identified is a 
material and a social reality, and not a spiritual plane or realm. Like early Marxism, 
Yoder’s prophetic materialism pays little attention to the affective and cultural 
aspects of the present or anticipated state of affairs.216 Like atheistic social theory in 
general, it pays little attention to actual or possible spiritual relations to the triune 
God. Bourdieu’s symbolic materialism can only respond directly to the first problem; 
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but preceding chapters have argued that it can nonetheless help theologians 
comprehend spiritual relations in such a way that enriches, not denigrates, an 
appreciation of material sociality.  
 Applied rationalism calls for empirical “testing” of the object—but how 
could this revised Yoderian methodology test its objects if they include metaphysical 
relations? For Yoder the majority of theological statements are about God’s 
interactions with human beings within history. Metaphysical statements about God’s 
trinitarian being may be necessary, but only as fences to keep us from saying the 
wrong things about Jesus.217 Yoder may have underestimated the need for 
constructive description of those fences, namely, of the relationship between Jesus, 
the Father and the Spirit. But his ethico-political theology supplies later theologians 
with a large number of empirical statements that can be confirmed or disconfirmed 
through empirical study.218  
 A nonreductive study of the principalities and powers might go as follows. 
First, construct the metaphysical “object,” the unique relation between Jesus, the 
Father, and the Spirit. This construction demands further construction of the 
historical life of Jesus of Nazareth, such as Yoder provides in The Politics of Jesus. 
That construction can then be used to investigate the relations between the Father, 
creation, and Israel; the Spirit and the church; and so on. Further, the human Jesus 
exists in relation to fallen creation, which must be constructed in all its complexity—
each variance in time and place, each power, is constructed in its particular relation 
to Jesus. Constructions of the historical Jesus and specific powers can of course be 
subjected to empirical scrutiny. With rare exceptions, Yoder’s handling of empirical 
data is far from rigorous. Nor does he clarify the central metaphysical hypothesis 
required for his research project to make sense: Jesus enjoys a unique relation to the 
Father and the Spirit. That theory can only be partially tested by investigating the 
coherence between Jesus’ life and interactions between YHWH and Israel, and the 
Spirit and the church—although systematic examination of the historical data in each 
case is crucial. At the heart of the theory is just that, a theoretical statement about the 
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being of God that is only indirectly testable by its coherence with associated objects. 
A realist constructivist theology would accept both the need for empirical 
confirmation of its objects and the irreducibility of its core theoretical statements.219 
  Reflexive theologians will not only construct the powers without, but those 
“within” the church and themselves. This movement overlaps with Yoder’s notion of 
repentant historiography, but should be more critical of the social conditions of 
theological practice.220 Reflexivity would allow also for the incorporation of other 
academic disciplines into theology, without ignoring how the presuppositions of 
other disciplines may conflict with theological perspectives.221 Bourdieu’s insistence 
that reflexivity be sociological, and not merely philosophical, is a salutary reminder 
here. Yoder’s sociological theology would, at the very least, seem to favor the 
prioritization of a critical theology-sociology dialogue.  
 Reflexive awareness of the contingent and compromised nature of theological 
practice should breed a deeper theological patience and humility. As with Bourdieu’s 
scientific city, theologians cannot obtain this level of reflexivity without help. The 
aim of reflexive theology is the production of the ecclesial city in which word and 
deed are related as intensely as possible to the life of the triune God. Each citizen of 
the ecclesial city has the task of receiving and constructing the divine gift of a free 
polis. Theologians’ critical tools aid the church, but they should also be receptive to 
the entire body of Christ. Those tools should be flexible as the hands of the church, 
and of the triune God, reach out to shape them. Reflexive theology occurs, therefore, 
in the relational reciprocity between theologians and their objects of research. Intense 
relating to God, church, and scripture is a central, not incidental, aspect of 
theological science. The break from Anabaptist common sense does not lead beyond 
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Conclusion 
This chapter has reviewed Yoder’s theological method in order to identify its major 
difficulties and explore revisionary resources from Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology. 
Yoder proposes a study of the powers that identifies their moral features by way of 
contrast to the way of Jesus. Within his larger theological method, the theology of the 
principalities and powers is a type of prophetic cosmology, one of the linguistic tasks 
of the theologian. Other theological tasks include linguistic self-consciousness and 
scriptural and historical memory. Yoder emphasizes patient interaction with his 
various interlocutors in the face of specific issues. The theologian’s goal is never to 
construct a master method that could suffice for all time, but to wield flexibly her 
constructive and critical linguistic and memory skills for the sake of the church’s 
mission. Yoder is the first to admit that he is not the exemplar of theological patience. 
His critics agree, pointing to an insufficient constructive vocabulary and a memory 
that is too often self-serving. Bourdieu’s applied rationalism gives Yoder a more 
critical framework for carrying out research, one in which the empirical dimensions 
of theological statements are subjected to rigorous confirmation. Moreover, 
Bourdieu’s reflexivity can help Yoder’s followers turn those research tools upon 
themselves, for the sake of a more patient, ecclesially-centered theological practice. 
That practice is the subject of the final two chapters. 
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5. REVISING YODER’S ECCLESIAL POLITICS 
 
Alongside his christocentric pacifism, Yoder is perhaps best known for posing the 
church as an alternative political body to the nation state. In imitation of the politics 
of Jesus, Christian communities are to share goods, welcome the excluded, and 
practice reconciliation, servant leadership, and the priesthood of believers.1 When it 
does these things, the church becomes “a proclamation of the lordship of Christ to 
the powers from whose dominion the church has begun to be liberated.”2 Through 
faithfulness to its master, not compromise, the church fulfills its call “to contribute to 
the creation of structures more worthy of human society.”3 Because of his emphasis 
on the church, and on faithfulness over efficacy, many of Yoder’s readers have 
labeled him as a sectarian. That criticism has waned somewhat in the wake of 
postliberalism’s “eccesiological turn” and the postmodern welcome of particularity—
but the criticism persists. At root is a concern that he reduces the political and moral 
options available to Christians due to an overly pessimistic view of the world—itself 
predicated on an obsession with the state—and an idealistic vision of the church. 
There is also worry that his ecclesiology is not animated by a robust theology of the 
Holy Spirit. The present chapter faces these criticisms in order to propose a revised, 
non-reductive ecclesiological politics based in a strong political sociology. The first 
section unpacks Yoder’s conception of the redemption of the powers and outlines 
relevant criticisms. Bourdieu’s sociological concepts “circuits of legitimation,” 
“corporatism of the universal,” and “negative philosophy” are then presented in order 
to set up a relational theology of the concrete church. This church participates 
through the Holy Spirit in the coming reign of God, and its relative autonomy from 
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5.1 Yoder’s Ecclesial Politics 
 According to Yoder, the created, fallen powers participate in God’s eschatological 
redemption of all things. Since “God is going to save his creatures in their humanity, 
the Powers cannot simply be destroyed or set aside or ignored.”4 This view would 
appear to be in tension with Paul’s in 1 Corinthians 15:24-26, where he writes: “Then 
comes the end, when [Jesus] hands over the kingdom to God the Father, after he has 
destroyed [katargs] every ruler [archn] and every authority [exousian] and power 
[dynamin]. For he must reign until he has put all his enemies under his feet. The last 
enemy to be destroyed [katargeitai] is death.” If the powers are going to be 
destroyed, then the prospect of their redemption seems unlikely. Yoder’s account of 
the powers, of course, follows Berkhof’s, and so it is unsurprising to find exegesis in 
the latter’s work to support an alternative interpretation of the passage. Berkhof, who 
is followed by Wink and others, argues that the proper translation of katarge is 
“dethroned.”5 His case is not merely semantic, but rests on a reading of other Pauline 
passages on the powers that speak of Christ’s redemption of “all things” (Col. 1:19; 
Eph. 1:10).6 The redemption of all things includes the redemption of the powers, and 
that redemption involves freedom from their tyranny. This is Berkhof’s view, and 
Yoder shares it. But what happens before “the end”? What are Christians to do while 
Jesus is reigning, putting his enemies under his feet? For Yoder, Christians 
participate in Jesus’ victorious reign by imitating his politics. The politics of Jesus 
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5.1.1 Christ, Church, and Powers  
In The Politics of Jesus, Yoder places Berkhof’s analysis of Colossians 2:15 at the 
center of his account of the effect of Christ’s death and resurrection on the powers. 
Berkhof focuses on the three verbs from that passage: Christ disarmed 
(apekdysamenos), made a public example (edeigmatisen), and triumphed over 
(thriambeusas) the powers. According to Berkhof, the crucifixion of Christ by the 
powers publicly exposes their opposition to God.8 This exposure breaks the illusion 
of the powers’ beneficence—their primary weapon—and the resurrection shows God 
to be the more powerful. Once their illusion is broken, the powers become an “object 
of God’s plan of redemption,” and therefore “will no longer lie between man and 
God as a barrier, but can and shall return to their original function, as instruments of 
God’s fellowship with His creation” (41). As Christians await the final redemption, 
they may observe a “limitation” now placed on the powers by Christ (43-46). This 
limitation is found in the way God uses the powers for God’s own ends, sometimes 
breaking their influence completely, as when Jesus cast out demons. The existence of 
the church is itself a significant limitation of the powers, for “by her very presence 
she breaks through that unshaken stability of life under the Powers” (44). The Holy 
Spirit, furthermore, “shrinks” or “de-deifies” the powers in the eyes of Christians, 
thereby enabling critical discernment (47-50). Christians engage the powers 
selectively, withdrawing when necessary, and boldly “walking through the middle of 
[the world’s] kingdoms” when possible.9  
 The church’s primary task, according to Berkhof, is to show “in her life and 
fellowship how men can live freed from the Powers” (51). Efforts to transform 
society directly are only possible when the church itself exhibits redeemed 
community. Ephesians 6:10-18 may instruct Christians to “put on the whole armor of 
God” for their struggle with the powers, but Berkhof contends that the armor listed 
there is for defensive purposes (52). Christ has already defeated the powers, so “our 
weapon is to stay close by Him and thus to remain out of reach of the drawing power 
of the Powers” (52). In doing so, Christians may find their influence spreading 
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through society, even to the extent that it would be possible to speak of its 
“Christianization” (53-64). Christianization is not to be confused with a “restoration” 
of the powers to their original state, which is impossible given their ongoing 
rebellion (56-57). It is instead a process through which those affected by the church’s 
witness guide the powers in such a way that they are “oriented by and pointed toward 
God’s dealings with men in Jesus Christ and to men’s life in fellowship with this 
same God” (58). For instance, a Christianized state would restrict its action to 
“staving off chaos” rather than perpetuating ideology, and a Christianized legal 
system would be based on Christian morality (59). Berkhof later questioned this 
notion of Christianization,10 and the anti-Constantinian Yoder unsurprisingly does not 
endorse it.11 But Yoder does agree with Berkhof that the witness of the obedient 
church takes part in Christ’s redemptive activity, and that this witness is potentially 
transformative of the powers in the present age. 
 Yoder develops those themes throughout his oeuvre, beginning with his 
European writings. In his doctoral dissertation he contrasts sixteenth-century 
Anabaptist obedience with the compromises of the reformers and others from the 
same era. The reformers, according to Yoder, chose alignment with civic authority 
over scripture. Huldrych Zwingli, the reformer of Basel, is Yoder’s main target: 
“from fear of the consequences of a consistent implementation of the Reformation, 
he made a pact with the powers of this world.”12 Zwingli began his reform with 
biblical critiques of fasting, interest, tithes, images, and the mass, but delayed 
introducing actual changes when the Basel town council hesitated (5-11). In October 
1523 he declared that the council held ultimate control over the pace and scale of 
reform (11-17). The growing frustrations of some of Zwingli’s closest associates now 
peaked, leading to a rupture in the reform movement. After a year of private debate, a 
final break occurred in January 1525 when some of the dissenters received believer’s 
baptism as the only valid biblical practice (18-28). The “Anabaptists” were thus born 
out of refusal to let Christian practice be dictated by state power. 
                                                 
10 Berkhof wrote of “Christianization” again in his book Doctrine of the Holy Spirit, 100-104, but in 
the preface to the second edition of C&P admits that “the concept of ‘Christianization’ ... probably 
cannot be used at all anymore” (11). See Min, Sin and Politics, 160-164, for a recent appropriation of 
the language. 
11 He does use it in “Servant,” 164, as a synonym for the “sobering of the powers.” 
12 Yoder, ARS, 123. Unless otherwise noted, references to ARS in this and the following paragraphs are 
in the text. 
   164
 Within the incipient Anabaptist movement there were some who imitated 
Zwingli’s reliance on civic authorities. Yoder is especially concerned to judge 
Balthasar Hubmaier “as influenced too much by the need to connect with the 
sociological facts” (134). More specifically, he did not fully renounce violence and 
attempted to implement Anabaptist reforms through the town councils of Waldshut 
and Nikolsburg.13 On the other hand, Anabaptist “pietists” such as Sebastian 
Pfistermeyer made no effort to institutionalize reforms.14 Pfistermeyer “was 
concerned with preaching repentance, awakening, and ethical strictness, but not with 
the formation of a community” (100).  
 Yoder regards Hubmaier and Pfistermeyer as “in between figures,” not fully 
Anabaptist (133). In contrast, those Anabaptists who both renounced civic authority 
and sought Christian community based on biblical teachings paradigmatically 
recovered the faith of the earliest followers of Jesus.15 By making believer’s baptism 
rather than citizenship the criteria for community membership, the Anabaptists 
allowed for accountability to a biblical lifestyle. This accountability took place in a 
community ordered by what Zwingli had initially called “the rule of Christ,” 
discerning dialogue empowered by the Spirit and centered on the scriptures (226-
228; cf. Matt. 18:15-10; Gal. 6:2). Unlike pietist or (Schwenckfeldian) spiritualist 
strands, Anabaptism thus “steps into sociological reality,” focusing on the Spirit’s 
role in forming concrete communities conducive to visible discipleship (ARS, 208).  
 A disciplined, dialogical community takes on a different character from 
surrounding communities in the practical integrity of its discipleship. As a distinctive 
community it can exist “against the world” (259-277). Yoder defines the Anabaptist 
                                                 
13 Hubmaier was a theologian and pastor who was involved with the early Swiss Brethren in Zurich, 
and then ministered around Moravia. He supported radical peasants at various points, though 
famously clashed with the radical Anabaptist leader Hans Hut. Although he recanted his Anabaptist 
beliefs in 1525 to escape death, he continued his ministry until his martyrdom in Austria in 1528. 
Yoder, ARS, 43-48, 56-64; Yoder, “Balthasar Hubmaier”; Pipkin and Yoder, eds. and trans., Balthasar 
Hubmaier. See Snyder, “Swiss Anabaptism,” for a recent reevaluation of Hubmaier’s legacy. 
14 Pfistermeyer was an Anabaptist leader in the Aargau, west of Zürich, who later recanted and sought 
to convert Anabaptists. See Yoder, ARS, 97-100, 134. A likely influence on Yoder’s antipathy towards 
pietism was Mennonite historian Robert Friedmann, who saw it as a distraction from “radical 
brotherhood.” See Friedmann’s two-part article “Anabaptism and Pietism,” its appendix, “Spiritual 
Changes,” and his book Mennonite Piety. For recent criticism, see T. F. Schlabach, “Mennonites and 
Pietism.” 
15 Yoder, ARS, 126-130. Yoder regards Grebel, Mantz, and the movement that coalesced around 
Michael Sattler and the Schleitheim Brotherly Union as the earliest representatives of this more pure 
Anabaptism.  
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understanding of “the world” in terms familiar from his theology of the powers: 
“‘world’ is the concrete form of creation’s disobedience. This disobedience is not 
simply an attitude that invisibly hovers over all things and works unnoticed in every 
heart, but rather it is as visible as is the person. It is embodied in the state, worship, 
class, economics, and in the demonic nature of a culture that has become 
autonomous” (265). Anabaptists, unlike those reliant on state power, embark on the 
“greater venture of faith” represented by the proclamation of the early church that 
“the powers of this world…stood under the lordship of Christ” (271). But trust in the 
lordship of Christ allows Anabaptists the freedom to follow Christ and assume a 
“prophetic-critical” missionary stance for the world (281). Criticism occurs within 
nonviolent dialogue, following the practice of those Anabaptists who sought dialogue 
with Zwingli and other reformers until they were persecuted into sociological 
isolation (109-110, 120-120). It is this “inexhaustible will to dialogue,” Yoder 
contends, that gives Anabaptism its continued viability (136). Anabaptist 
communities are thus internally dialogical, following the rule of Christ, and 
externally dialogical, engaging the powers. Internal obedience and external witness 
are intrinsically related as the church responds to the risen Lord.  
 As discussed in chapter one above, Yoder’s major texts on the powers all 
emerged out of ecumenical contexts. The first of them, Christian Witness to the State 
expands the Anabaptist logic with specific reference to the state as a power. Yoder 
updates his opponents, however, taking aim especially at the Niebuhrs for 
deemphasizing Jesus as the norm of Christian witness.16 By contrast, the early 
Christians exalted Christ as cosmic lord, as evidenced in the New Testament by the 
repeated use of Psalm 110:1, and by the passages on the powers (8-9). From the 
perspective of the New Testament authors, the present age is intersected by another 
age, “the redemptive reality which entered history in an ultimate way in Christ” (9). 
The tension between the two ages is not temporal, but sociological. It is “a matter of 
direction” between those who do and those who do not do God’s will. Thus the 
“meaning” or goal of history is seen in the work of the church as an obedient body, 
not the state or any other power (13). “In spite of the present visible dominion of the 
‘powers’ of ‘this present evil age,’” Yoder argues, “the triumph of Christ has already 
                                                 
16 Yoder, CWS, 7n4, 36n1, 66-68, 79-81, 89-90. References to CWS in this and the following two 
paragraphs are in the text. 
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guaranteed that the ultimate meaning of history will not be found in the course of 
earthly empires or the development of proud cultures, but in the calling together of 
the ‘chosen race, royal priesthood, holy nation,’ which is the church of Christ” (13; 
cf. Eph 6:12; 1 Pt 2:9). Ecclesial faithfulness has priority in Christian witness 
because it shows how God is redeeming the world through Christ. Yoder therefore 
suggests that ordinary Christian practices such as distributing leadership throughout 
the community, fraternal admonition, and consensus decision-making can influence 
the powers (CWS, 18-19). For instance, human rights can be traced to Christian 
egalitarianism, and democratic process is related to Christian accountability. Yoder 
develops this argument in a series of later works culminating in Body Politics.17 
There he focuses on the “sacramentality” of the same practices, with the addition of 
baptism and the Lord’s Supper: each practice is a way the church responds in the 
power of the Spirit to Jesus, and each is a way that God acts to redeem the world.18  
 In Christian Witness to the State, Yoder goes on to highlight other forms of 
Christian proclamation. The church often serves as a “pilot,” exercising “constant 
inventive vision” by experimenting with new institutional forms that may be taken 
over by others (CWS, 19-20). Christian individuals might have transformative 
influence through “conscientious participation” in various spheres, and a Christian 
ethos may spread through “moral osmosis” via Christian education and the church’s 
general reputation (20-21). But in this book Yoder’s focus is on more direct political 
witness, and he spells out in detail the conditions and form of Christian speech to 
rulers. Given his basic interest in obedience, it is unsurprising that he denies the 
possibility of meaningful Christian speech to rulers without a basic correspondence 
between the words used and the life of the church (21-22). The requirement of 
correspondence between word and work means not only that Christian speech to 
rulers must issue from clearly Christian concerns, but that Christians should agree on 
what is to be done and already be able to exhibit a significant response to the concern 
within their communities. A segregated church, for example, has nothing to say about 
integration. 
 These conditions being met, Christians are free to explore various linguistic 
formulations that will translate Christian concern into policy recommendations 
                                                 
17 Yoder, RP, 327-329; PK, 22-28; FC; BP; FTN, 15-50. 
18 See especially Yoder, BP, 71-80.  
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comprehensible to the rulers in question and apposite for the situation (CWS, 7n4, 
36n1, 66-68, 79-81, 89-90).19 Yoder draws from contemporary ecumenical discourse 
to name such formulations “middle axioms,” “concepts [which] will translate into 
meaningful and concrete terms the general relevance of the lordship of Christ for a 
given social ethical issue” (32, 33n3). He lists several examples, including critiques 
of state violence when it exceeds the bare needs of social order, or of state power 
when it it threatens to overwhelm personal and cultural values (36-38, 40). Christian 
speech to rulers aims then not at implementing an ideal Christian social order, but at 
pragmatically encouraging the realization of “lesser evils” that are closer to God’s 
will than might otherwise take place (38-40, 44). Christian public speech, following 
the Anabaptist model, should thus be dialogical, just as dialogue is at the core of 
ecclesial faithfulness.  
 Yoder introduces The Politics of Jesus with a reference to the cultural 
upheaval that had marked the previous decade of American life, his first back from 
Europe. Noting the “peculiar place of Jesus in the mood and mind of many young 
‘rebels,’” he suggests that “there is certainly no randomness to their claim that Jesus 
was, like themselves, a social critic and an agitator, a drop-out from the social climb, 
and the spokesman of a counterculture.”20 This popular Christology may be “half-
spoofing exaggeration,” but it usefully raises a point made increasingly apparent by 
biblical scholars: Jesus was radically political, and politically radical (2). Yoder’s 
task, as seen in preceding chapters, is to bring the relevant biblical scholarship into 
conversation with the many variations of “mainstream” Christian ethics that deny 
Jesus’ political nature (4-8). The Niebuhrs are again prominent opponents, but so are 
pietistic spiritualism and ethical personalism. Yoder responds to them with a close 
reading of the gospel of Luke suggestive of Jesus’ commitment to nonviolent 
political resistance and economic redistribution (21-75). He further shows how Jesus’ 
political posture was anticipated by certain strands of Judaism (60-92) and elaborated 
by the apostolic writers, especially the authors of the Pauline literature and 
Revelation (93-228). The chapter on “Christ and Power” importantly connects 
Pauline cosmology to the politics of Jesus. 
                                                 
19 Cf. PJ, 239-240, where Yoder implies that the conditions for direct witness are so far from being 
met that Christians ought to give it up for a time.  
20 Yoder, PJ, 1. Cf. OR, 7. References to PJ in this and the following paragraphs are in the text. 
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 Central to “Christ and Power” is the claim that at the cross Jesus 
demonstrates “authentic humanity” (145). In his treatment of Luke’s gospel, Yoder 
had argued that the cross should be understood as the natural political outcome of 
Jesus’ politics (36-39, 48-53). Although Jesus declined violent revolutionary tactics, 
neither would he acquiesce to the alliance between the Jewish temple and Rome (24-
27, 36).21 He instead founded a community “marked by an alternative to accepted 
patterns of leadership” and “a nonconformed quality of (‘secular’) involvement in 
the life of the world” (33, 38-39).22 The opposition that arises to this alternative 
community comes in the form of the cross. By accepting the cross and persisting in 
obedience to God, Jesus indicates that “the cross is not a detour or a hurdle on the 
way to the kingdom, nor is it even the way to the kingdom; it is the kingdom come” 
(51). God’s kingdom is brought near by Jesus’ practical, obedient love that rejects 
violent coercion to the point of suffering and death. 
 According to Yoder, Jesus’ choice of the cross over compromise shows that 
he, uniquely, is free from the grasp of the powers (145). Because the social order he 
envisioned was greater than Rome, and the righteousness he advocated greater than 
the Pharisees, he was liberated from their rules. “He did not fear even death. 
Therefore his cross is a victory, the confirmation that he was free from the rebellious 
pretensions of the creaturely condition” (145). The rest of Yoder’s discussion in 
“Christ and Power” follows Berkhof’s outline explicitly. The cross exposes the 
rebellion of the powers, and so defeats them (146-147). The church, further, is to be a 
“herald of liberation” and announce Christ’s victory, most significantly through the 
quality of its obedient community life (147-149).  
 As in Christian Witness to the State, Christian obedience is presented as a 
critical and generative social strategy: “The church’s calling is to be the conscience 
and the servant within human society. The church must be sufficiently experienced to 
be able to discern when and where and how God is using the Powers….[W]e are 
called to contribute to the creation of structures more worthy of human society” 
(155). Here an emphasis on discernment emerges that Yoder employs to position the 
                                                 
21 See also Yoder, OR, 13-33. For more recent critical debate over Jesus’ temptation by “Zealot” 
revolutionaries, see Klassen, “Jesus and the Zealots.” 
22 See also Lohfink, Jesus and Community, for a compatible account of the centrality of community 
formation in Jesus’ ministry. 
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theology of the powers and principalities as a kind of social criticism. The 
declaration of the lordship of Christ over the powers is “about the nature of the 
cosmos and the significance of history, within which both our conscientious 
participation and our conscientious objection find their authority and their promise” 
(157). Witness is therefore complex, determined as a series of overlapping responses 
to specific powers. But its sociological concreteness—and its visible link to Jesus’ 
politics—are not negotiable. Christians participate in “the lamb’s war,” choosing 
“powerlessness” over the short-term efficiency calculations that justify state and 
revolutionary violence (228-247). “The relationship between the obedience of God’s 
people and the triumph of God’s cause is not a relationship of cause and effect but 
one of cross and resurrection” (232). Because the politics of Jesus “go with the grain 
of the cosmos,” Christians can trust in their ultimate efficacy (246).23  
 In The Politics of Jesus, Yoder produces a novel interpretation of the 
apostolic “household codes” or Haustafeln that reads them as a call to “revolutionary 
subordination” (162-192). The codes specify appropriate relations between husbands 
and wives, parents and children, and masters and slaves (Eph. 5:21-6:9; Col. 3:18-
4:1; 1 Pt. 2:13-3:7). The second member of each pair is called to “be subject” or 
“submit” (hypotass, hypakou, hypotag) to the first member, although the first has 
reciprocal obligations. Against those who see the codes as teaching a conservative 
acceptance of the given cultural order, Yoder points out that these codes, unlike 
similar codes existing in the biblical era, address the subordinate as moral agents (PJ, 
171-172). The need to request a certain course of action from moral agents implies 
that these agents inhabit a context defined by some degree of choice: “the call to 
willing subordination is not explainable unless there has been a temptation to 
insubordination” (175). The reciprocity of the codes is, furthermore, “revolutionary,” 
for it calls the dominant member to respond to the humanity of their other (177-178). 
For Yoder, the church is the context in which “there is no longer Jew or Greek, there 
is no longer slave or free, there is no longer male and female; for all of you are one in 
Christ Jesus” (PJ, 173-175, quoting Gal. 3:28). Christian identity relativizes the 
cultural identities spoken of in the household codes; but for the very reason that they 
are relativized, there is no need to war against them. Christians can accept “willing 
                                                 
23 See also Yoder, “Armaments and Eschatology”; Hauerwas, Grain of the Universe. 
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servanthood in the place of domination” and enjoy “freedom from needing to smash 
[the structures of this world] since they are about to crumble anyway” (PJ, 186-187). 
The victory over oppressive cultural powers is realized by patient suffering—by a 
participation in Christ’s cross made possible by faith in resurrection.24 
 Yoder extends this same logic of revolutionary subordination to the Christian 
relation to the state. Conventional political theologies often focus on Romans 13:1: 
“Let every person be subject (hypotassesth) to the governing authorities (exousiais 
hyperechousais); for there is no authority (exousia) except from God, and those 
authorities have been instituted (tetagmenai) by God.” As with subordination to 
cultural roles, subordination to the divinely ordained state is understood as an 
inherently conservative affirmation of existing states, or at least of those that “are not 
a terror to good conduct, but to bad” (13:3; see PJ, 198-201). Because God institutes 
the state, moreover, Christians are free to participate in it, even in its essential task of 
“bearing the sword” (13:4).25  
 But Yoder rejects these views, noting that Paul has just in the previous 
chapter called Christians to “live peaceably with all. Beloved never avenge 
yourselves, but leave room for the wrath of God” (12:18-19; see PJ, 196-198). 
Contrasting these passages leads Yoder to surmise that Paul assigns to Christians the 
task of nonviolent community, and to the state the restraint of “bad conduct” through 
“the sword.” As he put it in an earlier work, “the divine mandate of the state consists 
in using evil means to keep evil from getting out of hand,” while “the divine mandate 
of the church consists in overcoming evil through the cross.”26 Neither does God’s 
“institution” of the state permit Christian collusion with state violence. Yoder 
disputes the translation of tetagmenai as “instituted” or “ordained,” as if God creates 
(at least some) governments and gives them an unqualified blessing (PJ, 201-202). 
The ubiquity of governmental corruption belies that translation. Rather, tetagmenai 
                                                 
24 This chapter of PJ was criticized by feminist theologian Elisabeth Shüssler Fiorenza, Bread Not 
Stone, 81-83, as inviting the oppressed to simply accept their oppression. Yoder, PJ, 188-192, insisted 
that the point is simply “don’t overdo your liberation”—an admonition that only makes sense if the 
liberation from oppression is concrete. N. Alexis-Baker, “Freedom of the Cross,” 89-96, argues from a 
womanist perspective that Yoder’s language of “subordination” is unfortunate, but his overall 
argument still has revolutionary potential. (She prefers his phrase “creative transformation” from PJ, 
185). 
25 On Yoder’s “positivist,” non-theoretical definition of the state, see CWS, 12, 77-79. See Bourne, 
Seek the Peace, 216-224, for a discussion of the implications of Yoder’s “functional” definition for the 
theory of state legitimacy. 
26 Yoder, DPR, 18, 21. 
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should be understood as the divine “ordering” of “the rebellious ‘powers that be,’” 
just as a librarian shelves books regardless of their content. As with the other fallen 
powers, the Christian relation to the state is thus defined by certain critical constants 
derived from the politics of Jesus—the critique of state oppression, violence, idolatry 
and so forth—and a form of “subordination” that does not entail blind obedience 
(209). This potentially disobedient subordination will likely involve suffering, which 
“is itself a participation in God’s victorious patience with the rebellious powers of 
creation” (209). 
 “Behold My Servant Shall Prosper” and “How H. Richard Niebuhr 
Reasoned” recapitulate Yoder’s conception of ecclesial participation in Christ’s 
victory over the powers. The first essay does so by deepening the understanding of 
“power” brought to bear on discussions of Christians’ cultural and political 
engagement. Whereas in The Politics of Jesus “powerlessness” was exalted as the 
proper mode of participation in the lamb’s war (237-241), here servanthood is itself 
portrayed as a powerful practice.27 In a familiar list, Yoder avers that distinctive 
servant communities are able to be powerfully creative on an institutional level, place 
pressure on authorities through tactical abstention, and affect change through 
transformed individuals in powerful positions.28 Christian experimentation with 
servanthood, further, becomes the basis for its critical and positive speech to rulers.29 
“We should,” therefore, “affirm with regard to the servant role that it is powerful in 
reality, and with regard to the rulers’ role that the ruler should become a servant.”30 
In contrast to the Reformed “orders of creation” model of cultural transformation, 
basing the church’s alternative form of power on servanthood roots its witness in the 
politics of Jesus and the cross. Yoder explains the significance of this christological 
form of politics: 
To say that the work of redemption is Christological is not a statement about logic, 
but about Jesus. The event that makes it possible for us to say that we are no longer 
the slaves of the Powers is not that we have reached a general insight into God’s 
purpose to overcome them. It is a report of the fact that in Jesus, in his dying and his 
rising, they have been overcome….It is a proclamation, the meaning of an event 
rippling out from Golgotha and needing to be reported if it is to reach anywhere. 
Because Christ the risen Lord rules not only over the church which is his body, but 
                                                 
27 Yoder, “Servant,” 151-160. 
28 Ibid., 158-159. 
29 Ibid., 159-160. 
30 Ibid., 158. 
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also over the world which is the terrain of his combat, this approach does yield the 
wherewithal for talking beyond the confines of the church. Its relevance is not 
limited to those who believe in Jesus or even to those who hear about Him. (164) 
 
The cosmic import of the cross and resurrection grounds the broad relevance of 
ecclesial witness. When Christians take up Christ’s political posture of servanthood 
and accept the suffering it brings, they show the world that the lordship of Christ 
ends the tyranny of the powers.  
 For Yoder, the dynamic of power is between service and domination, not 
withdrawal and participation. Christian cultural and political activity is flexible, and 
proceeds through continual discernment of prospects for servanthood. Yoder names 
this form of participation “asymmetrical,” because Christians, as a church and as 
individuals, are to interact with each power in different ways at different times.31 In 
“How H. Richard Niebuhr Reasoned” he draws attention to Niebuhr’s attempt in 
Christ and Culture to articulate a single Christian response to various cultural 
phenomena.32 Yoder instead calls for “a capacity for moral discernment, in the light 
of which Niebuhr’s ability to call all of those things ‘culture’ will no longer be 
permitted to get in the way of handling each issue in its own terms.”33 Against 
Niebuhr, the biblical perspective on the powers suggests that culture cannot be 
conceived as an autonomous, monolithic unity, but rather as variegated forms of 
rebellion in process of being subdued by the risen Christ (69). The church thus needs 
“categories of discernment,” and not an all-encompassing typology (70). These 
categories help the church fulfill its vocation “to represent within society, through 
and in spite of withdrawal from certain of its activities, as well as through and in 
spite of involvement in others, a real judgment upon the rebelliousness of culture and 
a real possibility of reconciliation for all” (71). The orientation of Christian 
engagement around discernment allows for a truly “conversionist” position (71)—
one that “transforms [the powers] by denying their monolithic unity in favor of 
discerning discrimination” (76). Gathered in the Spirit around the scriptures for 
discerning dialogue (71-77), Christians join in God’s redemption of the powers 
through the risen Christ (76).  
                                                 
31 Ibid., 165. 
32 Cf. Niebuhr’s definition of “culture” in Christ and Culture, 29-39. 
33 Yoder, “HRN,” 83. Further references to “HRN” in this paragraph are in the text. 
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 Throughout Yoder’s writings on the powers he emphasizes the continuity 
between Christian obedience and the ongoing redemption of creation initiated by the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. By practicing the politics of Jesus, the 
church’s body politics participate in Christ’s transformation of the powers. Christian 
cultural participation is thus an aspect of its participation in the person of Jesus 
Christ, an argument Yoder sets forth in The Politics of Jesus and elsewhere.34 The 
“gift of the Holy Spirit” makes it possible for “human being [to] correspond 
somehow to God’s own being,” namely through following Jesus in forgiving, loving, 
and suffering servanthood.35 Servanthood requires a non-defensive vulnerability to 
others that is expressed in dialogue, both within the church and between the church 
and others. Dialogue, established in the life of the obedient church, is a means of 
transformative witness. The earliest Christians and Anabaptists show that dialogical 
servanthood patterned after Jesus can be a powerful political and cultural force, and 
does not necessitate sectarian withdrawal. Yoder’s own ecumenical efforts and 
influence reinforce his claim that the church participates in the redemption of the 
powers through obedient imitation empowered by the Spirit. This imitatio Christi is 
internally and externally dialogical, prioritizing responsive discernment over 
reactionary rigidity or servile acquiescence—it is, in other words, free from 
enslavement to the powers. The present chapter continues to examine issues raised 
by this vision of redemptive politics, and the next looks at the implications of a 
dialogical construal of Christian identity, particularly as Yoder conceptualizes it 
under the rubric of “exile.” 
 
5.1.2 Criticisms 
Yoder’s argument that ecclesial obedience is the foundation of Christian political 
engagement has incited vigorous debate among theologians. The critical response 
can be divided into questions about three issues: First, is Yoder’s ecclesiology 
adequate? Is it idealistic, even idealist, or sectarian? Second, is Yoder’s 
pneumatology adequate? Does Yoder think the church really needs the Spirit to 
follow Christ? Third, does Yoder adequately describe the socio-political context and 
form of Christian witness? Are his bottom-up politics naïve? Does he focus too much 
                                                 
34 Yoder, PJ, 112-133. See also his ARS, 287; WL, 165-180. 
35 Yoder, PJ, 114, 115-127. 
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on witness to the state? Answers to these questions determine the viability of his 
understanding of the redemption of the powers.  
 
Sectarian 
The label “sectarian” has been attached to Yoder’s ecclesiology from early on. In the 
mid-1970s, Methodist theologian J. Philip Wogaman characterized sectarianism by 
the conviction that Christians are called (only) to faithfulness and that God will take 
care of the rest of the world.36 Wogaman finds Yoder to be more optimistic about 
God’s redemptive action in the present than most sectarians—but his logic is still 
sectarian. His moral perfectionism encourages withdrawal from social responsibility, 
the “pure sectarian nonsense” of thinking Christians can escape the “dilemma of 
civilization” in which earthly rewards and punishments often motivate more than 
faithfulness.37 Since Wogaman, the separatism allegedly implied by Yoder’s 
perfectionism and church-world division has been the target of numerous 
theologians. Concerns center around Yoder’s failure to support public institutions, 
especially the state and military,38 and his interest in moral purity and interior 
ecclesial identity.39 A few Mennonite theologians have traced the problem to Yoder’s 
initial involvement with the Concern group, which supposedly embraced a 
theological ideal of the church rather than engaging the contingencies of ecclesial 
reality.40 Yoder’s “heroic pneumatology”41 not only results in an isolated 
perfectionism, but it raises doubts about the possible existence of the church past and 
present. If these charges are accurate, then Yoder’s ecclesiology is not only idealistic 
and sectarian, but idealist, in the sense of being based on a purely intellectual 
construct of ecclesial being.42 
                                                 
36 Wogaman, Christian Method of Moral Judgment, 191. 
37 Ibid., 192. 
38 Beckley, “Rawls’s Idea of Justice as Fairness—Part I,” 219; Mouw, Politics and the Biblical 
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Mathewes, “Culture,” 59; Mathewes, Public Life, 240-241. See also Griffin, “Dirty Hands,” 36-38. 
40 Nolt, “Anabaptist Visions,” 288-289; Schlabach, “Continuity and Sacrament,” 181-191; Toews, 
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41 Schlabach, “Continuity and Sacrament,” 181. 
42 Cf. Friesen, Artists, Citizens, Philosophers, 67; Layman, “Inner Ground,”; N.G. Wright, Disavowing 
Constantine, 61, 74, 158. Ochs in Yoder, JCSR, 179, also suggests that Yoder reduces exilic Judaism 
to “a few overarching principles of belief and practice” (on this see also Harink, “The Anabaptist and 
the Apostle, 284). 
   175
 The editors of a recent collection of essays entitled The New Yoder celebrate 
the end of “old Yoder” scholarship, preoccupied as it was with the sectarianism issue. 
In its place they promote a new mode of scholarship philosophically oriented to find 
ecclesial distinctiveness unproblematic by postmodern philosophers such as Foucault 
and Deleuze.43 But these editors overlook that even some “new Yoder” scholars 
continue to worry over Yoder’s sectarianism.44 P. Travis Kroeker and Nathan R. Kerr, 
for instance, are still concerned that Yoder’s insistence on the visibility of the church 
leads, in Kroeker’s words, to “a new form of ‘compact collectivism’ which is non-
ecumenical and dogmatically closed.”45 For Kroeker, Yoder needs to be 
supplemented with an Augustinian theology of God’s invisible reign in society, 
church, and individuals. Kerr on the other hand believes Yoder’s late development of 
a diasporic or exilic ecclesiology already corrects for the “radical ecclesiological 
positivism” of his earlier “church as polis” model.46 Only by embracing the radical 
contingency of exile, and the decentering of identity it brings, does Yoder fully 
respond to the reality of God’s apocalyptic inbreaking.  
 In the previous section, Yoder’s theology of the redemption of the powers was 
presented in such a way as to highlight the continuities between his early and later 
writings, especially in regards to the dialogical nature of Christian identity. On this 
account Yoder’s writings on exile, to be explored in the following chapter, are not a 
departure from his church as polis theology, but a more nuanced outworking of the 
same approach. But the persistence of the sectarian charge suggests a critical 
impasse. Even Yoder’s friendliest critics continue to find fault with his ecclesiology. 
The proposed solutions, however, seem to detract significantly from Yoder’s legacy. 
Inwardness and invisibility, radical contingency, institutional compromise with the 
powers, lowered standards for the church—all belie Yoder’s emphasis on visible 
discipleship modeled on the life of Jesus as a powerful stimulus to social change, 
even when it involves withdrawal.  
 
 
                                                 
43 Dula and Huebner, “Introduction,” ix-xvi. 
44 For other recent theologians critical of Yoder’s sectarianism, see the references to Mathewes and 
Hunter in note 52 above.. 
45 Kroeker, “Yoder’s Voluntariety,” 56. See also his “War of the Lamb,” NY, 70-89. 
46 Kerr, Christ, History, and Apocalyptic,” 169-173, 183. See also his “Communio Missionis.” 
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Pneumatological Ecclesiology? 
The charge of Yoder’s “reductionism” has been examined at various points in this 
thesis. Critics of Yoder’s ecclesial politics extend the charge to his pneumatology, 
specifically to his depiction of the role of the Holy Spirit in the life of the church. In 
short, many question whether Yoder’s ecclesial politics require the Holy Spirit, or if 
they are a purely immanent, “secular” form of politics. Much of the criticism has 
focused on the potential for instrumentalization in Yoder’s account of the sacraments. 
Are the sacraments merely tools to reach political ends that could be arrived at 
otherwise, or do they participate in the life of God such that they are to some extent 
ends in themselves?47 Paul Martens raises these issues most acutely in his 
chronology of Yoder’s writings on the sacraments.48 Martens traces the process by 
which Yoder comes to identify church practices such as fraternal admonition and 
open dialogue with worship and the sacraments, and then “reduces” them to social 
processes. This reduction betrays “Yoder’s assumption that the church is important 
only as a secular social community.”49 “Granted,” Martens continues, “the Holy 
Spirit may still be functionally observable in the practices; but the force and 
frequency of claims that neither their substance nor pertinence depends on a 
particular faith seems to leave us with very little specifically Christian and very much 
reduced to social ethics.” Yoder opens the way “for Anabaptist assimilation into a 
form of secular ethical discourse.”50 Martens observes a similar process at work in 
Yoder’s transition from discussing ecclesial politics in terms of eschatological 
participation, to doxology, to sociological peacemaking.51 
 Martens notes that Yoder’s “enthusiastic admirer” Craig Carter is likewise 
concerned that Yoder’s account of the sacraments needs theological 
supplementation.52 Yoder’s biographer Mark Thiessen Nation too admits there is 
                                                 
47 Cartwright, “‘Sharing the House of God,’” 606-608; Doerksen, “Share the House,” 195-198. 
48 Martens, “Problematic Development,” 65-77. 
49 Ibid., 74. Martens sees the influence of Troeltsch affecting Yoder here.  
50 Ibid., 75. 
51 Martens, “Universal History,” 131-146. Marten’s narrative complicates Cartwright’s claim in 
“‘Sharing the House of God,’” 606, that an “instrumentalist account of worship in Christian formation 
floats through Yoder’s corpus of writing alongside other discussions of ‘doxological community’” that 
are more promising.  
52 Martens, “Problematic Development,” 74. See Carter, PC, 199, on Yoder’s “incomplete” theology 
of baptism. Carter, as Martens notes, does not argue there that Yoder is finally a reductionist, but 
rather that he made tactical arguments that require supplementation. Carter now repudiates Yoder as a 
liberal whose “influence was to train a generation of younger Evangelicals to hate and despise their 
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“some legitimacy” to the claim that works like Body Politics are reductive, and that 
more work is required in this area.53 Martens, among others, calls for a more robust 
articulation of the work of the Holy Spirit in the life of the Christian community than 
Yoder provides.54 Yoder does, as suggested above, see ecclesial politics as 
empowered by the Spirit and participative in the life of Jesus Christ. As Carter puts 
it, Yoder insists “on the leading of the Holy Spirit in the process of moral 
discernment, just as Jesus promised would happen (John 16:13).”55 Gerald Schlabach 
even accuses Yoder of a “heroic pneumatology,” albeit one more amenable to 
extraordinary individuals than ordinary congregations.56 Nevertheless, there appears 
to be a need to integrate Yoder’s sociological ecclesiology with a more robust 
account of the move of the Holy Spirit if Yoder’s ecclesial politics are to remain 
trinitarian. 
 
Focus on the State  
The third criticism of Yoder’s ecclesial politics can be stated briefly: the focus on 
“Christian witness to the state” limits his understanding of politics, attenuating the 
church’s witness. James Davison Hunter raises the point forcefully when he argues 
that Yoder is exemplary of the American “politicization” of theology.57 Hunter does 
not wish for Christians to abandon state politics, but to recognize that the state is 
capable of only so much—society is influenced by much broader cultural forces. 
James K. A. Smith voices a similar complaint when he indicates that the increasing 
                                                                                                                                          
own [Christedom] cultural heritage.” By fighting Christendom, Yoder has paved the way for Marxism 
and the sexual revolution. See Carter, “Yoder and the Evangelical Left,” The Politics of the Cross 
Resurrected (blog), May 2, 2011, http://politicsofthecrossresurrected.blogspot.com/2011/05/yoder-
and-evangelical-left.html. It is difficult to know how to evaluate these accusations without their 
scholarly substantiation. 
53 Nation, John Howard Yoder, 197, 199. Nation denies that Yoder is “really reductionistic,” blaming 
poor word choices on the confusion. See also Dintaman, “Socio-Ecclesial Brushpile,” 33-49. Finger, 
“Theology to Ethics,” 330-331, argues that Yoder appears to be reductionistic in some areas, but not in 
Body Politics, where the Spirit plays a clear role in shaping Christian practice. Kerr, Christ, History, 
and Apocalyptic, 171-173, contends that Yoder’s “church as polis” theology instrumentalizes worship 
for political ends and reduces the Spirit to an ordering principle, but his later exilic theology corrects 
for this.  
54 Martens, “Discipleship,” 32-40. See also Heidebrecht, “Yoder’s Perspective on the Church,” 118; 
Kroeker, “Yoder’s Voluntariety,” 56-58; Kroeker, “War of the Lamb,” 82-83. Eller, “Review: The 
Politics of Jesus,” 108, calls for more attention to the resurrection as the “enabling power” of 
Christian politics. 
55 Carter, Politics of the Cross, 204. 
56 Schlabach, “Continuity and Sacrament,” 181. 
57 Hunter, To Change the World, 162-164. 
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domination of the nation-state by global capitalism threatens to render Yoder’s state-
centric ethics “somewhat impotent.”58 Hunter, in addition, worries that Yoder’s 
ecclesial politics are ultimately parasitic on the state, taking far too much of its 
(unduly harsh) rhetoric from status quo political practice.59 The sharp church-world 
dichotomy present in Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers leads to the 
“demonization” of others.60 Hunter instead urges Christians to a “faithful presence” 
that celebrates the goodness of creation as it continues to be revealed throughout 
culture.61  
 Yoder did, of course, engage “culture” in “How H. Richard Niebuhr 
Reasoned.” There and in “Behold My Servant Shall Prosper” he makes it clear that 
he understands the multifaceted nature of social power as spread throughout the 
many powers. Yet as an ethicist the only contemporary issue he investigated with any 
depth was war and peace. His writings on economic and cultural powers offer only 
general biblical and theological perspectives.62 “Impotent” may be an overstatement, 
but if these critics are correct, the import of Yoder’s ethics may be limited. Revision 
of Yoder’s theology of the redemption of the powers thus requires enunciating how 
his ecclesial politics can affect all of life, and not just state politics. This revision 
would complement the non-sectarian ecclesiology and non-reductive pneumatology 
suggested above. 
 
5.2 Bourdieu’s Sociological Politics 
In light of the review of criticisms, Yoder’s ecclesial politics requires a non-sectarian, 
concrete ecclesiology that maintains an emphasis on ecclesial distinctiveness; an 
appreciation for the work of the Holy Spirit in the church that does not deflect 
attention from ecclesial social process; and an ecclesial witness with a broad cultural 
remit, but which remains attuned to the centrality of state power. The previous two 
chapters suggested that Yoder’s socio-political criticism is sharpened by taking on 
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aspects of Pierre Bourdieu’s reflexive sociology. The present chapter takes a further 
step to argue that Bourdieu’s explicitly political concepts are important resources for 
the revision of Yoder’s ecclesial politics. These concepts are “circuits of 
legitimation” (5.2.2), “corporatism of the universal” (5.2.3), and “negative 
philosophy” (5.2.3). 
 During the following discussion the operational nature of Bourdieu’s 
concepts should be kept in mind. In this case, Bourdieu constructed concepts to 
facilitate research into political effectiveness as that research was useful for his own 
increasing political activity.63 After the death of Michel Foucault in 1984, Bourdieu 
arguably became the leading French intellectual political activist.64 He circulated 
petitions, editorialized in newspapers, and in 1995 took a well publicized stand with 
striking railroad workers at the Gare du Nord. Under François Mitterand’s presidency 
he served twice as an education adviser to the government. Although some critics see 
Bourdieu’s late political action as opportunistic attention-grabbing,65 it is possible to 
see his political practice as responding to his developing sociological understanding 
of politics. This claim will be more comprehensible after examining the relevant 
concepts. The importance of Bourdieu’s political activity at this point is as a 
reminder that the concepts are less abstract theories than tools for practical political 
reasoning.  
 
5.2.1 Circuits of Legitimation 
According to Bourdieu, authorities only maintain power over a group of subjects by 
having their power recognized as legitimate by other, subordinate authorities. Power 
is successfully legitimated when the power of the subordinate authorities is accepted 
by the subjects, and when it is apparent that the subordinate authorities have some 
measure of independence, i.e., that their words and acts of legitimation are not 
coerced. In modernity, the highly differentiated nature of social fields means 
                                                 
63 For accounts of Bourdieu’s political engagement, see Heinich, Pourquoi Bourdieu, 68-105; Poupeau 
and Discepolo, “Scholarship with Commitment,” 64-90; Schinkel, “Bourdieu’s Political Turn?,” 69-
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64 See e.g., Swartz, “Critical Sociology,” 800-801.  
65 E.g., Heinich, Pourquoi Bourdieu, 101, and especially Verdès-Leroux, Le savant et la politique, 54-
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authority can only be legitimated through a number of subordinate authorities. 
Authority requires upkeep of increasingly lengthy “chains of legitimation.” 
 In his essay “From the King’s House to the Reason of State,” Bourdieu 
outlines the transition in the modern period from dynastic to bureaucratic states.66 
Because the dynastic state “mingles the domestic and the political,” the monarch’s 
political power is always susceptible to familial contestation.67 In European history, 
this situation led monarchs to construct and emphasize a legal basis for their 
authority, such that “the crown” would exceed the authority of their own person and 
family. Reliance on law entailed reliance on those bureaucrats entrusted with 
overseeing the law, and so there came about a bifurcation in the reproduction of 
political authority, between birth as the mode of dynastic reproduction and schooling 
as the mode of bureaucratic reproduction.68 Bureaucrats began to contest the 
“private” basis of dynastic authority in contrast to the relatively “public,” universally 
accessible foundation of their own authority.69 Much early modern political theory 
should be seen, Bourdieu contends, as bureaucratic weapons in this struggle against 
the dynastic state.70 Eventually the school-based reason of the bureaucrats proved 
more powerful, more legitimate in the eyes of its subjects, than the dynastic rulers.  
 Bourdieu suggests that this process demonstrates “how, through the 
lengthening of the chain of authorities and responsibilities, there came into being a 
veritable public order founded upon a degree of reciprocity within hierarchical 
relations themselves.”71 Bureaucrats were able to employ the autonomy granted to 
them by rulers for legitimation purposes to carve out a polity organized around the 
further distribution of power. For Bourdieu, 
Everything takes place as if the more a ruler’s power increases, the greater his 
dependency on a whole network of executive relays. In one sense, the freedom and 
responsibility of each agent is reduced, to the point of being completely dissolved in 
the field. In another sense, it increases inasmuch as each agent is forced to act in a 
responsible manner, under the cover and control of all the other agents engaged in 
                                                 
66 Bourdieu, “Reason of State,” 29-54. See also his SN, 377-382; PM, 102-106. “Circuits of 
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the field. Indeed, as the field of power becomes more differentiated, each link in the 
chain becomes a point (an apex) in a field.72 
 
Alongside the construction of this “public realm” in which power is relatively 
distributed, there is the creation of a new “public capital”—all the benefits such as 
salaries, titles, and honors conferred by the bureaucratic state.73 This capital can and 
has been monopolized by an elite. But because its value is its “publicity” or universal 
accessibility, struggle for public capital can also result in its greater distribution. In 
Pascalian Meditations, Bourdieu depicts the competition for public capital as the 
basis for resistance to tyranny.74 Political resistance partakes in the paradox of 
legitimation that requires that authorities grant autonomy to those subordinates 
whose legitimacy they covet, autonomy that can then be used to critique and weaken 
authority.75 
 What degree of autonomy is necessary for resistance? Bourdieu points to the 
ability of a field to “refract” the force of other fields as a measurement of its 
autonomy.76 “Refraction,” as one critic puts it, “is not digestion; it does not 
completely transform the strange into one’s own according to one’s internal rules. 
Refraction seems to imply a concern with defining the rules between different 
fields.”77 In other words, a field is sufficiently autonomous when the rules of its own 
“game”—its doxa, illusio, the forms of habitus and capital it produces—are strong 
enough to resist assimilation to the rules of other fields. Refraction does not imply 
isolation, for every field is, of course, interdependent on other fields. But it does 
entail that fields have relatively stable and distinct identities from one another. The 
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   182
5.2.2 Corporatism of the Universal 
If field autonomy lengthens the circuits of legitimation and resists tyranny, then 
politics is a matter of intersecting collectives clamoring for power. Bourdieu is not 
interested in “identity politics” as such, but rather in collectives that pursue their 
interests in the name of benefits that can be enjoyed by all—in the name of “the 
universal.”79 “The universal,” on Bourdieu’s reading of history, proceeds through the 
paradox of legitimation discussed above: since the universal is the “‘spiritual point of 
honour’ of humanity,”80 the dominant claim that their authority benefits everyone. 
Subjects accept this claim, (mis)recognizing the authority as legitimate, but the gap 
between the claim and the realities of the distribution of goods provides them with 
fodder for criticism. Progress towards the universal thus does not occur through a 
naïve altruism that surrenders all personal interest, but through a critical struggle for 
the realization of a more universal distribution—which of course benefits those 
engaged in the struggle. Bourdieu calls this disposition for public service an “interest 
in disinterest,” a passionate stake in a political order that benefits all.81  
 From this passionate dispassion were born truth, virtue, and reason, fragile 
products of history that are yet the strongest, the potentially most universal weapons 
against field heteronomy.82 Truth, virtue, and reason are not, for Bourdieu, timeless 
essences awaiting discovery, but conquests of a critical process that subjects reality 
to universal questioning. They are, in other words, conquests of science. Bourdieu 
therefore calls for a “corporatism of the universal,” a “collective intellectual” that 
will wield universalizing scientific reason against every force of domination.83 A 
“Realpolitik of reason” must be practiced in which “the institutional conditions of 
rational communication” are identified through research and instantiated through 
activism.84 This politics is both utopian and rationalist, as it seeks the practical 
implementation of ideal political arrangements. Bourdieu, however, warns against 
the temptation of forming an alternative political “programme” to dominant 
                                                 
79 See Grenfell, “Interest,” 166.  
80 Bourdieu, PM, 122-123. 
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politics.85 Because of the laws of legitimation, the effectiveness of the collective 
intellectual’s political engagement depends on the intellectual credibility of its 
participants. Intellectual political power is a function of scientific autonomy, not of 
bending science to political demands. If political authority cannot be validated by the 
most rigorous scientific inquiry, it loses its claim to the universal and its circuits of 
legitimation are broken. 
 
5.2.3 Negative Philosophy   
Near the beginning of Pascalian Meditations, Bourdieu confesses that during his 
research on French universities he “had never felt before the strangeness of [his] 
project, a kind of negative philosophy that was liable to appear self-destructive.”86 In 
the rest of the book, Bourdieu goes on to argue that, far from being self-destructive, 
the radical doubt of reflexive sociology exposes the barriers to reason set up by 
faulty scholasticism and symbolic violence. The final chapter concerns the 
constitutive identity that in modernity is uniquely conferred on individuals by state 
recognition (206-245). Humans crave a raison d’être or “sense of existence,” and in 
the absence of God this is provided by the state (237, 245). State rituals of 
recognition confer an “ultimate” identity, from birth and death certificates, to more 
occasional awards and rewards. These “acts of nomination…lead, in a kind of 
infinite regress, to that realization of God on earth, the State, which guarantees, in the 
last resort, the infinite series of acts of authority certifying by delegation the validity 
of the certificates of legitimate existence” (245). Sociology is therefore “a kind of 
theology of the last instance,” as it identifies the state’s absolute creative power. The 
book closes with an affirmation of Durkheim’s dictum that “society is God.” 
 Loïc Wacquant separates Bourdieu from the Saint-Simonian “secular 
theology” in which Durkheim partook,87 but these passages from Pascalian 
Meditations suggest otherwise. Bourdieu may have resisted direct public service for 
the most part, but in positioning sociology as a negative philosophy revelatory of the 
absolute, he casts his vocation as one of heterodoxical service to the state. In an essay 
                                                 
85 Bourdieu, Acts of Resistance, 56.  
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entitled “The State, Economics and Sport,” Bourdieu defends “the Hegelian or 
Durkheimian vision according to which the State, far from being reducible solely to a 
class-based State, is also society’s self-awareness; it is society that ‘thinks itself’ and 
goes beyond its conflicts to find in the universal a compromise between opposing 
interests.”88 Here Bourdieu presents a utopia in which the state is the product of and 
means to the widest possible power distribution. The state becomes, as he puts it 
elsewhere, the “universal state,”89 the locus of critical reflection through which 
society reviews and revises its attempts at universality. Negative philosophy is thus 
key both to the achievement of the universal state, and to its maintenance. Wacquant 
rightfully notes that “Bourdieu supplies a general principle of political engagement” 
that includes, on the one hand, the critical recognition that the universal is not 
realized and, on the other, the impetus to universalize universal values through 
constructive politics.90 Reflexive sociology is a via negativa, but it paradoxically 
illuminates the necessary conditions for institutionalizing the universal state. These 
conditions include lengthened circuits of legitimation in which intellectual fields are 
granted critical autonomy. 
 Bourdieu is sometimes accused of setting up intellectuals as elite regulators 
of social life.91 It is more accurate to say that he wishes for the rational faculties that 
mark intellectual life to be spread throughout the polis. When society can think itself 
through the rational state, society will be God omnipotent and charitable.  
 
5.3 Revising Yoder’s Ecclesial Politics 
Although significant differences exist between Yoder and Bourdieu’s political 
visions, Bourdieu’s political concepts enable an interpretation of the redemption of 
the powers that is congenial to Yoder’s theology. Yoder argues that ecclesial politics 
witness to the powers’ dependence on God. Autonomy for Yoder is a sign of 
rebellion, whereas for Bourdieu it is a sign of health. Bourdieu, however, is not 
concerned with relations between social fields and divine reality, but with social 
relations only. He counters the tyranny of the few over the many in ways that 
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89 Bourdieu, Firing Back, 96. 
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91 See note 214 in chapter four above. 
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correspond to Yoder’s opposition to Constantinian imperialism. Field autonomy is a 
form of social organization that promotes distinctive communal identity and 
intercommunal cohesiveness. It seeks a middle way between sectarian anarchy and 
oligarchy. From this perspective, the powers are transformed when the domination of 
one or two of them over the others is broken. The empowerment of many powers 
facilitates diverse modes of human flourishing. But this redistributive politics is not 
anomic. The powers hold sway only to the extent that they are oriented, in the form 
of personal dispositions and institutional structures, towards the service of 
humankind.  
 Bourdieu’s interest in universality also appears to conflict with Yoder’s 
emphasis on particularity. This topic will be treated in detail in the next chapter, and 
here it is sufficient to reiterate the conclusion of the preceding paragraph: realizing 
“the universal” for Bourdieu is primarily a matter of concrete public service. A more 
pressing issue is Bourdieu’s secular, immanent approach to politics. Even a 
heterodoxical state servant risks idolatry, and Bourdieu’s sociological “discovery” of 
the divinity of the state raises questions of Constantinian bondage to the powers. 
Nevertheless, it is arguable that Bourdieu does not see the state as the locus of 
history—as in Constantinianism—but rather the autonomizing fields that force the 
state to distribute its power throughout the polis. Although this is not yet a Christian 
perspective, it does sanction a sociological focus on the church as one such 
autonomizing field.  
 
Sectarianism 
If state authority depends on circuits of legitimation in which each node in a circuit is 
an autonomous field, then ecclesial distinctiveness may be seen as a contribution to 
the possibility of a legitimate state. Insistence on visible discipleship does not equate 
to withdrawal from social responsibility, but can be a concrete form of responsibility. 
By remaining autonomous and refracting the influence of the state, such that 
ecclesial politics are not assimilated to state politics, the church retains an 
independence through which it may criticize state tyranny and envision alternative 
arrangements. But further, the church recognizes, however ambivalently, state 
authority. If church autonomy is strong enough, and its influence broad enough, this 
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recognition could at least partially enable state functioning. From Yoder’s theological 
vantage, ecclesial recognition of the state is derivative of divine recognition: God 
grants the state authority so that it would provide a relative order in which 
discipleship can take place. What the church ultimately recognizes is this act of 
divine delegation.92 The sociological legitimation of state authority by the church is 
thus an aspect of its faithful response to God’s redemption of the powers.  
 The political contribution of the church is in many ways similar to what 
Bourdieu envisions for the corporatism of the universal. Yoder does not describe 
Christian practice as “scientific,” but he similarly calls for an open dialogical process 
in which Christians hold one another accountable for their performative responses to 
“the Universal,” God as revealed in Christ.93 This dialogical practice also shapes 
ecclesial public engagement, though with a proper adjustment to expected standards 
of conduct for the “world.” Interestingly, Yoder too sees “legitimacy” as a key 
critical tool in the confrontation with state power. He regards democracy, for 
instance, as a preferable political arrangement mostly because democratic regimes 
offer very strong claims to legitimacy, claims that can be turned back on them when 
they fail to serve their subjects.94 The ecclesial community thus pursues a reflexive 
negative philosophy—community accountability—that is useful for the 
transformation of the state and other powers. The autonomous church is not 






                                                 
92 At this point one might suggest a rapprochement between Yoder and Barth. Barth is still wrong that 
the fact of divine recognition gives Christians clear standards by which to decide whether or not a 
state should be overthrown. But because Christians’ interest in order, and it is involved in the 
production of alternative political arrangements, there is nothing in principle that prohibits the church 
from supporting nonviolent transfers of power from one regime to another. But the church should 
never confuse the new regime with God’s reign, should not put its primary energy into regime change, 
and must continue its autonomous existence. Ellul, Violence, 127-166, makes a similar argument, 
although he ambivalently accepts that Christians might use violence so long as they do not attempt to 
justify it theologically. 
93 Murphy, Anglo-American Postmodernity, 164, does draw the connection between science and 
ecclesial discernment. 
94 Yoder, PK, 151-171. 
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Pneumatology 
Sacramental practice is not just effective, but is a response to the Holy Spirit’s 
initiative in gathering Christians for concrete obedience to Jesus. The politics called 
“church” is only constituted by this special, empowering relation to the Spirit. The 
Spirit’s labor is fully sociological and is focused on molding Christians into a visible 
community around a specific set of practices that correspond to the being of God as 
revealed in Christ.95 The legitimacy of those practices, and of the texts that recorded 
them, is guaranteed by the presence of the Spirit in the church’s circuit of 
legitimation.96 In other words, ecclesial authority is received from the authority of 
the Spirit—but here the paradox of legitimacy ends. The absolute difference between 
the Spirit and the church’s authority means the church is not engaged in a process of 
wresting power from the Spirit. Rather the Spirit, and the specific practices of Jesus 
to which it calls the church, stands as a constant refutation of all ecclesial tyranny. 
Christian dialogical contestation aims at recognizing the authority which the Spirit 
has already bestowed on every member of the body of Christ. As the Spirit facilitates 
this contestation in specific local socio-political settings, churches are able to realize 
utopian relational modes, modes which are instructive outside the church as 
actualized ideals. 
 It is also notable that Bourdieu’s understanding of “interest in disinterest” 
would help Yoder to speak of the Spirit’s formation of individual Christians to desire 
and participate in ecclesial politics. For Bourdieu, public virtue is a result of 
historical struggle towards the universal, and is inculcated through educational 
practices. A more truly pneumatological ecclesiology would place a like emphasis on 
Spirit-inspired catechism and on the virtues acquired through the body politics.97 
Such a pneumatology supports rather than undermines a sociological, political 
Christian practice.  
 
 
                                                 
95 Yoder, Preface, 100 (on 1 Cor. 14:29): “There is a weighing process, an evaluation process, when 
the Spirit speaks through the prophets. What is the center of this weighing process? It is the confession 
that Jesus is Lord. If the Spirit makes somebody say something compatible with ‘Jesus is Lord,’ then it 
is the Holy Spirit.” 
96 Yoder on the canon. 
97 The combination of virtue ethics and Yoderian ecclesiology has, of course, been the special 
contribution of Stanley Hauerwas. See, for example, Peaceable Kingdom.  
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State Focus 
Because state power is legitimated by a variety of autonomous fields, criticism 
cannot focus exclusively on the state. Bourdieu indeed only began to write explicitly 
on the state after years of investigating education, art, and other cultural fields—not 
because his sociology was apolitical, but because these are the key institutions in his 
context that inculcate state doxa.98 Moreover, James Davison Hunter suggests that 
Christians have unrealistic expectations of the state when “there are no political 
solutions to the problems most people care about.”99 His proposal of “faithful 
witness” in all cultural realms is meant as a response to the centrality of cultural 
fields in shaping human practice. It thus appears that Yoder’s focus on Christian 
witness to the state bears expansion to cultural realms. If Hunter is right that state-
centrism has overdetermined the political rhetoric of Yoder’s “neo-Anabaptism,” 
then it is possible that complementary interests in “the culture of Jesus” or “body 
economics” are necessary.100 Much of this work is implicit in Yoder’s reflections on 
culture and power in “Behold My Servant Shall Prosper” and “How H. Richard 
Niebuhr Reasoned.” Body Politics, furthermore, does not completely ignore 
economics, since the Lord’s Supper is meant to be a process of material 
redistribution.101 Bourdieu’s political concepts give a powerful justification, and his 
reflexive sociology a powerful method, for extending these nascent Yoderian cultural 
and economic theologies into new research areas.  
 
Conclusion 
The autonomous church is the politically engaged church. The political church is the 
spiritual church. The spiritual church participates in God’s renewal of all of culture. 
These revisions to Yoder’s ecclesial politics retain his focus on sociological 
distinctiveness through the body politics, but they more clearly demonstrate how 
those politics escape charges of sectarianism, secularism, and an overemphasis on the 
state. Bourdieu’s concepts of circuits of legitimation, the corporatism of the 
                                                 
98 See Wacquant, “Foreword,” in Bourdieu, SN, xvii-xix. 
99 Hunter, To Change the World, 171. 
100 See Carter, Rethinking Christ and Culture, and Friesen, Artists, Citizens, Philosophers, for general 
treatments of culture that draw on Yoder’s work. 
101 See also Yoder, PJ, 60-75, on the Jubilee. Cf. Swartley, “Smelting for Gold,” and Zimmerman, 
“Yoder’s Jesus and Economics.” 
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universal, and negative philosophy aid in the articulation of a sociological 
ecclesiology in which the church contributes to the state’s viability through its 
critical separation from the state. Separation is the condition of the church’s public 
witness. Only the separated church can refract the state’s influence and develop 
alternative political practices. Only the separated church has the authority to lengthen 
the state’s circuits of legitimation and enable its legitimacy. Separation is, therefore, 
not absolute but a relative distance that is salutary for both church and state. By 
contrast, the church relates as intensely as possible to the Holy Spirit, who empowers 
its politics by directing it through discerning dialogue to the politics of Jesus. Yet the 
creativity of the spiritual church is not exhausted by the term “politics.” The church 
critically interacts with a variety of political, cultural, and economic realms in order 
to participate in Christ’s eschatological renewal of all things.  
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6. REVISING YODER’S THEOLOGY OF CHRISTIAN PARTICULARITY 
 
At the center of John Howard Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers is the 
conviction that Jesus Christ was crucified and then raised from the dead and made 
lord of the cosmos. Christ’s lordship is universal, knowing no bounds and hindered 
by no opposing powers. Hence, even in their continuing rebellion the powers are 
instruments of divine order. This instrumentalization of the powers denies them their 
autonomy, and is part of their redemptive subordination. The church participates in 
the redemption of the powers through intense relating to the triune God, relating that 
is especially empowered by the present Holy Spirit and that is focused on imitation 
of the social practices of Jesus. Christian politics are therefore unapologetically 
particular, a response to divine action that is structured by those historical structures 
produced through intense divine-human relations. The institutionally and personally 
embodied witness to Christ’s universal lordship does not hesitate to affirm Israel, 
Jesus, scripture, and the church as guides to transformative engagement of the 
powers. Christianity testifies to the particular form taken by the universal, to the 
specificities of human interaction with the divine throughout history. By recognizing 
the historical mediation of the universal, Yoder means to rescue universalist politics 
from imperialism. Or rather, by recognizing the incarnation of God as nonviolent—
and so nonpossessive, dialogical, and anti-authoritarian—he means to rescue 
Christianity from Constantinianism. 
 For the critics of Yoder’s “sectarianism” discussed in the previous chapter, 
Yoder’s construal of Christian difference is too different, too tied to a particular 
history to respond ably to God’s relations to all of creation. The present chapter 
introduces a new set of critics who, while appreciative of Yoder’s emphasis on 
communal distinctiveness, fear that he too easily assimilates non-Christian minority 
others to his pacifistic Christianity. According to them, Yoder has not fully absorbed 
the implications of his particular perspective on the universal. On the other other 
hand, there is a growing number of critics—many of whom have been discussed in 
previous chapters—who regard Yoder as exhibiting sociologically reductive 
tendencies. Far from being a particular Christian, Yoder kowtows to the historicist 
norms of secular modernity. 
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 Is Yoder too Christian or not Christian enough? Does he fail to see the 
genuine charms of secular and religious others, or is he unwittingly seduced by 
them? The present chapter extends the perspective on Yoder’s ecclesial politics 
developed in the previous chapter to revise his theology of Christian particularity. 
Bourdieu’s writings on the sociological universalization of particular French 
Republican virtues help point Yoder’s theology toward practical efforts to materialize 
the universal lordship of Christ. This materialized universal centers on mutually 
transformative encounters with particular others. 
 
6.1 Yoder’s Theology of Christian Particularity 
The basis of Christian political witness, according to Yoder, is the lordship of Christ 
over the cosmos. Near the beginning of Christian Witness to the State, he observes 
that “from the very earliest record of the witness and worship of the church in the 
first chapters of the Book of Acts to the latest portions of the New Testament canon, 
the affirmation is unchanging that Jesus Christ, ascended to the right hand of God, is 
now exercising dominion over the world.”1 The New Testament authors repeat, more 
than any other Old Testament passage, Psalm 110:1: “The Lord [YHWH] says to my 
lord, ‘Sit at my right hand until I make your enemies your footstool.’”2 Yoder then 
suggests that the Pauline theology of the principalities and powers makes this early 
Christian conviction intelligible. Christ has taken the captivating powers captive and 
established a universal peace. The forces that long rended humanity have been 
rendered impotent. While the fullness of the victory tarries, Christians are fully 
justified in obeying their lord, precisely because he is not just “their” lord. He is lord 
of the powers, and imitation of Jesus’ particular politics participates in universal 
redemption. This section examines how Yoder navigates this intersection between the 




6.1.1 The Lordship of Christ over the Powers 
                                                 
1 Yoder, CWS, 8. 
2 See, e.g., Mark 12:36 (and parallels); Acts 2:34-35; Hebrews 1:3 et passim. 
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In a brief epilogue to Christ and the Powers, Hendrik Berkhof suggests that Paul’s 
references to the principalities and powers are part of “his view of life and the world” 
more than of his explicit theology.3 Through his encounter with Christ, even his most 
basic “world view” had been transformed: “In the light of God’s action Paul 
perceived that mankind is not composed of loose individuals, but that structures, 
orders, forms of existence, or whatever they be called, are given [to] us as a part of 
creaturely life and that these are involved, as much as men themselves, in the history 
of creation, fall, preservation, reconciliation, and consummation.”4 Perhaps Yoder’s 
main innovation on Berkhof is to expand these brief comments into a coherent vision 
of Pauline “philosophy of history.”5 This philosophy is first articulated in Christian 
Witness to the State.  
 As just reviewed, the argument of that book is grounded in the New 
Testament vision of Christ’s universal lordship. The Old Testament authors caught 
something of this vision, but continued to confuse God’s reign with their own 
national political hopes. Jesus then uniquely taught that “God’s true purpose was the 
creation of a new society, unidentifiable with any of the local, national, or ethnic 
solidarities of the time.”6 This new society is now the focal point of history, as the 
state and the other powers are allowed by God to continue insofar as they provide 
“‘scaffolding’ service” for Christian witness.7 History, Yoder avers, is shaped around 
the particularities of cross and resurrection, Israel and the church. 
 At the heart of The Politics of Jesus is the argument that the lordship of Christ 
entails his normativeness for Christian politics and ethics.8 The chapter “Christ and 
Power” presents the apostolic writings on the principalities and powers as an 
outworking of Christ’s normativeness in the realm of social interpretation. Because 
Christ is Lord, Christians can discern contemporary social structures in light of his 
work and of the continuing existence of the church. Yoder follows Berkhof’s outline 
to trace Christ’s central role in the creation and redemption of the world. The powers 
                                                 
3 Berkhof, C&P, 65. 
4 Ibid., 66. Berkhof acknowledges the limitations of “worldview” terminology as a temptation to (non-
Christian) philosophical systematization (65). 
5 Yoder, Preface, 248n3. Berkhof develops a biblical “theology of history” in his Christ the Meaning 
of History. His work on principalities and powers does not feature there, though he claims it 
influenced the project (C&P, 12; Christ the Meaning of History, 100n1).  
6 Yoder, CWS, 10. 
7 Ibid., 10-14. 
8 Yoder, PJ, 11, 242, 246-247.  
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“subsist” or “hold together” in Christ (Col. 1:17).9 Jesus effects redemption on the 
cross because he alone escapes the powers’ tyranny.10 Yoder goes on to cite 
Berkhof’s contention that the “resurrection manifests what was already accomplished 
at the cross: that in Christ God has challenged the Powers, has penetrated into their 
territory, and has displayed that He is stronger than they.”11 Yoder offers another 
quotation from Berkhof in order to affirm the novelty of the church as a unified 
Jewish-Gentile community. This community has an irreplaceable role in the process 
of redemption, for “all resistance and every attack against the gods of this age will be 
unfruitful, unless the church itself is resistance and attack, unless it demonstrates in 
its own life and fellowship how believers can live freed from the powers.”12 Even 
though Christian faithfulness can enable present freedom, the redemption of the 
powers is ultimately “Jesus Christ’s own task.”13 When Christians remove their eyes 
from Jesus and the church, believing that “the forces which really determine the 
march of history are in the hands of the leaders of the armies and the markets,” they 
give in to the “temptation of the Sadducees” that Jesus rejected.14 The conviction that 
Christ is Lord concerns “the nature of the cosmos and the significance of history.”15 
The church is free for discipleship because history ultimately belongs to God. In his 
1994 epilogue to the chapter, Yoder reaffirms that the “proclamation of Christ’s rule 
over the rebellious world speaks a word of grace” to the entire cosmos.16 The 
universality of Christ’s lordship is unhindered by the particularity of his or the 
church’s humanity.  
 The rest of The Politics of Jesus proposes voluntary subordination and 
suffering as socially transformative—such activity participates in the “war of the 
Lamb” and goes “with the grain of the cosmos.”17 “The cross of Christ,” Yoder 
argues, “is the model of Christian social efficacy, the power of God for those who 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 140-141. 
10 Ibid., 145 (emphasis added), cf. 187. 
11 Ibid., 146, quoting Berkhof, C&P, 146. Berkhof later argues that the “resurrection has the 
ascendancy and victory over the cross” and eschatological consummation makes a “break” from the 
“Gestalt of the cross” (Christ the Meaning of History, 180).  
12 Yoder, PJ, 148, quoting Berkhof, C&P, 51. 
13 Yoder, PJ, 149, quoting Berkhof, C&P, 52. 
14 Yoder, PJ, 153, cf. OR, 19-21. 
15 Yoder, PJ, 157. 
16 Ibid., 161. 
17 Ibid., 246. 
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believe.”18 His Stone Lecture “Behold My Servant Shall Prosper” expands upon this 
statement with its investigation of servanthood as a practical form of deploying 
power.19 Yoder then offers the theology of the principalities and powers as an 
analytical framework undergirding “a useable contemporary vision of social process” 
(162). God’s creative and redemptive action—especially through the death and 
resurrection of Jesus Christ—provides Christians with standards for subtle social 
discernment (162-166). Jesus’ suffering servanthood provides a powerful pattern that 
may be deployed in a variety of ways and situations (166-167). It works, ultimately, 
because it goes along with God’s fatherly design and is “in conformity with the 
victory of the Lamb” (167). 
 Yoder’s argument in “Behold My Servant Shall Prosper” that servanthood is 
efficacious is meant as an example of his thesis that ecclesial practices can be taken 
up in analogous forms by other communities with transformative effect (149). 
Because the church is fundamentally an “order of service,” non-ecclesial groups can 
learn from the church and adopt servanthood patterns (151). The rationale for this 
thesis is set forth in the first of Yoder’s Stone Lectures, published as “Why 
Ecclesiology is Social Ethics: Gospel Ethics Versus the Wider Wisdom.”20 In that 
lecture Yoder suggests that “gospel social ethics” are only possible if faith in Christ 
makes a difference for how people live.21 The church is the group that tries to live by 
the implications of its central proclamation, Christ is Lord. It is therefore a 
community determined most of all by the biblical narratives about Jesus Christ (110-
121). The narrative character of Christian life means it proclaims a “gospel 
connected with a particular name and place and time, with Jesus and the Jews and 
Jerusalem” (110). Liturgy and worship too affirm the church’s “rootedness in the 
particularity of Judaism and Jesus”—whether or not that affirmation can be 
“verified” by supposedly more universal stories (113). Indeed, implicit in the 
doctrine of election is the confidence that the particularity of the Jewish and 
Christian stories is not a mark against their truthfulness (115). According to its 
                                                 
18 Ibid., 242. 
19 Yoder, “Servant,” 151-160. References to “Servant” in this and the following paragraph are in the 
text. 
20 Yoder, RP, 103-126. Unless otherwise noted, references to RP in this and the following paragraph 
are in the text. 
21 Ibid. Yoder develops his argument in dialogue with Barth, Against the Stream, 15-50, and Church 
Dogmatics IV/2, 719-726 (on the exemplarity of “True Church law”).  
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central narratives, the church bears “the meaning of history” (118). Within history it 
is led by the Holy Spirit—”not a reasoning process but a mode of God’s own 
working”—to faithfulness (122). God leads the church victoriously, and so its life is 
characterized by doxology, patterns of celebration that instill in its members a 
distinctive view of reality (123).  
 This fact of a particularly contingent community gratefully guided by its 
victorious Lord is, Yoder contends, good news for the world. The church is good 
news because it is how God shows where God is leading the whole world (126). 
Because the coming kingdom is “social in its essence,” the shape of its real presence 
in the church can be imitated by others (104, 125-126). As Yoder argues in the 
second Stone Lecture, “The Scandal of the Apocalypse,” the church’s conviction that 
God is active in redeeming the world means it must challenge sociological and 
political assumptions about causality.22 Yoder’s point is not that causation as such 
should be abandoned, but that we should expect, if Christ is Lord, for his practices to 
be causally effective in everyday social settings. In “Behold My Servant Shall 
Prosper” he makes this case in regards to servanthood, and in the fourth and fifth 
lectures he looks at the analogical potential of various specific ecclesial practices.23 
God is bringing a “new world,”24 and it is publicly accessible in the life of the church 
insofar as that is determined by the particular stories of God’s interactions with 
humanity through Jesus Christ, and by particular practices that respond doxologically 
to God’s victory over the powers. 
 Yoder articulates the specifically Christian basis for nonviolent practice two 
years later in his Warsaw Lectures. His genealogy of the modern nonviolence 
movement from King to Gandhi to Tolstoy suggests that it cannot survive without a 
substantive religious cosmology that disciplines its members and gives them hope.25 
For Christians, this cosmology is provided by the early church’s view of the creation, 
fall, and redemption of the principalities and powers.26 At the center of that 
cosmology is, of course, the risen Lord Christ: “To say that Christ is Lord does not 
                                                 
22 Published as parts of Yoder, “Armaments and Eschatology,” and “Ethics and Eschatology.”  
23 Those lectures were published with heavy revisions as Yoder, “Sacrament as Social Process,” and 
RP, 360-373).  
24 The general title of Yoder’s Stone Lectures was “New World on the Way” (RP, 126). 
25 Yoder, Nonviolence, 17-26. 
26 Ibid., 95-103. 
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mean only a declaration of personal allegiance but a statement about the shape and 
destiny of the cosmos. He must reign until all his enemies are under his feet (1 Cor 
15:25): that is the significance of present history.”27 Fourteen years later, in “How H. 
Richard Niebuhr Reasoned,” Yoder reaffirms his commitment to this cosmology by 
showing how it sustains a variegated and transformative Christian cultural 
engagement. The particularities of Christ’s Jewishness and humanity provide the 
baseline for cultural transformation, given that he is Lord of all the cultural powers.28  
 
6.1.2 Ecumenism and Exile  
As discussed in chapter one, Yoder was involved in ecumenical activities for the 
majority of his career. Many of the earliest scholars of Yoder’s work found 
ecumenism to be definitive of his theological approach. Mark Thiessen Nation 
focused his doctoral dissertation on Yoder’s “ecumenical patience and vocation” and 
his subsequent book emphasized the “catholicity” of Yoder’s Anabaptist ethics.29 
Though he has recently become more critical of Yoder, in The Politics of the Cross 
Craig A. Carter represents Yoderian ethics as “a viable option for mainstream 
Christianity” and the rightful inheritor to classical orthodoxy.30 Michael G. 
Cartwright, who wrote one of the first introductions to Yoder’s thought, portrays 
Yoder as unifying radical reform ethics with radically catholic theology.31 According 
to Cartwright, the Anabaptist practice of fraternal admonition is behind Yoder’s 
ecumenism: “Yoder’s approach to ecumenicity takes the form of admonition, and he 
in turn has invited ‘mutual correction’ from others, thereby seeking to elicit the kind 
of ongoing dialogue between the various communions which he would argue always 
characterized the church.”32 Admonitory dialogue with Christians is directed to 
common resources, such as scripture, but Yoder’s conviction that the gospel can 
become intelligible in any context facilitates a variety of conversations.33 Yoder’s 
                                                 
27 Ibid., 100. 
28 Yoder, “HRN,” 87. 
29 Nation, John Howard Yoder. 
30 Carter, Politics of the Cross, 19, 23. See note 52 in chapter five above about recent changes to 
Carter’s evaluation of Yoder. 
31 Cartwright, “Radical Reform, Radical Catholicity,” esp. 31-41. 
32 Ibid., 32. 
33 Ibid., 32, 35. 
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writings thus engage liberation theologians,34 evangelicals,35 Methodists,36 various 
Reformed Christians,37 members of other “believers” and “peace” churches,38 Roman 
Catholics,39 Jews,40 and secular intellectuals.41 His contributions to the global 
ecumenical movement span the entirety of his career, a career that for many years 
was based in a Roman Catholic institution, the University of Notre Dame. Yoder’s 
theology of the powers was no exception, and it was constructed for ecumenical 
purposes as well. For Yoder, the theology of the powers is a mode of dialogical 
theology, one way he seeks to engage the wider church in terms it can understand in 
order to move it to a practice of discipleship that is indebted to his Anabaptist 
tradition. It is a central means by which he proclaims his particular understanding of 
the universal lordship of Christ, that is, by which he proclaims the gospel. 
 Yoder’s approach to catholicity is further outlined in an essay he composed 
with the “baptist” theologian James McClendon, “Christian Identity in Ecumenical 
Perspective: A Response to David Wayne Layman.”42 As the essay’s title indicates, it 
was written to counter arguments against the authors by Layman, a Mennonite whose 
interest in Mercersburg theology puts him close to Roman Catholicism at several 
points.43 Layman’s criticisms are leveled at Yoder and McClendon’s “restitutionist” 
attempt to circumvent patristic and medieval developments for a direct return to the 
early church.44 For Layman, the Mercersburg theologians rightly require critical 
acceptance of later developments as continuous with the early church. Trinitarian 
ontology, high Christology, and high eucharistic theology should be central to an 
                                                 
34 Yoder, “Exodus and Exile”; WL, 169-172. Yoder’s OR, PJ, and “Jesus and Power” address 
liberation themes. 
35 Yoder, “Evangelical Dualism”; “Southern Baptists.” 
36 Yoder, OR, 13-33; PK, 64-65, 69, 199; BP. 
37 Besides his theology of the powers, see Yoder, “Reformed versus Anabaptist Social Strategies”; 
McClendon and Yoder, “Christian Identity”; Mouw and Yoder, “Anabaptist-Reformed Dialogue.” 
38 Yoder,” “Believers’ Church Conferences”; CWS; “‘Peace Church’ Perspective”; RP, 221-322; 
“Unique Role”; Gwyn, Hunsinger, Roop, and Yoder, Declaration of Peace. 
39 Yoder, WWIU; Nonviolence, 107-146. 
40 Yoder, JCSR; “Texts That Serve.” 
41 Yoder, FTN, 51-78; “Meaning after Babble.” 
42 McClendon, Ethics, 19-20, identifies himself with the “baptist” tradition coming out of the Radical 
Reformation. 
43 Mercersburg theology is associated with German Reformed theologians Philip Shaff and John 
Nevin in 19th-century Pennsylvania. As described by McClendon, Yoder, and Layman, it emphasizes 
high church sacramental and trinitarian theology as authentic ancient Christianity. 
44 Layman, “Inner Ground,” 483-487. 
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“Evangelical Catholicity in an Anabaptist-Mennonite Key.”45 According to 
McClendon and Yoder, their restitutionism does allow for identification with the 
great theological traditions of the church.46 However, they suggest that “catholicity” 
cannot be defined as a pure theological construct. It can only be achieved in practice 
through the interrelations of a number of churches striving to be faithful—and this 
unity is what the “baptist” emphasis on dialogue before scripture enables.47 Such 
“baptist ecumenism” is to be contrasted with the “Constantinian ecumenism” that 
forces unity without due conversation.48 McClendon and Yoder therefore suggest that 
a unified Christian identity can only be achieved through the negotiation of particular 
ecclesial communities as they occur in time. This achievement is a gift of the Holy 
Spirit, who facilitates Christian dialogue.49 Catholicity comes through patient 
exploration of distinctions as a response to God’s prevenient unifying activity.  
 Yoder’s perspective on interfaith dialogue is similar. In his paper 
“Disavowing Constantine: An Alternative Perspective on Interfaith Dialogue,” he 
distances Radical Protestant from Christendom models of dialogue. The latter seeks 
meta-frameworks for dialogue that inevitably “jettison the particular, the local, the 
Jewish, the specific biblical content. Jesus then matters less and agreement more. 
Universality will be sought at the price of specificity. Dialogue will mean the 
uncovering of commonality.”50 The Radical Protestant alternative is to focus on 
concrete encounters between local, internally dialogical congregations and other 
communities. These congregations engage others with a spirit of repentance for the 
sins of Christendom (250-251, 255-256). The present post-Christendom age may be 
marked by Christian “diaspora,” but there is much work to be done “to get out of the 
way so that instead of, or beyond, us or our ancestors, us or our language system, us 
or our strengths or weaknesses, the people we converse with might see Jesus” (261). 
Repentance, in other words, opens the possibility of a form of dialogue that does not 
evade Christian particulars but rather places them as a real option before the 
                                                 
45 Ibid., 499-502. 
46 McClendon and Yoder, “Christian Identity,” 571-572. 
47 Ibid., 562-565.  
48 Ibid., 573. The authors examine the early Anabaptists, Particular Baptists, and Restorationists as 
exemplars of baptist ecumenism (576-578).  
49 Ibid., 578-579. 
50 Yoder, RP, 257. Unless otherwise noted, references to RP in this and the following paragraph are in 
the text. 
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interlocutor. If dialogue is to be truly dialogical, and not another means of coercion, 
then Christians too must see their interlocutor’s faith as an option (255). It may even 
be possible to recognize the authentic faith of those like Gandhi who follow Jesus’ 
way but do not invoke his name because of its negative cultural and political 
connotations (260-261). The question, for Yoder, is not whether Gandhi and similar 
persons are “anonymous Christians.” “Since Constantine, it would be no compliment 
to Gandhi to ask the question that way. But the question is whether he was following 
Jesus, and if so, which Jesus?”51 
 These comments suggest that Yoder’s interests in interfaith dialogue might 
extend beyond the typical preoccupation with “world religions” to the 
encouragement of practical discipleship in a multitude of forms and under a 
multitude of guises. He states this capacious vision clearly in “Disavowing 
Constantine”: “Christians have no intrinsic reason to prefer ancient interlocutors to 
new ones. If Marx, or Freud, or Darwin, or Adam Smith becomes the faith of a 
believing community, those believers, too, are potential partners for dialogue” (253). 
Secular interlocutors indeed began to appear in Yoder’s work more frequently as his 
career progressed. As detailed in chapter four, he was interested in sociology and 
anthropology, and he also wrote several essays on Christian knowledge and 
communication in a pluralistic setting.52 Among these are two essays that engage 
philosopher Jeffrey Stout’s book Ethics after Babel.53  
 The first of these, “Meaning after Babel: With Jeffrey Stout beyond 
Relativism,” was published in the Journal of Religious Ethics in 1996.54 There Yoder 
applauds Stout’s refusal of any moral “foundation” that could somehow resolve 
disputes between communities without immersion into the lives of the actual 
communities (134). He likewise affirms Stout’s insistence that this lack of 
foundations does not preclude the possibility of inter-communal conversation (131). 
However, Yoder detects a measure of nostalgia in Stout’s work for a mythical time 
“before” rampant pluralism (126, 132). In Yoder’s view no such time existed. The 
                                                 
51 Ibid. Karl Rahner proposed that some who do not know or reject Christ may in fact be “anonymous 
Christians,” saved by Christ through their unwitting conformity to his way. See Biggar, Behaving in 
Public, 100-101, for a recent defense of the concept. 
52 Most of these essays have been gathered as Yoder, PWK. 
53 Stout, Ethics after Babel.  
54 Yoder, “Meaning after Babble.” References to this essay in this and the following paragraph are in 
the text. 
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appearance of universal moral language has merely been imposed on pluralist reality 
by medieval church and Enlightenment state. The biblical story of the tower of Babel 
is not, furthermore, a lament over a lost monoculture (127, on Gen. 11). In the larger 
Genesis narrative God has just commanded that his people scatter over the earth 
(Gen. 9-10), so it is more likely that Babel stands as a warning against centralization 
and homogeneity. The reality of pluralism is thus ancient and providential, and its 
greatest challenge is not Babel (or foundationalism) but “babble,” linguistic 
obfuscation that systematically renders cross-cultural communication impossible 
(“Meaning after Babble,” 127-129).  
 Stout seeks to circumvent the challenge of babble with a minimalist appeal to 
absolute ethics, encapsulated in the statement that slavery is an absolute moral evil.55 
Thoughtful moderns all agree on this statement, and our unenlightened ancestors 
may be excused by their lack of resources to question a prevalent institution. But 
Yoder points out a number of exceptions to the statement and, moreover, worries that 
by positing it Stout is still clinging to the remnants of foundationalist discourse (130-
132). The alternative for Yoder “is to go through and beyond the relativity, not to try 
and stop just a millimeter short of it” (132). This alternative seems to be what the 
Genesis narrator has in mind in the Babel story. It is what Jeremiah and Ezekiel do 
by focusing their hearers on faithful living within Babylon, and what Peter and Paul 
do by using Hellenistic intellectual frameworks to preach the gospel (132-133). 
Relativism is not navigated by escaping it, but rather by  
a vision of a coming world, a community, larger than any present community, but 
still finite, historically real, larger than the Corleones [i.e., traditionalists] and the 
Modernists, larger than the Messianic Jews and the Hellenists, because it was 
created—in the first fruits of real first-century life—out of the costly reconciliation 
of both of them, by means of one instance of the kind of vulnerable cross-cultural 
communication I have been describing. (133) 
  
Reconciliation of Jew and Greek in the early church is thus paradigmatic of the 
possibilities of inter-communal dialogue. For Jews and Christians such a possibility 
is intrinsic in their calling to organize their communities around publicly available 
texts in a variety of settings, employing a variety of languages. This confidence in the 
fruitfulness of ordinary cross-cultural encounter is rooted not in a theory of universal 
                                                 
55 Stout, Ethics after Babel, 82-105. 
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ethical norms, but in doxology: God “is the creator, sustainer, and ultimate savior” of 
the nations, so the gospel must be translatable always and everywhere (136).  
 Shortly before the publication of “Meaning after Babel,” Yoder gave a paper 
titled “See How They Go with Their Face to the Sun” at a colloquium on 
“Communities in Exile” convened in Los Angeles.56 Although he engages Stout in 
this paper too, the purpose here is to elaborate the prophet Jeremiah’s understanding 
of “galuth as calling” (51). Galuth is a Yiddish word Yoder translates as “diaspora 
identity” (52). Yoder locates Jeremiah’s diaspora call in his admonition to the Jews in 
Babylon to “seek the welfare of the city where I have sent you into exile, and pray to 
the Lord on its behalf, for in its welfare you will find your welfare” (Jer. 29:7).57 
Diaspora was thus not a seventy-year “detour” between exile (586 BC) and the 
restoration of the temple, but rather “the beginning of the mission of the next 
millennium and a half” (53). Yoder notes how, as Babylon became the worldwide 
center of Judaism, its Jewish inhabitants were able to pioneer a number of 
sociological innovations. Chief among these innovations is the synagogue, a non-
hierarchical form of local community life sustained by concrete contacts with other 
communities and based around practical, doxological attention to shared religious 
texts (58-59). Furthermore, “nothing about the self-esteem of the bearers of this new 
lifestyle is dependent upon or drives toward cultural homogeneity, political control, 
or autarchy. Jewish culture is comfortable and creative in dialogue with whatever 
Gentile world it lands in, as long as it is tolerated” (59). 
Yoder then moves on to discuss how, contra Stout, galuth is a recovery of the 
“real mission” of God’s people as indicated by the Babel story (61-65). Diaspora is in 
fact the sociological outworking of Jewish convictions about God’s sovereignty, the 
coming messiah, the failure of Maccabean nationalism, and the moral value of 
suffering (68-69). The refusal to “take charge” is clear, and “from Jeremiah until 
Theodore Hertzl this was the dominant Jewish vision.”58 Jesus and his followers 
would have shared this vision, and from this vantage early Christian pacifism is 
                                                 
56 Yoder, FTN, 51-78 (also in JCSR, 182-202). Unless otherwise noted, references to FTN in this and 
the following paragraph are in the text. 
57 Yoder, FTN, 53. Yoder provides his own translation of the text in a later note: “seek the salvation of 
the culture to which God has sent you” (76n60). Cartwright, JCSR, 29n68, disputes this translation. 
58 Yoder, FTN, 68. Theodore Herzl (1860-1904) was an early Jewish Zionist whose efforts later 
inspired the founding of the State of Israel.  
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wholly unsurprising (68-70). Jesus himself “added more and deeper authentically 
Jewish reasons, and reinforced and further validated the already expressed Jewish 
reasons, for the already well established ethos of not being in charge.”59 Galuth as a 
Jewish and Christian vocation therefore is not based on nostalgia for past glories; it is 
rather based on the conviction that every setting offers opportunities for 
demonstrating how the particular history of God’s dealings with humanity can be 
renewed. Yoder is worth quoting at length here: 
Jeremiah does not tell his refugee brothers and sisters to try to teach the Babylonians 
Hebrew. The concern to learn goes in the other direction. Jews will not only learn 
the local languages; they will in a few generations (and for a millennium and a half) 
be serving the entire ancient Near Eastern world as expert translators, scribes, 
diplomats, sages, merchants, astronomers. They will make a virtue and a cultural 
advantage of their being resident aliens, not spending their substance in fighting 
over civil sovereignty. Their conviction that there is but one God—creator, 
sovereign, anikonic, historically active, able to speak—enhances their cultural 
creativity over against the polytheistic, superstitious, tribally structured, fertility-
focused popular religions of their neighbors. (71) 
 
In other words, by embracing the particularities of Jewish identity in a process that 
includes dialogue with non-Jews, diaspora Jews have brought peace to Babylon and 
other cities. They have “in fact contributed mightily to making the Gentile world 
viable” (76). Christians are called to do likewise in their internal, ecumenical, and 
interfaith dialogical engagement of the powers. 
 
6.1.3 Criticisms 
John Howard Yoder’s writings on the principalities and powers, ecumenism, and 
exile suggest that the Christian proclamation of the universal lordship of Christ is 
unhindered by the historical particularities of Jesus, Israel, and the church. Indeed, 
the universality of Christ’s lordship is manifested in his suffering service at a 
particular place and time in history, and it is the redemptive potential of suffering 
service that is the shape and content of Christian witness, namely, cross and 
resurrection. The gospel message itself is a form of noncoercive dialogue that 
structures both a congregation’s doxology and its engagement of others it meets 
along the diaspora way.60  
                                                 
59 Yoder, FTN, 69. Yoder cites his essay “The Political Axioms of the Sermon on the Mount,” OR, 34-
54, as explicating this argument. 
60 Cf. Yoder, “Meaning after Babble,” 135, on the unity between medium (dialogical community) and 
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 By constantly emphasizing the church’s adherence to the particularities of the 
universal lordship of Christ, Yoder has earned the sectarian label discussed in the 
previous chapter. For opponents of sectarianism and other critics, Yoder’s vision of 
discipleship is too indebted to the particular histories of Israel, Jesus and the early 
church. James M. Gustafson summarizes this objection to Yoder’s overly 
“historicist” approach well. Yoder, as with other historicist theologians, “rejects in 
principle the need to make the particular ethics of the Christian tradition universal in 
its implications; the theologian rejects the need to show that Christian ethics are 
applicable to all persons. Rather, the Christian community is a particular historical 
community with a special vocation to follow its Lord, Jesus.”61 Gustafson’s solution 
is a “theocentrism” that accents the universality of God rather than the particularities 
of Jewish and Christian revelation. Writing in a neo-Calvinist evangelical register, 
Richard J. Mouw protests Yoder’s extreme historicism by pointing out the various 
ways in which Christians cannot or should not imitate Jesus’ suffering servanthood: 
the metaphysical transaction with God and payment of ransom to the powers cannot 
be repeated, and the physical agony of the cross should be avoided when possible.62 
Some feminist and womanist theologians have likewise complained that making 
suffering servanthood paradigmatic justifies the subjugation of women and ethnic 
minorities.63 On this view, the “original” meaning of the cross is negated by its later 
role in oppression.  
 Jewish philosopher Daniel J. Boyarin similarly warns against Yoder’s 
acceptance of the language and practice of Christian mission.64 In this case Yoder is 
too Christian and not Jewish enough—the Jews, according to Boyarin, are content to 
fulfill the commandments, trust that God is present in the world, and “leave other 
people alone.”65 The readings of Yoder’s work on Judaism by Peter Ochs, Michael G. 
Cartwright, and Douglas K. Harink seem to confirm Boyarin’s fears. They suggest 
that Yoder’s zeal to vindicate his christocentric model ends in an ahistorical 
                                                                                                                                          
message (lordship of Christ) in Christian witness.  
61 Gustafson, Protestant and Roman Catholic Ethics, 66. See Yoder’s response in “Theological 
Revision.” 
62 Mouw, Politics and the Biblical Drama, 113-114. 
63 See note 24 in chapter five above.  
64 Boyarin, “Judaism as a Free Church,” 14-15. 
65 Ibid. 
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assimilation of Jewish history to Christian pacifism.66 He is thereby inadvertently 
guilty of a kind of supersessionism67 that denies the ambiguous realities of a Judaism 
which holds, from Jeremiah’s time on, “religious ideals of centrality and not 
centrality, landedness and non-landedness, group particularity and universality.”68 
Yoder reduces the complexity of his Jewish interlocutors’ positions, absorbing them 
into his own, and so circumscribes the possibility of dialogue producing anything 
new.69 In other words, he has yet to learn fully the lessons of noncoercive dialogue 
and remains within the Constantinian imperialist project.  
 For secular political philosopher Romand Coles, there is a possible 
contradiction between Yoder’s vulnerable dialogical stance and his “jealousy of Jesus 
as Lord.”70 At issue here is Yoder’s proclamation of the universal lordship of Christ, 
and his concomitant suspicion of all other claims to lordship. Coles asks whether or 
not this jealousy “is entwined with and works in spite of itself toward the closure of 
the church’s generous and receptive participation in historical generativity.”71 
Yoder’s jealousy may empower to a degree the radical politics to which “he so 
profoundly calls us,” but “it needs to be inflected differently and reshaped, not only 
for the radical democratic community coalitions in which [Coles is] most invested 
but for the work that Yoder calls Good News.”72 Mennonite theologians Peter Dula 
and Alex Sider defend Yoder at this point by suggesting that the centrality of 
reconciliatory practice in his ecclesiology assumes “that there is no way of knowing 
now what kind of edges the body of Christ might finally be found to have.”73 
Drawing on a quotation from Rowan Williams, they suggest that the tyrannical 
                                                 
66 Ochs in Yoder, JCSR, 119-120, 158-159, 179, 203-204; Cartwright in Yoder, JCSR, 211, 215-217, 
219-220, 222-223. See also Harink, “The Anabaptist and the Apostle,” 283-284; Nugent, “Biblical 
Warfare Revisited,” 167-184.  
67 Cartwight in Yoder, JCSR, 229, calls this a “neo-neo-supersessionism”: “In no sense, does Yoder 
seek to replace Judaism with Christianity in the punitive sense of classical Christian supersessionism. 
Neither does he engage in the kind of displacement and erasure of Judaism that modernist Protestant 
theologicans sought in what in retrospect appears to be a form of neo-supersessionism. But in seeking 
a way for Jews and Christian to share a common witness for peace, Yoder slips into a form of neo-
neo-supersessionism that, in effect, erases the covenantal basis of Jewish peoplehood even as it 
attempts to redescribe Jewish identity within the framework of the ‘new covenant’ of Jesus.” 
68 Ochs in Yoder, JCSR, 120. See also A. E. Weaver, States of Exile, 35-38.  
69 Ochs in Yoder, JCSR, 158-159,  
70 Coles, Beyond Gated Politics, 135.  
71 Ibid., 135. 
72 Ibid., 136. 
73 Dula and Sider, “Radical Democracy,” 500. See also Hauerwas and Coles, Christianity, Democracy, 
and the Radical Ordinary.  
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implications of Yoder’s jealousy are mitigated by his institutionalization of “relations 
of ‘profound and costly involvement with each other and receiving from each other’ 
both inside and outside the church.”74  
 Yet it is precisely this decentered ecclesiology that Paul Martens finds 
suspicious. In his essay “Universal History and a Not-Particularly Christian 
Particularity: Jeremiah and John Howard Yoder’s Social Gospel,” Martens narrates 
Yoder’s “gradual evolution from articulating a strong Jesus-centered ethic towards an 
articulation of a less-than-particularly Christian social ethic rooted in a construal of 
universal history.”75 At the center of this evolution is Yoder’s increasing conviction 
that Jesus and the church stand in continuity with Jeremiah and the exilic synagogue. 
Martens notes how, in an essay from 1954, Yoder depicts Jeremiah as one of the 
prophets who correctly proclaims the eschatological nature of peace.76 The church 
may be “a new people in the prophets’ line,” but it is truly “new” insofar as it exists 
as a response to Jesus Christ’s unique role in bringing the new aeon alongside the 
old.77 By the late 1980s, Martens argues, it is difficult to discern what for Yoder is 
new about the church or, indeed, about Jesus Christ.78 In his 1988 essay “To Serve 
Our God and to Rule the World,” Yoder treats eschatological themes without using 
eschatological language. Christian doxology is now the primary category, for this 
contributes to “the progress of world history in light of the ‘Rule of the Lamb.’”79 
Christians do learn their doxological stance from Jesus, but Yoder is emphatic that 
Jesus affirms Jeremiah’s call to “seek the peace of the city”—and that this call 
provides the shape of doxology.80 By the mid-1990s, in the essay “See How They Go 
with Their Faces to the Sun,” Yoder makes no distinction between Jeremiah’s call 
and Jesus’ mission, and both are defined as a sociological stance of “not being in 
control.”81 “Seeking the peace of the city” now has little to do with Christ’s 
                                                 
74 Ibid., quoting Williams, The Truce of God, 27. 
75 Martens, “Universal History,” 131-132. 
76 Ibid., 136, citing Yoder, OR, 68. Martens seems to confuse Jeremiah’s “resume” of the false 
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77 Martens, “Universal History,” 136, on Yoder, OR, 61. 
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80 Ibid., 138. 
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eschatological inbreaking and much to do with a universal, “secular” socio-political 
struggle.82 
 Martens presents a powerful, though certainly disputable, case that Yoder 
moves from Christian particularity to sociological universality. The summary of 
Yoder’s theologies of the powers, ecumenism, and exile presented above hopefully 
suggests significant continuity in Yoder’s early and late work. This continuity is 
provided by his lifelong conviction that the meaning of history is defined by the 
death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, and by Christ’s subsequent rule over the 
powers and the church. But Martens is right to point out the ambiguities that exist 
between Yoder’s proclamation of the lordship of Christ and the significant overlap he 
finds between Christ, Jeremiah, Gandhi, and others. Is Jesus uniquely definitive of 
true social and political life, or is he merely an exemplar of what can be discovered 
from various sources? When these ambiguities are considered alongside criticisms 
from those who think Yoder is too tied to the particular history of Jesus, the question 
arises as to the coherence of Yoder’s theology of Christian particularity. If Yoder can 
be seen as both an embodiment of extreme Christian historicism and of generic 
secularism, then one suspects either that his position is ill-articulated, or that it is 
inherently unstable.  
 
6.2 Bourdieu on the Particular and the Universal 
Pierre Bourdieu’s political concepts and practices are rooted in the history of the 
European Enlightenment, a movement he takes to have universal implications. In a 
similar manner to Yoder’s renewal of Anabaptism, Bourdieu seeks a critical 
resourcement of Enlightenment and, more generally, modern European social and 
political thought with its focus on universal reason and ethics. Yet as a sociological 
inheritor of the Enlightenment, he is suspicious of symbolic formulations of the 
universal that remain detached from actual habitus and fields. He therefore calls for 
an Aüfklarung of Aüfklarung, an “Enlightenment of Enlightenment,” in order to 
universalize “the universal” in social reality as in theory.  
 The irreducible specificity of social reality means, of course, that 
universalizing the universal also particularizes the universal. It requires negotiating 
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concrete social spaces in order to give rise to a mode of universal distribution suited 
to each space and time—but for this universalization process to be effective, the 
universal has to remain universal and not merely another particular. This dialectical 
quality of the universal as both an historical product and a transhistorical norm is 
what makes Bourdieu’s recovery of the Enlightenment an interesting resource for the 
revision of Yoder’s theology of Christian particularity.  
 
6.2.1 Reason, Truth, and Virtue 
In 1985 Bourdieu was interviewed about his sociological approach by three German 
scholars, among them the now renowned critical theorist Axel Honneth.83 Near the 
end of the interview Bourdieu was asked why he, unlike Honneth’s teacher Jürgen 
Habermas, has no place for universal norms in his work.84 Bourdieu response was 
consistent with his general sociological approach: “J’ai tendance à poser le problème 
de la raison ou des normes de manière résolument historiciste.”85 He then goes on to 
elaborate his historicist “radical doubt,” reviewed in the third chapter above. The 
point for Bourdieu, however, is not to wallow in doubt and relativism. Rather, he 
argues that “il faut pousser jusqu’à sa limite l’historicisme, par une sorte de doute 
radical, pour voir ce qui peut être réellement sauvé.”86 Chief among those things that 
Bourdieu believes “can be really saved” are reason and truth. He does not suggest 
that they have “foundations” outside of history, but rather that they can be further 
produced by examining the social conditions of their production. The moments 
within history that have been conducive to reason and truth, to an “interest in the 
universal,” are guides to their further production. As an historical product, “La vérité 
est un enjeu de luttes en tout champ.”87 Yet it is the scientific field that 
paradigmatically demonstrates how truth is produced, as the constant threat of 
                                                 
83 Bourdieu, CD, 13-46. The other two interviewers were Hermann Kocyba, a critical theorist, and 
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mutual critique there leads to rigorous self-critique, to reflexivity. Bourdieu’s 
“politique de la vérité” (politics of truth), the Realpolitik of reason discussed in the 
previous chapter, employs the reflexive tools of reason to protect and develop the 
field autonomy necessary to further the production of reason. There is no absolute or 
universal foundation for reason and truth, but only a continual labor of wielding the 
provisional instruments of reason, honed by reflexivity, “pour s’arracher, au mois 
partiellement, au relatif.”88 
 A few years later, in an interview with Loïc Wacquant at the University of 
Chicago, Bourdieu again addressed a question about reason, truth, and historicism. 
Wacquant frames the question broadly, suggesting that Bourdieu’s approach 
overcomes antimonies in European philosophy between rationalism and idealism. 
These antinomies surface in contemporary debates involving Habermas and relativist 
“postmodernists,” debates that have a precedent in the conflicts between followers of 
Kantian critique and Hegelian speculation.89 Bourdieu’s answer is similar to the one 
he gave to his German interlocutors, and he stresses the need for “collective 
reflection and action designed to bolster the institutional conditions of rational 
communication in the social sciences” in order to secure scientific autonomy.90 These 
conditions are only brought about by thorough reflexivity. “Reflexivity is a tool to 
produce more science, not less,” he contends, “it is not designed to discourage 
scientific ambition but to make it realistic.” He goes on to insist that, “by helping the 
progress of science, and thus the growth of knowledge about the social world, 
reflexivity makes possible a more responsible politics, both inside and outside of 
academia.”91 Practices of critical reflexivity facilitate the construction of “rational 
utopias,” transformations of current political institutions towards reasonable ends 
fitted to the occasion. Such reflexive utopias include the transformation of persons, 
and Bourdieu speaks further of concrete, historical realizations of the rational 
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“universal subject.”92 By enabling the identification of “true sites of freedom,” 
reflexivity helps practical reasoners construct “small-scale, modest, practical morals 
in keeping with the scope of human freedom.”93 Instead of the Enlightenment faith 
that philosophical discourse, within or without the “bounds of reason,” can identify 
the contours of rational institutions and persons, Bourdieu offers sociological 
illumination of the historical conditions conducive to reason and virtue. 
 In lectures at the Collège de France given around the same time as his 
Chicago interview, Bourdieu elaborated his understanding of moral reasoning in 
more detail. These lectures, published as “Is a Disinterested Act Possible?,” 
investigate whether or not self-interest and altruism are incompatible. For Bourdieu 
“interest” is a function of illusio, the “enchanted relation” that exists between habitus 
and field when the former has been fully immersed into the latter.94 The resulting 
“feel for the game” is experienced as not only practical mastery of the dispositions, 
rules, and techniques needed to play well, but also as a sense that the game is 
important and worth playing—that the player has an interest in playing. Since social 
practice is always encapsulated by and constitutive of a social field, there is no total 
escape from illusio. Self-interest predominates in every realm of human activity. Yet 
this admission does not, according to Bourdieu, correspond to a rejection of the 
possibility of disinterested actions, i.e., of actions that are not obviously directed 
towards one’s own success in the game. The concepts of habitus and field suggest 
that genuine other regard is a possible disposition, even if it only exists under 
specific historical conditions (87, 89). The phenomenon of noblesse oblige, for 
instance, is a case in which generosity is definitive of nobility (87). This and other 
examples reinforce Bourdieu’s argument that rational change occurs through the 
direction of personal to universal interest: “Without bringing in any metaphysical 
hypothesis…, one can say that reason has a basis in history and that if reason 
progresses even the slightest, it is because there are interests in universalization and 
because, universally, but above all in certain universes, such as the artistic or 
scientific field, it is better to seem disinterested rather than interested, as generous 
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and altruistic rather than egotistical” (89). Virtue is possible when social games are 
set up to encourage players to revise their interests for the interests of others.  
 Bourdieu extended these moral reflections in a paper entitled, “A Paradoxical 
Foundation of Ethics.” Setting aside forms of ethical analysis that begin with the 
“universally witnessed, metadiscursive or metapractical second-order strategies that 
agents employ in order to appear (in act or intention) to conform to a universal rule,” 
Bourdieu rather focuses on practices that effectively realize the universal (141). He 
claims that these practices are effective because they appeal to all the members of a 
group and thereby affirm group identity (142). Kant’s categorical imperative is based 
in this logic, as it insists on judging moral statements by their universalizability 
(144). Even “suspicion constitutes a kind of partaking of the profits of the universal,” 
as it denounces actions that promote the interests of one part of the group over 
another (143). Moral persons and institutions are thus possible when they are 
ceaselessly scrutinized according to the criterion of universality. “It would be a 
question,” Bourdieu avers, “of establishing social universes where, as in the 
Machiavellian ideal republic, agents had an interest in virtue, disinterestedness, and 
devotion to public service and the common good” (144). The “values of civil virtue” 
such as equality, fraternity, disinterest, and sincerity are universal because they foster 
criticism of the ways one’s own and others’ practices inhibit universality (145).  
 Bourdieu’s own political activity bears witness to this interest in disinterest, 
as he spoke out on behalf of various marginalized groups. At the height of his 
engagement he was awarded the Ernst-Bloch-Preis for his outstanding scientific 
contributions to culture.95 His acceptance speech, entitled “A Reasoned Utopia and 
Economic Fatalism,” opposes a “banker’s Europe” based on the fatalism that “the 
world cannot be any different from the way it is.”96 The dissemination of economic 
fatalism paralyzes alternative action, rendering Europe helpless before the non-
universal self-interests of the economic elite. Against this false, imperialistic Europe 
he poses a rational utopia of “a really European Europe” in which the Enlightenment 
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tradition of universalization is given free reign.97 In other speeches and occasional 
writings he likewise attacked contemporary journalists for serving as a vehicle for 
neo-liberal interests.98 As intellectual practitioners these journalists were not only 
guilty of economic self-interest, but of betraying the European intellectuel who 
selflessly publishes knowledge at all costs.  
 The pursuit of the universal is thus for Bourdieu inseparable from the renewal 
of the particular histories that have promoted it, especially those of the European 
Enlightenment. Although the rhetoric of “globalization” is often used to promote the 
distribution of the benefits of European (and North American) culture globally, 
Bourdieu suspects that the distribution is far from universal. A truly global economic 
or political order would be responsive to the particular needs of all communities. The 
universal social order is therefore realized through care for particular others, and 
particular values, truths, and other forms of capital become universal when they are 
invested in the betterment of others.  
 Bourdieu treats these themes at length in the third chapter of Pascalian 
Meditations, “The Historicity of Reason.”99 There he begins by declaring 
historicization as “one of the most effective weapons in all the battles of the 
Aufklärung against obscurantism and absolutism and, more generally, against all the 
forms of absolutization or naturalization of the historical and therefore contingent 
and arbitrary principles of a particular social universe” (93). If reason is to escape 
“obscurantism and absolutism,” it too must be subjected to the acids of 
historicization. Against suggestions that historicization dissolves reason, Bourdieu 
maintains that only historicization avoids relativism. That is because the history of 
reason displays how “the rules and regularities of social games capable of forcing 
egoistic drives and interests to surpass themselves in and through regulated conflict 
can be set up in things and in bodies” (93-94). Before reason there was only arbitrary 
custom,100 that which lies behind and is hidden by every nomos or “common sense” 
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100 Bourdieu’s focus on reason as a product of the Enlightenment implies that the age “before” reason 
includes, not only the medieval and Reformation eras, and not only the Greco-Roman and Hebrew 
traditions, but also every other cultural tradition prior to the encounter with Enlightenment thought. 
Given his frequent citations of, for example, Plato, Aristotle, Pascal, and Berber proverbs, it is 
probable that he does not really view the Enlightenment as reason’s lone midwife. How historicization 
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(94-102). Reason, as Bourdieu repeatedly emphasizes, occurs as a product of fields 
organized around universal capital, such as knowledge or artistic appreciation (100-
101). Social scientific reflexivity now allows for systematic review of the conditions 
of reason’s production. The existence and protection of those fields is thus justified 
by “historical reason”—not merely reason—and the reflexive sociology that justifies 
this reason is a “rationalist historicism” (106). 
 Social science thus occupies a dual position, both denying “one to move 
fictitiously beyond the uncrossable limits of history” and insisting that “history can 
be made to yield some truths irreducible to history” (109). “It is in history, and in 
history alone,” Bourdieu suggests, “that we must seek the principle of the relative 
independence of reason from the history of which it is a product” (109). The history 
of reason is, moreover, the history of those social spaces where protection from 
social and especially economic demands meant survival was dependent only on the 
strength of one’s argument (109-113). The history of reason is the history of the 
autonomization of scientific fields. Within that history, reflexivity is the key 
development (118-122). Reflexivity as a self-critical practice helps thinkers 
provisionally and gradually overcome the limitations imposed by history and masked 
by the illusion that they are “subjects” somehow existing above the historical fray. 
Bourdieu recognizes that his rationalist historicism denies the transcendent reason 
sought by Kant and Habermas under the name of Enlightenment (120-121). Yet he 
holds that reflexivity “radicalizes” Kant’s quest “to rescue reason from history by 
helping to give sociological weapons to the free and generalized exercise of an 
epistemological critique of all by all, deriving from the field itself, in other words 
from the conflictual but regulated cooperation that competition imposes there” (120). 
Particular field struggles—fields whose struggles are for universalization—give rise 
to the most universal, “transcendent” of cultural products. Reason, truth, and virtue 




                                                                                                                                          
of his view of the Enlightenment would transform his view of historicization is an open question. 
Presumably for reason to be truly universal it would have to be vulnerable to the insights of alternative 
intellectual traditions. 
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6.2.2 Love, Beauty, and Understanding 
Bourdieu likewise argues for a practice of “pure love” with Enlightenment origins 
and universal implications. This argument is presented with reference to romance in 
a short section near the end of Masculine Domination, but is echoed elsewhere in 
discussions of aesthetic experience and scientific understanding.101 The bulk of 
Masculine Domination is devoted to showing how gender relations, in marriage as in 
labor, in traditional as in modern societies, have been disfigured by thousands of 
years of male rule. One might expect Bourdieu to offer a pessimistic evaluation of 
romantic love,102 and he indeed discusses two scenarios in which it serves 
misrecognition. The first is amor fati, “love of one’s destiny.”103 This love is evident 
in the way that romantic interests can often be strongly correlated to socio-economic 
interests, e.g., in the limiting case of love between partners of an arranged marriage. 
Bourdieu is especially sensitive to the female partner’s affections which, if they arise 
in such a situation, appear as “domination accepted, unrecognized as such and 
practically recognized, in happy or unhappy passion” (109). But “the mysterious grip 
of love can also take hold of men.” As depicted in the mythological stories of Eve 
and Circe, the charms of women may bind “men through the magic of the 
attachments of passion” and so reverse domination. Yet this love too “is still a 
context of struggle, or war, and it excludes the very possibility of the suspension of 
power relations which seems constitutive of the experience of love or friendship” 
(110). It is for this “pure love” that Bourdieu advocates.  
 Bourdieu believes that gender domination can be overcome by love: through 
“an endless labour…the icy waters of calculation, violence and self-interest” may be 
crossed and “a world of non-violence” attained.104 This world is an “economy of 
symbolic exchanges, of which the supreme form is the gift of self, and of one’s body, 
a sacred object” (110-111). Reciprocal self-exchange exceeds all instrumentalization 
of the other; it is a truly disinterested exchange in which self-interest is attained by 
                                                 
101 Contra Reader, “The State They’re In”, 50, and Grenfell, “Interest,” 16, who see Bourdieu’s 
writings on domestic love as novelties in his corpus.  
102 Especially given his earlier analyses of the function of marriage strategies in reproducing 
“traditional” societies: OTP, 39-40, 58-70; LP, 147-199; Bachelor’s Ball. 
103 Bourdieu, MD, 37, 109. Unless otherwise noted, references to MD in this and the following 
paragraph are in the text. 
104 Bourdieu, MD, 110. Bourdieu references Sartre positively here, but Bridget Fowler, “Reading 
Pierre Bourdieu’s Masculine Domination,” 475, highlights the differences between their views on 
love. 
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seeing and meeting the other’s interest. The love exchange is rooted in trust and the 
acceptance of the other’s reason for being. Bourdieu identifies spiritual and ethical 
dimensions to this love, and portrays mutual recognition as a kind of mystical union 
in which the tension between egoism and altruism is overcome.105 He further writes 
of each partner’s experience of pure love as “being a quasi-divine creator who 
makes, ex nihilo, the beloved, through the power that she or he grants him or her…; 
but a creator who, in return and simultaneously, unlike an egocentric and dominating 
Pygmalion, accepts to be the creature of his creature” (112). The loving recognition 
that so entwines a couple may be extremely fragile, but it also produces “an 
elementary social unit” that, for its total symbolic autonomy, rivals “successfully all 
the consecrations that are ordinarily asked of the institutions and rites of ‘Society,’ 
the secular substitute for God” (112). This divine power of love should be 
encouraged where possible, and Bourdieu writes elsewhere of society, and especially 
of the state’s, ability to foster it through legal recognition of, for instance, 
homosexual couples and other “new families” of the modern order.106 Pure love may 
match the state’s symbolic power of consecration, but the state still has a unique 
power of consecrating love.   
 Bourdieu does not detail the origins of pure love, other than to say that “it is a 
relatively recent historical invention, as is art for art’s sake, the pure love of art with 
which it is bound up, historically and structurally.”107 The genesis of art for art’s sake 
is reviewed systematically in Bourdieu’s 1991 book The Rules of Art. There he traces 
the nineteenth-century differentiation of the bohemian lifestyle from dominant 
commercial modes of life. Spurred in part by Kant’s Critique of Judgment, where he 
argues for the pleasures of “pure” aesthetic contemplation, litterateurs such as 
Baudelaire and Flaubert embodied—and gradually institutionalized—the conviction 
that artistic production should be free from economic, political, and moral 
                                                 
105 Bourdieu, MD, 111. Bourdieu draws a distinction between recognition (reconnaissance) and 
understanding (connaissance) on the one hand, and misrecognition (méconnaissance) on the other. 
The ethics of recognition is a major focus for Habermas, Honneth and other critical theorists. McNay, 
“Trouble with Recognition,” uses Bourdieu’s theory of practice to resolve disagreements between 
Honneth and Nancy Fraser, but does not examine Bourdieu’s own writings on recognition.  
106 Bourdieu, MD, 118-124; “Des familles sans nom.” See Martel, “Bourdieu et la question 
homosexuelle,” for an appreciative critique of Bourdieu’s writings on homosexuality.   
107 Bourdieu, MD, 111. 
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conventions.108 Given that ten years earlier Bourdieu had launched a scathing attack 
on Kantian aesthetics in the postscript to Distinction, the bohemian ideology of pure 
art would seem to be an obvious critical target.109 Yet Bourdieu here affirms the 
illusio that gives rise to aesthetic pleasure, denying that historicization negates it.110 
On the contrary, he insists that historicization can be a powerful aid to aesthetic 
pleasure.111 Because love, even so-called crazy love (amour fou), includes a kind of 
ongoing “apologetic” or self-justificatory commentary, sociological elucidation of 
the historical necessity of the artistic object can actually ground and encourage love 
of art. By constructing the social space of artistic production, the sociologist can 
enter into the point of view of the artist, effecting “a sort of amor intellectualis rei, 
the assimilation of the object to the subject and the immersion of the subject in the 
object, the active surrender to the singular necessity of the literary object.”112 
Recognition of art’s historical necessity is thus not a rejection of transcendent artistic 
experience, but an apprehension of the historical conditions that make it possible—of 
the artistic field as another of the “paradoxical worlds capable of inspiring or of 
imposing the most disinterested ‘interests.’”113 “The sublimated essence of the 
universal” emerges from, not above, the struggles and alliances of the social world. 
 If Bourdieu’s “science of works of art” has the function of enhancing 
aesthetic pleasure, it does so for ethical and spiritual purposes. The passages in The 
Rules of Art defending a science of art are written against those who, failing to see 
the social basis of aesthetic experience, identify the love of art with the inherent 
spiritual superiority of the lover.114 Bourdieu then proposes the corporatism of the 
universal in the book’s postscript, indicating that, like the revolutionary philosophes 
and Zola, his aim is not to destroy the spiritual attainments of European intellectual 
                                                 
108 Bourdieu, RA, 47-173; cf. 295 on the German aesthetic tradition mediated to the French litterateurs 
by the philosopher Victor Cousin.  
109 Bourdieu also attacks Jacques Derrida’s critique of Kantian aesthetics as failing to exceed a purely 
aesthetic conceptual space (Distinction, 485-500.) See Bennett, “Habitus Clivé,” 215-220; Loesberg, 
“Bourdieu’s Derrida’s Kant.”  
110 Bourdieu, RA, 333-334.  
111 Ibid., xvii-xx. 
112 Ibid., xix. Amor intellectualis rei is Bourdieu’s “secularized” version of Spinoza’s amor Dei 
intellectualis, the love of God that is active assent to the determination of all things (see Spinoza, 
Ethics V). Bourdieu, who was also influenced by Leibniz, insists on the possibility of change and the 
limits of determinism. See Weik, “Bourdieu and Leibniz.” 
113 Bourdieu, RA, xx. 
114 Ibid., xvii. See also Bourdieu and Darbel, Love of Art, 109-112.  
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culture, but to urge their concrete universalization.115 Art for art’s sake originated as 
“an exclusive religion…the last resort of those who reject submission and 
resignation” in the face of political and social disenchantment.116 Far from 
persecuting this radical religion of art, Bourdieu hopes that the scientific illumination 
of its genesis will enable it to flourish and grow.117  
 Masculine Domination and The Rules of Art were both published in the 
1990s, perhaps signaling a late “spiritual” turn. A few years earlier Bourdieu had, in 
fact, written explicitly of a “materialist spirituality,” in an obscure essay on the 
French poet Francis Ponge entitled “Nécessiter.”118 Bourdieu begins “Nécessiter” 
with a disavowal of any attempt to provide a commentary on Ponge’s poetry. Rather, 
the essay is an act of recognition, a gift in exchange for that which he has received 
from Ponge’s poetry and, at the same time, a “submission” to Ponge’s legitimate 
authority.119 Bourdieu goes on, lacing his prose with lines from Ponge, to write of the 
fight against “pharaïsme intellectuel” (intellectual pharisaism) to see things as they 
really are. This mode of seeing is connected to a way of changing things—or “tuer le 
vieil homme et le monde ancien”—by changing representations of things, 
overcoming in particular “les discours eschatologiques, fanatiques, pharisiens.”120 It 
is not a casual mode of seeing but, in terms that adumbrate his aesthetic science, a 
look that lingers carefully “jusqu’à redécouvrir le formule, le principe générateur, la 
nécessité informatrice, la raison d’être des choses.”121  
 Yet Bourdieu sees in Ponge more than looking, an act that still implies 
distance from the object. Bourdieu rather moves with Ponge “vers matérialisme” by 
writing of “une consommation et une dégustation des choses”—things are not merely 
perceived from afar, but internalized.122 Given the sensuality of taste, however, 
                                                 
115 Bourdieu, RA, 339-348.  
116 Ibid., 59. Bourdieu is careful to point out that this evaluation does not reduce art for art’s sake to 
politics or economics—on the contrary, only those agents endowed with artistic perception and 
involved in an autonomous artistic field could envision such a break from economics and politics (60).  
117 The religious function of art in modern society is also invoked and affirmed in Bourdieu and 
Darbel, Love of Art, 1-4, 108-113, and Bourdieu, “Piété religieuse et dévotion artistique.” 
118 Bourdieu, “Nécessiter,” 434-437.  
119 Ibid., 434.  
120 Ibid., 435: “to kill the old man and the old world” by overcoming “eschatological, fanatical, and 
pharisaical discourses.”  
121 Ibid.: a look that lingers “until it rediscovers the formula, the generative principle, the informing 
necessity, the reason for being of things.” 
122 Ibid.: to move with Ponge “towards materialism” by writing of “a consumption and a tasting of 
things.” 
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consumption requires an ethic of humility, one that leaves behind exaltation and 
resignation for “une forme d’acquiescentia animi, d’adhésion de l’esprit à ce qui est 
et qui est bien ainsi: ‘Ainsi soit-il’, païen de Ponge, Amor intellectualis rei; 
assimilation de l’objet au sujet et immersion du sujet dans l’objet: la bougie qui ‘se 
noie dans son aliment’….”123 Consumption thus enacts a spiritual unification of 
subject and object of the same kind that Bourdieu had written about art and love. The 
intensive word labor represented by Ponge’s poems are further, according to 
Bourdieu, “comme exercises spirituels matérialistes” or “une sorte de préparation 
mentale à l’adaequatio intellectus et rei qui est expérience de la nécessité de la 
chose.”124 Apprehension of necessity is therefore “la soumission active à la nécessité 
singulière de l’objet [qui] produit le texte, objet à travers lequel l’objet désigné 
s’impose irrémédiablement au lecteur, qui apprend et retient par coeur, devenant 
ainsi capable d’évoquer à volonté la chose signifiée, de lui signifier purement et 
simplement d’exister. Il s’agit bien de magie.”125 Bourdieu draws a parallel here 
between Ponge’s poetic identification and aesthetic pleasure, both enabling an 
understanding of “l’étranger” that favors receptivity over judgment. This penetration 
of another implies a sort of violence, an intrusion, but without it understanding 
(connaissance) and recognition (reconnaissance) of the most strange is 
impossible.126 
 “Understanding,” an essay written to explain the unusual ethnographic 
methods of The Weight of the World, ties in Bourdieu’s reflections on love, aesthetics, 
and necessity with the work of reflexive science. Eschewing both non-directive 
interviews and questionnaires, Bourdieu and his team looked to practice a form of 
“active and methodical listening” in which systematic construction of the 
                                                 
123 Ibid., 435: “a form of acquiescentia anima [aquiescence of the soul], of an assent of the spirit to 
that which is and which is thus good: ‘Let it be,’ Ponge’s pagan, Amor intellectualis rei [intellectual 
love of the thing]; assimilation of the object to the subject and immersion of the subject in the object: 
‘the candle that drowns itself in its food’….” The internal citations are from Ponge, the ellipsis is 
Bourdieu’s, and the Latin phrases are, again, from Spinoza. 
124 Ibid.: “like spiritual-material exercises” or “a sort of mental preparation for the adaequatio 
intellectus et rei [correspondence of the intellect and the thing] that is experienced from the necessity 
of the thing.” For Spinoza adequate knowledge is the mind’s recognition of the determination of 
things by God, and so is bound up with the amor Dei intellectualis (Ethics V). 
125 Bourdieu, “Nécessiter,” 435-436: “active submission to the singular necessity of the object [that] 
produces the text, object through which the designated object imposes itself irremediably on the 
reader, who learns and retains it by heart, thereby becoming capable of evoking at will the signified 
thing, from there to signify it purely and simply to exist. It really is magic.” 
126 Bourdieu, “Nécessiter,” 437.  
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interviewee’s social setting is combined with “a total availability to the person being 
questioned, submission to the singularity of a particular life history.”127 Sociological 
construction and interpersonal receptivity are not opposed here, as “understanding 
and explanation are one”—to grasp fully the socio-historical explanation for the 
genesis of a person is be able to inhabit their mental space.128 Bourdieu therefore 
insists that the sociological interview can be a “spiritual exercise that, through 
forgetfulness of the self, aims at a true conversion of the way we look at other people 
in the ordinary circumstances of life.” This spiritual understanding is “a sort of 
intellectual love,” “the capacity to take that person and understand them just as they 
are in their distinctive necessity.”129 Reflexivity is necessary on the part of the 
interviewer, in order to avoid allowing power imbalances to distort the interview, but 
this “permanent control of the point of view” does not rule out mutual 
transformation.130 The interview process, as an “induced and accompanied self-
analysis,” can help interviewees gain perspective on their lives, and the transcriptions 
may have a similar “revelatory” effect on readers from similar social backgrounds.131 
Interviews as spiritual exercises thus require a transformation of the self that issues in 
a broader social transformation.  
 Romantic “pure” love, aesthetic pleasure, and science are for Bourdieu 
modern European practices that carry universal spiritual and ethical import, and his 
work is meant to spread their influence. As opposed to a universalism that ignores 
local variation, part of what makes these productive practices universal is their 
sensitivity to the particular. Their wider legitimacy depends in each case on the 
recognition of the “necessity” of another, the specific confluence of socio-historical 
events productive of persons, works of art, and everything else. Human being exists 
within and as the structured, structuring practices of habitus and fields; and the 
specific structured, structuring products of habitus and fields are irreducible to one 
another, even if they are subject to regularities and family resemblances. To 
                                                 
127 Bourdieu, WW, 609. This method was described more fully in chapter three above. 
128 Ibid. 612-613. Bourdieu’s language here is meant to oppose the classic hermeneutical distinctions 
of Wilhelm Dilthey.  
129 Ibid., 614. 
130 Ibid., 625-626. 
131 Ibid., 615, 623. 
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apprehend the universal necessity of an object is to apprehend its historicity, and thus 
its particularity.132  
 
6.3 Revising Yoder’s Theology of Christian Particularity 
The cosmic lordship of the risen Christ cannot be explained by a purely immanent 
sociological process. Insofar as Yoder is convinced of the reality of Christ’s lordship, 
he is committed to a broader cosmology that affirms the existence of God, Christ’s 
special relationship to God, and thus the special relationship of Christ’s followers to 
God. These cosmological affirmations are included in the trinitarian reading of 
Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers developed in this thesis. The triune 
God’s practical interactions with humanity through creation; the election of Israel; 
the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ; and the constitutive presence of the 
Holy Spirit in the church entail something prior and external to history and society, 
namely, the divine life of the Trinity. Christianity’s particularity derives its triune 
shape from its affirmation of the universal ultimacy of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 
Christian particularity and universality are both bound to the triune God who creates 
and redeems the powers, and to the structures developed in response to God’s intense 
interactions with humanity.  
 The unity of Christian particularity and universality follow from Yoder’s 
theology of the powers. His radical commitment to Christian history as uniquely 
revelatory can nevertheless obscure its universality; and his radical commitment to 
dialogical social practice as fulfilling the Jewish-Christian exilic vocation can 
obscure its particularity. Pierre Bourdieu’s sociological resolution of the particular-
universal antinomy can help clarify Yoder’s position. Bourdieu’s argument that social 
practice is constructive of the universal can be affirmed on the theological grounds 
that historical process is intrinsic and not incidental to God’s self-revelation. Human 
social life occurs as a complex set of relations to God, strands of which may be more 
or less revelatory of God’s person and purpose. The incarnation is, of course, the 
paradigm for this viewpoint: that the word became flesh is the heart of the gospel 
proclamation, not a particular add-on to a less historical, more universal truth. As 
Yoder put it, “what [incarnation] means is that God acted in a totally human way, and 
                                                 
132 Cf. Spinoza on the love of God as knowledge of things sub specie aeternitatis (Ethics V.XXXII). 
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unhesitatingly entrusted his own cause to the hands of ordinary people.”133 Jesus 
reveals God’s acceptance of the contingency and vulnerability of history. The 
suffering love displayed on the cross is not tangential to the incarnation, but “a 
revelation of the shape of what God is, and of what God does, in the total drama of 
history.”134 More broadly, Jesus’ socio-political practices constitute the most 
universally significant history of divine-human interactions. Jesus’ history is valid 
always and everywhere because it was produced through the most intense relation to 
God possible for a human being—that is, the unique relation of being God and 
human. The histories of Israel and the church have a derivative universality insofar as 
they exhibit high continuity with Jesus’ history. Together these histories define the 
universal history of God’s creative and redemptive relation to humanity. The story of 
Israel, Jesus and the church is universal history.  
 Universals are grounded in the objectivity of God’s self-revelation, which is 
produced in and through social relations. Conceived without reference to God, social 
practices too easily appear as a collection of arbitrary occurrences without universal 
meaning.135 Conceived without reference to particular social practices, God becomes 
a cipher for the theologian or philosopher’s preferred narrative.136 God and the divine 
will are encountered through participation in a specific history and its practices. 
Universals are neither subject to casual revision, nor are they timeless forms to be 
dropped into any situation. They are, rather, being produced through the history of 
God’s relation to God’s people. Because this productive labor occurs in relation to a 
God who cannot be reduced to social practice, the history of the production of 
universals is also the history of their reception as divine gifts, i.e., as revelation. 
Theological science is critical participation in the church’s labor of receiving 
revelation. 
 Christian particularity is universal because it entails spiritual participation in 
the triune God. Since spiritual participation is an intense practical mode of relating to 
God, Christian universality is fully particular and sociological. The choice between 
                                                 
133 Yoder, HCPP, 72. 
134 Ibid., 85. 
135Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, argues that only theology can avoid Nietzschean 
deconstruction of the universal into the arbitrary. Whether or not Bourdieu’s historicist universalism 
escapes this criticism is a matter for further investigation. 
136 See Martens, “Universal History,” on Rauschenbusch.  
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narrow particularism and capacious universalism is a false one. Moreover, the choice 
between fixed universals and relativism is false, as Christian love, reason, and virtue 
are produced with God in the struggle for faithfulness to God. These universals are 
furthered by forming institutions—i.e., churches, that foster an interest in their 
production. Christian interest in the universal is self-interest, a concern with the 
church’s own purity before God. But this self-interest is also interest in the God 
before whom the church wishes to remain pure. True Christian self-interest is 
subordinate to and derivative of interest in God, that is, to worship. 
 But what about interest in others, and in others’ interests? According to Yoder, 
the core of Jesus’ socio-political practice was nonviolent dialogue. Among Jesus’ 
spiritual forebears and descendants, those Yoder judges as faithful are the ones that 
place dialogue at the center of their practice: Jeremiah, with his exilic politics, and 
the Anabaptists, with their suffering commitment to conversation. Dialogue is not 
only a means to an end, but already a realization of the universal way of being. 
Institutions that are not internally and externally dialogical do not participate fully in 
the triune life. Christian interest in faithfulness is, therefore, an interest in engaging 
interlocutors whose lives are likewise constituted by a relation, however intense, to 
God.  
 The church’s self-interest is to be interested in God and others. In a similar 
manner, Christian identity is protected and consolidated insofar as it is shaped 
through practices that expose it to relentless questioning by God and others. The 
irreducible particularity of Christian identity is found in its attempt to relate intensely 
to the triune God, i.e., in its worship. Triune worship is exclusivist in the sense that it 
recognizes no God but the one God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Interaction 
with God is always the church’s priority. But this radical exclusivity engenders a 
radical inclusivity: worshipping the triune God requires receptiveness to others’ 
witness to Christ. Worship is shaped through inclusive encounter with others; 
institutional purity and syncretism are not necessary opposites. Christ is lord and 
Christ is dialogical. His universal lordship is not an obstacle to dialogical receptivity, 
but its animating principle. 
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Conclusion 
Bourdieu’s sociological insight that universals such as reason, truth, love, and virtue 
are products of social struggles illuminates Yoder’s contention that particular 
histories have universal significance. Particular histories can have universal 
significance, because universal significance only arises within them. Critics who urge 
Yoder to drop his historicist particularity and adopt a more universal, “theocentric” 
perspective are ignorant of the historicity of the universal. The historicity of the 
universal entails that it is not a static substance awaiting discovery and acceptance. It 
is in process of production. Yoder’s feminist, Jewish, and secular critics who worry 
that his particularism binds him to unhelpful or unjust convictions participate, 
through their criticisms, in the production of more adequate views on gender, 
interreligious relations, mission, and the lordship of Christ. The interest of 
particularist ecclesial institutions in producing faithful convictions about these issues 
must be an interest in open dialogue with dissenting interlocutors. 
The ongoing story of the production of universals is the particular history of 
God’s intense interactions with Israel, Jesus, and the church. This history is 
sociologically objective, a product of innumerable practices of prayer and service 
and of habituated practices become institutions. To be Christian, those practices and 
institutions must be oriented towards relationship with the triune God. To be 
Christian, those practices must be oriented towards dialogical engagement of others. 
The church participates in God’s redemption of the powers, the subjection of all 
things to the lordship of Christ. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
This thesis has been a sustained attempt to revise John Howard Yoder’s sociological 
theology so that it might better avoid charges of reducing theology to sociology, 
method to ideology, and expansive Christian witness to narrow socio-political 
perfectionism. Pierre Bourdieu’s relational sociology has been the primary tool of 
revision, as it enables amendments to Yoder’s social theoretical assumptions that 
render them more clearly non-reductive. Several of Bourdieu’s key concepts were 
put into conversation with Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers, his 
broader oeuvre, and his critics. This conversation facilitated revisions to Yoder’s 
thought in several areas: creation, anthropology, violence, method, politics, and 
Christian particularity. Yoder’s understanding of the powers was placed at the center 
of the thesis, so that the revisions would have to be articulated within the horizon of 
the history of God’s creation, preservation, and redemption of social structures. In 
other words, the proposed revisions are meant to be fully theological and fully 
sociological. They are offered as potentially faithful inheritances of Yoder’s 
sociological theology. Insofar as the revisions help Yoder’s legacy to identify more 
with Jesus’ legacy, they are also offered as potentially faithful inheritances of the 
latter. Whether or not they are successful on either count, of course, is for other 
discerning Christians to decide. 
            Critics of Yoder’s theology of creation suggest that it lacks a clearly stated 
affirmation of creation as a work of the triune God. In Yoder’s hands, they charge, 
created society is reduced to fallen society, a wasteland barren of God’s presence. 
This wasteland is dominated by evil social structures that the church must oppose 
with its nonviolent politics—leaving no room for personal spirituality. Furthermore, 
since he did not develop a consistent doctrine of the Trinity, he creates the problem 
of a nonviolent Jesus and a violent God. When this tension is combined with his 
unshakeable commitment to nonviolence, it is unsurprising that some critics question 
his belief in Christ’s divinity. As in other areas, there are considerable resources 
within Yoder’s work to counter these criticisms; but there is also sufficient ambiguity 
to suggest the need for significant revision.  
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In chapter one, Bourdieu’s basic sociological concepts were used to interpret 
the principalities and powers as capital-oriented habitus and fields. Because habitus 
and fields interpenetrate, there can be no total division between the personal and the 
social. Personal dispositions towards and away from specific forms of capital are 
formed by inhabiting social fields that are disposed towards and away from specific 
forms of capital. The structure of a given field, in turn, is defined by the relative 
amounts of capital possessed by the individuals and groups that constitute it, amounts 
that change over time as individuals and groups seek more capital. Society, therefore, 
is not a “thing” or a collection of “things,” but a dynamic set of relations objectively 
structured by relative proximity to desired forms of capital (material, symbolic, and 
social). Yoder’s theology of the principalities and powers suggests that God must be 
included in the total set of relations that constitute society. God created the powers. 
God is not a relation among relations, but the one who brings all the other relations 
into being and sustains their existence. Society exists in relation to God and, since 
God is spirit, social relations are spiritual. Because personal dispositions are a part of 
society, personal relations to God are irreducible. Personal spirituality is a matter of 
intense participation in social practices and structures that have developed through 
the history of intense relationship with God. The doctrine of the two natures of Christ 
arises from the insistence by participants in those structures that Jesus’ social 
practices exhibit such an intense relationship with God that he must be God. The 
doctrine of the Trinity is complete when those participants recognize that the Holy 
Spirit’s work of empowering intense relationship with Jesus also indicates the Spirit’s 
divinity. The intensity of the relations among God the Father, Jesus, and the Holy 
Spirit suggests a triune godhead. Their relations are real relations among persons 
with whom humans can relate, too. Human knowledge that relations among the 
divine persons are relations of identity—that is, that they are trinitarian relations—is 
derived from human judgments about the character of each person, judgments that 
result from intense relating to each person. Humans can affirm that God is triune 
because they have related to God—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.  
            If God is God, then human knowledge about God is not simply the product of 
human social activity. Theological knowledge is also a gift from God that humans 
receive in the process of relating to God intensely. Chapter two developed that 
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argument with reference to Yoder’s theological anthropology. Yoder suggests that 
persons have the capacity to choose to relate to God. Since Yoder affirms that the 
powers are created and sustained by God, this capacity to choose would seem to exist 
only in relation to God. However, it is not always clear if he believes that genuine 
freedom for choice is experienced as a gift given in the encounter with God through 
the church, or if free choice requires individual autonomy from God and others. 
Bourdieu’s conceptions of social reproduction and freedom are useful, at this point, 
because they depict capacities for change as latent within personal and institutional 
structures, even if those structures tend to reproduce themselves and resist change. 
The break from social reproduction, therefore, is not a break from society itself. 
From the perspective of Yoder’s theology of the powers, social reproduction is not 
inherently oppressive, but is the gift of order that makes human life possible. The 
capacity to choose relationship with God is built into the structure of human being, 
since, again, that structure only exists in relation to the God who creates and sustains 
it. As a social practice, choice for God occurs in relation to God and society, as a gift 
from God received through social process. The structure that is continually structured 
through intense relating to God, the church, is the medium through which God 
extends the gift of freedom. The social practices of the church are the means by 
which anyone receives that freedom. Human freedom is a divine gift received 
through ecclesial practice. Baptism is the initial practice—for both converting 
nonbelievers and children reared in the church—that signals and enacts reception of 
the gift. 
The existence of the church as a specific institution characterized by intense 
practical relating to God implies that other institutions are not so characterized—the 
powers are fallen. Chapter three examined complaints that Yoder identifies the fall 
with physical violence. According to some critics, the identification of fall and 
physical violence fails to recognize that some genuine goods must be preserved by 
violence from violence. On the contrary, Bourdieu’s theory of symbolic violence 
gives strong sociological support to Yoder’s contention that killing is always wrong 
because it takes away the victim’s possibility for obedience to God. Symbolic 
violence works by duping the victim into recognizing the perpetrators’ legitimate 
authority to maintain capital inequalities. Because capital bestows the power to exist 
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in certain ways rather than others, symbolic violence reduces the being of the victim. 
Of course, since all being involves the possession of capital, all being is “violence” 
to some degree. But this admission opens up the possibility of making moral 
judgments among practices as more or less violent. Killing, which eliminates the 
victim’s capital altogether, clearly is the most extreme form of violence on this scale. 
From a theological viewpoint, killing denies the minimum capital necessary for 
obedience: embodied being. In doing so, the killer refuses God’s gift of freedom for 
obedience on behalf of the victim. This refusal inverts Christian mission. The goods 
killing protects cannot be exchanged for another’s freedom for obedience. 
            Killing is at the end of the spectrum of violences. At the other end of the 
spectrum are practices that encourage and restore being, practices which can be 
judged morally as “nonviolent.” In between is a range of symbolic, physical, and 
structural violences, each of which, according to Bourdieu, can be converted into the 
other. This recognition allows for a more capacious understanding of violence than 
that implied by Yoder’s focus on war.  
Bourdieu’s insight into the relations among the various types of violence is 
indicative of his overall methodology. He models a progressive practice of research 
that involves rigorous theoretical construction and empirical inquiry into the full set 
of relations that constitute a given object. Systematic theory denies the illusion that 
objects are “out there” waiting to be found, and empirical research denies the illusion 
that what is “in here” is all there is. This formula implies that the researcher is always 
involved with the object, and Bourdieu’s method prizes sociological reflexivity as the 
primary means of social scientific progress. Chapter four employed this reflexive 
sociology to revise Yoder’s theological method. Although Yoder’s writings continue 
to command respect, many readers believe that he sometimes skewed his data to fit 
his theological presuppositions. Furthermore, because he was concerned mainly with 
communal social ethics, he left spiritual and personal classes of relations outside of 
his methodological purview. The revision of Yoder’s methodology resulted in a 
proposal for a non-reductive research practice that patiently attends to all dimensions 
of the powers. This practice would put reflexive metaphysical construction and 
empirical research to work in the church’s process of moral discernment. 
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            As the church reflexively discerns the powers, it gains greater insight into 
how its own practices might better conform to the politics of Jesus. Chapter five 
presented Yoder’s understanding of Christian politics as a form of imitatio Christi 
that participates in Christ’s redemption of the powers. The fallen powers executed 
Jesus, but he has been raised from the dead and is now bringing all things under his 
cosmic lordship. When the church imitates Christ by practicing nonviolent dialogue 
and capital redistribution, it gives the world a glimpse of his coming reign. The body 
politics are the church’s political witness. Although this political vision would seem 
to be at once public and spiritual, critics are swift to point out the ambiguities that 
leave it open to charges of sectarianism and sociological reductionism. At this point, 
Bourdieu’s political concepts—the circuits of legitimation, the corporatism of the 
universal, and negative philosophy—are helpful for a revision that displays more 
clearly how only an autonomous church can give the critical legitimacy required by 
the state to function. Moreover, because the state exists as a node of relations to other 
fields, Christian politics are rightly concerned with cultural and economic issues, and 
not narrowly centered on the state. And because the church’s politics are conducted 
in relation to the Holy Spirit who empowers obedient participation in Christ, 
Christian politics are fully spiritual as well. 
            The tension between the particular christocentric politics of the church and 
the universal lordship of Christ over the powers was the subject of the sixth chapter. 
Some critics contend that Yoder is so intent on locating Christian politics within the 
history of Christ and the church, that he ignores the universal scope of Christ’s 
redemptive activity. Other critics suggest the opposite. Yoder, they say, was only 
interested in showing how Jesus presents a sociologically viable nonviolent politics, 
a politics that can be imitated by anyone regardless of confession or creed. 
Bourdieu’s research into the historical production of universals is a valuable resource 
here, for it suggests that historicist particularity need not be opposed to the 
affirmation of transhistorical and universal modes of being. The particularity of 
Christian history is not an obstacle to its universality, but the condition of its 
possibility. Christian being is universal because it participates, concretely and 
spiritually, in God as revealed in Christ. Moreover, the particular form of Christian 
being is rigorously dialogical. Both the church’s internal and external practices are 
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structured by the refusal to coerce and the willingness to listen. Through its 
distinctively nonviolent dialogical practice, the church produces the universal 
freedom to know and love God and others intensely—again, a freedom that can only 
be produced through its reception as a gift. 
The powers are created, fallen, and subject to Christ. The social is spiritual, 
and the inner is outer. God relentlessly relates to it all, creating it all and redeeming it 
all. The church participates in the life of the triune God as it learns to relate intensely 
to others while maintaining its autonomy.  
 
This revision of Yoderian sociological theology, therefore, makes room for 
metaphysics without becoming speculative; for methodological rigor without 
unhinging theology from the church’s mission; and for robust political engagement 
without losing sight of the place of the church in God’s plan of redemption. The 
remainder of this conclusion explores the possibility that the revisionary proposal of 
this thesis satisfies at least one criterion for faithful inheritance of Yoder’s legacy: it 
offers an integrated theological method for moral discernment of the powers.  
  The introduction to this thesis surveyed several options for inheriting Yoder’s 
legacy faithfully. In Cramer’s review of recent literature on Yoder, he discerns a 
philosophical option, which favors dialogue with “outsiders”; a systematic option, 
which surveys Yoder’s writings to respond to questions about his legacy; and an 
ecumenical option, which puts him into conversation with specific ecclesial 
traditions.1 Cramer suggests that all of these options should be pursued if Yoder’s 
legacy is to be inherited faithfully, because Yoder’s own methods sanction a plurality 
of approaches.Yet these options by no means exhaust the diversity that exists within 
Yoder’s own body of work. He wrote prolifically and influentially on systematic 
theology, ethics, history, sociology, ecumenism, biblical exegesis, hermeneutics, 
epistemology, and other topics. It is unlikely that every theologian can be as well-
versed as Yoder in each of these fields, but his legacy points towards an integrated 
theological method that might, at least, be attempted. Glen Stassen has written of the 
need for a “holistic method…that can guide [the] variety of specialties in the 
interdisciplinary discipline of Christian ethics, and can identify the variables that 
                                                 
1 Cramer, “Inheriting Yoder,” 137-141. 
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shape real existing Christian ethics as people actually do their Christian ethics.”2 
Stassen sees Yoder as an exemplar of such a holistic method, and his own work 
combines exegesis, narrative character ethics, research on specific ethical issues, and 
the development of public political practices that can be engaged by Christians and 
others.3  
 This integrated Yoderian methodology resonates with the reflexive 
sociological theology proposed in this thesis, which is oriented towards research into 
specific powers met by the church in the course of its mission. Although many 
theologians reference Yoder’s theology of the powers, none of them—including 
Stassen—develop it into a framework useful for research into actual social 
structures.4 That, however, was what Yoder seemed to have in mind when he 
referenced Jacques Ellul’s works on money, law, violence, and technology as 
paradigmatic of a modern appropriation of the powers.5 Ellul employs a dialectical 
method in which his theological and sociological assessments of various powers are 
split into separate books.6 This method is meant to help Christians navigate their 
different responsibilities in the church and in the secular world, but Ellul admits that 
few readers connect the theology to the sociology or vice versa.7 In her dissertation 
on Ellul, Marva Dawn argues that the concept of the powers provides the conceptual 
link between his theology and sociology, and that some effort is needed to merge the 
two sides of his work.8 An integrated or holistic sociological theology is required if 
the theology of the powers is to fulfill the role Yoder envisioned for it as a Christian 
method of social criticism.9 
                                                 
2 Stassen, “What I am Working on in Christian Ethics,” Fuller Theological Seminary faculty page, last 
accessed August 31, 2011, 
http://www.fullerseminary.net/sot/faculty/stassen/cp_content/homepage/homepage.htm. 
3 Stassen, “Concrete Christological Norms for Transformation”; Stassen, Just Peacemaking; Stassen 
and Gushee, Kingdom Ethics.  
4 See note 59 in the introduction to this thesis for references to work that draws from Yoder’s theology 
of the principalities and powers. 
5 Yoder, PJ, 156. See note 12 in chapter four above for references to Ellul’s works. 
6 Ellul, “On Dialectic,” 305-307. 
7 Ibid., 307.  
8 Dawn, Ellul, 375. 
9 Walter Wink approaches this method but, as suggested in chapter one above, his melange of Jungian 
psychology, process theology, and quantum physics makes its validity difficult to discern. However 
valuable Wink’s theology of the powers may be, it represents a different approach from the Yoderian 
sociological theology developed here. 
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 Yoder, of course, is associated with one prominent project in theological 
social criticism, namely, Stanley Hauerwas’s attack on “liberalism.” Hauerwas 
understands his “method” to be “a form of gossip generally known as journalism” 
that is “not quite theology, not quite ethics, not quite cultural criticism.”10 By 
“renarrating widely shared stories” in Christian language he hopes to draw people 
who are “captured” by liberal practices into a new, Christian world.11 Critical 
theological, ethical, and cultural redescription of specific liberal practices would 
seem to be closer to Yoder’s integrated method. Nevertheless, Hauerwas’s method is 
subject to Bourdieu’s evaluation of “journalistic” social commentary: because it 
evades systematic theoretical construction and empirical research, it offers few 
resources for combating the common sense of the dominant order.12 Although 
Hauerwas’s tireless polemic against war and capital can hardly be accused of willing 
service to the dominant, Jeffrey Stout’s reading of Hauerwas adds weight to the 
charge that insufficient object construction weakens the critical impact of his work. 
Stout points out that “liberalism,” for Hauerwas, represents a slim selection of 
egregious practices and despised philosophical texts. War, abortion, and John Rawls, 
however, do not equal liberalism. There may be very negative aspects of liberal 
democracy that must be addressed, but they cannot be addressed without some 
acknowledgment of the day-to-day democratic practices within liberal democracies 
that support the kind of traditioned communities of virtue desired by Hauerwas. 
Furthermore, there are many liberal theorists who celebrate tradition, virtue, and 
local community in terms similar to Hauerwas’s own.13 If Hauerwas’s “liberalism” is 
a straw man, then the church he exults as an alternative is lacking similarly in 
concreteness.14 Stout argues that vitriolic criticism of liberalism combined with an 
ethereal church only provides comfort for middle class readers who like to mock the 
system without lifting a finger to change it.15 Because he prefers “journalism” over 
rigorous engagement with actual liberal practices and actual churches, it is difficult 
                                                 
10 Hauerwas, Dispatches from the Front, 9. 
11 Ibid., 9-10. 
12 Bourdieu, RA, 347; WW, 629. Bourdieu uses the Platonic term “doxosophes” to describe such 
intellectuals: their wisdom is only the wisdom of the doxa, or common sense. 
13 Stout, Democracy and Tradition, 156-157. 
14 Ibid., 157-160. 
15 Ibid., 158. See Hauerwas and Coles, Christianity, Democracy, and the Radical Ordinary, for an 
attempt, in response to Stout, to name the democratic practices he sees as offering concrete 
alternatives to liberalism.  
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to see how Hauerwas’s theology can aid the church in discerning how to interact with 
the powers. 
 Nigel Biggar shares some of Stout’s concerns with Hauerwas’s project, and 
offers a “Barthian Thomist” alternative. Hauerwas, Biggar acknowledges, is right to 
search for a theologically orthodox mode of ethics that is governed by the entire 
biblical narrative, including the church’s embodiment of the politics of Jesus.16 To 
this extent, at least, Hauerwas is a Barthian, and Biggar wishes to affirm his ethics. 
However, Biggar does not agree with Hauerwas that the ethical task is complete once 
the governing theological narrative is articulated: the task of Christian ethics is more 
than the squeezing of “dogmatic tenets for the juice of ethical concepts, leaving to 
others the task of figuring out how these generic or specific concepts should bear on 
concrete conduct and issue in particular judgments.”17 Biggar, accordingly, turns to 
the Thomistic casuistic tradition and its recognition of the dialectical relationship 
between ethical principles and case analysis.18 The lack of such analysis in 
Hauerwas’s work suggests that he leaves the task of moral discernment half finished. 
 If Ellul and Hauerwas do not provide integrated methods for discerning the 
powers, then perhaps the proposal in this thesis will fare better. Like Ellul, it sees 
theological and sociological analysis of social structures as indispensable for the 
church as it finds its way in a complex fallen world. It does not conflate theology and 
sociology, but it does bring them together in order to display the powers’ full 
material, symbolic, and spiritual relations. Like Hauerwas, it sees the orthodox 
theological narrative—and its metaphysical components—as definitive for the 
discernment process, and accepts that Christian convictions will often lead to critical 
redescriptions of reality that invite persons into the freedom of the gospel. It does not 
assume, however, that those redescriptions can occur in the absence of significant 
efforts to understand the shape of the fallen powers, and it does not assume that 
theological discourse is sufficient for that purpose. Nor does it assume that criticism 
of the powers is useful, or even possible, outside of involvement in concrete practices 
that embody an alternative.  
                                                 
16 Biggar, Behaving in Public, 4-6. 
17 Ibid., 22. 
18 Ibid., 17-23. 
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 Although these comments indicate that the proposal here may result in an 
integrated method for research on the powers, a proposal alone is insufficient. It must 
be tested through research and subjected to the exigencies of ecclesial discernment. 
Yoder was uninterested in theology for the sake of theology. He was interested, 
rather, in the church’s participation in Christ’s redemptive reign over the powers. 
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